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I 



WAR-TIME STRIKES 
AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 



Ml 



WAR-TIME STRIKES 

AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

BY 

ALEXANDER M. BING 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

FELIX ADLEB 




NEW YORK 
E. P. DUTTON fir COMPANY 

681 FIFTH AVENUE 









Copyright, 192 i, 
BY E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 



All Rights Reserved 



^5 



co-yv^^ 



Printed in the United States of America 



MAR -8 192' 
©CLAG08604 



PREFACE 



The writer has endeavored in the following pages to give as 
complete an account as space and. available material will allow 
of the larSbr difficulties which occurred during the war and of the 
machinery which was created to adjust them. It has, of course, 
been impossible to deal with every one of the thousands of strikes 
which took place — even controversies of considerable size and 
importance had to be omitted — nor has any attempt been made 
to thoroughly cover the events of the post-armistice period. But 
inasmuch as most of the labor difficulties after the signing of the 
armistice were directly connected with those which took place 
during the war itself, it was considered desirable to include some 
of these later occurrences as far as such a course was practicable. 

This book is based upon the writer's personal experiences in 
Government work during the war, upon statements made to him 
by officials of Government Boards, employers, union leaders and 
others, and upon awards and reports of labor adjustment agencies, 
the testimony taken at many hearings, the Monthly Labor Re- 
view of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and other publications of 
the U. S. Department of Labor, economic journals and the pub- 
lications of trade unions, corporations and employers' associa- 
tions, the Congressional Record, and the newspaper files. 

Many of the chapters have been submitted to the men who 
were connected with the labor boards during the war. Some of 
the errors which are almost unavoidable in a presentation of facts 
covering so wide a range have in this manner been eliminated. 
The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness for this help 
and also for the cordial cooperation with which his requests for 
information and material have been received by members of labor 
adjustment boards, employers and labor unions. It would be 
impossible to give the names of all of the persons who have 
given their assistance; he wishes, however, to especially mention 
Mr. Payson Irwin, Mr. V. Everitt Macy and Mr. Stanley M. 
Isaacs, Prof. Henry R. Seager, Prof. Wm. Z. Ripley, Prof. Edwin 



vi PREFACE 

R. A. Seligman, Miss Julia O'Connor, President, Telephone Op- 
erators' Department of the International Brotherhood of Elec- 
trical Workers; Fred Hewitt, Editor, Machinists 7 Journal; B. M. 
Squires, chairman, New York Harbor Adjustment Board; John 
Fitch, and Harold Stearns for assistance on the manuscript. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction by Felix Adler xi 

PART I. THE MEDIATING AGENCIES 

CHAPTER 

I. The Industrial Background I 

General Causes of Unrest 2 

Wages 2 

Hours 3 

Opposition to Unionism 3 

Other Causes 4 

The War and Our Industrial Unpreparedness . . 6 

Specific Causes of Unrest 7 

Pre-War Mediating Agencies io 

II. The Emergency Construction Wage Commission . 14 

III. Shipbuilding . . . . ■ 20 

Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board .... 20 
Industrial Relations Division, Emergency Fleet Cor- 
poration 31 

IV. Shipping 33 

Marine and Dock Industrial Relations Division . . 33 

National Adjustment Commission 39 

The New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Board . . 45 

V. The President's Mediation Commission 53 

VI. Special Agencies of the War and Navy Departments 58 
Administrator of Labor Standards in Army Clothing . 58 
Arsenal and Navy Yard Wage Commission 62 
National Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commis- 
sion 63 

VII. Special Agencies of the War and Navy Departments 

(Continued) 65 

Industrial Service Sections of Ordnance, Quartermaster 

and Aircraft 65 

Industrial Service Section — Quartermaster Corps . . 71 

Industrial Service Section — Aircraft . ... 72 

The Bridgeport Strikes • 73 

vii 



viii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

VIII. Railroad, Fuel and Food Administration ... 82 

Railroad Administration 82 

Fuel Administration 95 

Food Administration 104 

IX. Telegraph and Telephone . . . ... . . 106 

X. The National War Labor Board 116 

XI. War Labor Policies Board and Conference Committee 

of Labor Adjustment Agencies 126 

War Labor Policies Board 126 

Conference Committee 128 

XII. United States Labor Department and State Boards 133 

United States Labor Department 133 

Bureau of Industrial Housing, U. S. Labor Department 134 

State Boards 136 

Massachusetts . 137 

New York 144 

Kansas 145 

PART II. PRINCIPLES 

XIII. General Principles ........ 151 

No Strikes or Lock-outs during the War .... 154 

Collective Bargaining 160 

Right to Organize 164 

Coercion 169 

No Change from Union to Open Shop or Vice Versa . 170 

Union Recognition 172 

Maintenance of Established Standards . . . . 175 

Equal Pay for Equal Work 176 

XIV. Hours 178 

XV. Wages 188 

The Minimum Wage . 191 

Increases in the Cost of Living 195 

Standardization ,. 195 

Increase in Productive Efficiency 203 

Overtime .....' 206 

Bonus and Piecework 209 

Wage Charts 211 

PART III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF 
INDUSTRIAL UNREST 

XVI. The Employer 22 

XVII. The Workers 23 



CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XVIII. The Public 244 

XIX. The I. W. W. and the Loyal Legion of Loggers and 

Lumbermen 255 

The I. W. W. 255 

Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen . . . 270 

XX. Conclusions 273 

appendices 

I. Strike Data, 1914 to 1919 291 

II. Emergency Construction Wage Commission . . 297 

III. Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board .... 298 

IV. National Adjustment Commission 299 

V. New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Board . . 300 

VI. Railroad Wage Boards 301 

VII. National War Labor Board 303 

VIII. War Labor Policies Board 311 

IX. Conference Committee of Labor Adjustment Agencies 314 

X. Labor Clauses 314 

XL Chart 318 

Index ...,..., 321 



INTRODUCTION 

The author of this book was rarely equipped for the work 
he undertook. An employer of labor of large business experience, 
he was one of the dollar-a-year men who gave their services to 
the Government during the war, was assigned first to the Hous- 
ing Department of the Shipping Board, then to the Ordnance 
Department, and took an active part in the settlement of labor 
controversies. He thus came into touch at first hand with the 
matter of such disputes, and the various methods by which it has 
been attempted to settle them. He supplemented the personal 
knowledge of the subject he thus gained by a comprehensive 
study of the material contained in official reports and other 
available documents. 

In the book thus produced, two qualities seem to shine out: 
painstaking accuracy and deep sympathy with the human factor 
in industry. 

Mr. Bing's bias as a so-called capitalist might be expected to 
incline towards the group to which he belongs. On the contrary, 
nothing is more apparent than his eager desire to be absolutely 
just in presenting the case of labor. It is exceedingly difficult 
to be just. The author has scrupulously endeavored to be so. 

I have no doubt that this work will form a valuable addition 
to the library of social reform, and that it will be widely read, 
appreciated and pondered by those who are interested in the 
supreme practical question of our time. 

FELIX ADLER. 



3d 



I 



PART I. THE MEDIATING AGENCIES 



WAR-TIME STRIKES 
AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 



CHAPTER I 
The Industrial Background 

The war created an emergency in which it was necessary, be- 
sides recruiting and drilling an enormous army x and building up 
the navy to the required war strength, to embark on a ship- 
building program of hitherto unthought of size, hastily to con- 
struct cantonments each of which was as large as a city, and to 
produce quantities of munitions, food, clothing, aeroplanes, and 
other essentials on a scale that dwarfed into insignificance any for- 
mer activities of the Government. The United States faced an 
unprecedented production program. To meet it successfully re- 
quired an augmented supply of labor and continuous work, un- 
hampered by strikes and other causes of inefficiency; it was ab- 
solutely essential to remove every factor that would interfere with 
production and to take advantage of every factor that would 
promote it. 

Obviously it was not a time for social experimentation. Yet 
if to prevent strikes, to augment morale, and to increase effi- 
ciency, it was necessary to attack fundamental industrial wrongs 
of long standing, then such action can be justified as a war meas- 
ure to the extent to which it was useful for this purpose. 

To form an intelligent estimate of the problem, a knowledge of 
industrial conditions before the war is as essential as a knowledge 
of the effects upon industry of the war itself. The labor problem 

1 In one year and a half the army grew to twenty times its former 
size. In March, 1917, it consisted of 189,674 men and in November, 
1918, of 3.554)000. Report of Secretary of War for 1918, page 9. 
Similar figures could be quoted for the Navy and other branches of 
the service. 



2 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

which confronted the nation, upon our entry into the European 
conflict, resulted from adding to the existing causes of bad indus- 
trial relations those emergency elements which magnified and 
intensified the factors of unrest that had previously been present. 
The most important causes of strife in the pre-war period were 
inadequate wages, long hours, and opposition to collective bar- 
gaining and unionism. These, together with others of lesser im- 
portance, will be briefly examined before considering the effect 
of the war upon the industry of the country, and the labor dis- 
turbances which followed. 

GENERAL CAUSES OF UNREST— WAGES 

The United States Commission on Industrial Relations, report- 
ing in 191 5, found that "between one- fourth and one-third of 
the male workers 18 years of age and over, in factories and mines, 
earn less than $10 a week; from two-thirds to three- fourths earn 
less than $15, and only about one-tenth earn more than $20 a 
week . . . from two-thirds to three-fourths of the women work- 
ers . . . in industrial occupations generally, work at wages of less 
than $8 per week." x 

The Railroad Wage Commission reporting in May, 191 8, to 
the Director General of Railroads found that 51% of all rail- 
road employees during December, 191 7 (at a time when costs of 
living had already gone up materially), were receiving $75 per 
month, or less; 80% were receiving $100 per month, or less. Less 
than 3% received from $150 to $250 a month. 2 The average 
weekly earnings of laborers in Western sawmills for 191 5 was 
$9.58; 3 in the steel mills and the packing plants and other trust- 
controlled industries up to 1915, prevailing wages for unskilled 
men varied from 15 cents to 20 cents per hour, averaging about 
18 cents. 4 For ten hours a day and six days a week, this meant 
weekly earnings of $10.80 or $562.60 per year. Stockers in 191 5 
averaged 74.8 hours and earned $13.95 per week. And these 

1 Report of B. M. Manly, Director of Research and Investigation, 
Final Report of Commission on Industrial Relations, page 31. 
a Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918. 

3 Bulletin 225 of Bureau of Labor Statistics, page 11. 

4 N. C. Adams in a study of wages for the steel industry says that 
the rates for common labor in 1915 were 15 cents to 16 cents in the 
eastern district, and 19 cents in the Pittsburgh and Great Lakes dis- 
tricts. Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March, 1918. 



THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND 3 

figures are typical of the wages paid, prior to the war, to semi- 
skilled and unskilled labor in the United States. Nor were low 
wages in all cases confined to workers of little skill; in many 
cases skilled men and women fared little better. 1 

HOURS 

The history of industry, since the inauguration of the era of 
factoiy production, is the story of constant struggle by the work- 
ers for the reduction of hours of work. In the years immediately 
preceding our entry into the war, considerable progress had been 
made in the introduction of the eight-hour day (that is to say, 
the forty-eight-hour week), yet there were still many industries 
in which the normal working week was over seventy-two hours. 
The rule was still twelve hours a day and seven days a week in 
a substantial number of places. 2 

OPPOSITION TO UNIONISM 

A large part of our industrial workers, in addition, were pre- 
vented from joining labor unions by the bitter opposition of their 
employers and were refused the benefits of collective bargaining. 
Among the large trusts where, prior to 191 5, wages had been low- 
est, this attitude particularly prevailed, but it was also to be 
found in the metal trades and in hundreds of other occupations. 
Although the employers themselves had increasingly united in in- 
dustrial combinations — that is to say, in trade associations and 
in chambers of commerce — there existed on the part of a large 
proportion of the emp^ers of the country the determination to 
treat with their employees as individuals only and to prevent 
them by every means in their power from associating themselves 
with their fellow workmen in organizations "of their choice." Per- 
haps the most striking, as certainly the most unfortunate, survival 

1 President Wharton of the Railway Employees Department, A. F. 
of L., in addressing the Fourth Biennial Convention of that Depart- 
ment, said that an examination of Railroad payrolls showed hourly 
wages in some cases as low as the following : machinists, 24 cents ; 
machinist helpers, 18 cents; millwrights, 21 cents; pattern workers, 30 
cents; pipe fitters, 26 cents. Official Proceedings, page 130. 

2 The President's Second Industrial Conference, reporting as late 
as March 6, 1920, says at page 33 : "There are large basic industries 
which still employ substantial numbers of men in exhausting work 
for eighty-four hours per week and longer." 



4 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

of this opposition was manifest in the first of the President's 
recent Industrial Conferences at Washington, which ended by the 
withdrawal of the labor delegates. 1 

OTHER CAUSES 

Another source of unrest was the bad sanitary conditions under 
which many men and women worked, and the absence of ade- 
quate protection against accidents. Much progress had been 
made in both of these respects yet much remained to be done. 
Some of the large corporations, which offended most with respect 
to inadequate wages, long hours, and anti-union discrimination, 
had nevertheless done splendid work toward the prevention of 
accidents and, to a lesser degree, toward the betterment of sani- 
tary conditions. In some of the hazardous occupations, however, 
such as mining and in many less dangerous callings, there was a 
failure to observe State and Federal law and an indifference to 
obvious dangers, which were followed by an unnecessarily large 
number of fatal accidents. Inevitably unrest increased because 
of the workers' feeling that the laws had been violated and that 
many injuries and. deaths could have been prevented. So also 
with respect to conditions of health and sanitation: Dissatis- 
faction and resentment were augmented by bad physical condi- 
tions, especially in labor camps and isolated communities, al- 
though by no means there alone. In fact, because sanitation was 
immeasurably better, in some places, than it had been in previous 
years, was precisely the reason why those industries and locali- 
ties that had failed to keep up with the progress which elsewhere 
had been accomplished were made all the more irritatingly con- 
spicuous. 

There can also be no doubt that the employer had not given 
adequate thought to the problem of labor management. His at- 
tention had been absorbed by other difficulties of production, as 
well as by questions of distribution and finance. His relations 
with labor questions — whether or not his workers were able to 
live on the wages which they received; how they were affected by 
seasonal idleness or the monotony of their daily task, whether or 
not general working conditions were as they should have been — 

1 See New York Times, Sunday, October 26, 1919, for statement 
by the late Mr. Endicott, a "public" delegate although himself a large 
employer. 



THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND 5 

these, and dozens of similar questions, were quite outside the hori- 
zon of most business men. It is only in the last few years when 
all employers have experienced great difficulty in getting and 
keeping men that these questions have received any appreciable 
amount of study. It is only recently, for example, that labor 
turnover has been recognized by the employer as an industrial 
evil, costly alike to the worker, the employer, and the community. 
The employment manager, in whom responsibility is now vested 
for better relations between management and men, is a late de- 
velopment in industry. Prior to the war, very few firms realized 
the need for this expert service, and in addition very few men 
or women were available to supply it. 

Moreover, the large number of foreign born workers, millions 
of whom were unable to speak our language, the overcrowding in 
large industrial centers, and the bad housing and sanitary condi- 
tions which resulted (from which small communities were also 
sufferers) contributed to the awakening of that antagonism and 
that dissatisfaction which were part of our general industrial un- 
preparedness. 

Not only were relations between employers and employees bad 
for the reasons recited above, but two things were lacking which 
would have been of inestimable value in the crisis that was about 
to confront the nation. 

First: A public opinion at least moderately informed as to 
actual industrial conditions, and reasonably in agreement as to 
general policies to be adopted and measures immediately to be 
taken. 

Second: Government machinery ready to aid in making the nec- 
essary adjustments from a state of peace to one of war, including 
(i) means for handling the problems incident to a shifting of the 
working population to new industries; (2) means for the training 
of workers to supply emergency needs; (3) means for giving aid 
to private employers in increasing the efficiency of their labor 
force by better management, especially with respect to those mat- 
ters making for better industrial relations; and (4) the necessary 
machinery for the avoidance or prompt adjustment of industrial 
disputes so that production might proceed uninterruptedly. 

We needed not only the knowledge of industrial conditions and 
the physical equipment necessary to cope with the emergencies 
that confronted the nation, but also an expert personnel reen- 



6 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

forced by an enlightened public opinion. Every one of these ele- 
ments was almost completely lacking. 

THE WAR AND OUR INDUSTRIAL UNPREPAREDNESS 

With the outbreak of the European War in 19 14 there was at 
first a cessation of all industry in the warring countries. Wide- 
spread unemployment occurred in spite of the fact that millions 
of men were being inducted into the armies, a fact which under 
normal conditions would have created an acute labor shortage. 
Much of the normal production of peace time came to a stand- 
still simultaneously with the universal consternation that followed 
the beginning of the war. A considerable period was needed be- 
fore the idle men could be absorbed into the newly organized war- 
making industries. But the growth of the munition plants and 
the manufacture of other articles needed to carry on the war on 
the gigantic scale on which it was being waged, together with the 
increasingly heavy drafts upon the male population of the Allied 
countries for military service, soon did absorb the men whom a 
general stoppage of industry had made idle. Gradually, too, 
peace industries were resumed, creating additional demands for 
workers. 1 

In a short time, in fact, a labor shortage was created, which as 
the months wore on became more and more acute. This short- 
age was partly met by the introduction of women workers into 
industry in ever increasing numbers, 2 partly by the abrogation of 
trade union customs which tended to curtail production, and 
partly by the absorption into industry of old men and others who, 
in normal times, for one reason or another, were unemployed and 
in some cases unemployable. In these ways, principally of course 
by the first, means were found to provide enough men for the 

1 See Alary Conyngton, Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, April, 1918, p. 204, for an account of the effect of the war 
upon the employment of women in England. At first they were 
thrown out of work in large numbers, relief work having been needed 
in thousands of resulting cases of destitution. Gradually the unem- 
ployed women were reabsorbed into industry and hundreds of thou- 
sands of others drafted into it. 

2 Thus, The Labour Gazette, London, November, 1917, quoted in 
Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Jan., 1918, p. 65, 
states that there were 1,421,000 more females employed in Great Britain 
in July, 191 7, than at the outbreak of the war (an increase of almost 
50%). 



THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND 7 

armies and enough workers to meet the enormous demands made 
by modern warfare for manufactured articles of every description. 

In the United States there occurred a similar industrial crisis 
in August, 1 9 14, not so severe, however, as that originally expe- 
rienced in European countries. Our ordinary peace industries 
were slowed down, whereas in Europe many of them were almost 
wiped out. It was several months before the full resumption of 
normal peace industries in this country, together with the demand 
for war materials from abroad, absorbed our unemployed man 
power. Gradually, as factory after factory was built to supply I 
the needs of the Entente Nations, as our shipbuilding plans began 
to develop, and as the demand for food products at home and 
abroad constantly increased, an oversupply of labor was changed 
to a Iabor_ shortage. __ 

Upon our own entry into the European war in 191 7, industrial 
conditions were once more disturbed and large numbers of men 
were thrown out of employment. These, however, were soon ab- 
sorbed by the recruitments for the army and navy and by our 
rapidly expanding war production program, which during 1918 
assumed gigantic proportions. As a result, our labor shortage 
soon became acute. 

SPECIFIC CAUSES OF UNREST 

Our difficulties, like those of England (and other European 
countries), were much complicated by the concentration of v/ar 
industries into certain sections of the country where housing and 
transportation, all too poor before the war, became, by reason 
of the influx of additional workers, almost unbearable. In addi- 
tion, from August, 1915, on, there occurred a constant and in- 
creasingly rapid rise in the cost of living. By June, 191 7, the 
increase amounted to 29%; by June, 1918, 58%; by December, 
1918, 74%; by December, 1919, the cost had almost doubled. 1 
Up to the fall of 191 7, in spite of the great increase in the cost 
of practically every article that entered into the workingmen's 
budget, there were many industries and localities in which no 
substantial wage increases had occurred. 

1 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau Labor Statistics, June, 1920, 
p. 79. The estimates of the National Industrial Conference Board, 
Research Reports Nos. 9, 14 and 25, are somewhat more conservative : 
June, 1918, 52.3% ; November, 1918, 65.9% ; November, 1919, 82.2%. 



8 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

We have seen that the general wage level prior to the war was 
:in a majority of cases too low to permit of proper living stand- 
ards. If our workers were to avoid acute suffering, adequate 
wage increases became imperative. Moreover, the injustice re- 
sulting from the lessened purchasing power of the worker's wages 
was felt with added keenness because of the general belief (which 
ras substantially correct) that the employers were making large 
>rofits and that the mounting costs of the necessities of life were 
lue in part at least to profiteering. 

Furthermore great irregularity in wages and conditions of em- 
ployment attended the changing of the nation from a peace to a 
war footing. There were numerous causes responsible for this 
result. Most important of these was the stealing of labor which 
accompanied the efforts of Government contractors and depart- 
ments to speed up their work. After our entrance into the war 
the Government awarded contracts on cost plus basis. 1 War 
psychology, as well as the demands of Government departments, 
laid emphasis on speed rather than economy. Contractors and 
Government officials, in their eagerness to get their particular 
; pieces of work done, disregarded the effect of their actions en 
I other Government work, and' the stealing of men from one plant 
[to another was freely indulged in, Government departments and 
\employers bidding against each other for men and supplies. 
Many firms, when they wanted men, showed themselves abso- 
lutely unscrupulous in the manner in which they disregarded the 
Swishes and even the express orders of Government officials re- 
garding wages and overtime. 

As a result, some workers remained at the old wages, whereas 
others doing the same work in the same community were paid 
much more by aggressive employers — or perhaps by some agency 
of the Government itself — having profitable contracts to fill and 
eager to get men. Wages in one branch of an industry might 
remain stationary, while another part of the same industry re- 
ceived large increases. These inequalities affected men in differ- 
ent parts of the Government service as well as in private plants. 2 
Thus a mechanic in the shipyards might be receiving 50% more 

*H. B. Endicott in the New York Times, March, 1918, says that 
"the cost plus method was apparently the cause of more unrest among 
workingmen than any other single factor." 

2 Specific instances of these inequalities will be cited in subsequent 
chapters. 



THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND 9 

than an equally skilled worker in the same community and trade, 
working, for instance, in a munition plant. 

The unrest which was bound to follow inequalities of this kind 
was greatly augmented, not only by the high living costs and 
the bad conditions produced by overcrowding and inadequate 
transportation, but also by the continued refusal of many em- 
ployers to grant collective bargaining, and by their persistence 
in practices of discrimination against labor unions. To make 
matters worse, the urgent need for production and the publicity 
which this need received, in an effort to make the best use of 
every particle of the nation's resources, gave the workers a reali- 
zation of a strength which before they had neither realized nor 
possessed. 

But now, both realizing and possessing this new power, they 
desired, naturally enough, not merely to have their wages keep 
pace with the rising cost of living but also to effect an improve- 
ment in pre-war conditions. Even in 19 16 there occurred the ^ 
largest number of strikes in any one year of the country's pre- 
yious history, 1 and in addition a tie-up of the entire railway sys- 1 
tern was averted only by Congressional action which forced the? 
railroads to grant the men's demands. Furthermore, the workers 
realized that the time to enforce demands was when men were 
scarce, not when they were plentiful. 2 

As against these factors making for conflicts of great magni- 
tude can be set the war psychology, making powerfully for the 
maintenance of industrial peace. Patriotic fervor demanded uni- 
versal sacrifices for the nation, and it was realized that increased 
production was essential for the winning of the war. Interrup- 
tion of the manufacture of munitions or ships or of the produc- 
tion or transportation of food, might result in national defeat. 
Yet the patriotic motive, although genuine and potent, was not 
of itself sufficiently strong to overcome the many adverse condi- 
tions making for severe industrial conflicts. It was a real element 
in the situation, but never a determining one, and in the first 

1 See Appendix No. 1 for statistics relative to strikes. 

3 The correctness of this point of view has been demonstrated by 
the events of 1920. Curtailment of credits together with excessive 
prices of commodities made it necessary to decrease production in 
many industries. Taking advantage of this condition there were 
employers who not only refused legitimate wage demands but delib- 
erately closed their factories to weaken the strategic position of the 
workers. 



io WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

year of our participation in the war there occurred an even larger 

/ number of strikes than in the record }^ear of 191 6. 
t 

PRE-WAR MEDIATING AGENCIES 

What the war disclosed was the fundamental need of a method 
by which the workers could obtain redress of grievances without 
resorting to the strike. Machinery for mediating these grievances 
was utterly lacking as was also any compulsion — other than frag- 
mentary and ill-informed public opinion — to procure the accept- 
ance of arbitral decisions by either side. 

Prior to our entry into the war, the only governmental ma- 
chinery for the adjustment of labor disputes was as follows: 

(a) The Department of Labor. The Conciliation Bu- 
reau of the department did excellent work in some cases, but it 
was for several reasons inadequate to meet the emergency. In 
the first place, the Labor Department was insufficiently supplied 
with funds 1 and Congress was unwilling to make additional ap- 
propriations. It was furthermore thought by many of the largest 
employers that the department was under the control of organ- 
ized labor. The law under which the department was organized 
states its purpose to be "to foster, promote and develop the wel- 
fare of the wage-earners of the United States." 

In fact, the purpose of the department is regarded by most 
people as that of protecting the interests of labor rather than of 
administrating measures for the improvement of relations be- 
tween employer and employee — which would include projects to 
secure increased productive power as well as improved working 
conditions. The fact, too, that the Secretary of Labor is the ex- 
official of a powerful national labor union has helped to secure for 
the department the confidence of organized labor, but has had the 
opposite effect on employers who are unsympathetic with labor 
organizations. The members of the Secretary's staff had also 
been more successful in gaining the confidence of the men than 
of the employers, although these members had been recruited 
from different walks of life, some having been lawyers and em- 
ployers, others, labor leaders and college professors. Another 
reason why the department could not take care of the war emer- 
gency was that it has always been opposed to the undertaking 

1 Report, Secretary of Labor, 1917, page 10. 



THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND n 

of arbitral functions by its commissioners, believing that the use- 
fulness of the department, in the long run, would be greater if 
it confined its efforts to mediation and conciliation. But the 
war called for the exercise of larger powers than the Labor De- 
partment possessed and made the exercise by other agencies of 
arbitral determinations of wages and other questions absolutely 
necessary. 

(b) The Board of Mediation appointed under the 
Newlands Act of 19 13 for the settlement of industrial dis- 
putes on the railways. The jurisdiction of this board was limited 
to men engaged in the movement of the trains, and in the absence 
of agreement between the parties it had no powers of arbitration 
but only of conciliation. It had an excellent record, and con- 
tinued its work for those railroads — only the smaller and less im- 
portant ones — which were not taken over by the Government. 

(c) Boards of Conciliation existed in many of the 
States. They were, however, never — except in a few cases — im- 
portant factors in the settlement of industrial disputes. The 
shortcomings of the Mediation Bureau of the Department of 
Labor applied to most of the State Boards of Conciliation; in 
addition these boards were unable to do the work of which a 
national board was capable, because their jurisdiction was too 
narrow. 

(d) Joint Boards of Adjustment, in some industries, 
resulted from agreements — usually concluded annually — be-' 
tween employers' associations and labor unions. These agree- 
ments fix wages and hours for the period covered by the agree- 
ment, and provide a method of adjusting other questions that 
may arise. In the anthracite coal mines of Pennsylvania the 
board of conciliation was the outgrowth of the Roosevelt Com- 
mission of 1903, and has been maintained by the renewal, from 
time to time, of the agreement under which the board was created. 
In other industries, such as in many of the building trades, the 
glass blowers, and a portion of the needle trades, similar agree- 
ments had been made. But difficulties frequently arose when the 
time arrived, upon their expiration, for the renewal of these 
agreements. No machinery existed to facilitate this process other 
than that above set forth, which in many cases proved ineffectual. 
Moreover, these agreements were made under circumstances so 
different from those which confronted the nation during the war 



12 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

that even in the trades in which they existed they were frequently 
insufficient to meet the war emergency. In some cases there had 
been so rapid an advance in the cost of living that the workers 
were unable to get along on the wages set for the industry by the 
trade agreement made one or two years previously. Thus joint 
trade agreements, which had been of the greatest service in nor- 
mal times in preserving industrial peace, were in the war emer- 
gency inadequate. 

Because of the conditions above set forth the United States 
after the declaration of war drifted into a condition of affairs 
that rendered serious labor troubles almost inevitable. Millions 
of "workers whose pre-war wages were insufficient to support a 
proper standard of life found their earnings every day more in- 
adequate because of the increase in the cost of food, clothing, and 
shelter. In some cases increases in wages took place; in com- 
paratively few, however, in the first year of the war, were they 
as great as the added living cost, and in many cases no increases 
whatever was made. The feeling was strong that this was the 
time to insist upon remuneration more in keeping with the work- 
er's ideas of his deserts. 

The eight-hour day, required by law for Government work, was 
the goal of labor everywhere. Although largely extended in 191 6, 
it was nevertheless denied in a substantial number of localities 
and industries. Most serious of all, however, in the difficulty 
presented of reconciling capital and labor were the differences in 
regard to unionism. The men's insistence upon their right to join 
trade unions and in some instances their demand for union rec- 
ognition and the closed shop clashed with the very strong desire 
of many employers to deal with their workers as individuals and 
their dislike of labor organizations in themselves. And although 
both sides were patriotic, neither was unmindful of its own in- 
terest, and each side was afraid that the other would take ad- 
vantage of the unusual conditions to secure changes which would 
have been impossible in normal times. Employers desired profits 
and held tenaciously to pre-war industrial prejudices, even in 
cases where to do so meant to jeopardize production. Workers, 
on the other hand, were not deterred by the war from efforts to 
improve conditions. The difference between the two was that 
because of constant increases in the cost of living the worker had 
in almost all cases to take the initiative, if he was to secure an 



THE INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND 13 

amelioration of his grievances — even to the extent of the main- 
tenance of the status quo ante — and this often meant that he had 
to resort to the strike. And we must also remember that the 
temptation to do so was all the stronger because, due to the 
scarcity of labor, a strike was almost certain to be successful. 



CHAPTER II 
The Emergency Construction Wage Commission 

Immediately after the declaration of war the construction of 
cantonments was commenced. It was planned to construct 16 
National Army Cantonments to accommodate 40,000 men each, 
and to rush them to completion in 90 days. 1 The task seemed 
utterly impossible of achievement as each cantonment practically 
amounted to a city in itself. So great was the desire for speed 
that the contractors did not wait to receive signed contracts from 
the Government but proceeded immediately with work amounting 
to many millions of dollars on verbal orders. 

The building industry in large cities had been conducted al- 
most exclusively under the closed shop, the men having been very 
strongly organized. There were, however, hundreds of thousands 
of mechanics in rural districts — and also not a few employed by 
smaller contractors in the cities, who were not members of unions. 

It was essential that a contractor be in a position to avail him- 
self of the labor nearest at hand, irrespective of whether or not 
it was union or non-union. It was also necessary that disputes 
for any cause be not permitted to develop into stoppages of work. 
There were a number of contractors engaged on heavy construc- 
tion, especially in the country districts, such as the building of 
dams, power plants, and railroads, who conducted open shops and 
who were alleged by the unions to discriminate against union 
men. Owing to the nature of the cantonments, combining road- 
building, sewage systems, and power plants, some of these con- 
tractors seemed by their past experience best fitted for the work 
and one of them was awarded the contract for the construction of 
a cantonment at Indianapolis. This contractor advertised all 
over the country for men, although it was claimed that members 
of unions, residing at Indianapolis, were unemployed and that the 

1 "To this requirement was almost immediately added the task of 
constructing 16 National Guard Camps of nearly the same size." Re- 
port of the Secretary of War, 1918, page 62. 



THE CONSTRUCTION WAGE COMMISSION 15 

contractor was discriminating against them. A strike occurred 
on this and other grounds and stoppages of work were also 
threatened elsewhere. 

Growing out of the negotiations undertaken both to secure a 
return to work of the men at Indianapolis and to prevent any 
more occurrences of a similar nature, an agreement was made 
June io, 191 7, between the Secretary of War and the President 
of the American Federation of Labor, for the organization of the 
first War Labor Adjusting Board — the Cantonment Adjustment 
Commission. 1 

This was the first time in our history that the United States 
Government entered into an agreement with labor unions. The 
event is considered by many to mark the beginning of a new era 
in the history of American industry. The agreement provided for 
the adoption of union wages and hours in the vicinities in which 
the work was located, but it was understood that union men were 
not to object to the employment of men who did not belong to 
the union. 2 Three members of the commission were provided for, 
one to represent the public, one the army (as employer), and a 
third to be nominated by the President of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor. 

As so frequently happened during the war, the work to be 
performed by the commission was very much underestimated at 
the time it was organized. It was thought that cantonment con- 
struction would last only a few months, and it was not expected 
that the work of the commission would extend over a long period, 
or be of an arduous nature; with the development of our war 
activities, however, it became necessary for the Government to 
undertake a construction program of vastly greater size than was 
at first contemplated. 3 A large part of this work was placed 

*In the original agreement the Secretary of War and the President 
of the American Federation of Labor signed as individuals ; in subse- 
quent amplifications thereof they signed in their respective official 
capacities, See Appendix II for personnel of the board and agreements 
under which it was constituted. 

2 The agreement was short and indefinite and in the early period of 
its history the commission was loosely organized. See Louis B. 
Wehle, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1917, p. 122. 

3 By November 1, 1918, the original 32 projects had grown to 448, 
including only major undertakings. At one time no fewer than 
400,000 workmen were employed on work coming under the jurisdiction 
of the board, the buildings having been erected at the total expendi- 
ture of $1,250,000,000. See Report of the Secretary of War for 1918. 



16 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

under the jurisdiction of the Board — first, army aviation fields 
and storage facilities; later Navy shore construction. With this 
expansion of the activities of the Board its name was changed to 
the "Emergency Construction Commission." 

The country was divided into districts and an examiner ap- 
pointed for each district, who at first was not a regular em- 
ployee of the commission but was employed on a per diem basis. 
With the increase in the scope of the Board's duties two exam- 
iners, usually army officers, were placed in charge of labor adjust- 
ments for each district. A competent statistical bureau was also 
developed which studied the earnings and efficiency of the work- 
ers, their regularity of attendance, and the relation of absenteeism 
to overtime work. (Use will be made in subsequent chapters of 
some of the material collected by the commission.) 

The work of labor adjustment was much facilitated by the fact 
that all of the contracts let by the Government were on a 
basis of cost plus a fee and that there was incorporated in each 
contract the so-called labor clauses by which the contractor agreed 
that in the event of any labor dispute he would notify the Gov- 
ernment and accept the instructions of its representative in rela- 
tion thereto. 

With the exception of small local flareups the commission 
maintained almost uninterrupted peace in places where it had 
jurisdiction, all national unions abiding by the policy under which 
it was organized, except the carpenters, who claimed not to be 
bound by the signature of the President of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor x (of which they were members) and who objected to 
the waiver of the demand for the closed shop — which was involved 

At the time of the signing of the armistice the Emergency Con- 
struction Wage Commission estimated its own shortage of labor 
at 200,000 men and for all trades in the country at one million. It 
planned to bring 50,000 to 75,000 men from Porto Rico and the Bahama 
Islands and before the war ended they had brought in about thirteen 
thousand Porto Ricans and three thousand from the Bahamas. These 
men were all sent back shortly after the signing of the armistice. 
See "A Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field 
of Industrial Relations During the War." 

technically this contention was undoubtedly correct; but the car- 
penters accepted the benefit of the Baker-Gompers Agreement and in 
any event were not justified in refusing to join all the other building 
trades in recognizing its validity. 



THE CONSTRUCTION WAGE COMMISSION 17 

in the agreement under which the commission was created. There 
was, however, very little serious trouble until after the signing 
of the armistice. 

In the spring of 19 18, the commission undertook to standardize 
wages in the building industry all over the country. It was a 
stupendous undertaking, requiring conferences with representa- 
tives of labor and of employers for all building trades in every 
locality. In the midst of the work, after the organization of the 
War Labor Policies Board and its determination to standardize 
wages for every war industry in the United States, the Emergency 
Construction Commission was requested to discontinue its work 
and turn over its material to the Labor Policies Board, which it 
did. The latter board, however, never completed its task and un- 
fortunately nothing was done towards the standardization for 
which the Emergency Construction Wage Commission had ex- 
pended so much effort. 

The rule under which wages were adjusted by the Emergency 
Construction Wage Commission was a peculiar one and unlike 
that used by any other war labor board. It ascertained the wages 
for any given locality which had been adopted by bona fide agree- 
ments between employers' associations and labor unions, ■ and 
accepted these wage scales, irrespective of its judgment as to 
their fairness. The work of wage adjustment was thus simplified 
and reduced to the mechanical process of determining the stand- 
ards which had already been fixed by previous agreements, and 
the application of these standards. The weakness of this pro* 
cedure, however, was that it led to the exertion of great pressure 
by local unions upon local employers to change wage rates in 
order to induce the commission to adopt these new scales which 
had been locally agreed to. Such changes, naturally enough, 
might thus be arbitrarily made. On the other hand there arose 
towards the end of the war cases in which this rule, of adopting 
local standards, prevented the Board from making increases 
which the equities of the situation demanded and which other- 
wise it would have made. At the beginning of the war employers 
generally were more willing to concede local wage increases than 
towards the end of the war when there was a common belief that 
a period of declining prices confronted them. In such cases the 
maintenance by the Commission of the existing wage scale did 



18 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

not end the difficulties and the Commission seemed helpless to ef- 
fect an adjustment. 1 

This rule of wage adjustment was adopted more or less hastily 
at a time when it was believed that the Commission's work would 
not last very long; nevertheless when the scope of the Commis- 
sion's activities was enlarged and its life indefinitely prolonged 
by the extension of its jurisdiction over many kinds of building 
work which were undertaken by the War and Navy Departments, 
the rule was never changed. 

The greatest evils connected with war labor administration, 
the abuse of overtime and the stealing of men from one plant to 
another, first became prominent with the commencement of can- 
tonment construction. 2 Looking back over the war period, the 
important facts which stand out in this connection are that the 
cantonments were finished and occupied in an incredibly short 
period and that our army was sent to France with corresponding 
expedition, arriving there in time to be one of the deciding factors 
of the war. As compared with this achievement, very little else 
is of much significance. Yet the same results, tremendous though 
they were, could doubtless have been accomplished without the 

*The carpenters' strike in New York City in the fall of 1918 was 
a case in point. 

3 To meet this condition there was organized in the Hampton Roads 
District (Virginia) a Board of Control charged with the duty of 
reconciling the conflicting claims for materials and men created by 
the pressure of Government work in this locality. In close proximity 
were Newport News with its shipbuilding plant, embarkation depots 
and army cantonments and Norfolk and its Navy Yards, aviation 
fields and other war plants. These activities were all carrying on 
building and war production programs of great magnitude. Each 
was short of labor and competed with every other enterprise — Govern- 
ment as well as private — for its share of the inadequate supply. 
Hence the organization of the Board of Control with Rear Admiral 
F. R. Harris, as Chairman representing the Navy, the U. S. Shipping 
Board, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the U. S. Housing Corpora- 
tion and the War Industries Board and other representatives of the 
War Department, the U. S. Employment Service and the Railroad and 
Fuel Administrations. The Board did not attempt to make inde- 
pendent wage adjustments but working closely with the Emergency 
Construction Wage Commission and containing representatives of 
every Government agency employing building mechanics in the dis- 
trict, it was able to prevent the adoption by any one department of a 
wage scale which was not in accordance with the rate fixed for the 
district. That is to say, it coordinated the work for this district of 
the different wage boards so that uniform scales and conditions would 
prevail. 



THE CONSTRUCTION WAGE COMMISSION 19 

riotous com petition for men which accompanied the actual work, 
or the reckless employment of overtime with its consequent ab- 
normal daily earnings — in some cases as high as twenty dollars a 
day. These excessive war time earnings had the unfortunate ef- 
fect of leading the workers to expect in normal times earnings 
which industry on a peace basis was incapable of affording. 1 The 
disillusion of the workers which inevitably followed the armistice 
is no doubt in part responsible for much of the recent labor unrest. 

1 This will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent chapter, as 
will the confusion in wage fixing which resulted from the fact that in 
addition to the > Emergency Construction Commission, three other 
agencies were fixing wages in the building trades for men engaged on 
construction work over which they had jurisdiction. 



CHAPTER III 
Shipbuilding 

SHIPBUILDING LABOR ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

The need for ships and for Government assistance, if that need 
was to be promptly met, was realized some time before our par- 
ticipation in the war; and resulted in the bill which created the 
Shipping Board. This bill was passed in September, 191 6; and 
the organization of the board was immediately begun, although 
not completed until considerably later. The early months of 
191 7 saw the launching of Germany's unrestricted submarine 
campaign, followed by our entry into the war. These events were 
accompanied by very large sinkings of the merchant ships of the 
Allies, and by great fear as to their ability to maintain the neces- 
sary ocean shipping. The delays in our own shipbuilding pro- 
gram gave rise in the public mind to a feverish anxiety for ship 
production, and the attention of this country as well as of almost 
the entire world was fixed upon the activities of the United States 
Shipping Board in its efforts to meet the situation. 

The task which confronted the board was one of unusual diffi- 
culty — unusual even at a time when difficult and seemingly im- 
possible tasks confronted every branch of the Government. Of 
the many problems with which the board was faced the labor 
problem was probably the most perplexing. The shipping in- 
dustry had, until some time after the outbreak of the European 
war, been an unprofitable one, and most of the shipbuilders were 
or had been in receivers' hands. The result was that the yards 
were in poor physical condition — the best of them without even 
proper toilet facilities; lockers, baths, and hospitals jwere usually 
lacking, and, in this extra-hazardous calling, even provision 
for first aid was utterly inadequate. Modern ideas in regard to 
the treatment of labor had not reached the shipyards, and men 
were still hired and fired in the same haphazard way that was 
the custom twenty-five or fifty years ago. There was probably 

20 



SHIPBUILDING 21 

not a single yard at the time of our entry into the war using the 
services of an efficient employment manager. 1 Wages also had 
lagged behind the point which had been reached in most pros- 
perous industries, 2 and it was further claimed that cutting piece 
rates was practiced in many of the shipyards. 

During this period transportation facilities from the workers' 
homes to the yards became so overtaxed that it was stated at 
many of the hearings that large numbers of the men were travel- 
ing two hours in the morning to reach the yards and an equal 
length of time in the evening to reach their homes. Conditions, 
which were well described as approaching a riot, prevailed during 
the rush hours on many of the trolley lines — men rode on fenders, 
they clung to the outside of the cars, with the natural result of 
frequent cases of serious injury and, so it was reported, of several 
fatalities. It was in the face of such conditions and of the uni- 
versal shortage of labor that the vital need for ships made it 
necessary to augment the force of shipyard workers from about 
ninety thousand at the time of our entry into the war to close to 
four hundred thousand at the time of the armistice, 3 an increase 
of over four times, in less than two years. 

These general conditions were at first not fully appreciated by 
the members of the Shipping Board, but as time went on the 
Government groped its way to a more thorough understanding 
of what they implied. The reader must keep in mind these 
peculiar difficulties with which the Shipping Board was con- 
fronted in order to comprehend the steps that were taken to 
get men, to prevent strikes, and to increase production. 4 

1 P. H. Douglas and F. E. Wolfe in the Journal of Political Economy 
for May, 1919, Volume XXVII, page 376, state that at as late a date 
as January 1, 1918, only 13 shipyards had employment departments 
in any organized form. (At that time the yards were employing 
about 146,000 men.) 

3 A representative of the unions stated at the Philadelphia hearings 
of the Board, December, 1917, that when he arrived in the Delaware 
River section (a few years before) boilermakers were getting 29 cents 
an hour — a rate which he stated to have been the lowest paid any- 
where in the United States. Another witness said that the rate for 
blacksmiths had remained stationary for thirty years. 

3 P. H. Douglas and F. E. Wolfe in the Journal of Political Economy 
for May, 1919, Volume XXVII, page 372. 

4 One of the first steps was the granting of industrial exemption for 
all shipyards workers. (Work in the shipyards and in the actual 
operation of vessels were the only occupations for which a specific 
exemption, irrespective of the importance of the individual to the in- 



22 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Indeed the forces making for unrest in the yards were stronger, 
especially for the first year of the war, than the efforts of the 
Shipping Board to counteract them. For in spite of the dan- 
gerous crisis which the world faced during the months succeeding 
our entry into the war, threats of strikes and actual cessations 
of work were taking place in our Atlantic Coast shipyards, delay- 
ing the construction of new ships and the repairs to the requisi- 
tioned German merchant vessels. Still more serious troubles were 
threatening on the Pacific Coast. 

To meet this situation, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment 
Board was created on August 25, 191 7, by agreement made be- 
tween the Government, the President of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor, and all the International Unions doing the work 
of shipbuilding (except the carpenters). This agreement as 
amended in December, 191 7, provided for the adjustment of dis- 
putes by a board of three, one a representative of the public, one 
of the Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the 
Navy jointly, and one representing organized labor, nominated 
by the President of the American Federation of Labor. 

The first task of the board was to prevent threatened stoppages 
of work on the Pacific Coast. Both sides came to Washington 
and hearings were held, in the midst of which, however, the au- 
thority of the member of the Commission representing the Ship- 
ping Board was suddenly withdrawn by that body. 1 The hearings 
had to be suspended in spite of the fact that trouble had arisen 
in all the shipbuilding cities of the Pacific Coast, and in Seattle 
had gone so far that an actual strike order for September 5th 
had been issued. The labor representatives from the coast re- 
turned home with their grievances unsettled, and called out their 
men on what was to be one of the most serious labor disturb- 

dustry, was given under the draft regulations.) A preferential was 
also determined upon, in the wages of mechanics engaged in the build- 
ing of ships, over those in every other occupation. The construction 
of houses was undertaken by the Government in many shipbuilding 
centers, and, in addition, the patriotic side of work in the shipyards 
was emphasized. Efforts were also made to improve the physical 
conditions of the yards, as well as the method of labor management 
a A fact which never became known to the public. 



SHIPBUILDING 23 

ances of the war. The board was thereupon reconstituted, trav- 
eled to the Pacific Coast, and held hearings in all the large ship- 
building centers, many of the men in the meantime continuing 
on strike. 1 

The testimony taken at these hearings shows the extreme bit- 
terness which existed between most of the employers, especially 
in the steel shipyards, and their men. The demands included 
wage increases, no discrimination against union members, the 
elimination of "10-hour lumber." In Portland the closed shop 
was also asked for, but the demand was withdrawn when its in- 
consistency with the understanding under which the board was 
created was pointed out. The employers attributed their diffi- 
culties to a comparatively few "agitators," failing to realize that 
their troubles were due to a general condition of unrest and dis- 
satisfaction among all the workers — a state of mind which, with 
all the other elements affecting the situation, was destined to 
make the war period a time of the largest number of strikes in 
the country's history. 

After the board had held its hearings in Seattle, decision was 
postponed until San Francisco and Portland had been heard, 
and although other unions favored a return to work pending the 
announcement of an award, the Brotherhood of Boilermakers and 
Iron-shipbuilders held out, and they at first refused to go back 
until their grievances were settled. Only after great pressure 
from their national officers were they finally induced to return 
to work. At the conclusion of the San Francisco hearing the 
board set uniform wage scales for all Pacific Coast shipyards, 
awarding an increase of 31% over the wages established by joint 
agreements on June 1, 191 6, in San Francisco and Seattle. This 

*In San Francisco the men had been induced to return to work 
through the efforts of Mr. Gavin McNab, who acted as President 
Wilson's personal representative. Elsewhere on the coast, however, the 
strike was still on when the board held its hearings. Although labor 
adjustment boards have usually insisted that men return to work be- 
fore they will take jurisdiction, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment 
Board felt that, under ail the circumstances, it would be unwise to 
adhere strictly to this rule. 



24 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

percentage was the estimated increase in the cost of living from 
that date. 1 

Dissatisfaction with the wage award and with certain features 
of the agreement under which the board was constituted led to 
danger of another strike and hence to the execution of a supple- 
mentary agreement of December 8, 191 7, making changes in the 
Pacific award, equivalent to a further increase in wages. 2 

In the meantime while the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment 
Board was on the Pacific Coast trying to induce the men of 
Portland, Seattle, and San Francisco to return to work, the 
troubles which had been threatening in the East came to a head 
in strikes at Fore River, Newark Bay, and Baltimore. None 
of these were, however, of long duration, 3 and shipbuilding now 
proceeded peacefully under labor adjustments made by the board, 
until interrupted on the Atlantic Coast by disputes with the car- 
penters in February, 19 18, resulting in a dramatic exchange of 
telegrams between Chairman Hurley of the Shipping Board 
and Mr. Hutcheson, President of the Brotherhood of Carpenters, 
and ending finally in the famous "Will you cooperate or will 
you obstruct?" telegrams of the President of the United States to 
the carpenters, urging them to return to work and submit their 

1 In accordance with the agreement the award should have been 
based on wages of July 15, 191 7, but wages up to that time not having 
kept pace with increases in living costs, an award based on wages in 
effect at the later date would have been insufficient to meet the entire 
increased cost of living and would have failed to keep the men at 
work. As it was, one of the Seattle shipyards had advanced rates very 
much faster than its competitors and in some instances had been pay- 
ing its men considerably higher rates than those awarded by the Board. 

3 The new agreement provided for a war bonus of 10%, contingent 
until February 1, 1917, upon regularity of attendance ; after that date 
it became a permanent addition to wages. It also provided for appeals 
from the decision of the board and eliminated representation ^ from 
the wooden shipbuilders' unions, which had been provided for in the 
original agreement, because of the refusal of the carpenters to become 
a party to the agreement. 

s Henry Endicott, Chairman of the Commission on Public Safety for 
Massachusetts, was accepted as arbitrator for the Fore River dis- 
pute, and Vice-Chairman Stevens of the Shipping Board secured a 
return of the men at Baltimore. The latter testified before the Senate 
Committee in December, 191 7, that strikes in the shipyards had, up 
to that time, caused a loss of 536,992 working days— an equivalent of 
20,000 men working for one month. 



SHIPBUILDING 25 

grievances to the orderly determination of the Shipbuilding Labor 
Adjustment Board, which resulted in a return of the men. 1 

Another period of comparative peace in the shipyards now en- 
sued, to be broken only after the signing of the armistice by the 
dissatisfaction of the metal trades of Seattle because of the denial 
by the board of their request for a wage increase to $1.00 an 
hour. The decision of the board was appealed, and the Board 
of Appeals, whose membership' was evenly divided between cap- 
ital and labor, was deadlocked. This was construed by the Ship- 
ping Board as an affirmation of the decision of the board. The 
men refused to accept this interpretation. Protracted negotia- 
tions with the Shipping Board followed, during which the work- 
ers endeavored to obtain permission to negotiate directly with 
their employers for a wage increase, which permission the board 
at first gave but later withdrew. 2 The early decisions of the 
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board had fixed minimum rates, 
but in a great many cases these became maximum rates as 
well, by reason of the fact that the shipyard owners had agreed 
in their contracts with the Shipping Board not to increase rates 
without the permission of the board, which the board was un- 
willing to grant. 3 During the progress of the war, it more and 
more became the general practice for the adjustment boards to 
establish rates of wages as maxima as well as minima, the object 
of this being to prevent one employer from bidding against an- 

x The Carpenters' Union was never reconciled to the abandonment 
during the war of union labor's demand for the extension of the 
closed shop. It also desired separate representation in the Adjust- 
ment Board, when matters were being heard concerning its member- 
ship. Upon the failure of President Hutcheson in his negotiations 
on these and other points with the Shipping Board, the carpenters in 
Staten Island and Baltimore shipyards quit work (Mr. Hutcheson 
claimed against his wishes), and refused to submit their grievance to 
the Shipbuilding Adjustment Board. Public opinion strongly con- 
demned the carpenters' stand, and Mr. Hutcheson appealed to Presi- 
dent Wilson for an opportunity to present to him the grievances of the 
men, whereupon the telegrams of the President above referred to 
were sent. 

3 See The Strike in Seattle by Theresa S. McMahon, The Survey, 
March 8, 1919, p. 822. 

3 Some of the yards were prevented from increasing wages by reason 
of the fact that their work was on the basis of cost plus fixed fee for 
every ship built and the Shipping Board would not reimburse them 
for wage payments in excess of the awards of the S. L. A. B. 

I 



26 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

other for men, and the consequent shifting from one plant to 
another. The unions had acquiesced in this restriction during 
the war, although a good deal of resentment was caused by the 
Government's having prevented employers from paying more than 
the fixed rates, even when they wanted to. Now that the war 
was over, it was felt very strongly that the Government should 
not preveat an employer from paying as high wages as he chose. 

These Seattle negotiations seem to have been taken out of the 
hands of the S. L. A. B. and to have been conducted in person by 
Mr. Piez, the General Manager of the Emergency Fleet Corpora- 
tion. 1 His final decision was not to permit individual shipyards 
to increase their rates of compensation, and after much negotia- 
tion, upon refusal of the yards to grant their wage demands, on 
January 21, 19 19, the men walked out in Seattle, Aberdeen and 
Tacoma. 2 

There now followed one of the most dramatic labor struggles 
of the war. After the strike had been in progress only a few 
days, the metal trades of Seattle requested the Central Labor 
Council, with which all the labor unions of that section are affili- 
ated, to call a general sympathetic strike in support of the metal 
trades. The Council, upholding the metal trades in their de- 
mands, and feeling that the Shipping Board should either have 
granted their wage increase or have permitted the men to negoti- 
ate directly with the shipyards, decided upon a general strike, 
subject to ratification by the individual unions. With very few 
exceptions the unions agreed to aid the metal workers, and the 
date of February 6 was set for the commencement of the strike. 
By that time no fewer than no unions had fallen in line, in- 

1 Mr. Piez in a telegram to the shipyard owners said : "The Fleet 
Corporation feels that the men in your district have had every oppor- 
tunity for a proper and fair hearing. That the men in striking vio- 
lated the spirit and letter of their agreement with the Government . . . 
that if they were successful in securing their demands . . . the future 
of the entire shipbuilding industry would be jeopardized. The Fleet 
Corporation stands by the Macy Board decision and will do nothing 
more." Seattle Post-Intelligencer, January 26, 1919. 

3 V. E. Macy in the National Civic Federationist. February 5, 1919, 
said that the Seattle situation was 60% the fault of selfish employers, 
who violated all orders of the f, L. A. B. by paying wages far in 
excess of the scale authorized, and 40% tne fault of the radical lead- 
ers, who thought themselves strong enough to defy their national 
officers. 



SHIPBUILDING 27 

eluding street-car workers, teamsters, restaurant workers, and 
electricians and other building trades men. 1 

This general strike was a most remarkable phenomenon. Not 
only were the grievances of the metal workers, in calling the 
original strike, less acute than those of the workers in most other 
controversies during the war period, but in addition the strike 
was called against the decision of the S. L. A. B., a wage adjust- 
ing agency which contained in its membership a representative 
of the metal trades and which had earned a general reputation 
for fairness. It is true that the men in Seattle had never been 
satisfied with any of the av/ards of the board — unlike the work- 
ers in other sections of the country the men of the Pacific Coast 
shipyards had not profited by the awards of the S. L. A. B. because 
wage scales in the West had been higher than in other parts of the 
country. In the general wage leveling process that inevitably 
accompanied the war the tendency of the board toward stand- 
ardization resulted in very much smaller wage increases in the 
West than in the East. Seattle, which had enjoyed a particularly 
high scale, was most adversely affected by this policy. The high 
level there was due partly to the degree of labor organization 
and partly to the action of some thoughtless and unscrupulous 
employers who offered rates far in excess of either the local rates 
or those set by the board. 

From the standpoint of the Shipping Board and of the general 
public the men of the shipyards had been very liberally treated 
during the entire war period. The rates which they received were 
high, and when supplemented by overtime, resulted in very large 
earnings. But for the men of Seattle the rates were not high 
and the cutting off of overtime immediately upon the signing of 
the armistice accentuated their dissatisfaction with the awarded 
scale. It was therefore especially hard for them to realize that, 
for the general good, it was necessary to maintain standardized 
rates even if this worked to the disadvantage of a particular com- 
munity. 

On its side, the community felt, in the early months succeed- 
ing the signing of the armistice, that the cost of living was going 
to come down and that therefore wages ought not to be any 

x An effort was also made to call a general strike at Tacoma at the 
same time as the strike at Seattle. This was not successful. 



28 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

further increased. The business interests of the country were 
extremely positive on this point as were a substantial number of 
labor men and liberal thinkers. 1 

The insistence of the Seattle metal trades, therefore, upon 
their demand for an increase of wages to $1.00 an hour was 
frowned upon throughout the country, and when this demand 
was denied by the S. L. A. B., its decision met with popular ap- 
proval. The strike appeared to involve both a violation of the 
agreement under which the S. L. A. B. was organized (although 
to be sure, the Seattle metal trades claimed that the agreement 
was a violation of the constitution of their international union 
and that they were, therefore, not bound by it), as well as an 
unreasonable demand for which no justification could be found 
in the equities of the situation. 

In spite of ail the weaknesses in the workers' position, and in 
spite of the fact that this was one of the least justified strikes 
of the war period — although, of course, a different psychology 
had followed the signing of the armistice — the remarkable thing 
was that a general sympathetic strike should have been called at 
all, and that it should have met with an almost unanimous re- 
sponse from the labor unions of Seattle. 2 As a demonstration of 
solidarity in the ranks of labor this showing was impressive. 3 

The effect of the strike 4 upon the residents of Seattle and 

1 This expectation, as succeeding events have shown, was too san- 
guine. Up to the summer of 1920 the cost of living continued to 
increase. 

2 In all cases except one the strike call received a majority vote; in 
most cases, however, a two-thirds or three-fourths vote was necessary, 
and in a few instances these large majorities were not polled. 

3 It is interesting to note that there has resulted a corresponding 
solidarity on the part of the employers who have since the general 
strike formed a powerful association of their own. 

* The general strike lasted until February nth, and was conducted 
with great ability and moderation ; there seems to have been no vio- 
lence, and the general strike committee, which was formed to take 
charge of the situation, not only organized a special labor guard com- 
posed of 300 ex-service men but by means of subcommittees arranged 
for the exemption from strike of certain necessary functions. Thus 
the electric light workers were allowed to maintain power for the 
city water supply, the teamsters were authorized to collect such garbage 
as was a menace to the health of the community, and other essential 
operations were permitted to go on undisturbed ; otherwise, the life of 
the city came to a complete stop. Sixty thousand workers laid down 
their tools ; trolley cars, taxicabs, and trucks were stopped for several 



SHIPBUILDING 29 

upon the country generally was electrical; a great many people 
seemed to feel that a general revolution was at hand. In Seattle 
there was a rush for firearms, coupled with a fear of violence and 
catastrophe out of all proportion to the events which called it 
forth. 1 To-day there is a great deal of difference of opinion as to 
the extent to which an industrial revolution was contemplated; 
there can be no doubt, however, that there were some of the 
workers who hoped that the upheavals of Europe would be dupli- 
cated in the United States and that the Seattle strike was only 
the beginning. As a matter of fact the strike committee did 
adopt as one of its maxims that of revolutionary socialism (from 
the old international manifesto) — "you have nothing to lose 
but your chains and the world to gain." Yet radical as many of 
the leaders of the strike undoubtedly were, it does not appear 
that revolutionary opinions and motives animated either their 
calling or their conduct of the strike. Certainly the actions of 
the strike committee were not those of a body of men who 
seriously contemplated revolution. 

Tremendous pressure from the international officers of a num- 
ber of important unions concerned in the strike resulted in an 
early return to work of the street-car men, teamsters, and others; 2 
and on February nth the general strike was declared off (al- 
though the strike in the shipyards continued). Its concrete re- 
sult was practically nil; but its psychological effect was not con- 
fined to the city of Seattle but spread all over the country and 
was most unfortunate. It sharpened the antagonism of the em- 
ployer toward, and increased his fear of the labor union, which 
antagonism, in turn, has served to increase the bitterness of the 
workers. Other general strikes had occurred during the war and 

days, and almost all the industrial activities of the city were brought 
to a standstill. The strike committee organized restaurants at which 
as many as 30,000 meals a day were served; milk stations were 
opened for the supply of milk to babies, and cooperative enterprises 
of various kinds were started. No matter what we may think of the 
occasion for this particular strike, or of the legitimacy of ever calling 
a general strike, we cannot but admire the efficiency and organizing 
skill with which it was carried out. 

1 See The Seattle General Strike. Issued by the History Committee 
of the General Strike Committee, published by the Seattle Union 
Record. 

1 See The Seattle General Strike, p. 37- 



30 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

indeed a general lockout, 1 yet these events aroused no particular 
excitement. The mere fact that the Seattle strike was larger 
would not of itself explain this difference; the temper of public 
opinion at the time the strike was called, as well as the sensa- 
tional publicity which each side gave to the occurrences at 
Seattle, must be taken into account, if the focussing of public 
opinion upon this strike is to be understood and the intense in- 
tolerance it aroused explained. 

*In September, 1917, a general strike occurred in Springfield, 111. 
The street car workers were out and a parade had been organized as 
a demonstration in their favor. This parade was stopped by the police 
and as a protest a general strike of union workers of Springfield took 
place. The miners were particularly active and the A. F. of L. weekly 
newsletter for September 29, 1917, states that in all 10,000 workers 
joined the strike. Hater the deputy sheriffs were dismissed and assur- 
ances given that the right of free assemblage would be maintained. 
. . . But the most important general strike which occurred during the 
war itself (the Seattle Strike took place after the armistice) was that 
of March, 1918, at Kansas City. Here also the strike was sympa- 
thetic; this time with the laundry workers and drivers who had sought 
recognition of their union (a demand not sanctioned by the Govern- 
ment's war labor policy). There seems to have been little disorder 
during the seven days that the strike lasted, until an attempt was 
made to run the street cars. Rioting then occurred and the National 
£uard had to be called in. The feelings stirred up by this general 
strike may have been in part responsible for the creation of the Kansas 
Industrial Court, which will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
... At about the same time a general strike occurred at Waco, 
Texas, which was likewise sympathetic but this time with street car 
men who had been locked out. ... A general lockout occurred at 
Billings, Montana, in April, 1918. It seems that in the previous year 
all the workers under the jurisdiction of the Federated Labor Union 
had quit work in sympathy with mechanics in the building trades who 
had been locked out by the Billings Employers' Association. The men 
who struck included icemen, city employees, gasmen, creamery work- 
ers, truck drivers and others. The strike lasted two weeks and was 
finally settled by the men receiving an increase in wages and a return 
to their former positions. But when, ,in April, 1918, the laundry 
workers struck for a further increase, the members of the Billings 
branch of the Montana Employers' Association locked out all of the 
employees affiliated with the Building Trades Council "as well as the 
clerks, cooks and waiters, laundry workers, common laborers and 
teamsters in the jurisdiction of the Trades and Labor Assembly." The 
purpose of the lockout as stated in the Third Biennial Report of the 
Montana Department of Labor and Industry, page 39, seems to have 
been to force the acceptance of the open shop. The trouble spread to 
other trades and a number of the employers were declared unfair 
and, as such, boycotted by the workers. Although wages were in- 
creased when the men resumed work, the lockout seems, on the whole, 
to have been successful. 



SHIPBUILDING 31 

The difficulties of the Shipping Board were not confined to 
cases of actual or threatened stoppages of work; other trouble- 
some issues arose which seriously threatened production. 1 Thus 
early in the war, as the number of wooden shipyards and their 
activity increased, the demand for caulkers rapidly outstripped 
the limited supply. To add to the difficulty, the caulkers them- 
selves, for many months, refused to permit any increase in the 
percentage of apprentices. Indeed the situation became so acute 
that a number of otherwise finished ships could not be used be- 
cause of a shortage of men to caulk them. Finally in December, 
191 7, Government pressure (and the acquiescence by the local 
representative of the board to a rate of $8.50 a day, which the 
shipyards had been paying caulkers in their efforts to get an 
adequate labor supply) induced them to meet the plans of the 
board for the training of new men, and the shortage was grad- 
ually relieved. Still another typical difficulty was the effort of 
the metal trades of the Pacific Coast to extend trade unionism 
and the closed shop, the men refusing to work on "unfair" ma- 
terial and to install boilers made in non-union plants. This issue, 
similar to the one which had led to the strike in the wooden ship- 
wards (of September, 191 7), was finally overcome by a waiver 
of the men's demands that only "union" materials be used. 



INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DIVISION EMERGENCY FLEET 
CORPORATION 

In September, 191 7, the Emergency Fleet Corporation of the 
Shipping Board established an Industrial Service Section, which 
at first was mainly concerned with the procurement and training 
of labor for the shipyards and with questions relating to draft 
exemption. To these functions others were gradually added and 
in May, 19 18, in order to better organize the work, the Industrial 
Relations Division was created. 2 We are concerned, in this book, 

1 In order to prevent the shifting of men from one yard to another, 
decisions, which at first were for single 3'ards, were made to cover 
larger and larger territory until in the last decisions of the board one 
award was made for the Pacific Coast and one for all other districts 
of the country. Uniform wage scales were established in both awards 
for the higher paid occupations. 

3 Second Annual Report, United States Shipping Board, p. 152. 



32 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

with only one of the activities of the new Division, to wit, the 
Labor Section, charged with the settlement of labor controversies 
arising in plants having contracts for materials for ship construc- 
tion. As we have seen in the first part of this chapter, the Ship- 
building Labor Adjustment Board had jurisdiction over all labor 
questions arising in the shipyards. In many cases, however, a 
shipbuilding company would sublet a contract for the manufac- 
ture of mechanical parts of the ship or for machinery needed in 
its construction. Labor disputes occurring in shops engaged on 
filling such orders were referred to the Labor Section. 1 

In order to insure the necessary harmony between the two 
boards, the director of the Industrial Relations Division was also 
a member of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board. The 
nature of the work of the Labor Section and its methods of pro- 
cedure w r ere similar to those of the Industrial Service Section of 
the Ordnance Department, which are set forth in some detail in a 
subsequent chapter and need not. therefore, be examined at this 
place. 

*John J. Casey was in charge. 



CHAPTER IV 

Shipping 

MARINE AND DOCK INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
DIVISION 

(JThe adjustment of wages and working conditions of men oper- 
ating coastwise and deep sea vessels was undertaken by the Ship- 
ping Board itself..! In the organization of its own work the Board 
had delegated to Vice-Chairman Stevens supervision of all labor 
matters directly affecting it. When Mr. Stevens went to Europe 
in December, 191 7, the supervision of labor^ matters was placed 
in the hands of Robert P. Bass. Finally, [a few months before 
the armistice, the Shipping Board decided to create the Marine 
and Dock Industrial Relations Division in order to give more 
definite structure and standing to the work which hitherto had 
been accomplished in a less formal way| and Mr. Bass became 
Director of this new division. 1 

The jurisdiction of this division covered generally three dif- 
ferent groups of workers — the dock workers, that is to say, the 
longshoreman, the harbor men, who operate tugs, barges, light- 
ers, and other harbor craft, and the licensed officers and crews of 
coastwise and deep sea vessels. As we will see in the next sec- 
tion the Shipping Board cooperated with other Government 
agencies in establishing the National Adjustment Commission 
charged with the duty of fixing wages and general labor condi- 
tion for the dock workers. In theory the Shipping Board — and 
later its Marine and Dock Industrial Relations Division — was 

- x The purposes of the division are stated as follows, in the Second 
Annual Report of the United States Shipping Board, page 84: "It is 
the duty of the new division to act as a coordinating agency in all 
labor matters affecting the Board; to supervise labor questions which 
pertain to the operation of vessels and marine equipment including 
the work oi loading and unloading; to secure peaceful adjustment of 
disputes," etc. John G. Palfrey was Assistant Director. On Janu- 
ary 1, 1919, Herbert B. Ehrman became Director. 

33 



34 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

supposed to exercise general supervision over these activities, so 
far as they concerned the Shipping Board itself. As a matter of 
fact this supervision was exercised through the election of the 
Shipping Board's representative as Chairman of the National Ad- 
justment Commission. [The Marine and Dock Industrial Rela- 
tions Division dealt primarily with the officers and crews of ocean- 
going vessels, leaving to the local commissions which were af- 
filiated with the National Adjustment Commission (except in the 
Port of New York, where a special ^commission was created) 1 
the framing of wages for harbor era:;. 

In considering the labor problems of the workers on ocean-go- 
ing and coastwise vessels, a further division will be found con- 
venient, and in this case again the division will fall naturally into 
three sections. Each section will represent roughly one of the 
three geographical divisions into which the marine shipping in- 
dustry of the country is naturally divided — the Atlantic and Gulf 
Ports, the Great Lakes, and the Pacific Coast. The conditions 
of the industry and the methods of handling labor differed vitally 
in all three localities. These differences, as far as they concerned 
the workers, arose chiefly from questions relating to the unions. 
And as was so often the case during the war the attitude of the 
employers toward unions largely determined the degree of indus- 
trial peace which was maintained in any port, that of the em- 
ployers on the Atlantic and Pacific Ports presenting a sharp con- 
trast to that of the employers on the Great Lakes. 

In the Atlantic and Gulf Ports, where a majority of the men 
(65%) were members of the International Seamen's Union and 
where the employers were willing to cooperate with the Govern- 
ment by dealing with these organizations, little trouble was expe- 
rienced during the period of active hostilities (in fact none until 
1919). ' In May, 191 7, a conference was held between the Ship- 
ping Board, the Shipping Committee of the Council of National 
Defense (of which shipowners were members), and the Interna- 
tional Seamen's Union, at which what became known as the "At- 
lantic Agreement" was worked out. This agreement fixed wages 
and bonuses, provided for the training of apprentices, the dilu- 
tion of the trade, and for the recruiting of men by a joint appeal 
of representatives, of owners and workers, known as the "Call 

1 1, c, the New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Commission, dis- 
cussed in the concluding section of this chapter. 



SHIPPING 35 

to the Sea," the object of which was to induce men who had been 
seamen to return to their former occupation. 1 Later ratified by 
the employers and the union, this constituted the first written 
agreement ever made between American shipowners and the Sea- 
men's Union. 

A second conference was held a year later, when the Atlantic 
seamen agreed to leave the adjustment of wages to the Shipping 
Board, and the owners agreed to accept such adjustments for 
privately owned vessels. Shortly thereafter the board issued 
new wage scales awarding the men substantial increases. 2 

After the armistice, demands of the men for wage increases, for 
shorter hours, and for changes in union status threatened a stop- 
page of shipping. To prevent a strike, and if possible to provide 
permanent machinery for the adjustment of future disputes, the 
Shipping Board in June, 19 19, once more called the parties in in- 
terest to an industrial conference in Washington. The marine 
section of this conference 3 was unable to come to any agreement, 
having been deadlocked on the question of preferential treatment 
of union men. 4 

Conferences continued but the men were unwilling to accept 
the wage increases which the Shipping Board offered, and the at- 
titude of the private owners on the question of preferential treat- 
ment for union men was one of unalterable opposition. A strike 
ensued and for more than two> weeks the entire ocean-going and 
coastwise shipping at Atlantic and Gulf ports was completely 
tied up. The settlement was a compromise, giving the men sub- 
stantially the wages they had demanded, but not the preferential 
union treatment. 5 The eight-hour day was allowed while vessels 

*See Report of Director of Marine and Dock Industrial Relations 
Division, submitted as of December 31, 1918. 

3 A standing committee of five was arranged for, charged with the 
improvement of sanitary conditions and other employment problems. 

3 There were also two other sections — a Dock Section and a Harbor 
Section. See B. M. Squires in Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, July, 1919, page 14. 

4 It is interesting to note that here again is an illustration of the 
difficulty which, after the armistice, employer and employee found in 
corning together, who, during the war, had been able to adjust their 
differences without serious trouble. 

^ 5 The steamship companies did not expressly agree to give preferen- 
tial treatment to union men but there seems to have been a tacit un- 
derstanding that such preference would in practice be given. 



36 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

were in port, but the three watches which the men had demanded 
ai- sea were refused. 

„ On the Pacific Coast, where before the war 95% of the seamen 
had been organized, wages were fixed by joint agreement between 
the private owners and the men, and the Shipping Board agreed 
to accept, for the vessels under its control, the wage scales thus 
reached. Arrangements for recruiting former seamen and for 
the dilution of the trade, similar to those on the Atlantic Coast, 
were made. On both coasts the war record was excellent. The 
Shipping Board succeeded in. keeping the rapidly increasing mer- 
chant marine fully manned. 

Lin contrast to the record of both Atlantic and Pacific Coasts is 
the record of the Great Lakes. Here the opposition of the em- 
ployers to the union — strengthened as the union was by the na- 
tional crisis — produced a situation in which disastrous strikes 
were on two occasions averted by only the narrowest marg£m\ On 
the Great Lakes 80% of the tonnage was handled by the Lake 
Carriers' Association, alleged to have been controlled by the 
United States Steel Corporation. Whether this claim was true 
or not, its labor policies were extremely hostile to the Seamen's 
Union. 

It had been the practice of the Association to recruit its men 
from the assembly halls of its so-called Welfare Association, and 
to require them to carry "Continuous Discharge Books," in which 
officers of the vessels made reports on the men leaving their em- 
ploy. The men claimed that these discharge books, which had to 
be deposited with the ship operator on entering the employment 
and without which no new job could be obtained, were used to 
discriminate against the union. The great resentment which this 
aroused resulted — as in many other places during the war — in 
demands that the cards and the assembly halls be abolished. The 
Lake Carriers' Association being unwilling to recede from its posi- 
tion, a strike for this and other grievances was ordered to com- 
mence October 1, 191 7. 

Through the intervention of Mr. Stevens of the Shipping Board 
the wage differences — one of the matters in controversy — were 
adjusted. The Board also promised to investigate "the discharge 
books," and thereupon the strike was indefinitely postponed. 
After an examination of the facts, the Shipping Board directed 
the Lake Carriers' Association to discontinue the use of these 



SHIPPING 37 ) 

books, allowing them to substitute certificates of discharge, from 
which, however, certain objectionable features, such as the per- 
sonal opinion of the discharging officer and notations that might 
indicate union activity, were eliminated. 

Nevertheless the Lake Carriers' Association devised a method 
of making use of these discharge certificates which was as ob- 
jectionable to the men as the old discharge books had been. The 
association "substituted for the discharge book a 'certificate of 
membership,' with a pocket in it, as a container for the individual 
discharge certificates, and that all the papers had as before to be 
produced and deposited at the time of employment." 1 The men 
claimed that this would also be used for discriminatory purposes 
and demanded its abolition, as well as the practice of hiring men 
at the assembly halls, which the association had maintained. 

Another source of irritation was the attitude persistently taken 
by the association toward the union. Its representatives had re- 
fused to attend the Marine Conference because of the presence of 
representatives of the Union. Furthermore, when a Government 
Committee on recruiting had unanimously recommended that the 
cooperative arrangement, contained in the "Atlantic Agreement," 
be extended to the Great Lakes and the Pacific Coast, the as- 
sociation refused to do so. It also refused to sign the "Call to the 
Sea," which had been signed by Atlantic and Pacific shipowners, 
Nor would it adopt the method of training provided for in the 
"Atlantic Agreement." The reason given by the Lake Carriers 
for these refusals was that to accede to any of these requests 
would have been equivalent to recognizing the union. Irritated 
by these extreme manifestations of hostility, the men now in- 
sisted not only on the elimination of the discharge certificates, 
and the hiring of men at the assembly halls, but that the owners 
sign the "Call to the Sea," and that they adopt a training plan 
similar to that contained in the "Atlantic Agreement" for recruit- 
ing men to the service. 

Wage demands could easily have been adjusted, but the as- 
sociation held out firmly on the other matters, and a strike was 
declared for July 28. A week or two before the date set, the 
Shipping Board ordered a change in the discharge certificate, 
eliminating its objectionable features and directing that it should 

Report of the Director, Marine and Dock Industrial Relations Di- 
vision, p. 24. 



38 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

state on its face that it was the property of the man, and that 
it need not be produced or deposited at the time of hiring. 
The Shipping Board also decided questions of overtime, and an- 
nounced that it would immediately adjust wages. The men, how- 
ever, persisted in their full demands. The situation became 
tense, and feeling ran very, high indeed. To have tied up ship- 
ping on the Great Lakes in July, 191 8, would have meant ir- 
reparable damage to the nation's fighting ability, as these vessels 
transported grain for the Allies' Armies and iron ore for the prin- 
cipal steel mills of the country. 

Four days before the date set for the strike, Chairman Hurley, 
of the Shipping Board, issued a statement in which he reviewed 
the circumstances and the men's demands, and'he concluded that 
"The Shipping Board does not feel that there are any grievances 
of such a nature as to justify a strike at this time." The state- 
ment was published in large advertisements by the association and 
was bitterly resented by the union, which objected not only to 
the conclusion, but also to a portion of the statement in which it 
said that, "The Board has not decided to use the Great Lakes 
for training and recruiting marines." The men felt that this was 
either a misstatement or that the Shipping Board had "suddenly 
decided to change its policy ... to recall the letters sent to 
the unions and the shipowners last month, and to lay aside its 
program with reference to the national use to be made of the 
Great Lakes, because the Lake Carriers' Association has refused 
cooperation.'' 1 The men held their grounds, and it looked as if 
the strike could not be averted. As a result, however, of last 
minute conferences with each side the Shipping Board issued 
orders compelling substantial compliance with the union's de- 
mands, and the strike was called off. 

The action of the Lake Carriers' Association furnishes the only 
example that has come to the writer's attention in which an em- 
ployer refused to attend a national conference called by the 
Government, because of the presence of the members of a union. 
Most of the associations composing the Industrial Conference 
Board cannot be accused of fondness for unions, and probably 
a large majority of the firms comprising the membership of these 
associations are just as unwilling to "recognize" unions as was 

better from Victor Olander, Secretary International Seamen's 
Union to H. B. Ehrman of the Shipping Board. 



SHIPPING 39 

the Lake Carriers' Association. Yet to meet the national emer- 
gency five representatives of the Industrial Conference Board 
joined with five representatives of unions in the organization of 
the National War Labor Board. In the shipbuilding industry, 
every shipbuilder submitted to labor adjustments by a board 
of which a representative of organized labor was a member. This 
did not constitute recognition of the union, nor did the actions 
which the Lake Carriers' Association refused to take. And yet 
if a strike had occurred, the public would doubtless have blamed 
the union whose affirmative action would have actually brought 
it on. But would not the strike, as a matter of fact, have been to 
a much greater degree the result of the association's stubbornness 
and lack of cooperation? 

NATIONAL ADJUSTMENT COMMISSION 

To adjust disputes between longshoremen and their employers, 
strikes having already occurred in several ports, the Shipping 
Board and the War and Labor Departments cooperated in 
August, 191 7, in the organization of the National Adjustment 
Commission, by agreement with shipping operators, the Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor, and the International Longshoremen's 
Association. 1 It was also provided that local Commissions be 
appointed in important ports with memberships of three — one to 
represent the Shipping Board and War Department jointly, one, 
the Longshoremen's Union, and one, the employers. 2 

The jurisdiction of the board extended over the entire At- 
lantic Coast and the Gulf of Mexico. But because of the op- 
position of the employers of the Great Lakes 3 and the Pacific 
Coast 4 to the presence of union representatives on both the board 

1 The Board was to consist of one member nominated by the Shipping 
Board, one by the War Department, one by the Longshoremen's 
Association, and two representatives of the shipping interests, one of 
whom was to act in cases involving deep sea and the other coastwise 
shipping. See Chairman's Report National Adjustment Commission. 

3 Local Commissions were established at 26 ports. 

8 One group of employers, the Lumber Carriers' Association of 
the Great Lakes, adopted the agreement of the National Adjustment 
Commission on August 22, 1918, and a local Commission was estab- 
lished at Chicago for the lumber industry. Local commissions were 
also established at ports on the Great Lakes to adjust disputes in the 
coal-handling industry. 

4 In Seattle and Tacoma, Washington, the principal shipping com- 
panies adopted the agreement with the proviso that any disputes not 



40 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

and the local commissions, the authority of the National Adjust- 
ment Commission in these localities was confined to special cases. 

In the original agreement by which the Commission was cre- 
ated, its jurisdiction was limited to longshoremen's work. This 
was, however, extended by special agreements of the parties in 
interest, including the Shipping Board, to the adjustment of 
wages and working conditions on harbor craft, and many of the 
local commissions organized by the Naticaal Adjustment Com- 
mission exercised a likewise broadened jurisdiction. 

In the fixing of wages it was found that the employees, while 
striving to establish uniform scales for the same kind of work 
at different ports, felt that differences in compensation should be 
made for handling different cargoes in cases where a special 
hazard to life or health was involved. Thus the men desired uni- 
form scales of wages set for all Atlantic and Gulf ports, but they 
asked for double wages when handling wheat in the bottom of the 
hold, or uncrated barbed wire, or when loading explosives '"'down 
stream." The employers, on the other hand, took exactly the 
opposite view on both questions. They insisted that differences 
in compensation which had for a long time existed in the different 
Atlantic ports were founded on differences in the cost of living 
and should be maintained. And they claimed that little if any 
differential should be established for handling different kinds of 
merchandise. 1 

In its earlier decisions the commission set different scales for 
the different Atlantic ports and for deep sea in contrast to coast- 
wise longshore work. As the war continued, however, it became 
increasingly necessary to be able to shift men from one point to 
another and from one kind of work to another as the emergencies 
demanded, and this made a uniform scale imperative. A second 
reason for a uniform scale was that it was a method for obtaining 
higher wage levels which were especially needed in those ports 
where the wages were lowest. The tendency had been for skilled 

settled locally should be referred to the Commission. A local com- 
mon was established in Portland. Oregon, with representatives in 
its membership of the Longshoremen's Union; but this was the only 
Pacific port at which such a local commi : • created. For the 

Puget Sound District a special local commission was organized, con- 
sisting of only one member — a local agent of the National Adjust- 
ment Commission. 

1 For a discussion of standardization of wages during the war see 
Chapter XV. 



SHIPPING 41 

longshoremen to drift into better paid occupations, particularly 
the shipyards. Inasmuch as shipyard wages were being stand- 
ardized on the entire coast — that is to say, inasmuch as all of the 
shipyard workers were receiving the rates of the highest paid 
yards — the competition of the shipyards in places where long- 
shore wages were low was particularly severe. For this reason 
uniformity, meaning as it did the adoption of the highest scales, 
would better enable all ports to keep their longshoremen in spite 
of competition of other occupations. 

For these reasons the awards of the Commission, of October 
and November, 19 18, established uniform rates for deep sea and 
coastwise longshore work for all the ports included within the 
North Atlantic Division (New York, Baltimore, Boston, and 
Hampton Roads District); and in November, 191 8, a similar 
award was made for deep sea work for the Gulf ports. The 
policy of standardization was also applied in the deep sea award 
of December, 19 18, fixing rates for the South Atlantic ports, 
lower than those established for the North Atlantic and Gulf 
ports but uniform within the South Atlantic District. 

The Commission was able to prevent the occurrence of any se- 
rious strike during the active war period, although many con- 
troversies arose in which peace was maintained with a great deal 
of difficulty. Thus on the Pacific, where the employers' opposi- 
tion to the unions prevented the creation of local commissions, 
disputes occurred in the Puget Sound district very similar to those 
which, as we have seen in the previous section of this chapter, 
took place on the Great Lakes. Here, as there, the men de- 
manded the abolition by the use of employers of "rustling cards" 
(identical in principle with the "discharge certificates") and of 
"hiring halls." In an effort to avoid a strike the board sum- 
moned respresentatives of both sides to Washington. The great- 
est difficulty was experienced in reaching an award which would 
be accepted by both sides; the decision as finally announced 
abolished rustling cards — which the board's representatives for 
the Puget Sound District, Professor Carleton Parker, had found 
to have been used for discriminatory purposes. The award per- 
mitted the continued use of the hiring halls but only under the 
supervision of an appointee of the Shipping Board and provided 
that in any event the use of the halls be discontinued by July 
1, 19 18. The board's decision, especially this last part of it, was 



42 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

virtually forced by the men; it aroused bitter resentment on the 
part of the employers, who felt — with some degree of justice — 
that on this point they had not been given an opportunity to 
be heard. Feeling ran high and it was only by the exertion of 
severe pressure on both sides by the Government that peace 
was maintained. A rehearing was held on June 25, 1918, which 
the employers failed to attend. By this time, however, the ex- 
tension of the work of the U. S. Employment Service, sanctioned 
by Presidential order, opened the way for an easy solution of this 
troublesome point. The employers were directed either to close 
the halls or to put them under the supervision of the IL S. Em- 
ployment Services (of which the President of the Longshore- 
men's Association was Director of dock labor) . 

Another case, which has a certain human interest, developed 
out of the men's demand in New York that a foreman by the 
name of Frank Laguiro be discharged. Over an issue apparently 
so insignificant, the entire shipping of the Port of New York was 
almost tied up at a critical period during the war. The com- 
mission found that the evidence did not warrant ordering his dis- 
charge, but that, in view of the fact the men at his pier were so 
hostile to him, it recommended that he be transferred to another 
pier. 

The longshore industry at the Port of New York is another of 
the many industries in which, although no serious strike oc- 
curred during the war, the difficulty of preserving industrial 
peace in the period immediately following is clearly exemplified, 
and this in spite of the fact that longshore work was one of the 
few industries in which an attempt was made to continue as a 
piece-time agency, war machinery for the adjustment of dis- 
putes. 1 

In June, 1919, the dock section of a conference called by the 

J The creation of permanent arbitral machinery is all the more 
noteworthy in view of the fact that strong union organization in 
the longshore industry was a matter of very recent growth. B. M. 
Squire, in the Monthly Laoor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics, December, 1919, points out the casual nature of longshore work 
and the checkered history of longshoremen's unions. He states that 
in 191 1 the International Longshoremen's Union had a membership in 
the port of New York of 3,200. In 1914, after consolidating with a 
rival union, its members were over 6,000. In 1918 the membership 
included practically every member of the trade, variously estimated at 
from 40,000 to 60,000. 



SHIPPING 43 

Shipping Board (referred to in the second part of this chapter) 
reached an agreement for the continuance during peace times of 
the National Adjustment Commission, with certain changes in its 
structure and personnel. These changes recognized the desire 
which many of the employers had expressed during the war for 
the maintenance — especially after the war was over — of separate 
wage scales at the different ports and the country was divided 
into nine districts with separate commissions for each, but with 
one chairman (named by the Shipping Board to represent the 
public) serving on all the commissions. The agreement which 
constituted the National Adjustment Commission provided that 
pending its awards there should be no strikes, and that its awards 
be accepted by both sides. A convention of the Longshoremen's 
Union unanimously authorized a committee to enter into an agree- 
ment embodying these general terms, and later both the executive 
council of the union and the employers' association ratified the 
agreement, with some few changes. 1 

At the Port of New York demands had been made of wage in- 
creases for longshore work to $1.00 an hour for straight time and 
$2.00 an hour for overtime, and late in September, 1919, the re- 
constituted commission for the North Atlantic deep sea district 
commenced its hearings. Upon its announcement on October 6, 
1 9 19, of an award of 70 cents for straight time and $1.10 for 
overtime (increases of 5 and 10 cents respectively), the men re- 
fused to accept it and quit work. The President of the Long- 
shoremen's Association had been a member of the Commission 
and he, together with the other representative of the men, had 
voted against the award. He did all in his power, however, to 
induce the men to accept it and remain at work. The strike was 
led by men who had quarreled with officials of the International 
Longshoremen's Union. It lasted about four weeks, paralyzed the 
shipping of New York during that time, and through its interfer- 
ence with the export of food and other vitally needed materials 
intensified, in other parts of the world, the suffering which the 
war had already caused. All branches of the Government were 
firm in their insistence that the award of the National Adjustment 

*In August, 1920, the Shipping Board announced its unwillingness to ' 
continue its membership in the reconstituted Commission. On October 
1st, the Commission formally dissolved and there was thus abolished 
the only one of the war adjustment agencies which had survived as a 
permanent peace-time organization. 



44 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Commission be respected. The Secretary of Labor, however, 
after appealing to the strikers to return to work, made the tactical 
blunder of appointing a conciliation committee, including in its 
membership F. P. A. Vacerelli, the insurgent leader of the strikers. 
Mayor Hylan and one of the Labor Department's conciliators 
were the other members. The appointment of this committee led 
to the prolongation of the strike, inasmuch as it revived the hopes 
of the men that they would receive further concessions. But the 
employers, as well as the officers of the International Longshore- 
men's Association, insisted upon the validity of the award of the 
National Adjustment Commission. Gradually the men returned 
to work, yet not, unfortunately, until after the efforts of the 
strikers to prevent members of the International Longshoremen's 
Union from going back had resulted in a number of riots, in one 
of which two fatalities occurred. 

The award of the commission had provided that if the Govern- 
ment's efforts to reduce the cost of living should prove unsuccess- 
ful the case would be reopened on December i (or if it appeared 
at that time that there had been an improvement in the efficiency 
of the workers — the award calling attention to the lack of effi- 
ciency then prevailing). The cost of living did not decline 
and late in November the commission reopened its hearings and 
awarded the men a further increase of 10 cents an hour. In the 
meantime the commission had heard the Gulf case and an- 
nounced an increase coincident in time and practically identical 
in provision with the revised New York award. 

But the wages of coastwise longshoremen had all this time re- 
mained unchanged at 65 cents an hour, in spite of the increase 
granted to deep sea men of 15 cents an hour. 1 The coastwise 
shipping industry had become unprofitable. The Government 
guarantee of income, which, together with the railroads, these 
shipping interests had received upon the Government's assump- 
tion of war-time control, had not been continued under the Act 
of Congress under which the railroads and the coastwise shipping 
lines were restored to their private owners. It therefore seemed 
impossible to increase wages until higher railroad and shipping 

1 There had, before the war, been a differential between the two of 
about 5 cents which was justified by the fact that there was some- 
what steadier work for the coastwise longshoremen, but during the 
war, as we have seen, this differential had been abolished. 



SHIPPING 45 

rates could be established. The coastwise longshoremen, resent- 
ing the continuance of the 15 cent differential between the deep 
sea men and themselves, went on a strike, which continued for 
many months and brought about innumerable complications. 

THE NEW YORK HARBOR WAGE ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

In the fall of 191 7 a strike was threatened at the Port of New 
York by the men on all the harbor craft. Such a strike — in the 
midst of the war — would have been a calamity. Not only would 
it have tied up all the ferries connecting Manhattan Island with 
New Jersey, Brooklyn, and Staten Island, and the lighters upon 
which New York City is absolutely dependent for food and fuel 
and for the movement of much of the freight in and out of the 
city needed in war manufacture, but it would also have brought 
all ocean shipping to a standstill. And inasmuch as more than 
half of our shipments to the Allies were sent through the Port of 
New York, the seriousness of the situation will readily be under- 
stood. 

Among the unions whose members were employed in harbor 
work a movement had begun in 19 13 for closer association. This 
movement culminated in 191 7 when practically all of the unions 
became united in the Marine Workers' Affiliation of the Port of 
New York. The opposition of the employers to this organization 
and their unwillingness to deal with some of the unions which 
composed it, had led in the spring of the year to the breaking 
off of negotiations for the settlement of demands of some of the 
harbor crafts. Persistent efforts to adjust the difficulties, par- 
ticipated in by Federal and State mediators, had failed, and a 
strike seemed imminent. 

The situation was so threatening that in October, 191 7, Mr. 
Stevens, Vice-Chairman of the Shipping Board, came to New 
York and in separate conference with both sides endeavored to 
get them to agree to the organization of a local board of ad- 
justment, of the type provided for in the agreement creating the 
National Adjustment Commission — that is to say, consisting of 
one representative of the public, one of the employers, and one 
of the employees. The men were willing to accept a board of 
this kind, but the employers claimed that the Marine Workers' 
Affiliation did not represent their employees, as to whom they 



46 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

made the statement, so often made under these circumstances, 
that "a majority of their employees are satisfied and loyal . . . 
and have no knowledge of any threatened strike." 1 

They refused to meet representatives of the Affiliation, and 
"challenged the patriotism of any set of men who when their 
country is at war will attempt to form a union in this great Port 
of New York where unionism was never before known for the 
purpose of taking advantage of the times and compelling tow- 
boat interests to join with them in the extortion of unheard of and 
exorbitant prices at the expense of the commerce of the port." 2 

As a compromise, an agreement was reached on October 20, 
191 7, whereby a board was created known as the Board of Ar- 
bitration, New York Harbor Wage Adjustment, of which all three 
members were to be Government representatives — one from the 
Shipping Board, one from the Department of Commerce, and 
one from the Department of Labor. It was also provided that 
the board was to have no authority over the question of the open 
and closed shop, but on the other hand the employers agreed not 
to discriminate against the men for union membership. Its first 
award, on November 16, fixed a new scale of wages; and the suc- 
ceeding months were taken up by efforts of the union to have .the 
scale put into effect by all the employers, many of whom denied 
the jurisdiction of the board and were unwilling to comply with 
its award. The situation was further complicated by the fact 
that boats were owned not only by private companies but also 
by the railroads — soon to be taken over by the Federal Govern- 
ment — and by the City and the State of New York, as well as 
by different departments of the Federal Government. In Decem- 
ber, 19 1 7, one hundred employers — including marine departments 
of the railways and City and State agencies — were complained 
against for not putting the award into effect. By the end of 
January 200 complaints had been received. Many private em- 
ployers openly defied the authority of the board and as the unrest 

1 Statement of the New York Towboat Exchange, quoted by B. M. 
Squires in Monthly Labor Review for September, 1918. The reader 
is referred to this and other articles by Mr. Squires in other issues 
of the Monthly Labor Review, and also in the Journal of Political 
Economy, Volume XXVII, Number 10, December, 1919, for an excel- 
lent account of labor adjustments and industrial conditions in the 
port of New York. 

a Statement of employers to Shipping Board. 



SHIPPING 47 

among the workers increased new demands by the union were 
made and a strike once more threatened. As a result of a con- 
ference called in March, 191 8, by the Shipping Board a commit- 
tee of the employers was formed to enforce compliance. Many 
employers claimed to be paying the wages fixed in the award 
but an inspection of the payrolls of 80 of them showed that 60 
were not doing so. Thereupon those who still refused to comply 
were summoned before the Shipping Board, and in some cases it 
was necessary to threaten to commandeer their boats before they 
could be induced to fall in line. 

During all this time the membership of the union was growing 
by leaps and bounds. The extent of this growth was largely at- 
tributable to the non-compliance of the boat owners with the 
award. If his employer was unwilling to grant an increase in 
wages, the individual, unorganized worker did not know how to 
secure it. Nor was the union organizer slow to take advantage 
of the opportunity which the employer thus created, since in prac- 
tice, by reason of his knowledge, experience, and spare time the 
union representative was best fitted to bring the complaints of 
the men to the attention of the board and thus secure, for any 
group of workers, the benefits of the award. A great deal of time 
was thus necessarily consumed before the new wage scale was 
adopted by all of the boat owners, and in the meantime the unrest 
caused by their resistance was intensified by the conflicts of juris- 
diction between the Harbor Board, the Railroad Administration, 
and the Municipal and State authorities. 1 

Even before the general acceptance of the award new demands 
were accumulating, and when on March 20, 19 18, the board re- 
fused to consider these new demands until September 30, the 
men became indignant and appealed to the newly organized Na- 
tional War Labor Board. Without attempting at that time to 
decide the controversies, the War Labor Board, by means of 
conferences with all of the parties in interest, brought about a 

3 It should be noted that the adjustment of wages for State and 
Municipal employees was complicated by legal difficulties — wages in 
some cases being prescribed by law. The Railroad Administration, 
faced the obstacle of having to fix wages for the entire country. It 
was, therefore, difficult for it to make an exception in the case of 
employees at the Port of New York Yet granting this, there can be 
little doubt that the Railroad Administration failed to give to the 
other departments of the Government that degree of cooperation 
which the emergency demanded. 



48 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

modification of the arbitral agreement so as to enlarge the mem- 
bership of the Harbor Board by including a representative of 
employers and employees. The board 'as thus constituted held 
hearings and granted a new wage scale; before this became effec- 
tive, however, the first general award of the Railroad Adminis- 
tration was announced, which gave the railroad harbor employees 
a higher rate of wages than had been granted to them by the 
Harbor Board. The Railroad Administration was induced to 
hold its award in abeyance so far as it affected New York harbor 
men, and in an effort to overcome the difficulties resulting from 
this conflict of jurisdictions the agreement was again amended so 
as to add to the Harbor Board a representative of the Railroad 
Administration and a second representative of the employees, 
thus bring the membership of the new board up to seven. A re- 
hearing was now held before this new board and another award 
promulgated, to be effective until May 31, 19 19, "unless in the 
judgment of the board conditions warranted a change prior to 
the date thus fixed for expiration." 

Even now the troubles of the harbor were not at an end. It 
was the employers' turn to be dissatisfied, partly with the award 
itself and partly with the indefiniteness of its duration, and they 
appealed to the National War Labor Board for a hearing. 1 In 
the meantime, because of protests of the railroad men, the Rail- 
road Administration had put General Order Number 27 into ef- 
fect wherever the wages under the order were greater than those 
fixed by the Harbor Board. General Order Number 27 had also 
the effect of disturbing the processes of standardization in the 
rates of men employed by different railroads at New York harbor, 
and lead to demands from the railroad men for uniform rates — 
that is to say, for a standardization upward. This resulted in a 
new and more vigorous protest from the owners. 2 

The next few months witnessed a struggle by the railroad em- 
ployees to receive the maximum benefits accruing to them under 
General Order Number 27, including the basic eight-hour day, 
which was referred to although not expressly granted in this 
order, but which, as a matter of fact, the Railroad Administration 

1 No action was taken on this appeal. 

a The situation was further complicated by the reluctance of the 
City, State and Federal authorities to put the award into effect, which 
very much increased unrest, and came very near resulting in strikes. 



SHIPPING 49 

had been extending in other branches of the service. 1 It is un- 
necessary to go into all the difficulties that arose as a consequence 
of these conflicts of jurisdiction except to say that they were ex- 
tremely irritating, needlessly adding to the complications of a 
situation which for months had been almost at the breaking point, 2 

The demand of the railroad men for the eight-hour day finally 
led to the adoption of this demand by the entire Marine Work- 
ers' Affiliation. So serious became the danger of a strike that 
shortly after the armistice, the Harbor Board (which had a 
few weeks before recommended its own dissolution on account of 
the conflicts of jurisdiction, but which had, in spite of this, re- 
mained in existence) called a hearing for December 6, 191 8. The 
employers now refused to submit to the board's jurisdiction on 
the ground that the termination of the war (by the armistice) 
had ended the authority of the board. A new board was pro- 
posed which the employees were willing to accept, but the em- 
ployers, although willing to submit to a new board the question 
of wages, were unwilling to arbitrate the question of the eight- 
hour day, and the employer member resigned from the Harbor 
Board. 

Efforts to induce the National War Labor Board to assume 
jurisdiction failed on the ground that the Harbor Board was still 
in existence, and that it should immediately hear the controversy. 3 
But because both the Railroad Administration and the private 

1 See Chapter VIII for a more detailed discussion of railroad ad- 
justments and of the effect of General Order Number 27. 

7 Robert P. Bass, in the Report of the Director of the Marine and 
Dock Industrial Relations Division, U. S. Shipping Board, says at 
p. 29: "The New York harbor situation stands out as a striking 
example of the futility of agreements to arbitrate, yyhich include only 
a portion of the employers and employees in a given locality and 
industry. Because of the lack of a complete or unified system of 
arbitration, and because of the attempt to enforce conflicting stand- 
ards of wages and working hours in a single labor market, the 
situation at New York was always precarious, and throughout the 
latter part of 1917 and all of 1918 steadily drifted toward open 
rupture." 

'While the dispute was at its height, the Shipping Board issued the 
following statement: "There are still in the American armies in 
Europe over a million and a half men, and it is inconceivable that 
the American people or its Government would permit of any action 
which would imperil the movement of food and supplies to these 
Americans, now that their actual task of fighting is over. In addition 
to the maintaining of our own armies^ there is the obligation to feed 
and clothe the peoples of our allies in Europe in a large measure 



50 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

boat owners refused to agree to accept the decision of the board, 
its remaining members declined to act and recommended that the 
case be again presented to the National War Labor Board. 

Once more the War Labor Board held a hearing and once more 
the Railroad Administration and the private boat owners refused 
to accept its jurisdiction. Proposals by the employers for a new 
board, coupled with a thirty-day investigation of conditions, were 
rejected by the men, and the War Labor Board felt unable to 
act. 1 

A few days later the boat owners issued advertisements in the 
press setting forth their side of the controversy. In these state- 
ments the employers, as was so often the case (see Chapter XVI), 
attempted to exploit the patriotic motive by capitalizing the 
fact that any action taken by the men to enforce their demands 
would result in suffering to the boys "over there," forgetting 
their own share of the responsibility for such an outcome. On 
the other hand, they pointed out — with some degree of justice 
— the peculiar conditions of their industry, which differentiated it, 

impoverished and destitute because of their long resistance to the 
German power . . . There is also the nation's obligation to its 
citizens to bring back to America as rapidly as circumstances will 
allow hundreds of thousands of American troops awaiting transporta- 
tion on the other side. In the performance of all of these tasks the 
Government will find itself seriously crippled by reason of any 
stoppage of work on the part of the harbor craft operators and em- 
ployees of New York Harbor." (New York Times, December 17, 
1918.) 

a The Board issued the following statement: 

"The National War Labor Board finds itself unable to secure a 
settlement of the controversy with reference to the New York 
Harbor situation for the following reasons: 

1. The private boat owners and the Railroad Administration failed 
to comply with the order of the board of December 21. 1918, to fill 
the vacancies existing on the New York Harbor Wage Adjustment 
Commission. 

2. The private boat owners and the Railroad Administration refused 
to submit the case to the National War Labor Board and to agree 
to abide by its decision. 

Under the principles and policies of the National War Labor Board 
we cannot proceed further and give assurance of rendering a definite 
and binding decision, except in case of joint submission. 

3. The private boat owners refused to submit the question of an 
eight-hour day to any other proposed form of arbitration except after 
an investigation for a period of not less than thirty days by a specially 
created conference committee, supplementary to the Arbitration Board." 



SHIPPING 51 

as far as the eight-hour day was concerned, from normal factory 
work. 

A strike which lasted three days immediately followed, and 
completely tied up every activity in the harbor. Appeals to the 
President for relief resulted in his cabling from Paris an urgent 
request to both sides to submit to the War Labor Board. In 
this emergency all of the Government bodies, including the 
troublesome Railroad Administration, signified their willingness 
to accept the finding of the War Labor Board. The employers, 
however, remained obdurate, except that one of them submitted 
to the jurisdiction of the Board, thus giving their counsel a 
standing in the subsequent hearings. 

The strike ended upon the assumption of jurisdiction by the 
War Labor Board. Extended hearings were held which were 
marked by the most intense bitterness on both sides. The War 
Labor Board was deadlocked in regard to the issues in contro- 
versy, and the case was referred to an umpire, Mr. V. Everett 
Macy (Chairman of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board). 

His decision came as a great disappointment to the men. At 
this particular time (March, 19 19) the labor market was over- 
supplied with workers, due to the returning soldiers, the shutting 
down of war production and the fact that peace production had 
not yet been resumed. It was thought that commodity prices 
were going to be substantially reduced and wage increases were 
deprecated because they interfered with the hoped-for reductions 
in the cost of living. The umpire concluded that no case had 
been made out for an increase of wages over the Harbor Board's 
decision of July, 19 18. The eight-hour day was awarded for a 
few of the harbor occuptions but. denied to the most important 
ones. The Marine Workers' Affiliation considered the award ab- 
solutely unsatisfactory and refused to accept it. On March 4th, 
they declared another strike which was directed not alone against 
the private owners (only one of whom had joined in the sub- 
mission to the War Labor Board) but also against the Railroad 
Administration which had been a party to it, and a great deal of 
indignation was caused by the failure of the workers to abide 
by the decision of the umpire. 

The Railroad Administration, after insisting for a time that 
the men abide by the decision, finally granted the strikers the 
eight-hour day and wage increases, which were also conceded by 



52 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

other Government agencies. The strike continued, however, 
for many weeks against the private owners until settled by the 
acceptance by the workers of a ten-hour day with an agreement 
by both sides to arbitrate the question of wages. 1 

J The anomalous condition was thus produced of an eight-hour day 
for harbor men working for the railroads and a ten-hour day for those 
employed on privately owned boats. This resulted in another strike, 
caused by the transfer to a private company of a number of the boats 
owned by one of the railroads. The men claimed that the transfer 
was not bona fide but was merely part of a plot on the part of the 
railroads to get rid of the eight-hour day. 



CHAPTER V 
The President's Mediation Commission 

In order to understand the circumstances surrounding the cre- 
ation of the President's Mediation Commission we must go back 
to the early months of the war. At that time very little war me- 
diating machinery had yet been provided — none whose jurisdic- 
tion extended beyond a particular industry. And yet, the neces- 
sity for adequate methods for adjusting labor disputes, which 
were occurring in almost every trade, was then every day be- 
coming apparent. 

Production of spruce lumber in the Pacific Northwest (vitally 
needed for aeroplanes and shipbuilding) was practically at a 
standstill because of the bitter antagonisms between the lumber 
jacks and their employers. Copper mining in the most important 
producing areas had almost entirely ceased; industrial warfare, 
resulting in most serious stoppages of public service operations 
and war industries, was threatening from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. 

Long-standing grievances of the workers, employers' opposition 
to collective bargaining, the use to which an unlimited supply of 
immigrant labor had been put to keep wages of the unskilled at 
an abnormally low level, the belief that the rise in the cost of 
living was largely due to profiteering — all of these factors were 
contributing to stoppages of work which seriously threatened the 
Government's war program. These labor disturbances, espe- 
cially in the Far West, were met by ruthless and illegal reprisals 
on the part of both employers and Government officials. These 
reprisals were ostensibly directed against the I. W. W., but in 
fact were indiscriminate and branches of the A. F. of L. as well 
as more radical organizations suffered from them. The national 
leaders of the A. F. of L. were consequently driven to appeal to 
the President, in an effort to protect their members, and to aid in 
restoring production. 

53 



54 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

General conditions, brought to a focus by these protests, re- 
sulted in September, 191 7, in the appointment of a Mediation 
Commission, the purpose of which was to bring about the adjust- 
ment of disputes which at that time were of paramount impor- 
tance, and to investigate the general causes of industrial unrest 
and recommend methods for abating it. 

This body, like the National War Labor Board, which was 
created seven months later, was quite different from all of the 
other war Labor Adjustment Boards. It was the product of 
Presidential proclamation — not of agreement with labor unions — 
and its jurisdiction was not limited to one place or one trade 
but extended over the entire country. The Secretary of Labor 
was Chairman of the Commission, the other members of which 
were representatives of labor and capital. 1 Felix Frankfurter, 
afterwards to become the Chairman of the National War Labor 
Policies Board, was secretary. 

The industrial troubles of the packing plants in Chicago, of the 
mines and lumber fields of the West, of street railways, of tele- 
phone operators and oil workers of California were investigated 
and the Commission secured the return of the strikers in all but 
one of these industries. It was one of the first Government 
agencies to establish collective bargaining by the appointment of 
shop committees and to insist that they be dealt with by the 
employers and the excellent work accomplished by these com- 
mittees and the publicity which attended their installation was 
a powerful factor in the extension during the war of the shop 
committee movement. The Commission appointed administra- 
tors who settled the details of controversies and, acting as arbitra- 
tors in some cases and as mediators in others, ^maintained peace 
for the balance of the war period. 

The President's Mediation Commission induced the meat pack- 
ers to submit to arbitration their differences with the men, al- 
though two separate agreements for this purpose were necessary, 
one with the employees through their unions, 2 and one with the 

Ernest P. Marsh, Verner Z. Reed, Jackson L. Spangler and John 
H. Walker. 

'It is interesting to note that in its efforts to organize the packing 
house workers, the Chicago Federation of Labor under the leadership 
of John Fitzpatrick and William Z. Foster devised a form of industrial 
unionism by which all of the workers in the packing industry were 
united. A Stockyard Labor Council was formed which included local 



FKJSSIDKNT'S MEDIATION COMMISSION 55 

employers. Judge Alschuler was appointed arbitrator, and his 
award provided for materially increased wages, the basic eight- 
hour day, collective bargaining, and the right to trade union mem- 
bership. 1 Conditions were established which made for peace 
throughout the war period — that is, until a number of months 
after the armistice. 

In the copper mines where the production of millions of pounds 
of copper had been stopped by strikes tying up the richest fields 

unions of many trades such as butchers, blacksmiths, colored laborers, 
electrical workers, leather workers, machinists, office employees, rail- 
road carmen, firemen, engineers, switchmen, teamsters, etc. The local 
unions were affiliated with the A. F. of L. and received permission 
from their Internationals to join the Stockyard Council, although at 
the time of its formation some of the locals had no members in the 
stockyards. A vigorous organizing campaign then followed, in which 
among others, two negro organizers were employed. The spread of the 
movement was facilitated by discontent with conditions in the industry 
and strikes occurred in Omaha, Kansas City and Denver. At a na- 
tional conference in Omaha in November, the Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workmen decided upon demands for an eight- 
hour day, wage increases, etc. The presentation of these demands 
was, it is claimed, followed by the discharge of a number of members 
of the union, The packers refused to discuss the matters in dispute 
with representatives of the union and a strike followed. This resulted 
in the intervention" of the President's Mediation Commission and the 
agreement above referred to. Before the submission of the points at 
issue to the arbitrator, 18 separate demands of the men were referred 
to a committee of four — Carl Mayer and J. G. Condon, representing 
the employers and Frank P. Walsh and John Fitzpatrick, the men. 
This committee agreed upon 12 of the demands. The other six which 
included wages and the eight-hour day were submitted to arbitration. 
John E. Williams was originally appointed arbitrator but ill health 
compelled his* retirement and he was succeeded by Judge Samuel 
Alschuler. Recent disputes between the Stockyard Council and the 
International Officers of Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher 
Workers of North America lead to the demand that the Council be 
abolished. Upon the refusal of a large number of locals to sever their 
connections with the Council, their charters were revoked. 

1 Judge Alschuler's decision, reprinted in the Monthly Labor Review, 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, May, 1918, gives an excellent picture 
of the packing industry, showing that, from the date of the last strike 
in 1904 (in which the men were badly beaten and their union 
crushed), wages had remained at 18 cents per hour for many stockyard 
occupations, in spite of increased cost of living and the utter inadequacy 
of that remuneration to afford a minimum of subsistance. After the 
European War and the consequent cessation of immigration, the pack- 
ers, in order to keep their men, were forced to make substantial wage 
increases. But owing to the increased cost of living and the originally 
low wage levels, the men's compensation was before Judge Alschuler's 
award quite inadequate and very much less than that paid in other 
industries. 



56 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

of the country x the Commission was successful in procuring a re- 
turn to work of all of the men. It set up or reestablished local 
machinery for collective bargaining and appointed* an adminis- 
trator to adjust any differences which the copper companies and 
the men could not settle by themselves. 

With the administrator's aid strikes were avoided during the 
remainder of the war period. And the readjustments to a peace 
basis, which in the copper industry were particularly difficult, 
were made with a minimum of friction. 2 

The Mediation Commission also attempted to settle the differ- 
ences in the lumber districts of the Northwest, but here its efforts 
were not so successful. The I. W. W. was in control of the labor 
in this field, 3 and the Commission, although holding hearings in 
the lumber belt at which both employer and employee were called 

* See Chapter XIX for more detailed account of copper strikes and 
Bisbee deportations. 

2 In a letter to the Conciliation Division of the Department of Labor, 
dated October 20, 1919 (Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1919, page 
20), Mr. Hywel Davies, Labor Administrator for the Arizona copper 
industry, states that by the latter part of January, 1919, the copper in- 
dustry "was confronted with an accumulated surplus of over 1,000,- 
000,000 pounds of copper produced at a maximum cost under war 
conditions and with an expected market price of 26 cents but which 
had now slumped to about 15 cents per pound." The wage agree- 
ments made during the war had provided for a sliding scale depend- 
ing upon the selling price of copper. In view of the seriousness of the 
situation which confronted the industry a conference was called at 
Washington, and reductions in wages of $1.00 a day during February 
and March, 1919, in Montana, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada were decided 
upon and approved by representatives of the men. The administrator 
comments upon the fact that no such wage reductions were made in 
any other war industry and gives the men great credit for having 
accepted them without any serious stoppage of work. The only dis- 
turbance of any consequence was at Jerome, Arizona, where the mines 
were shut down for four months. The employers also are praised 
for not having insisted upon the full wage reduction called for in the 
sliding scale ... in Montana the Anaconda companies accepted the 
men's demand that after July, 1919, the sliding scale be abolished and 
a flat rate be established, restoring the $1.00 per day by which the 
wages had been reduced. (There was, however, a strike of the metal 
workers who demanded a larger increase.) The report gives details of 
other adjustments and shows that the spirit between the operators 
and the miners has improved to a marked degree during the war and 
post-armistice period. 

3 Robert Bruere in "Following the Trail of the I. W. W." page 17 
(reprinted from the New York Evening Post), states that the I. W. W. 
membership in the Washington lumber districts was variously esti- 
mated at from 7 to 30 thousand, and that the organization was 
rapidly growing. 



PRESIDENT'S MEDIATION COMMISSION $7 

upon to testify, failed to hear any of the members of the I. W. W., 
either individually or as members of that organization. 1 The ef- 
forts of the Commission to restore lumber production were un- 
successful, and it was not until a number of months later when 
the Loyal Legion was organized by a representative of the War 
Department that industrial peace was secured in the lumber belt. 2 

In the California oil fields a threatened strike was averted by 
the willingness of the independent companies to follow the lead 
of the Standard Oil Company and adopt the eight-hour day. It 
is interesting to note that the agreement made by the companies 
not to discriminate against their men for union membership was 
limited to unions affiliated with the American Federation of 
Labor. 3 , 

The report of the Commission, covering the work that it ac- 
complished and analyzing the underlying causes of the labor diffi- 
culties which it had investigated, is probably the ablest laboi 
document which the war produced — a document which has perv 
manent value for peace times as well as for the special emer- 
gencies of the war. The recommendations of the Commission 
were so excellent intrinsically, that it is a pity some of their 
practical value was lost because they were couched in general 
terms, whereas what was needed at this particular time was sug- 
gestions of such definiteness that they would naturally result in 
speedy administrative action. 

1 This position was in strange contrast^ to the attitude toward the 
I. W. W. taken by the Commission in its report to the President. 
This report gives an eminently fair and illuminating account of the 
origin and status of the I. W. W. — in fact, so fair to that body 
that it was introduced by members of the I. W. W. as evidence in their 
favor at' a number of Federal prosecutions. 

2 See Chapter XIX for a more detailed account of the I. W. W. 
and of the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumberman. 

3 The Federal Oil Inspection Board, set up by agreement between 
employers and their men through the efforts of Verner Z. Reed of 
the President's Mediation Commission functioned as labor adjuster in 
the California oil fields until May 12, 1919, and during that time 
prevented any cessations of work. See Seventh Annual Report Secre- 
tary of Labor, p. 23. 



CHAPTER VI 
Special Agencies of the War and Navy Departments 

ADMINISTRATOR OF LABOR STANDARDS IN ARMY 
CLOTHING 

One of the first needs of our new army to receive the atten- 
tion of the War Department was the need for uniforms. The 
clothing manufacturers were in part prepared to meet this de- 
mand because in the earlier days of the war the Allies — especially 
England — had placed large orders in this country for the manu- 
facture of uniforms and army coats. Our Government had the 
British experience to draw on. At first England had given out 
contracts for complete garments. That is to say, the manufac- 
turer furnished the cloth as well as the labor and delivered a 
completed article for a definite price. But England soon found 
it more satisfactory to purchase the materials, receiving bids from 
manufacturers for the labor only. And this practice, adopted by 
our Government, very much simplified the bidding and resulted 
in keener competition. It also lessened the contractor's risk and 
at the same time limited his profits to what he could make solely 
out of the labor involved. Thus the pressure to cheapen labor 
costs by subletting the work to the tenement house "sweat shop" 
sub-contractors was very much increased. 

Soon the War Department was flooded with complaints that 
some of the work was being done under insanitary conditions, 
that army uniforms were being manufactured in the tenements 
and in unsafe and unhealthy factories. The situation was further 
complicated by the existence of two rival unions, whose contests 
for domination resulted in frequent quarreling and often in 
strikes. (The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, whose 
members manufactured most of the army uniforms, was the more 
radical organization. It was organized in 19 14 by men who 
had seceded from the United Garment Workers of America, which 
is affiliated with the A. F. of L.) Another element of difficulty 

58 



SPECIAL AGENCIES 59 

was the fact that many of the employers were men who them- 
selves had recently risen from the ranks of the workers, and, as 
was usual in these cases, they were very reactionary and strongly 
anti-union. 

In view of the general situation the War Department ap- 
pointed a committee of three to investigate and this committee de- 
veloped into the Board of Control for Labor Standards in Army 
Clothing. To this board there were appointed an army officer, a 
former clothing manufacturer, and the executive secretary of the 
Consumers' League. Because the dominant union in this industry 
was not affiliated with the A. F. of L., no labor representative 
was appointed. 

The board found much need for improvement in the conditions 
under which the uniforms were being manufactured. Some of 
the employers had induced the army to station soldiers in uniform 
in front of the factories presumably to give to their plants the 
atmosphere of an official Government agency. And in certain 
cases the pressure of patriotic appeals induced the employees, in- 
cluding many women, to work long periods of overtime. Sanitary 
conditions were, in some places, exceedingly bad, and an ener- 
getic campaign was inaugurated to get the manufacturing of uni- 
forms out of the tenements. In these respects the Commission 
was successful, and under its direction, the sweat-shops were 
abolished, the making of army uniforms was carefully supervised, 
and the sanitary and safety conditions of factories improved. It 
did not, however, function as a mediating agency. 

In December, 191 7, 1 there was substituted for the board of 
three a single individual, who was known as the Administrator 
of Labor Standards in Army Clothing, and whose office was made 
a subsidiary branch of the Industrial Service Section of the Quar- 
termaster's Department. The position of Administrator was at 
first filled by Mr. Kirstein, one of the members of the original 
board, and in April, 19 18, Professor William Z. Ripley, who had 
served as one of the experts of the Railroad Wage Commission, 
succeeded Mr. Kirstein. 

Under the direction of the Administrator, the work of sanitary 
inspection was continued, with the function of labor adjustment 
added. The Administrator sought to prevent union discrimina- 

1 Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field 
of Industrial Relations During the War. 



60 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

tion and to maintain a position of neutrality between the two 
rival unions. He insisted upon collective bargaining, but followed 
the National War Labor Board rules in connection therewith. 

In the eagerness of the men to obtain concessions to which they 
considered themselves entitled, strikes were called for various 
reasons, frequently against the wishes of the national officers of 
the unions. These strikes were contrary to the labor policy of 
the Government, and met with the rebuke of the Administrator. 1 
On the other hand, he also experienced a great deal of difficulty 
with some of the employers who also violated the labor policies 
of the Government and who sometimes attempted by indirection 
to accomplish their purpose of weakening the union. In some 
cases the Administrator had to threaten manufacturers with the 
removal of their names from the list of approved contractors in 
order to secure their compliance with his decisions. 

Because much of the labor involved in clothing manufacture 
was in some localities done under the piece work system, many 
(disputes arose as to piece work rates, and a staff, expert in cal- 
culating costs of manufacturing, was developed to adjust these 
disputes (and also to advise the contract branch of the Quarter- 
master's Department). On that part of the work which was 
done on a basis of a weekly wage, considerable difficulty was ex- 
perienced in keeping up the efficiency of the men. At one time 
the cutters, dissatisfied with their pay, were shown to have de- 
liberately limited output in order to force a wage advance. 2 

At the time of the armistice a very serious strike occurred in 
New York because of the insistence of the Amalgamated Cloth- 
ing Workers of America upon receiving the forty-four-hour week, 
which, at their May convention, they had decided to demand. 
Although work was continued on Government orders, the stoppage 
applying only to private work, Mr. Ripley offered his services as 
labor adjuster. The employers seemed willing to accept the arbi- 
tration of the Labor Administrator and of the War Labor Board. 
The union, however, for some time, insisted upon its demands be- 

1 See decision of Administrator in Pahl-Hoyt Co. Brooklyn. 

a An abuse which the Administrator tried very hard to correct. 
In the case of Zeeman and Grossman, N. Y., decided in November, 
1918, the Administrator found that production had decreased 50 per 
cent since May, 1918. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES 61 

ing granted and refused to arbitrate. 1 The strike that followed 
lasted three months and was finally adjusted through the efforts 
of an advisory board, consisting of Mr. Ripley, Chairman; Felix 
Frankfurter, of the War Labor Policies Board and Louis Mar- 
shall, a promiment attorney. After the submission to this board, 
but before it had time to reach a decision, the manufacturers con- 
ceded the forty-four hour week 2 and the other questions were 
submitted to the board. 3 

A campaign now followed for the adoption of the forty-four- 
hour week all over the country, and soon thereafter the shorter 
week was adopted in all of the important clothing centers. In 
some places, notably Cincinnati, this result was only achieved 
after a very bitter struggle. 

1 Its reason for taking this attitude was probably the teeling that 
there was very little likelihood of receiving a favorable verdict from 
any Government board, the War Labor Board favoring the eight- 
hour day for factory work, but not the 44-hour week. See Chapter 
XIV. 

a Shortly before the concession of the 44-hour week by the New 
York manufacturers — indeed one of the facts which induced this action 
— the largest clothing factory in the country, Hart, Scha finer and 
Marx, of Chicago, had entered into an agreement with the Amal- 
gamated, providing for the 44-hour week. 

3 The advisory board made three separate reports — the first was pre- 
liminary and recommended the adoption of the 44-hour week, the 
return to work of the men and that studies be made in reference to 
wages and the creation of machinery to improve "efficiency, discipline 
and production." In the second this machinery was provided for as 
follows : Disputes which the representative of the union and the 
"Contractors Appeal Agent" were unable to settle were to be referred 
to an Impartial Chairman. The discharge of employees, which had 
been a source of controversy in this industry, was to be regulated 
by an Employment Agent, designated by the manufacturers, with the 
consent of the Advisory Board and subject to the approval of the 
Impartial Chairman. No discharges except "in aggravated instances" 
were to be made without written notice to employee and Employment 
Agent, who was directed to hold hearings — with appeal to the Im- 
partial Chairman in whom was vested the power of review. In the 
Board's final report a wage increase was granted and provision made 
for adjustments in the event of a "substantial reduction in the cost 
of living." The necessity of cooperation by the workers with the 
manufacturers "to the end that there shall be assured efficiency in 
production and adequacy of output" is emphasized. And the report 
states that : "The voluntary or deliberate interference with efficiency 
or reduction of output is a matter of such seriousness as to be 
regarded as justifying the immediate suspension by the Employment 
Agent with the sanction of the Impartial Chairman of any worker 
committing such an act." 



62 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 



ARSENAL AND NAVY YARD WAGE COMMISSION 

The Government had always maintained a number of its own 
plants for naval construction and ordnance manufacture. 1 But 
even in peace times they did not have sufficient capacity to supply 
the comparatively small needs of our regular army and navy. 
With our participation in the war, vast quantities of ordnance 
were ordered from private corporations and in addition the fa- 
cilities of the Government arsenals and navy yards were en- 
larged and the work very much speeded up. 

It was especially important to avoid strikes in these Government 
plants, both because of the vital need for their products and be- 
cause of the effect which an inability of the Government to main- 
tain continuous production in its own factories would have upon 
private industry. In certain respects the task was easier here 
than elsewhere. The eight-hour day had been established as in 
other government work, and it was also required by law that 
wages paid to Government employees be equal to those received 
by workers in private industry in the immediate neighborhood. 
Most of the Government workers were members of unions and 
questions of discrimination, which were so prominent elsewhere, 
did not arise. 

The chief task was therefore to increase wages in accordance 
with the advance in living costs and in accordance with the 
changes which were taking place in wages in the vicinities. For 
this purpose the Secretaries of War, Navy and Labor cooperated 
and on August 15, 191 7 the Arsenals and Navy Yard Commis- 
sion was organized. 2 A number of hearings were held on the basis 
of which the Navy was prepared to fix new scales for Navy Yards. 
The War Department, however, was not at that time ready to 
join, and the Navy Department made an independent award for 
Navy Yards. 

1 The principal arsenals are located at Watertown and Springfield, 
Mass.; Watervliet, N. Y.; Picatinny, N. J.; Frankford Arsenal, Phila- 
delphia, Pa., and Rock Island, 111. See A Report of the Activities of 
the War Department in the Fields of Industrial Relations During the 
War. 

a The members were Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy; Walter Lippmann, representing the War Department, and 
William Blackman, representing the Department of Labor; Stanley 
King succeeded Mr. Lippmann and Rowland B. Mahaney, Mr. Black- 
man. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES 63 

The Ordnance Department assigned Major B. H. Gitchell, 
afterward head of the Industrial Service Section, to consider the 
question at each arsenal separately and the scales arranged by 
him, in consultation with arsenal commanders and representatives 
of the men, were formally approved by the Commission and made 
effective November 1, 191 7. 1 From time to time thereafter new 
scales were established by both the Army and the Navy. The 
two Departments consulted informally before making awards, but 
the Commission as such ceased to function. 

NATIONAL HARNESS AND SADDLERY ADJUSTMENT 
COMMISSION 

The manufacture of harness and saddlery had, in recent years, 
very much fallen off due to the increasing use of automobiles and 
auto trucks. The war, however, made very large demands upon 
this industry as it did upon so many others. As a result of the 
unusual activity of the trade and of the increased living costs 
the men demanded wage increases, which the employers were 
unwilling to meet. Disputes also arose as to the application of 
the Federal eight-hour law and as to whether or not it applied 
to sub-contract as well as to direct Government work. During the 
summer of 191 7 the situation became acute and a general strike 
in the industry threatened. Fortunately this was averted by the 
organization in September, 19 17, of the National Harness and 
Saddlery Adjustment Commission. The agreement under which 
it was formed was signed by almost all of the manufacturers in 
the country and by the United Leatherworkers International 
Union. It was one of the few agreements to provide expressly 
that no interruption of work should take place during the war. 
All disputes were to be left to the adjustment of the Commission, 
which was to consist of two representatives appointed by the 
Secretary of War (one of whom was to«act»as chairman) one by 
the employers and one by the union. 2 

In order to prevent the heavy turnover due to competition 
among employers for men, the rates fixed by the commission (at 

1 A Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field of 
Industrial Relations During the War, p. 25. 

2 Stanley King, of the Secretary of War's office, was the first chair- 
man of the Commission; he was succeeded by Major S. J. Rosensohn. 
The other representatives of the War Department were Lt. Col. John 



64 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

first fifty cents an hour for skilled men and then sixty cents) were 
made maxima as well as minima. Somewhat later the competition 
for men having taken the form of giving them excessive amounts 
of overtime instead of increases of pay, the commission limited 
the number of hours which any employee was permitted to work 
to 55 hours in summer and 58 hours in winter. 1 

The commission accomplished its purposes so successfully that 
there were no strikes of any consequence in this industry. It was 
formally dissolved by the Secretary of War on January 15, 1919. 

S. Fair, and Major John R. Simpson, who acted in matters concerning 
the Quartermaster and Ordnance Departments respectively. The 
employers were represented by Henry Diegel and the union by 
W. E. Brown. 

1 It was also provided that men might be permitted to work 60 hours 
on certificate of necessity from the employer member of the commis- 
sion and "that in case of extraordinary emergency, upon a certificate 
from a duly authorized representative of the War Department stating 
that the needs of the Government demand that a particular manufac- 
turer shall operate his factory more than 60 hours and that the needs 
of the Government cannot otherwise be supplied, the Commission may 
authorize a manufacturer to permit his employees to work more than 
60 hours." 



CHAPTER VII 

Special Agencies of the War and Navy Departments 
(continued) 

INDUSTRIAL SERVICE SECTIONS OF ORDNANCE, QUAR- 
TERMASTER AND AIRCRAFT 

Although the War Department had, as early as June, 191 7, 
appointed a Commission to adjust labor conditions in connection 
with the construction of cantonments and although it had created 
all of the other boards which we have just described, yet it had 
not organized the task of supervising industrial conditions and 
preventing strikes in the hundreds of private plants, in all parts 
of the country, in which munitions were being manufactured. Nor 
can this omission be explained on the theory that no labor diffi- 
culties had been encountered in connection with the manufacture 
of guns and powder and all of the many articles which the Ord- 
nance branch of the War Department was striving with feverish 
haste to have manufactured. As a matter of fact, strikes had oc- 
curred in the munition factories of Bridgeport, Bethlehem, 
Newark and elsewhere. Unrest prevailed throughout the entire 
industry, due not only to the abnormal conditions prevailing gen- 
erally, but also to the opposition of most of the large munition 
companies to the existence and growth of the machinists' union. 

Under these circumstances it seems very strange that the War 
Department did not follow the practice it had adopted in all of 
these other cases, and create machinery, which we can now see 
was so urgently needed, to adjust labor conditions in ordnance 
plants. The Department itself has stated that its reason for this 
omission was its belief, in the early months of the war, that Con- 
gress had placed in the Labor Department the functions of labor 
adjustments and that its best course was to refer these difficulties 
to the Labor Department. 1 (The action of the department in 

1 See A Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field 
of Industrial Relations During the War, p. 26. 

65 



66 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

creating the boards mentioned above is considered merely as an 
exception to this general policy.) There can be very little doubt, 
however, that the War Department was further influenced by the 
fact that the large munition firms were opposed to the interven- 
tion of Government boards. This opposition had been shown in 
the objections of these firms to the inclusion of the "labor clause" x 
in munition contracts. They feared that the growth of the unions 
would be accelerated if the Government became active in the 
adjustment of labor problems and they wanted more than any- 
thing else to retain the freedom of action, in these matters, which 
they had possessed in times of peace. 

Whatever the reasons may have been, it was not until the fall 
of 19 1 7 that the organization of an Industrial Service Section was 
undertaken by the Chief of Ordnance, and not until January, 
191 8, that it was formally constituted. 2 The Section was organ- 
ized by dividing its work into different branches, each of which 
had jurisdiction over one activity such as employment manage- 
ment, housing, community organization and mediation. The 
Mediation Branch (later known as the Wages and Working Con- 
ditions Branch) with which we are mainly interested, was organ- 
ized in February, 19 18, for the adjustment of labor disputes. 3 

In the summer of 19 18, the Industrial Service Section adopted 
a decentralized form of organization, maintaining a main office in 
Washington but opening branch offices in each of the districts 
into which the Ordnance work of the country was divided. 4 It 
was in close touch with both manufacturers and union, and en- 
deavored to anticipate strikes by composing difficulties. In many 
cases, however, this was absolutely impossible. In the spring 
of 19 1 8, as a consequence of the rapidly increasing cost Of living 

1 See Appendix No. IX. 

2 In the first months of the war the Secretary appointed Felix Frank- 
furter as special assistant, for labor matters. Shortly thereafter Wal- 
ter Lippmann was appointed in a similar capacity. Later still Stanley 
King and E. M. Hopkins succeeded Messrs. Frankfurter and Lipp- 
mann. 

3 Major William H. Rogers was in charge; he was succeeded by 
Major James Tole. 

4 It should be pointed out that the representatives of the Industrial 
Service Section acted, as a rule, as mediators rather than arbitrators. 
There was no general agreement that both sides should submit contro- 
versies to the'adjustment of the Industrial Service Section. Some 
of the contracts for ordnance work contained the "labor clause'" but 
very many did not and a great deal of munition work was in the hands 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 67 

and of the wage increases in other industries, especially the ship- 
yards, the machinists union formulated a series of wage demands, 
which were presented to manufacturers all over the country. 
These demands were resisted by the employers, practically every- 
where, and the important strikes at Bridgeport, New York, 
Newark and elsewhere were due to the resulting conflicts. 

If a commission had been established for this industry, similar 
to the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board or the National Ad- 
justment Commission, these demands could have been handled 
in an orderly manner, a fair wage could have been established 
for different localities commensurate with the increased cost of 
living and with the pay of the men doing similar work in the 
shipyards and other war industries. The fact was, however, that 
the War Department was slow in the creation of the necessary 
machinery, and when created, this machinery proved inadequate 
in that it lacked authority and was not expanded rapidly enough 
to meet the growing difficulties. 

The disastrous situation at Bridgeport resulting largely from 
the causes outlined above will be treated in greater detail in the 
next section of this chapter. In New York, where the conflict be- 
tween the two sides was not as acute, the strikes which did occur 
were not of so serious a nature. Two things characterized the 
New York situation — the manufacturers were not united in a 
strong association and the men, although highly organized, were 
more conservatively led. Upon the occurrence of strikes in a 
number of the larger shops, because of the failure of the employers 

of sub-contractors who had no contractual relationship whatever with 
the Government. The situation was further complicated by the fact 
that some contracts were for fixed sums, others were cost plus ; manu- 
factories were engaged in private as well as Government work. Some 
contracts were profitable and the employers in their eagerness for men 
with which to execute them, were willing to pay the high wage rates 
of the shipyards. In other cases employers had not realized the dis- 
advantageous conditions under which work would have to be done and 
had taken contracts at a price which made it very difficult for them 
to keep pace, in wages, with the increased cost of living. To be sure, 
if their agreements contained the labor clause, they would receive from 
the Government the added costs due to wage increases. If however 
their contracts did not contain this clause, they would have to bear the 
loss, and it was not until the war was almost at an end that the legal 
difficulties which seemed to prevent the amendment of ordnance con- 
tracts, by the addition of the labor clause, were overcome. 
r 



68 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

to meet the demands of the machinists union, 1 an award was 
made by the representative of the Industrial Service Section (act- 
ing in this case in cooperation with the Navy, whose work was 
also affected) for all of the plants in the vicinity of New York. 
Although this award was a general one intended to apply to all 
of the plants in the vicinity, only the employers whose men had 
been on strike, comprising only a small proportion of the New 
York shops, had agreed to accept it. Every day, for months 
thereafter, complaints were received that individual factories were 
not paying the wages called for in the award. And the men were 
frequently forced to strike to compel the payment of the Govern- 
ment scale. If the shop were not working on contracts containing 
the labor clause, the Government had no authority whatever to 
compel the payment of the scale. Even in such cases the em- 
ployer usually acceded to the demands of the men soon after it 
was pointed out that these demands had the Government's ap- 
proval and that they were being met by most of the other em- 
ployers in the community. These strikes were therefore seldom 
of long duration. 2 

The situation in Newark was a most interesting, although un- 
satisfactory one. Most of the employers were members of a 
powerful association and were bitterly anti-union. The men, be- 
fore the war, had not been strongly organized. But the union, 
whose leader was extremely aggressive and radical, took advan- 
tage of the general unrest and the reactionary attitude of the em- 
ployers to conduct a vigorous campaign for members. 3 As the 
union grew in strength the opposition of the employers was re- 
doubled. And when the demands for wage increases were pre- 
sented early in the summer of 191 8, the employers not only dis- 
regarded them, but urged the War Department to keep its 
hands off and allow them to fight matters out themselves. In 
spite of the fact that the men were willing to submit to arbitra- 
tion by the National War Labor Board or by the Ordnance De- 
partment, the employers persisted in this attitude. Faced by the 
very general dissatisfaction of many of the manufacturers with 
its labor policy, the War Department determined not to intervene 

*A hearing had been held in Washington but no award had been 
made. 

3 The many strikes which occurred in New York to enforce the closed 
shop in particular plants are referred to in Chapter XIII. 

a See Chapter XVII. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 69 

but to allow the men to go out if the employers could not them- 
selves adjust the controversy. When, however, the strike occurred 
and the Government found that work had been stopped on some 
of the things it needed most for the army in France, it quickly 
intervened — against the most violent protests of the employers — 
and the men returned to work on the promise of Government ad- 
justment. 1 Major B. H. Gitchell,- who came to Newark with 
authority from both War and Navy Departments to settle the 
strike, conferred with both sides and issued an award similar to 
that made by him in other localities. Although only one of the 
Newark employers had agreed in advance to abide by Major 
GitchelPs decision, many of them were willing to accept it after 
it was made. The men, however, were dissatisfied because the 
award failed to provide for a basic eight-hour day and appealed 
to the National War Labor Board. Hearings were held but the 
employers maintained their previous unwillingness to submit to 
the Board's jurisdiction and urged that inasmuch as the men 
had agreed to abide by the War Department's decision, their 
appearance before the War Labor Board was a violation of their 
agreement. On this and other grounds they maintained their re- 
fusal to come under the jurisdiction of the War Labor Board. 

Wages aside, the most important cause of strikes in munition 
plants was the question of discrimination for union membership. 
This was especially so after the enunciation by the President of 
the principles of the War Labor Board. These principles were 
adopted by the War Department and reinstatement was always 
ordered when it appeared that the dismissal was solely for union 
activity. The case of the Smith & Wesson Company, of Spring- 
field, Mass., was a flagrant example of the violation of these 
principles. The company had maintained a closed non-union 
shop requiring each employee to sign an agreement not to join 
a labor union without giving the company one week's notice. Dur- 
ing the summer of 191 8 when wages of machinists all over the 
country were being readjusted, a new wage scale was put into 

*In their brief before the National War Labor Board, the manufac- 
turers, speaking of the Government's promise to intervene if the men 
would immediately return to work say, "no such promise should have 
been made. By striking the men were holding back guns and munitions 
from our troops. They should have been dealt with sternly, not ten- 
derly." See Chapter XVI for more detailed discussion of this atti- 
tude on the part of employers. 



70 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

effect at the Springfield Armory. The Smith & Wesson Company 
was unwilling to meet this scale and went so far as to discharge 
a committee of its own employees, who asked for a wage increase. 1 
Under these circumstances a number of men joined the union 
and were discharged. A strike followed and the Secretary of War 
asked the War Labor Board to hear the controversy. The case 
was squarely within the principles of the War Labor Board and 
its award ordered the reinstatement of the men and the abolition 
of the individual contracts by which each man had agreed with 
the Company not to join a union. In spite of the fact that its 
agreements with the War Department contained the labor clause 
and that the firm had therefore agreed to submit any labor con- 
troversy to the determination of the nominee of the Secretary of 
War, the Smith & Wesson Company refused to recognize the juris- 
diction of the National War Labor Board or to accept its decision. 
Thereupon the War Department exercised its most drastic remedy 
by taking over the plant. The fact that this occurred during the 
same week in which the Bridgeport workers refused to abide by 
the War Labor Board's decision, gave the Government an excel- 
lent opportunity to show.both sides that it would insist impartially 
upon both employer and employee living up to decisions which 
they had agreed to accept. The fact that the action of this com- 
pany was so patent a violation not only of the Government's war 
labor policy but of its own agreement makes it ajl the more re- 
markable that the press in so many places should have attacked 
the Government for this action, 2 and that a group of New Eng- 
land manufacturers should have written a letter of protest to the 
Secretary of War. 

In certain other cases the Secretary referred disputes to the Na- 
tional War Labor Board, which in this way settled strikes in the 
most important munition factories in the country. Among these 
were some of the largest plants of the General Electric Company 
and of the Bethlehem Steel Company. 3 The mechanics involved 
in settlements made by the Industrial Service Section were pre- 
dominently machinists, but molders, blacksmiths and other 
machine shop employees were also not infrequently the subjects 

1 See A Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field 
of Industrial Relations During the War, p. 34. 

2 One of these attacks is reprinted at page 252. 
•See Chapter X. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 71 

of wage adjustments. The department was likewise active in ad- 
justing disputes in the building trades of men engaged in con- 
structing plants and additions for munition factories. 1 

Immediately after the signing of the armistice, notwithstanding 
the confusion which was bound to follow the readjustments of 
munition plants to a peace basis and notwithstanding the fact 
that many months would have to- elapse before all of the claims 
arising out of war-time awards could be settled, the War Depart- 
ment decided to abolish the Industrial Service Section. The In- 
ternational Association of Machinists wrote to the Secretary and 
protested against this action, but Mr. Baker insisted that it would 
be "unwise for the War Department to continue their functions 
in labor matters when, as now, the problems of production of war 
supplies had given place to the problems of reconstruction." 2 

The Industrial Service Section was speedily demobilized, and a 
great deal of confusion resulted, together with a material increase 
in the feeling of labor unrest. Many of the men believed that 
war promises were not kept and that with the end of the extreme 
emergency the Government had suddenly lost its interest in their 
welfare. That the men had a good deal of justification for this 
feeling there can be very little doubt, and the action of the War 
Department is one of the many illustrations of the Government's 
haste to rid itself of practically all war emergency boards. 

It is interesting to note that some months later the Depart- 
ment changed its policy and decided to retain during peace times 
an Industrial Service Branch to supervise the handling of the 
labor problem at the arsenals and elsewhere. 3 

INDUSTRIAL SERVICE SECTION— QUARTERMASTER 
CORPS 

Most of the labor problems affecting the work of the Quarter- 
master Corps were settled by special boards which have already 

1 In these cases the Industrial Service Section cooperated with the 
Emergency Construction Commission investigating the facts and re- 
porting them to that body with recommendations for its action. 

2 Letter Secretary of War to International Association of Machin- 
ists, November 20, 1918. 

3 Payson Irwin, who was Special Assistant to Chief of Industrial 
Service Section from the time of its organization, succeeded Major 
Gitchel and was in charge of the Section during the period of plant 
demobilization. He became the first head of the new peace-time or- 
ganization. 



J2 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

been considered. Thus the Emergency Wage Adjustment Com- 
mission adjusted the difficulties which arose in connection with the 
construction of cantonments. The harness and saddlery industry 
was taken care of by the National Harness and Saddlery Board. 
The Administrator of Labor Standards in Army Clothing adjusted 
difficulties in connection with the manufacture of uniforms and 
raincoats. This latter function was placed under the jurisdiction of 
the Industrial Service Section but in practice its activities were 
largely independent. 

Dr. E. M. Hopkins, in December, 191 7, became chief of the 
Industrial Service Section of the Quartermaster Corps. Later 
he was transferred to the office of the Secretary of War and 
placed in general charge of the labor problems of that entire de- 
partment, and Mr. John R. McLane took charge of the Industrial 
Service Section. Mr. McLane also acted as one of the Board of 
Referees for the Clothing Industry of Cleveland. 1 But, partly 
because of the facts above set forth and partly because of special 
circumstances surrounding some of the industries in which Quar- 
termaster's supplies were manufactured, 2 the activities of the sec- 
tion itself remained comparatively unimportant. 

INDUSTRIAL SERVICE SECTION— AIRCRAFT 

The problems faced by the Bureau of Aircraft Production 
Were very similar to those of the Ordnance Department, the 
trades employed by each of them being largely the same. Much 
of the machine work of the Bureau was done in sub-contract 
shops, and many factories were engaged at the same time on work 
for both departments. In January, 191 8, an Industrial Service 
Section was organized. 3 It did not, however, become very active 
until the following spring, when Major Gitchell, in charge of the 
Industrial Service Section of Ordnance, was placed in a similar 

1 The other members were Dr. Hopkins and Major Rosensohn. 
Stanley M. Isaacs acted as Secretary. 

2 Thus in the shoe trade the Massachusetts State Board of Concilia- 
tion and Arbitration had for a number of years acted as arbitrator 
for that portion of the industry — the largest and most important — 
which was located in that State. 

3 Charles P. Neill was appointed chief and W. Jett Lauck Assistant 
Chief. The services of both were soon thereafter requisitioned by 
other important boards, Mr. Neill serving with the Railroads and 
Mr. Lauck becoming Secretary of the National War Labor Board. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 73 

position for Aircraft. The policy of decentralization adopted in 
the Ordnance Department was carried out for the Bureau of 
Aircraft and branch offices were opened in each district into which 
the work of the Bureau was divided. Although the personnel in 
each of the departments was distinct, cooperation between them 
was facilitated by reason of the fact that Major Gitchell was 
in charge of both sections and similar wage scales and policies 
were maintained. 

THE BRIDGEPORT STRIKES 

The series of strikes at Bridgeport, Connecticut, are singled 
out for extended description because they illustrate so vividly the 
important factors of industrial strife during the war. A further 
reason for giving closer attention to this controversy is the promi- 
nence which it received by reason of the refusal of the men to 
obey the award of the National War Labor Board, resulting in 
the dramatic order of President Wilson in which he demanded 
that the men return to work. The Bridgeport situation is also 
illustrative of the fact, to which reference has often been made, 
that war labor difficulties were the direct outgrowth of bad 
pre-war industrial relations. 

Labor unrest at Bridgeport had long antedated the war, and 
this city as well as practically all of New England, had seen a 
struggle in the machine shop industry between the unions and the 
type of employer who refuses to have any dealings whatever with 
them, and who does his best to prevent the spread of unionism 
among his employees. 

Frequently this attitude of the employers is responsible for 
breeding radicalism in the unions, and many examples can be 
cited where cooperation on the part of the owner of the industry 
with organizations representating his employees has been accom- 
panied by a conservative and cooperative spirit on the part of 
the men and their leaders — whereas an attitude of bitter antag- 
onism to any organization of the men has been met with radical- 
ism and added bitterness by the employees. 

In this particular case, for example, the Bridgeport local 
union — although a branch of the International Association of Ma- 
chinists, affiliated with the A. F. of L. — was led by radical so- 
cialists (just as was the machinists union at Newark, where simi- 



74 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

lar opposition on the part of the employers prevailed). In spite 
of its hard struggle against the hostility of the manufacturers, it 
maintained a flourishing existence, and published the Labor 
Leader, whose radical utterances hardly made it easier to keep the 
peace. 

Bridgeport was one of the first American cities to receive 
large war orders from the Allies and as the war continued from 
year to year their ever growing demands for greater and greater 
quantities of ammunition kept the manufacturers of Bridgeport 
working night and day — expanding their plants, taking on added 
forces of men, straining the housing facilities of the town, crowd- 
ing more and more men into increasingly congested quarters. 
Rents were soaring and the cost of living was rising even more 
markedly than in most other parts of the country. 1 

Bridgeport was seething with life, booming with war orders. 
Most of the workers believed that the employers were, as a result, 
rolling in wealth. And when the United States entered the war 
this belief was intensified by their knowledge that contracts were 
doubled and trebled. Although the profitableness of the contracts 
undoubtedly varied very much — they were let in a great rush on 
a rising labor market; in some cases they were very profitable, in 
others not profitable at all 2 — the men nevertheless believed that 
there was a fortune in every one. Furthermore the leaders in 
Bridgeport were radical socialists to whom any profits were irri- 
tating and these supposedly large war profits especially so. 

There is a good deal of conflict of evidence as to whether or 
not the pay of the Bridgeport workers kept pace with increased 
costs of living, and whether, considering the prosperous condition 
of the industry (a condition which the men undoubtedly exag- 
gerated) wages had increased as much as might reasonably have 
been expected. But of this there can be no doubt. At the begin- 
ning of Bridgeport's war labor troubles the workers in the am- 
munition plants did not enjoy nearly such good wages nor such 

*If any one were to ask which of the communities of the country 
suffered most from intolerable overcrowding of industrial workers 
during the war, the towns of Bridgeport, Chester, Wilmington, Erie 
and Newport News would at once come to mind. In all of them much 
work was being done for the Army and Navy, and a greater or lesser 
amount for the Shipping Board. 

3 One of the largest firms was in great financial difficulties during a 
large part of the war period, and its notes were selling in the open 
market at about 60% of their par value. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 75 

favorable overtime rates as did their fellow workers in the Navy 
and shipbuilding plants, located in this very same community 
and throughout New England — and the men were aware of this 
difference. 1 Furthermore, their dissatisfaction with their pay was 
intensified by the fact that not only was their union not recog- 
nized, but that a systematic effort to crush unionism, by means of 
a blacklist and otherwise, was practised in Bridgeport. And it 
was made difficult, if not impossible, for some of the active union 
workers to secure employment in the machine shops, even at a 
time when men were extremely scarce, and when the national need 
for the products of Bridgeport factories was greatest. 

Demands were made in the summer of 191 7, which looked at 
now, appear to have been quite reasonable. These were, among 
others, the eight-hour day; the right to join unions without dis- 
crimination; reference of differences between employers and their 
workers to shop committees, with arbitration in case of disagree- 
ment; a 10% increase in wages with a minimum rate of 60 cents 
for toolmakers and 50 cents for machinists, and overtime at time 
and one-half for the first three hours, thereafter and on Sunday 
and holidays double. A demand for the closed shop was also 
made, but not pressed. 

These demands were followed up by a letter on August 14, 
19 1 7, asking for a conference. The employers thereupon went to 
Washington and in accordance with uncontradicted evidence be- 
fore the War Labor Board laid the matter before the Attorney 
General, asking for criminal action. The matter was referred by 
the Department of Justice to the War Department, and Mr. 
Walter Lippmann, special assistant to the Secretary of War, was 
sent to Bridgeport. Conferences were held with both sides, but 
no definite adjustments were made at that time. 

In February, 19 18, the Machinists' Union wrote to the Rem- 
ington Arms Company 2 demanding a rate of 80 cents for tool- 

1 Union scale of wages of machinists in manufacturing shops in 
Bridgeport in May, 1918, are stated in Bulletin Number 259 of the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (page 167) to have been 55 cents 
an hour with time and a half for overtime on weekdays ; at the hear- 
ings of the National War Labor Board, the employers testified that 
the average hourly earnings of machinists June 22, 1918, were 57.5 
cents; Shipping Board rates at this time throughout New England 
were 62H cents for second class and 72^ for first class machinists. 

a The Remington Arms Company was by far the largest producer of 
rifles and small arms in this country and formed the center of the ma- 



76 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

makers and 70 cents for machinists. The Company (whose con- 
tract contained a clause by which all wage disputes were to be 
submitted to the War Department) referred the union to the 
office of the Secretary of War. Thereupon the business agent of 
the union saw representatives of both the War and Labor De- 
partments.. 

The War Department referred the matter to its recently or- 
ganized Industrial Service Section of the Ordnance Department, 
and the Labor Department sent one of its mediators, Mr. Ma- 
haney, to Bridgeport to investigate. On Mr. Mahaney's arrival 
he found that some of the Remington men were out in protest 
against the refusal of the Company to pay time and one-half for 
overtime on Good Friday. The men were induced to return to 
work but demands were presented for wage increases to 70 cents 
for machinists (which was approximately shipyard rates) and 80 
cents for toclmakers. 

After more negotiations the Industrial Service Section of the 
War Department once more took the matter in charge, this time 
dispatching Payson Irwin and a number of assistants to study 
wage and labor conditions in Bridgeport. In the meantime the 
men had taken a strike vote, which showed that they were over- 
whelmingly in favor of going out. Mr. Irwin, on reaching 
Bridgeport, induced them to stay at work, promising that the 
Ordnance Department would make a definite wage adjustment. In 
addition, Major William C. Rogers, who had now been placed in 
charge of the mediation branch of the Industrial Sendee Section, 
wrote to the machinists' union, promising them that the award 
would be made retroactive from May 1, 191 8. Major Rogers, 
however, instead of at once taking up the Bridgeport matter 
was compelled to go to the Middle West because of a situation 
there that seemed even more pressing. 

Still more weeks elapsed, and no action was taken by the Gov- 
ernment. And when on April 29 the men, already impatient with 
the delays, received from the contract shops a flat refusal of their 
demands, they took a strike vote, and on May 3 went out in 

chine industry in Bridgeport. At the time of the entry of the United 
States into the war this one firm employed many thousands of men 
and women. It also supplied many of the smaller shops of Bridgeport, 
and indeed those throughout New England, with a considerable portion 
of their work. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 77 

twenty- two of these shops, and on May 8, at the Remington Arms 
Company. 

Major Rogers now hurried to Bridgeport ; held conferences with 
both sides, and got the men to return to work by repeating his 
promise of an award by the Ordnance Department, retroactive 
from May 1. Because of the bitterly anti-union feeling of the 
employers, these conferences were held separately with employers 
and men. They showed how completely the manufacturers mis- 
construed the temper of their workers by blaming their troubles 
upon a few agitators. As a matter of fact the resentment of the 
men, because of union discrimination and because of the discrep- 
ancy between their wages and that of the shipyards, was almost 
universal. 

On May 23 a hearing was held in Washington before a special 
board consisting of Major Rogers, Major Tole, and Mr. Irwin. 
Both sides appeared before this board and presented their case. 
On June 8, having received the approval of the Secretary of War ? 
the award was made public. But as is often the case, it satisfied 
neither side. Nevertheless the men finally accepted it. The em- 
ployers, on the other hand, flatly refused to do so, and exerted 
the strongest possible pressure upon the Secretary of War to have 
the award withdrawn. Weeks passed, and the employers still 
continuing to ignore the award, a strike resulted in one of the 
large plants, and a strike vote was taken in all the others. Secre- 
tary Baker now telegraphed the men that he had referred the 
entire matter to the Taft-Walsh Board, and urged them to stay 
at work. 

The men, however, regarded the Secretary's action in not com- 
pelling the manufacturers to accept the award of the special board 
created by his own department as a surrender to the manufac- 
turers' association and a breach of faith with them. On June 26 
all machinists stopped work. 

With production at a standstill in the most important munition 
center in the United States, the War Labor Board took juris-, 
diction, promised speedy action, and persuaded the men to re- 
turn to work after they had been out about two days. All of the 
manufacturers now agreed to abide by the War Labor Board's 
decision, and the union did likewise. Hearings were held in 
Bridgeport which lasted many days. The testimony, like that of 
so many other hearings of the War Labor Board, is full of bitter 



78 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

accusations by the men against the employers. They charged 
systematic discrimination against those who were active in the 
union, 1 and the use of the draft as a means of intimidating the 
workers and keeping them from striking. 2 The demand for classi- 
fication, with minimum wage rates for toolmakers, machinists, 
and helpers, 3 which had previously been granted by the special 
board of the Ordnance Department, was strongly urged by the 
men and even more bitterly opposed by the employers. In sup- 
port of this the men claimed that their fellow machinists in the 
ship and navy yards, and in arsenals, and hundreds of private 
plants in other localities, were working under a minimum wage 
scale. And this demand for classification and a minimum rate 
was the point at issue about which each side felt most strongly. 
The War Labor Board was unable to agree, and after a great 
deal of difficulty Otto M. Eidlitz, a prominent New York builder 
and Director of Housing in the Labor Department, was chosen 
as umpire. His decision gave the men an eight-hour day (which 
had already been introduced in most shops), and established an 
elaborate system of collective bargaining. But he did not give 
them what they most wanted — classification with a minimum 
wage scale, 4 for which the machinists' union, all over the country, 
had been contending. Instead, he awarded a flat wage increase of 
15% to the lower paid workers, with smaller increases to the 
better paid and no increase whatever to the men who already re- 
ceived 78 cents an hour. 

1 The testimony amply sustains the men's contention on this point. 
9 See Chapter XVI. 

* See Chapter XV. 

* In a letter to the War Labor Board, written by Mr. Eidlitz on 
September 14, 1918, interpretating the award, he says, "I felt that it 
was not fair for me to establish classification of trade and minimum 
wage at this time, under all the conditions existing at Bridgeport, but 
in view of the fact that the representatives of the employers and em- 
ployees on the National War Labor Board had agreed that collective 
bargaining should be instituted at Bridgeport, and in addition that a 
Local Board with equal representation of employers and employees 
was to be inaugurated, that this Board, with the help of employers 
and employees of Bridgeport, would take up all questions on which 
the parties to the controversy were not in agreement ... It would be 
fully within the province of this Local Board to create other subsidiary 
boards, and it was not the intent to bar the establishment of classifi- 
cation of trade and minimum wage." The failure of the Government 
to organize the Local Board made it impossible to carry out the sug- 
gestions contained in the umpire's letter. 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 79 

The men were bitterly disappointed. They felt that the Gov- 
ernment should have insisted upon the employers accepting the 
previous award of the War Department. Now after more months 
had elapsed, an umpire had, they claimed, adopted the viewpoint 
of the employers and denied them that to which they felt them- 
selves richly entitled. In spite of the efforts of the national lead- 
ers to keep them at work, 1 the men refused to accept the award 
and once more went out on strike. 

As will have been observed from this account, the situation was 
most unfortunately handled by the Government agencies, in that 
unpardonable delays took place and confusing conflicts of juris- 
diction. We can, therefore, understand the indignation of the 
men, even though we cannot excuse their action in deliberately 
refusing to abide by the decision which they had previously 
agreed to accept. A strong letter followed from the President 
of the United States addressed, "on the joint recommendation of 
the Secretary of Labor, the Acting Secretary of War, and the 
joint chairmen of the National War Labor Board, 2 to the strik- 
ing employees at Bridgeport. After pointing out the supreme im- 
portance of orderly procedure and the acceptance of "solemn ad- 
judications of a tribunal to which both parties submitted their 
claims," the President concluded by requesting the men to return 
to work and threatening them that unless they did so, they would 
not be employed for the period of one year in any war industry 
in the community in which the strike occurred, that they could 
not claim draft exemption on occupational grounds, and that dur- 
ing that time the United States Employment Service would de- 
cline to obtain employment for them in any war industry else- 
where. 3 

The men thereupon, on September 17, 1918, voted to resume 
work. As they sought to return to their jobs, however, they found 
that the companies were discriminating against some of the men, 
refusing to reinstate them. The War Labor Board was notified 

1 There is a conflict of evidence as to the position taken by some of 
the national officers immediately after the award was announced. Later, 
they undoubtedly did their best tf secure the acceptance by the men 
of the umpire's award. 

3 See Report of the Activities of the War Department in the Field 
of Industrial Relations During the War, page 33. 

3 Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 
1918, page 24. 



80 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

•that unless immediate action was taken the machinists would 
once more be on strike. The President now telegraphed to the 
employers demanding that all of the men be reinstated. Even 
now the difficulty was not entirely settled, as the employers per- 
sisted in their refusal to reinstate a number of grinders, whose 
places they had filled with women. For three days these grinders 
stood alongside the women who were doing the work that the 
grinders had done before the strike, and finally got their places 
back (with pay for the three days). 

Following its usual practice, the War Labor Board appointed 
an examiner to supervise the application of the award, which in- 
volved not only the payment of back wages in many plants and 
the setting up of machinery for collective bargaining in the va- 
rious factories, but also the establishment of a local board of 
mediation and conciliation consisting of three members selected 
by the employers and three selected by the employees, presided 
over by a Chairman selected by the Secretary of War, "for the 
purpose of bringing about agreements on disputed issues not 
covered by" the umpire's award. 

This local board might have developed into a most useful piece 
of machinery but its organization was never completed and it 
never got a chance to function. As a first step in the selection of 
their three representatives the men, under the supervision of the 
War Labor Board, elected delegates from each shop to a city 
convention. Of these 136 delegates it is remarkable that only 
18 were members of labor unions and still more remarkable that 
the three men selected by the convention to represent all of the 
men were all members of the union — one of them was Sam Lavit, 
the union leader to whom the employers so strongly objected. 
Whether the composition of the committee was responsible for the 
failure to organize the mediation board is difficult to say. The 
first appointee of the Secretary of War as chairman of the board 
refused to serve and no other appointment was made so that the 
board was never properly organized. Mr. Winter, the Examiner 
appointed by the War Labor Board, acted informally as presiding 
officer, but in matters of importance the board was usually dead- 
locked and Mr. Winter not being officially appointed as its chair- 
man could not settle the dispute. The employers had strenuously 
objected to that portion of Mr. Eidlitz's award which provided 



SPECIAL AGENCIES (CONTINUED) 81 

for collective bargaining of any kind. 1 Nor were they satisfied 
with many of the rulings of the Examiner and especially with his 
very firm insistence that the election of shop committees take 
place (as was the War Labor Board's invariable rule) under his 
personal supervision. They were particularly unfriendly to the 
idea of a general local board and this hostility was very much 
increased by the choice of active unionists as employee repre- 
sentatives. It would therefore seem as though the failure of the 
Secretary of War to complete the board was somewhat more than 
an accident. 

Finally the existence of the local board came to an end by the 
resignation of the employee members. 2 

1 They claimed that they had not submitted to the War Labor Board 
the question of either hours or collective bargaining and that the 
umpire had exceeded his authority in making findings on either of 
these two points. 

2 During the summer of 1919 many strikes occurred in Bridgeport, 
for wage increase and the 44-hour week. On the ground that Samuel 
Lavit, the business agent of the local Machinists' Union, had disobeyed 
the rules of the International Association of Machinists, by calling 
strikes without proper authority, he was removed from office. The 
local voted to keep him in office and its charter was revoked. 



CHAPTER VIII 
Railroad, Fuel and Food Administrations 

RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION 

Even before the war the absolute necessity of maintaining un- 
interrupted operation of the railroads was sufficiently apparent 
to cause machinery to be created for the adjustment of labor dis- 
putes. This responsibility was vested under the Newlands and 
Erdman Acts 1 in a Board of Mediation and Conciliation, which, 
however, did not possess the power to serve as arbitrator unless 
both parties agreed to abide by its decision. Yet this board — 
together with special arbitration boards for particular contro- 
versies — had for many years succeeded in avoiding any interrup- 
tion in railway service. And this in spite of the fact that the fix- 
ing of rates and the establishment cf rules on the railroads had 
become an unbelievably complicated task- 
In the early days of railroad operation the men engaged in the 
actual movement of the trains (i.e., conductors, engineers, fire- 
men, trainmen) received wages based entirely upon the element 
of time. Gradually, however, there came to be added, as a further 
standard for the determination of wages, the distance actually 
traveled, and in this way there developed the dual standard of 
hours and miles by which to determine remuneration. 2 

1 The Newlands Act was approved July, 1913, U. S. Statutes at Large, 
Volume XXXVIII, Part 1, pp. 103, 108. It superseded the Erdman 
Act of June, 1898, U. S. Statutes at Large, Volume XXX, pp. 424-428, 
which, in turn, had superseded the Act of October 1, 1888. Under 
all of these statutes provision had been made for the adjustment of 
disputes on the railroads. See Railroad Labor Arbitrations, Report 
of the U. S. Board of Mediation and Conciliation, 1916. Senate Docu- 
ment, number 493, 64th Congress, 1st session, pp. 8 and following. 

2 Before the enactment of the Adamson Law, the normal day's work 
consisted of 10 hours or 100 miles for freight and usually 200 miles 
for passenger service. See Julius H. Parmelee in The Annals of the 
Academy of Political and Social Science, January, 191 7, page 2. The 
Adamson Law left the number of miles unchanged, but substituted 
8 for 10 hours. 

82 



V 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 83 

When collective bargaining was first instituted on the railroads, 
the groups involved in any wage adjustment were small in num- 
ber. The early agreements covered only divisions of a road; 
gradually the area over which wage adjustments applied was ex- 
tended to include the entire road, and then the entire system. 
Irrespective of the attitude of the railroads toward this extension 
of the area covered by collective bargaining, there was one point 
as to which the wishes of the railroads and those of the men were 
in sharp conflict. The railroads had sought to maintain varia- 
tions in wage rates to fit differences which they claimed existed 
in the individual skill of the men, in the character of the service, 
and in the relative advantage of the locality in which the service 
was performed (such as differences in cost of living). On the 
other hand the employees sought greater simplicity in wage fixing, 
classification on broader lines ignoring minor differences, and 
standardization affecting ever wider areas of the country. 1 

This tendency toward greater uniformity was hastened by con- 
certed movements affecting an entire section of the country. 
Finally, in 19 16, for the first time in their history, the four 
brotherhoods joined together and presented identical demands to 
every one of the railroads. At this time the desire for the eight- 
hour day with time and one-half for overtime united the brother- 
hoods in a common demand. A "National Conference Commit- 
tee" was formed, representing all of the important railroads of 
the country, and meetings were held with representatives of the 
men. Lengthy conferences followed, but no adjustment was 
reached. The railroads were willing to arbitrate; the men, on 
the other side, dissatisfied with the personnel and decisions of the 
recent arbitration boards, insisted upon their demands being 
granted and voted to strike. 

This was in August, 19 16, at a time when our entry into the 
war was becoming more and more probable and when the Entente 
powers, whose cause was favored by a large majority of our 
people, were in the greatest need of our supplies. The stoppage 
of railroad service would have been an international calamity, and 
the President, after fruitless efforts to effect a settlement, a 
strike then appearing to be imminent, 2 recommended that Con- 

1 See J. Noble Stockett, Jr., The Arbitral Determination of Railway 
Wages. Houghton, Mifflin; 1918. 
'In a letter from Harry A. Wheeler, Chairman Committee on Rail- 



84 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

gress establish by law the eight-hour day for men employed in 
operating the trains, and that a commission be appointed to study 
the workings of the new law. Although these demands had been 
made more than six months before, and although Congress had 
been repeatedly urged to take some definite action, by which, 
through an immediate investigation or otherwise, a solution could 
have been found based upon the facts, yet Congress followed its 
usual practice of doing nothing until matters had reached a crisis 
and then acted more or less in a panic. In the passage of the 
Adamson Law Congress accepted both of the suggestions of the 
President and the threatened strike was thus narrowly averted. 1 
But the enactment of the law did not immediately settle the con- 
troversy; for the railroads fought its constitutionality, and, in the 
meantime, refused to put its provisions into operation. Once 
more, this time on the very eve of our entry into the war, the 
country was threatened with a strike. The President thereupon 
appointed a committee of four from the newly organized Coimcil 
of National Defense to effect a settlement of the dispute. 2 
Through the efforts of this committee the strike was postponed 
and a settlement reached by which both sides accepted the Com- 
mittee's award on the very day on which the Supreme Court 
handed down a decision sustaining the constitutionality of the 
law. The provisions of the award were substantially an accept- 
ance of the Adamson Law. There was also established a Com- 
mission of Eight to adjust any differences which might arise in 

road Situation of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, to the President, 
dated July 29, 1916, he says — "As a result of the meeting yesterday 
my conviction is deepened that an amicable settlement is remote and 
that while other orderly steps are yet to be taken before a final break 
is reached, yet such a break is inevitable unless some strong measures 
of intervention are speedily introduced." 

1 Perhaps no other legislative enactment has so aroused the opposi- 
tion of employers, who are still denouncing the Administration for 
having yielded to the threats of the brotherhoods. Nor do the leaders 
of the men seem to have approved of the course taken ly the Gov- 
ernment. They would have preferred a test of strength, claiming that 
the strike would have lasted only a few hours, and that ^ they ^ would 
thus have obtained the adoption of the eight-hour demand in their own 
way. See W. N. Doak, Vice President. Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen, in Proceedings of Academy of Politiccd Science, January, 
1920, page 180. 

'This committee consisted of Secretaries Lane and Wilson, Samuel 
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor and Daniel 
Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Report of 
the Eight-Hour Commission, page 10. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 85 

the application of the eight-hour settlement. This commission 
was composed of equal representation of the railroads and the 
men — with no arbitrator or umpire. And its importance lay not 
only in the fact that it was able — always by unanimous vote — to 
adjust practically all the differences which arose, 1 but also be- 
cause it became the model for all of the permanent wage boards 
which were created by the Railroad Administration during the 
war. 2 

Nevertheless the labor difficulties of the railroads were not 
solved by the enforcement of the Adamson Law. It must be borne 
in mind that the new law did not bring about any increase in 
wage rates. To be sure, the shortening of the hours from ten to 
eight did, in many cases, result in somewhat larger earnings, but 
this result was not sufficient for any length of time to keep the 
men satisfied in the face of the increased costs of living. Further- 
more, the men had not received time and one-half for overtime, 
as this feature of their demands was eliminated by the President, 
when as a compromise he urged the passage of the Adamson Law. 3 
Even if the Adamson Law had been sufficient to allay the unrest 
— which, as we have seen, it was not — it applied, after all, only to 
the men engaged in the actual movement of the trains, who as 
a matter of fact included only about 20% of the men employed 
by the railroads. It did not affect the shopmen, the station 
masters, the railway clerks, or innumerable others, and these men, 
as distinguished from the members of the brotherhoods, had been 
far less organized and not nearly so well paid. 

The popular error that men in the railway service were re- 

1 W. N. Doak, in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 
for January, 1920, page i8o ; states that 30,000 disputes were adjusted 
with only three deadlocks, and these deadlocks were settled by the 
Board of Adjustment, Number 1, which likewise consisted of an equal 
number of representatives of the Railroads and the men. 

a The jurisdiction of the Commission of Eight was confined to the 
men who operated the trains. It must not be confused with the Eight- 
Hour Commission, appointed by the President in accordance with the 
terms of the Adamson Law, "to observe the operation and effects of 
the institution of the eight-hour standard workday." 

8 The Adamson Law contained no reference whatever to overtime 
rates. The award of the Committee of the Council of National De- 
fense provided that overtime should be paid for "at not less than" 
regular rates. No allowance of extra compensation was made in any 
trades which hitherto had not received it. 



86 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

ceiving high wages has been referred to in a previous chapter. 1 
The fact of the matter is that although wage increases had been 
made during 1915, 191 6, and 191 7, they were not relatively as 
large as the increases which many workers were receiving in other 
industries, and they were 'in most cases not sufficient to keep 
pace with the increased cost of living. 2 The feeling of the men 
at this time was described by the president of one of the brother- 
hoods as one of "unrest, if not desperation. " 3 Especially were 
the railroad shopmen and clerks dissatisfied with the pay they 
were receiving, and in the summer and fall of 191 7 a number of 
strikes took place. 4 

At this time the railroads were facing demands of their men 
for wage increases aggregating one billion dollars a year. Con- 
ferences had been held between the representatives of the four 
brotherhoods and the President, as a result of which pledges had 
been given to accept Federal mediation, but the men seemed un- 

1 See Chapter I, quoting the Railroad Wage Commission of 1918. 
President A. O. Wharton of the Railroad Employees Department, 
A. F. of L., speaking at their Fourth Biennial Convention in April, 

1918, and explaining the work of the Wage Commission, which he 
was assisting, said, referring to their current wages (page 129, 
Official Proceedings), "I don't even know how they live under those 
conditions. You take it for blacksmiths on the Bangor and Aroostook 
Railroad, on the hourly basis, 23 cents an hour . . . On the Lehigh 
Valley ten blacksmiths at 23. ... I am only giving the lowest rate. 
They go up above that, of course. Some blacksmiths'* helpers get 13 
cents an hour. One man on the Erie Railroad. I don't know how he 
lives but he is there, according to this book . . . car repairers getting 
18 cents an hour," etc. 

2 G. H. Sines, Chairman, Board of Railroad Wages and Working 
Conditions, in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Febru- 
ary, 1919, page 96. 

3 W. S. Carter, President, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen, and later Director of Labor, U. S. Railroad Administra- 
tion, in Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, February, 

1919, page 64. 

4 Among the strikes affecting the railroads which occurred before 
the Government took control, the following may be mentioned : July, 
1917, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida Railroad (completely tied up). 
A strike of the Boston and Maine machinists of September, 1917, was 
referred by the Council of National Defense to Henry B. Endicott 
of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety and adjusted by 
him. (See Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public Safety, 
page 107.) The report of the Department of Labor for 1917 gives 
details of controversies of freight-handlers of the Chicago and Illinois 
Railroad in June, 1917; clerks of the Maine Central Railroad, in 
August, 1917, and shopmen on a number of roads. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 87 

willing to accept arbitration. 1 The weak financial condition of 
the railroads, together with the fact that they had been unable 
to procure an increase in rates, produced a situation in which 
it seemed impossible for them to meet labor's demands for wage 
increases as long as the roads remained under private ownership 
— that is, without a Government subsidy and without independ- 
ent power to raise rates. Therefore on December 28, 191 7, in 
order to prevent the occurrence of strikes on the railroads during 
the war 2 and to make it possible to use them more efficientlyjor 
war-making purposes, all of the important railroads of the coun- 
try were placed under Federal control. 

It will be seen from the above that the situation which con- 
fronted the Director General of Railroads was a most difficult 
one. In fact at this time so dissatisfied were the railroad shop- 
men — who, it is worth noting, were receiving 40% less than 
the men engaged in the same trade in the shipyards 3 — that strike 
votes were being taken in many of the shops in the Middle West, 
and a meeting had been called at Kansas City for January 14 to 
arrange for a concerted strike of the men in the railroad shops. 

As a result of all these conditions the Director General, in one 
of the first general orders issued by the Railroad Administration, 4 
created a Railroad Wage Commission charged "with the duty of 
making a general investigation of the compensation of persons in 
the railroad service; the relation of railroad wages to wages in 
other industries," and the special emergency created by war con- 

1 President Wilson, in a statement published by the press on 
November 23, 1917, said that the men representing the brotherhoods 
"were not inclined to contend after anything which they did not deem 
necessary to their own maintenance . . . and that they would be will- 
ing, in case any critical situation should arise, to consider any pro- 
posed solution in a spirit of accommodation and patriotic purpose." 

a W. F. Willoughby, Government Organization in War Time and 
After, page 182: "Undoubtedly one of the prime considerations lead- 
ing to the taking over of the railroads by the Government was the 
critical situation that existed in respect to railway labor." 

3 Louis B. 'Wehle, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 
XXXII, page 361, states that agreements of May and June, 1917 (<?n 
a 30-day cancellation basis), established a general scale of wages for 
machinists in railroad shops east of Chicago from 50 to 52 cents 
and west of Chicago of from 52 to 56 cents. Machinists in the ship- 
yards of equal skill had been awarded 72^2 cents an hour, with a basic 
eight-hour day, and time and one-half for overtime. 

4 General Order Number 5, January 18, 1918. Annual Report of 
Director General of Railroads, 1918. 



88 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

ditions and the greatly increased cost of living. The Commission 
was to report its findings to 'the Director General and in the 
meantime it was arranged that the demands of the shopmen and 
others be held in abeyance, with the understanding that increases 
in wages would be retroactive as of January i, 1918. 1 

The task of the Commission was no less than an investigation 
of the adequacy of the pay of two •million men and women, em- 
ployed in every part of the country, in an industry in which there 
existed the greatest variety of wage scales and the most compli- 
cated methods for wage fixing. These men and women were 
working for more than 150 of the largest railroads, and included 
representatives of almost every trade in the country. The Com- 
mission held hearings in Washington, and devoted three and a half 
months to its investigation, in which it had the help of a corps 
of statisticians and railroad experts. To "reclassify the many 
hundreds of employments in which the 2,000,000 railroad workers 
engage would be a task," the Commission decided, "calling for 
more time, skill, insight, and knowledge than we possess." They 
therefore determined upon a fiat percentage of increase as the 
method best adapted to meet the exigencies of the.situation. And 
inasmuch as substantial wage increases had been made since De- 
cember, 191 5, and in view of the additional fact that these ad- 
vances were uneven, some roads increasing one amount, some an- 
other, the Commission decided to base its wage adjustments upon 
the wages received by employees at that date. It found that from 
December, 191 5, to the date of the report the increased cost of 
living was from 40 to 43% (depending upon income), and it 
gave to the lowest paid workers an advance equal to its estimate 
of the entire increased cost of living. Workers receiving more 
than $50.00 a month were given advances of smaller and smaller 
percentage until incomes of $250.00 a month were reached, in 
which cases no increase whatever was made. 2 In addition the 

1 See report of Railroad Wage Commission, reprinted in Monthly 
Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1918, page 26. 

' The Commission stated that "the War has brought to us all the 
necessity for sacrifice." No other wage board applied this doctrine in 
so drastic a manner. In fact, many of them did not act upon it at all. 
The Commission was not justified in asking workers, who were re- 
ceiving wages as low as from $50 to $75 per month, to share in the 
sacrifices of the war by accepting a wage increase less than the in- 
crease in living costs. And yet this part of the report received little 
adverse comment in the newspapers. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 89 

report recommended equal pay for equal work without regard to 
sex or color, and also that permanent wage tribunals be estab- 
lished. 

The Director General accepted the recommendations of the 
Commission, and put them into effect in General Order Number 
27, by which he created a permanent wage board known as the 
Board of Railroad Wages and Working Conditions. He also 
made a few changes in the recommendations of the Commission 
by establishing a minimum of 55 cents an hour for machinists, 
boiler-makers, and other shop mechanics, and by "recognizing the 
principle" of the basic eight-hour day for all railroad service. 

The report of the Commission caused a great deal of dissatis- 
faction among railroad employees. 1 In the first place, by making 
the wages of December, 191 5, the basis for wage adjustments the 
inequalities which existed at that time were perpetuated, and the 
men — especially the shopmen — lost the benefit of whatever stand- 
ardization they had, in the meantime, been able to bring about. 
Moreover the actual increases which the men received under the 
terms of this award were very much less than what they con- 
sidered just. In the shop trades, for example, many of the men 
received nothing at all. This resulted from the fact that the 
new rate was reached by granting a sliding scale of increases over 
the 191 5 standards, and inasmuch as the men, in many instances, 
had already received this amount of increase, they did not profit 
at all from the award. Furthermore, even the 55 cent rate, which 
the men received under General Order Number 27, was far 
from the 72^ cent rate being paid to the men in the shipyards 
and in many of the munition plants. This dissatisfaction of the 
shopmen found expression in a number of strikes and was not 
allayed until the rate for first class machinists, and other shop- 
men, was raised to 68 cents. 2 

In addition to the Board of Railroad Wages and Working Con- 
ditions, three other boards were created by the Railroad Admin- 
istration, by agreement between the Administration and the sev- 
eral unions concerned, known as Boards of Adjustment Numbers 

1 On the other hand The Railroad Trainmen, the organ of the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, for July, 1918, expressed satis- 
faction with the award. The opposition to it came more largely 
from the employees not engaged in the actual operation of the trains. 

3 By Supplement Number 4, to General Order Number 27, issued 
July 25, 1918. 



90 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

i, 2, and 3. The first of these superseded the Commission of 
Eight and had jurisdiction over men connected with the move- 
ment of trains, the second dealt with the railway shopmen, while 
the third was charged with adjustments concerning switchmen, 
telegraphers, and clerks. The jurisdiction of these boards ex- 
tended over employees who were working under agreements with 
their respective railroads. Controversies affecting other employees 
were looked after by a Labor Director, whose duties included gen- 
eral supervision of all labor matters affecting the Railroad Ad- 
ministration. 1 

All of these wage boards, like the Commission of Eight (cre- 
ated to apply the settlement under the Adamson Law) , were com- 
posed of equal representations of management and men. 2 In this 
respect they presented a striking contrast with the Railroad Wage 
Commission, which was a body whose personnel represented only 
the public. It is a remarkable fact that the Railroad Wage 
Adjustment boards, created by the Railroad Administration, were 
before the armistice never deadlocked — on the contrary, their de- 
cisions were always by unanimous vote. Speaking in November, 

1919, W. N. Doak, Vice-President of the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen and a member of Adjustment Board Number 1, stated 
that his board had settled 1500 disputes. 3 In all, the three 
boards settled over 3100 controversies without a dissenting vote. 

And yet, in spite of the fact that these were large boards, half 
of the members of which were railroad officials, and in spite of 
the fact that their decisions were unanimous, the wage adjust- 
ments of the Railroad Administration have been very severely 
criticized. This adverse comment did not come so much from the 
men (except the shopmen) ; they were on the whole fairly well 
satisfied. The bulk of the criticism came from the employers. 4 

The dissatisfaction sprang largely from the extent to which 

1 W. S. Carter, President of the Brotherhood of Firemen and 
Enginemen appointed February 9, 1018, by Circular Number I, 
creating the Division of Labor of the Railroad Administration. 

3 By this method that constant fear of 'prejudiced arbitrators', so 
pronounced among railway employees, has been entirely removed." 
W. S. Carter, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, for 
February, 1919, page 66. 

* See Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, for January, 

1920, page 180. 

4 W. G. Besler, President of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, January, 1920, page 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 91 

the process of standardization was carried — a process for which 
union labor is everywhere contending but to which the railroads 
have always been opposed. It is a fact that any arbitral wage 
adjustment is likely to result in standardization; x and when the 
adjustment of wages is being made for almost every member of 
a given industry in the entire country, it is impossible to avoid 
creating certain more or less roughly denned classifications, within 
which all employees will receive the same remuneration. With 
thousands of cases to handle, involving hundreds of thousands of 
men, it was inevitable that more or less minor differences in the 
character of the work and in the advantages of varying localities 
should be ignored. This same process of equalization took place 
to a greater or less extent in every industry in the country. There 
is, however, a widespread opinion that in the railway service it 
was carried to an extreme, 2 and this opinion is probably correct. 
The extent to which the men in railroad shops and other hither- 
to unorganized parts of the railway service became members of 
the unions during the period of the war 3 is also a source of irri- 
tation among many. of the employers. And yet the policy of the 
Railway Administration in forbidding discharges for union mem- 

170, quotes with approval the following editorial from the New York 
Sun: 

"As a matter of cold, hard fact the railroads never underpaid their 
labor and their labor never tried to pillage the railroads until the 
Government tried to take out of the hands of the railroads the duties 
and functions which belonged to the railroads. 

"As a matter of cold, hard fact the American railway system never 
mortgaged its body, life and soul to gratify the exactions while stimu- 
lating the excesses of labor union leaders. It was the Government it- 
self, after it took the railroads away from their owners, which did 
that very thing as a gross political gamble/' JVlr. JBesler goes on to 
characterize the actions of the Railroad Administration as "blundering, 
bungling incapacity in high places" and he speaks of the "bungling of 
the wage demands which, because of failure to comprehend the question, 
resulted in absurd readjustments and the granting of schedules of 
wages for certain classes without due regard to the character of the 
service performed, thus establishing inappropriate and extravagant 
measures of compensation that caused discontent in other classes." 

1 "American arbitration boards (before the war) have been practi- 
cally unanimous in their approval of the principal of system standard- 
ization . . . the boards evidently recognizing the disadvantages attend- 
ing a wide diversity of rates." J. Noble Stockett, op. cit., page 8. 

2 See William J. Cunningham in the New York Evening Post, Janu- 
ary 13, 1920. 

a It is claimed that one million men in the railway service joined 
labor unions during this period. 



92 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

bership was identical with that adopted by every war board, and 
is surely not open to legitimate criticism. Nor can it be said that 
the total wage increases, large as they were in the aggregate, were 
more than the circumstances warranted. 1 On the contrary, there 
were many occupations in which the wage increases, in spite of 
the scarcity of labor, did not keep pace with the cost of living, 
nor has the average advance been equal to the increased living 
cost. 2 

By the methods outlined above, peace was maintained in the 
operation of the trains during the war period, and there were 
very few strikes in other branches of the service. In fact it was 
not until August, 191 9, that any very serious stoppage of work 
took place. Early in that month a strike of the railroad shop- 
men, unauthorized by the national leaders, occurred in the Middle 
Western states, spreading to different parts of the country, es- 
pecially to New England and the South. 

This controversy had its roots in the dissatisfaction of the 
shopmen with the treatment accorded them during the war. We 
have already discussed the resentment with which they received 
the award of the Railroad Wage Commission. And although the 
award of 68 cents an hour which they obtained in July, 191 8, 
partially satisfied them, it did not do so entirely as the increase 
did not bring their wages up to the standard enjoyed in other in- 
dustries. But their chief resentment arose from the fact that 
during the following year, although further increases had been 
awarded in other industries, 3 their wages remained stationary. In 
January, 19 19, their demands had been* referred to the Board of 
Wages and Working Conditions and hearings had been held, but 

*G. H. Sines, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 
February, 1919, page 06, enumerates these increases as follows : During 
1916 and 1917 the railroads, under private control, had granted in- 
creases amounting to about $300,000,000. The award of the Railroad 
Wage Commission added $300,000,000 more, which was increased an- 
other $250,000,000 by supplemental wage orders issued up to the end of 
1918. Since then further wage increases have been granted. 

a G. H. Sines, op. cit, page 98 (speaking in December, 1918) : "The 
average increase in wages will be less than fifty per cent while the 
increase in living costs is over seventy-five per cent," 

3 Thus, in the shipyards, machinists who were^ receiving 72^4 cents 
per hour in July, 1918, at the time when the machinists in the railroads 
were awarded 68 cents, were awarded 80 cents in October, 1918. 
Navy Yards and Arsenals followed the Shipping Board and many 
other Government and private plants made wage increases; but the 
wages of the railroad shopmen remained unchanged. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 93 

it was not until July that the board made its report to the Di- 
rector General. The report showed that the board, which dur- 
ing the war had always been able to reach unanimous decisions, 
was, now that the pressure of war was released, deadlocked — 
the three labor representatives recommending an increase to 80 
cents an hour, the shipyard rates; the three members representing 
the management being against this proposal, though favoring a 
wage readjustment. 

Instead of acting one way or the other on this report of the 
board, Director General Hines, in a letter to the President dated 
July 30, recommended the creation by Congress of a new com- 
mission to consider and pass upon wages in the railway service. 
The men, who had been waiting since January for a decision on 
their demands, were bitterly disappointed, and on the following 
day many of them went out. The national leaders, who had not 
authorized the strike, urged the men to return to work, and 
ordered that a strike vote be taken. Nevertheless the walkout 
continued to spread, and as a result the Director General an- 
nounced on August 7 that power had been given him by the 
President to settle the controversy directly with the officers of the 
men, provided that in the meantime the workers returned to the 
shops. Even then a great many of the men continued out. Grad- 
ually, however, they resumed work, and a conference took place 
at the White House between the President, the Director General, 
and the representatives of the men. An offer of a wage increase 
of four cents an hour, retroactive to May 1, was made and the 
national leaders decided to submit it to the men, who, by a refer- 
endum vote, reluctantly accepted it. 1 It was at the time of this 
conference that the President made his appeal to the men of the 
railroads, as well as to all of the other workingmen of the country, 
to hold in abeyance any demands for wage increases until normal 
conditions had been restored and until the Government had had 
an opportunity of prosecuting its campaign for a reduction in the 
cost of living, which the President said was already showing signs 
of success. 

The feeling of unrest which resulted in the actions of the shop- 
men found additional expression in another unauthorized strike 
— this time by the trainmen of California. The trouble started on 

1 The men had demanded an increase of 17 cents an hour, retroactive 
to January 1, 1919. 



94 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

August 19, 19 19, at Los Angeles, when, in sympathy with the 
striking employees of the Pacific Electric Railroad and in viola- 
tion of their agreement with the U. S. Railroad Administration, 
the trainmen went out. The strike spread quickly from California 
to Arizona and Nevada in spite of the most explicit orders of the 
national leaders to the contrary, which was remarkable in so 
well disciplined organizations as the railroad brotherhoods. (The 
men claimed that they went out as individuals.) An ultimatum 
of the Director General x backed up the Federal and State 
Governments and the orders of the officers of the brotherhoods, 
resulted in a return of the men to work; not, however, until 
eleven days after the inception of the strike. 2 

During all this time the railroad brotherhoods were urging that 
the men engaged in the movement of trains be compensated for 
overtime in the same manner as were the other men in the rail- 
road service and generally in industry; that is to say, by the pay- 
ment of time and one-half for overtime. As we have seen, the en- 
actment of the Adamson Law, giving the men the eight-hour day, 
did not carry with it any extra compensation for overtime; nor 
was this granted by any of the decisions of the Boards thereafter 
created. In November, 19 19, the Director General suggested to 
the brotherhoods that the men in the freight service receive time 
and one-half for overtime and that they relinquish certain special 
allowances which they had for a number of years been receiving. 
The matter was put to a vote by the brotherhoods and accepted 
by three of the four. Under their rules it was, therefore, adopted 
by all of them and on December 15, 1919, the Director General 
issued an order 3 calling for time and one-half for overtime for the 

1 See New York Times for August 28, 1919, in which the ultimatum 
is reprinted in full. 

3 The dissatisfaction of the men with conditions that prevailed after 
the armistice, the failure of the Government to reduce the cost of 
living and resentment caused by the delay in the appointment of the 
Wage Board provided for in the Bill under which the railroads were 
restored to their private owners, resulted in another unauthorized 
strike. The firemen, switchmen, yardmen, etc., in many sections of 
the country went out against the wishes of their national officers and 
a strike of momentous importance resulted. The freight service was 
for many months demoralized and an "outlaw" organization has de- 
veloped which has seriously affected the compactness of the railway 
unions. 

3 Supplement No. 24 to General Order No. 27, December 15, 1919. 
Article VII provides that "(a) ... 100 miles or less, 8 hours or less 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 95 

freight service and that all "arbitraries" and special allowances 
applying to freight service, excepting payments for delays at 
initial and final terminals, be eliminated. The same order pro- 
vided that yard service was to be paid for at one and one-half times 
the regular rates and that arbitraries and special allowances be 
similarly abolished. For the express service also time and one- 
half for overtime was granted to all the employees who worked 
the full number of hours per week. 1 

FUEL ADMINISTRATION 

One of the causes of anxiety throughout the entire war period 
was a threatened shortage of coal. Not that the facilities for fuel 
production were lacking. On the contrary, years of intense com- 
petition in the coal mining industry had resulted in the opening 
up of an unnecessarily large number of mines, especially in the 
bituminous fields, and the industry had been conducted in a 
wasteful and almost reckless manner. But bituminous mining 
also suffered from the tremendous handicap that the coal could 
not be stored for any length of time at the mines and in large 
quantities without deterioration. This meant that it had to be 
shipped as soon as mined. Production was therefore limited at 
any particular place by the supply of coal cars available at that 
place. 2 The consumption of coal had in recent years, been 
rapidly increasing 3 and during the war itself there was a large 
additional increase due to the tremendous industrial activity 
which war-making involved. This increase, together with the 

. . . shall constitute a days work; miles in excess of ioo will be paid 
for at the mileage rates provided. . . . (b) On runs of ioo miles or 
less overtime will begin at the expiration of 8 hours ; on runs of over 
ioo miles overtime will begin when the time on duty exceeds the miles 
run divided by 12^2. Overtime shall be paid for on the minute basis 
at an hourly rate of three-sixteenths of the daily rate." 

1 By Amendment No. 1 to Supplement No. 19 to General Order No. 
27, November 22, 1919. (Employees in the train messenger service 
were excluded from the operation of the order.) 

3 At a critical time, during the war (December, 1917) the allotment 
of cars fell as low as 11, 10 and even 7% of normal. See Harry A. 
Garfield, U.S. Fuel Administrator, in Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science, February, 1918, p. 52. 

8 In 1897 the annual production of coal was 200 million net tons. By 
1917 it had risen to 630 million tons (of which only 5 to 8% was for 
export). Ibid, p. 51. 



96 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

shortage of cars and general railroad congestion, brought the 
nation to a point where a coal famine seemed imminent. 

In May, 19 17, the Council of National Defense endeavored to 
meet the situation by the appointment of a Committee on Coal 
Production. It was soon realized, however, that the powers of 
the Council were not sufficiently broad to enable it to deal suc- 
cessfully with the difficult problems involved and on August 10, 
191 7, Congress enacted the famous Lever Act "to provide further 
for the national security and defense by encouraging the produc- 
tion, conserving the supply and controlling the distribution of 
food products and fuel." Drastic and far-reaching powers were 
given to the President under this Act. He could fix prices, take 
over and operate plants and completely control production, dis- 
tribution and consumption. In order to administer these powers 
in relation to fuel, the President on August 23, 191 7, by execu- 
tive order, created the United States Fuel Administration and ap- 
pointed Harry A. Garfield Fuel Administrator. 

In the meantime, serious labor difficulties were threatening in 
the coal industry as they were in so many other places. In fol- 
lowing these occurrences it will be necessary to distinguish be- 
tween the anthracite and the bituminous industries because their 
labor histories both before and during the war were quite different. 
In the bituminous field collective bargaining had been highly de- 
veloped for a considerable period before the war. Since 1898 the 
wages of coal miners in the Central Competitive field x had been 
fixed at annual or bi-annual conferences between miners and oper- 
ators; the result of these conferences was embodied in agreements 
expiring on April 1 of each year, or of alternate years. 2 In the 
anthracite field collective bargaining came somewhat later and in 
a different form. In 1902 the United Mine Workers of America 
sought a conference with the anthracite operators but were re- 
fused. A long and bitterly fought strike followed which led to 
intervention by President Roosevelt and the appointment by him 
of the Anthracite Coal Commission. The award of the Commis- 
sion was embodied in a three-year agreement under which a Board 

1 Indiana, Illinois, Ohio and Western Pennsylvania. _ 
a In other parts of the bituminous industry the organization of wage 
adjustments proceeded much more slowly. The reader is referred, 
for a detailed account of labor adjustments in the coal industry, to 
A. E. Suffern, Conciliation and Arbitration in the Coal Industry of 
America. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 97 

of Conciliation was established. This has been renewed from time 
to time, frequently after the occurrence of a strike, the last re- 
newal before the war having been made in 19 16, to run for four 
years. 

Before the appointment of the Fuel Administrator, the Secre- 
tary of Labor (a former secretary of the United Mine Workers 
of America) had been instrumental in averting a number of 
strikes which, had they occurred, would have seriously interfered 
with the supply of fuel. Thus in May, 191 7, the miners and 
operators of the Central Pennsylvania districts were unable to 
agree as to wages and a strike appeared imminent. The Secre- 
tary of Labor thereupon conferred in Washington with representa- 
tives of both sides and an agreement was reached which was sub- 
sequently ratified by the Miners' Convention. In Alabama, in the 
month of August, 19 17, differences between the mine owners and 
their men had gone so far that a strike order had been issued. 
In this case the difficulty was intensified by the fact that the oper- 
ators were unwilling to meet with a committee representing their 
employees. The Secretary of Labor once more intervened and 
after a number of conferences, which had to be held separately 
with each side, succeeded in averting the strike. 1 

At the time that the Fuel Administration was being organized, 
the operators and miners of the Central Competitive fields were 
meeting at Indianapolis to consider wage increases. The Fuel Ad- 
ministrator requested that this meeting be adjourned until his 
office was better organized and until he had time to formulate a 
policy. In September, at the request of the Administrator, a 
joint conference was held at Washington. This resulted in the 
agreement of October 6, 1917, known as the Washington agree- 
ment, the terms of which were embodied in contracts by which 
disputes in other territories were subsequently settled. An im- 
portant clause of these settlements, especially in the light of post- 
armistice occurrences, provided for their continuance for the period 
of the war, but not to exceed two years from April 1, 19 18. 

The wage increases called for in the Washington agreement 
were made conditional upon an increase to the coal operators in 
the selling price of coal, sufficient to cover the increased cost, and 
on October 27, 191 7, the President issued an order making such 
increase. The Administrator had appointed as advisors on labor 

1 Annual Report, Secretary of Labor, 1917, page 13. 



98 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

matters Mr. Rembrandt Peale, a representative of the operators, 
and Mr. John P. White, President of the United Mine Workers of 
America. On July 23, 19 18, the Fuel Administrator announced 
an understanding with the United Mine Workers, setting forth in 
detail the labor policies * which were to govern the Administration 
for the war period and establishing a bureau of labor with Messrs. 
Peale and White as joint heads. 2 

Although the joint agreement in the anthracite field did not by 
its terms expire until 1920, an allowance had been made by the 
operators in May, 191 7, to meet the higher wages which were 
being paid in other industries. In December, 191 7, a supple- 
mental contract was entered into, similar to the Washington agree- 
ment, giving the anthracite miners a further wage increase, and 
toward the end of the war both anthracite and bituminous miners 
sought additional wage increases at the hands of the Fuel Adminis- 
tration. The miners claimed that the cost of living had advanced in 
so unprecedented a fashion that more pay had become absolutely 
essential. The operators themselves realized that, because of the 
higher wages paid in other industries, the pay of the miners would 
have to be increased, if the men were to be prevented from drift- 
ing away from the mines. 3 Largely on this account, in October, 
1 9 18, the anthracite miners were awarded an advance of approxi- 
mately $1 per day; in the bituminous fields, however, where the 
competition with other industries was not so keenly felt, no in- 
crease was granted, although Mr. Garfield's labor advisors, both 
the representative of the operators as well as the representative of 
the men, recommended that such increase be made. 

The refusal of the administration to grant to the bituminous 
workers an advance similar to the one which had been obtained 
by the men in the anthracite fields led to a great deal of bitter- 

1 See Monthly Labor Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. 
Dept. of Labor, September, 1918. 

2 Warren Pippen, an officer of the Miners' Union, succeeded to the 
position held by Mr. White in the Labor Bureau. 

3 It was stated before the Conference Committee of National Labor 
Adjustment Agencies that, whereas there were 180,000 men normally 
employed in the anthracite fields, this number had dropped to 144,000. 
It was urged that any further depletion would be a matter of very 
grave concern. Contract miners (one of the two classes into which 
men at the mines are divided) had not only to be skilled men but 
were working under a state certificate which required two years ex- 
perience in the mines to qualify the worker. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 99 

ness, and when the cost of living kept on increasing after the 
armistice had been signed, the men became more and more insis- 
tent that their wages be increased. It will be remembered that the 
agreement for the Central Competitive fields was to continue for 
the duration of the war but not later than April, 1920. The men 
claimed, in the fail of 19 19, that the war had come to an end 
and that the agreement was, therefore, not operative. A con- 
vention of the miners was held which adopted a series of demands, 
among other things for a 60% increase in wages, 1 a six-hour day, 
a five-day week, and the abolition of all penalty clauses. These 
demands were rejected by the operators and it was every day be- 
coming more apparent that unless something were immediately 
done, a strike could not be averted. The Government had per- 
mitted the Fuel Administration to disband, and although it had 
been perfectly apparent for months before matters reached a crisis 
that conditions in the coal industry needed radical readjustment, 
things were allowed to drift until it was too late to effectively 
correct them. On October 16, 1919, in an effort to avert the 
impending strike, Secretary Wilson brought about a conference 
in Washington between the representatives of both sides. At this 
time a strike order for November 1 had already been issued and 
the operators refused to enter into negotiations for a new schedule 
until the order was rescinded. The representatives of the miners, 
on the other hand, said they had no power to call off the strike 
and the conference broke up without having accomplished any- 
thing. The feeling of the men was very much embittered by the 
statement which the President issued October 20, 19 19, in which 
he referred to the proposed action of the miners as an abrogation 
of their agreement and said that the strike was not only un- 
justifiable but unlawful. Referring to the efforts of the Adminis- 
tration to reduce the cost of living he sought to persuade the 
miners to remain at work. But the President himself had long 
before said that the war had come to an end and the miners felt 
that an effort was being made, because of the technical con- 
tinuance of the war, to hold them to a contract which so far as 
the intention of the parties to it was concerned had expired and 

1 See C. F. Stoddard in Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, December, 1919, page 61. See note at page 182 
of this book for an explanation of the miners' demand for the 30-hour 
week. 



ioo WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

which was no longer a fair contract. The President was entirely 
unsuccessful in his appeal to the men and when it appeared that 
nothing further could be done to prevent the occurrence of the 
strike, the Attorney General, at the request of the President, pro- 
cured from a Federal Judge at Indianapolis an order restraining 
the union officials and all other persons from taking steps to put 
the strike order into effect. This injunction not only deprived 
the strikers of any assistance from their national and local officers 
but the funds of the unions were tied up so as to prevent the 
payment of strike benefits, which the union had counted upon to 
prevent suffering among the strikers. - The injunction, however, 
absolutely failed to prevent the men from going out and the 
strike which followed resulted in a tie-up of the greater part of 
the bituminous fields and involved more than 400,000 miners. 
A week later, Federal Judge Anderson, who had issued the original 
restraining order, granted a temporary injunction, including there- 
in a most unusual provision — a direction to the officials of the 
miners that the strike orders be withdrawn. On November n 
the miners' officials obeyed the mandate of the court and recalled 
the strike order. But the Government was now to learn that the re- 
calling of a strike order was not, under these circumstances, equiv- 
alent to the settlement of a strike. The men paid no attention to 
the action of their leaders and continued their refusal to work. 

Conferences were now resumed between the operators and the 
miners in which the Government took part. The Secretary of 
Labor felt that the miners were entitled to an increase of 31%; 
Mr. Garfield, whom the President on October 30 x had asked to 
resume his duties as Fuel Administrator, did not think that so 
large an increase was warranted. He favored the granting of 
14% (which he claimed could be paid by the operators without 
increasing the cost of coal to the consumer). But the men were 
absolutely unwilling to accept so small an increase and after 
additional conferences, the President, going over the Fuel Admin- 
istrator's head, offered to the men a reference of the issues in 
controversy to a commission with broad powers if they would 
return to work on an immediate increase of 14%; the question 
of further increases to be determined by the commission. 2 This 

1 One of Mr. Garfield's first acts on his resumption of the duties of 

Fuel Administrator was to restore war time regulation of coal prices. 

3 The Commission, consisting of Messrs. Peale and White, Mr. Gar- 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 101 

offer was accepted by the men who had remained out on strike all 
this time, and work was resumed. 

An examination of the labor policies of the Fuel Administra- 
tion will show that, in the main, they were the same as those 
applied by other agencies. The most important difference was the 
adoption of the so-called penalty clause. In order to avoid stop- 
pages of work at the mines, the Fuel Administrator insisted that 
in every agreement made between operators and men it be provided 
that, if the men should strike without bringing their grievances 
to the Fuel Administrator for settlement, each man be fined $i a 
day; the fine to be collected automatically by the employer and 
paid over by him to the Red Cross. A lockout by the employer 
would be similarly punished by a fine of $i per day for every 
worker affected. A great deal of difficulty was experienced in in- 
ducing the workers to accept this penalty clause but the Fuel Ad- 
ministrator insisted upon its acceptance and wage increases were 
made dependent upon its adoption. This resulted, in the fall of 
191 7, in a strike in the Kansas field, caused by the refusal of 
Mr. Garfield to sanction an agreement which gave the men an 
increase but which did not contain the penalty clause. President 
Howatt, of the Kansas miners, who had at first refused to agree 
to the penalty, finally ordered the men to return to work and, 
after protracted negotiations, the penalty clause was accepted. 

The eight-hour day, which prevailed in the mines before our 
entiy into the war, was not the basic eight-hour day obtaining 
in most industries, but an actual one; that is to say, no work was 
done after the expiration of the eight hours. And it is claimed 
by labor representatives that this policy was most successful and 
that a greater amount of work was done by a smaller number 
of miners than ever before in the country's history. 

field's former labor advisors, and Mr. Henry M. Robinson was un- 
able to come to a unanimous decision. The chairman and the repre- 
sentative of the employers united in an award which gave the men 
an average wage increase of 27%. They found that, from 1913, ton- 
nage wages had advanced on the average 48% for machine and 35% 
for pick workers whereas for day men, the increase had been 76%. 
Their award was a 31% increase for tonnage, and a 20% increase for 
day men. These advances are both in excess of the rise in the cost of 
living and brought the increase since 1913 in the wages of tonnage 
workers to 88% and of day workers to 111%. The commission re- 
fused to make any change in the eight-hour day. For majority and 
minority reports see Awards and Recommendations of U. S. Bitu- 
minous Coal Commission, 1920. 



102 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

In July, 19 1 8, at the time of the organization of the Bureau of 
Labor of the Fuel Administration, Mr. Garfield announced the 
text of an understanding which he had reached with the Secretary 
of Labor and with the United Mine Workers of America. 1 The 
principles contained in this statement are consistent with those 
enforced by other war labor agencies. The election of mine com- 
mittees was encouraged and it was provided that in the first in- 
stance disputes should be referred by such committees to mine 
officials; if they could not be adjusted in this way, they were to 
be referred to an umpire 2 with right of appeal to the Adminis- 
trator. 

Convinced that the payment of bonuses disturbed wage condi- 
tions and caused shifting of men from mine to mine, a determined 
effort was made by the Fuel Administrator to abolish these pay- 
ments and Mr. Garfield went so far as to declare that in any case 
where the operator paid a bonus, this would be considered an 
admission that such operator did not need the increase in sell- 
ing price which had been allowed by the Fuel Administration, 
and the operator would be compelled to sell fuel at the old price. 
It would have seemed that, armed with the absolute right to con- 
trol prices, it would have been comparatively easy for the Ad- 
ministrator to have insisted upon the abolition of bonuses; such, 

*The text of this understanding is given in the Monthly Labor 
Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for September, 1918, and 
can be summarized as follows : 

(a) No strike pending settlement of controversies until dispute has 
been reviewed and decided by Fuel Administrator. 

(b) Recognition of union not to be exacted where union was not 
then organized, but if fields are already organized, any future 
adjustment shall recognize the United Mine Workers of 
America. 

(c) No recourse to be had to Fuel Administration until other 

methods of mediation, provided for in agreements, were ex- 
hausted. 

(d) No discharge because of affiliation with union. 

(e) No change from open to closed shop or vice versa during the 

war. 

(f) The provisions of the Maryland and Potomac agreement were 
held applicable in any cases in which the Fuel Administration 
intervened. This agreement provided for mine committees and 
their protection against discharge, for the appointment of 
check weigh men, semi-monthly pay days, and the right of 
peaceful assemblage. 

J Prof. Jacob Hollander was appointed umpire for the Maryland 
and upper Potomac district. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 103 

however, was not the case and the desire of certain operators to 
make these extra payments was so strong that the Administrator 
found it impossible to prevent them. As the labor shortage in- 
creased, and it became more difficult to keep the men, the tend- 
ency of the operators to increase rates by premiums and bonuses 
became more pronounced and resulted in an appeal by the oper- 
ators' association to Washington to put a stop to this practice. 
The employers realized that to prevent the men from going into 
other industries a further wage increase was necessary and they 
are said to have encouraged the miners in the fall of 19 18 to ask 
for a wage increase. 

In the mines, as elsewhere, immunity from discharge for union 
affiliation resulted in a large increase in the membership of the 
unions and it is stated that locals were established during the 
war in fields which had, until then, successfully resisted the ef- 
forts of the organizer. 1 

The war experience and the crisis that succeeded the armistice 
have brought into prominence the chaotic conditions that sur- 
rounded the bituminous mining industry. In spite of the obvious 
dependence of the United States upon an abundant supply of coal 
at a fair price, the Government has consistently failed to take any 
action that would remedy the outstanding evils surrounding coal 
production. The first of these is tendency to overproduction of 
coal and the second our failure to devise a method of keeping the 
mines going six days a week. It appears from the records of the 
United States Geological Survey that from 19x0 to 19x8 the num- 
ber of days worked by the miners ranged from 195 fo 214. Since 
the armistice and through October, 19 19, only 625/2% of full time 
capacity was employed, and a week's work consisted on an average 
of thirty hours. 2 If we are to successfully meet the nation's indus- 
trial problems, wasteful conditions of this kind will have to be 
eliminated. 

1 James Lord, President of the Mining Department of the A. F. of L. 

in the Report of the Executive Council, to the 39th Annual Conven- 
tion, June, 1919, page 143, says "The United Mine Workers of America 
have made a gain of 447 local unions and the average paid up 
membership is 406,089. . . . The organization has been extended into 
fields hitherto considered impregnable, local unions having been es- 
tablished in the Fairmont field of West Virginia, the Georges Creek 
field of Maryland, Eastern Kentucky, Nova Scotia and Utah." 

"These figures are quoted by W. L. Chenery in the Survey of 
November 22, 1919, page 152. 



104 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

FOOD ADMINISTRATION 

The Food Administration organized its own labor bureau, 1 but 
did not directry handle the mediation of industrial disputes. These 
were referred to the Labor Department. Although the Federal 
Food Administrators of California and Massachusetts occasionally 
acted as mediators, such action on their part was not directly a 
function of the Food Administration. 

Perhaps the most acute situation which confronted the Admin- 
istration was a strike in August, 191 7, in the canning industry of 
the San Jose district of California, led by a newly formed organi- 
zation known as "The Toilers of the World." 2 Rioting took 
place, resulting in one death and in a number of injuries, and 
troops were called out. The Governor of California appointed 
Mr. Harris Weinstock, State Market Director (a former member 
of the United States Industrial Commission), to represent the 
State of California, and Mr. Ralph B. Merritt, Federal Food Ad- 
ministrator, was asked to act on behalf of the Federal Govern- 
ment. 

The two mediators stipulated that troops should be withdrawn 
and that all municipal, state and federal authority should be 
vested in them. These conditions were complied with and the 
mediators held conferences with the parties in interest. They re- 
quested the workers to clear the streets, and this having been 
done, meetings were held and, upon the assurance that their 
wage demands would be investigated and considered, the strikers 
returned to work. Within a few days uniform wage scales were es- 
tablished, with the acquiescence of both sides, and the canning in- 
dustry proceeded without further interruption. 

Mr. Merritt was also appointed to act as mediator in additional 
disputes involving food production — fishermen, employees of milk 
distributors and others. In 1919 the operators in canneries and 
dried fruit plants petitioned the Governor to appoint a representa- 

1 Prof. M. B. Hammond, of the Ohio State University, was labor 
director and representative of the Food Administration on the War 
Labor Policies Board. 

a In spite of the similarity of names the "Toilers of the World" do 
not seem to have been connected with the I. W. W. and made applica- 
tion for affiliation with the American Federation of Labor ; it did not, 
however, become affiliated with that body. It appears from evidence 
at the Chicago trial of members of the I. W. W. that the strike was 
in part at least, due to that organization. 



RAILROADS, FUEL AND FOOD 105 

tive who should establish the wage to be paid to employees in 
canneries and dried fruit plants in the state. Mr. Merritt served 
in this capacity and, after conferences with the parties involved, 
rendered decisions which were posted in every cannery of the 
state and which proved satisfactory to both sides. 

Before the appointment of the Food Administration and in the 
first days of the war, quite a serious strike occurred among the 
Gloucester and Boston fishermen which was settled through the 
activities of the Labor Department. 1 

Strikes in the packing industry were handled either by state 
mediators or, as we have seen in previous chapters, by the Presi- 
dent's Mediation Commission, or its representatives. 

* See Fifth Annual Report, Secretary of Labor, page 26. 



CHAPTER IX 
Telegraph and Telephone 

In order to understand the situation which developed in these 
industries during the war a brief explanation of pre-war condi- 
tions will be necessary. In making this explanation we must bear 
in mind that we are dealing with two separate industries — easily 
confused because of similarity of name and function. 

The telegraph industry has, for many years, been in the abso- 
lute control of two large national companies, the Western Union 
and the Postal Telegraph. These corporations are competitive, 
but both have adopted similar labor policies as well as the policy 
of central rather than diffused organization. The Western Union 
Company, by far the larger of the two, has always taken an atti- 
tude of open opposition to the membership of any of its "essential 
employees, especially those working the wires," in any labor 
unions which would subject them to "a strike order either for 
their own benefit or sympathetically for the benefit of others." * 

As contrasted with the telegraph, the telephone industries were 
not so centrally organized. The dominant corporation in this 
field is the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (the 
name is a misnomer, inasmuch as the company's business is con- 
fined to the operation of Bell telephone systems). In some dis- 
tricts there are independent competing companies, all of which, 
however, operate in restricted territories. The A. T. & T. Com- 
pany had resulted from the amalgamation of a number of local 
companies, most of which have been retained as separate corpora- 
tions. The stock of these companies is to a varying extent held 
by the parent company, but the separate companies each keep 
their own individual organization, and to a large degree deter- 
mine their own labor policies. 2 

1 Statement of "The Company's Position" issued by the Western 
Union Telegraph Company, 1918. 

3 Annual Report of the A. T. & T. Company for 1918, page 4: 
"There are in the United States approximately 11,000 separate tele- 

106 



TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 107 

Unlike the telegraph companies, most of whose employees are 
skilled, telephone work is largely done by girls of little skill. 
Some of the local companies, affiliated with the Bell System, dealt 
collectively with labor organizations but many of them have, like 
the telegraph companies, been hostile to unions and have dis- 
criminated against their members. 

In pursuance of its long-established policy, the Western Union 
Telegraph Company made it a practice to discharge any of its 
employees who joined the Commercial Telegraphers' Union of 
America (which was affiliated with the American Federation of 
Labor). As might have been expected, however, upon the an- 
nouncement of the principles of the Taft- Walsh Board, permitting 
employees to join trade unions of their choice without interference 
by the employer, redoubled efforts were made by the union to ex- 
tend its membership among Western Union employees. One hun- 
dred and forty men responded to the union's call; attended an or- 
ganization meeting, joined the union and were thereupon promptly 
discharged. 1 This led to complaints to the National War Labor 
Board, and an endeavor by the joint chairmen to adjust the 
grievances of the discharged men. A compromise was suggested 
to the company, which would have permitted the men to join the 
union, but with an agreement not to strike during the period of 
the war, and to leave all grievances to the adjustment of the 
board. The company rejected this offer, insisting upon its right 

phone companies. Of them 36 are Bell companies, 9,338 independent 
companies whose telephone systems connect with the Bell System, and 
about 1,600 independent companies whose telephone systems do not 
connect with the Bell System. There are also a large number of rural 
lines and systems which connect with the telephone systems of these 
companies, 26,055 of which are connected with the Bell System." 

1 This is the figure given by the Western Union Company ; the union 
states that a very much larger number of men were discharged. It 
is interesting to note that this meeting took place in Seattle, where as 
we have seen labor was especially well organized and radical in tem- 
per. The incident led to the introduction of several resolutions in the 
Minneapolis convention of the American Federation of Labor in June, 
1918. The one adopted called upon the President and Congress imme- 
diately to take over the wires. One of the resolutions that was pro- 
posed by the representative of the Central Labor Council of Seattle, 
contained language which amounted to the suggestion of a general 
strike. This feature of the resolution was opposed on the floor of the 
convention and the resolution was defeated. See Proceedings Con- 
vention American Federation of Labor, June, 1918, p. 204. 



108 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

to discharge men for union affiliation. 1 This led on June n, 
19 1 8, to a letter from the President of the •United States to both 
the Western Union and Postal Telegraph Companies in which the 
President stated that "It is imperatively necessary in the national 
interest that decisions of the National War Labor Board should 
be accepted by both parties to labor disputes, " and asked for the 
cooperation of the companies and their acquiescence in the Gov- 
ernment's labor policies, The Postal Telegraph was willing to ac- 
cede to the President's request, but the Western Union remained 
obdurate. Thereupon the Government took over the wires of 
both companies, 2 and their administration was placed in the hands 
of the Post Office Department. 

The hostile attitude of the Post Office Department toward labor 
unions— and especially of its chief, Mr. Burleson — was well 
known, and had been clearly stated by him in his report for 191 7. 3 
For this reason the action of the Government in placing the tele- 
graph wires under the control of the Postmaster General was 
much more welcome to the employers than it was to the workers. 

Simultaneously with the Government's taking over of the tele- 
graph wires, control was also taken of the telephone system of 
the country. In order to handle the problems of management, the 
Post Office Department vested this function in a Wire Control 
Board, consisting of three Government officials. 4 The late Mr. 

1 See discussion of worker's right to organize into trade unions in 
Chapter XIII, where statement of the President of the Western Union 
Telegraph Company, on this point, is quoted. 

a The President was authorized to do so by joint resolution of Con- 
gress, approved July 16, 1918. 

3 On page 33 of this report Mr. Burleson says: "The advisability 
of permitting Government employees to affiliate with an outside or- 
ganization and use the strike and boycott as a last resort to enforce 
their demands is seriously questioned by those interested in the public 
welfare. Postal employees have become bold because of this affiliation 
and have within recent years threatened to strike, and in one case 
actually did so by tendering their resignations and leaving the service 
in a body. In this case they were promptly indicted and prosecuted 
in the Federal Courts. While strikes in the Postal Service may be 
averted for the time being, yet they will inevitably come, and the 
public will then be brought face to face with a most serious situation 
— one which will be a menace to our Government. . . . The conduct 
of these organizations at this time is incompatible with the principles 
of civil service and with good administration of the Postal Service." 

4 John C. Koons, First Assistant Postmaster General; D. J. Lewis, 
U. S. Tariff Commission; W. H. Lamar, Solicitor of the Post Office 
Department. 



TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 109 

T. N. Vail, President of the A. T. and T. Company, was appointed 
advisor to the Wire Control Board. There was also appointed 
an Operating Board, consisting of four telephone and telegraph 
officials. 1 

When we come to examine the Post Office Department's labor 
policy, as distinguished from its methods of management, we will 
find the greatest confusion. The most vital question — that is, the 
location of authority to deal with labor disputes and to adjust 
wages and working conditions, was not settled until many months 
later. In the meantime the actions of the department were in- 
consistent in the extreme, and if a deliberate attempt had been 
made to evade the issues, what actually took place would not 
have been markedly different. 

The first step of the department was on the surface an excel- 
lent one. It appointed a committee "to investigate the working 
conditions and wages paid to employees of the telegraph and 
telephone companies." 2 But the fact is that this committee 3 
almost completely failed to function. According to its name, it 
might have been a board like the Railroad Wage Commission. 
This board, it will be remembered, made a thorough investigation 
of wages and working conditions, and subsequent Railroad Ad- 
justment boards were based upon its report. In sharp contrast 
to this, the wage committee for the telephone and telegraph in- 
dustries was never given either the funds or the authority to make 
a similar investigation, and ft seems to have accomplished nothing 
whatsoever. 

Although it had no authority to adjust grievances, and although 
it had no connection with the Wire Control Board, in which this 
authority was afterwards discovered to be located, a number of 

'U. N. Bethel (Chairman), Vice President of the A. T. and T. 
Company; F. A. Stevenson, of the Bell System; C. M. Yorks, of the 
Western Union Telegraph Company; A. F. Adams, representing inde- 
pendent telephone companies. 

'Order Number 2005, September 13, 1918. 

3 The Chairman was an official of the Post Office Department; of 
its other members two represented the employers, one the Labor 
Department, and one the employees, e. g. — W. S. Ryan, Assistant 
Superintendent Division of Post Office Service; U. N. Bethal, Vice 
President of the A. T. and T. Co., and F. B. MacKinnon of the 
Independent Telephone Association ; John B. Colpoys, Special Agent 
of the Department of Labor; and Miss Julia S. O'Connor, President 
of the Telephone Operators Department of the International Brother- 
hood of Electrical Workers. 



no WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

wage complaints were nevertheless sent to the committee. In 
June, 19 1 9, almost a year after the assumption of Government 
control, an order was issued by the Postmaster General directing 
each telephone company to designate an officer to whom such 
complaints might be presented. But nothing was said as to the 
authority of local companies to make adjustments, nor what 
was to become of controversies, if the action of the local com- 
panies was unsatisfactory to the workers. To make the confusion 
worse, many of these local officials refused to undertake the ad- 
justment of serious grievances, claiming that they had no au- 
thority to do so. 

At a later date the Postmaster General stated 1 that the oper- 
ating officials had been instructed to receive committees of their 
own employees and to transmit recommendations as to wages and 
conditions to the Wire Control Board for final review and action. 
This procedure had certainly not been clearly established nor 
were the previous actions of the Department consistent with it. 
But in any event the statement is remarkable in that it com- 
pletely ignored the Wage Committee. Moreover, the Wire Con- 
trol Board, in which authority for wage adjustments was thus 
apparently placed, consisted of Mr. Burleson's first assistant, the 
Solicitor of the Post Office Department, and a third representative 
of the Government, with the President of the A. T. and T. Com- 
pany an official adviser, and no representative whatever of labor 
— nor was labor represented, for that matter, on the Operating 
Board, closely associated with the Wire Control Board, all four 
of which were officials of the telegraph and telephone companies. 

Under all these circumstances it is not strange that a condition 
of unrest and dissatisfaction should have prevailed. The workers 
had hoped that Government control would result in the removal 
of grievances; instead, its only effect was that company officials 
who had been fighting the demands of the men were thereby 
changed into officers of the Government whose wishes it was just 
that much harder for the workers to oppose. The policy of dis- 
criminating against members and officers of the union was, the 
employees claimed, more vigorously pursued under Government 

1 In a letter to the Secretary of Labor, in answer to criticism on his 
labor policies and administration contained in a report by Felix 
Frankfurter. 



TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE in 

than under private control; x this in spite of the fact that on 
August 15, 1918, the Postmaster General had issued an order 
forbidding discharges solely because of union affiliation. 

As to the telegraph industry, it will be remembered that it was 
the Western Union Company's persistence in discriminatory dis- 
charges in spite of the Government's policy to the contrary which 
led to the taking over of the wires. The action of the Post Office 
Department in not preventing the continuance of this practice 
was therefore particularly irritating. 2 The exasperation of the 
workers was further increased by the manner in which the Post 
Office Department handled a wage increase that the Western 
Union Company had, just prior to the assumption of Government 
control, agreed to. This increase was to be of 5, 10 and 15%, 
depending on seniority and retroactive from August 1, 191 8. After 
the Government had taken over the wires, a demand for this in- 
crease was presented to the Wage Committee, which held hear- 
ings and recommended its adoption. The Post Office Depart- 
ment, however, did not accept this recommendation, but reduced 
the maximum increase to 10%, and later the entire wage advance 
from January 1, 19 19, instead of from August 1, 19 18. 

During the entire period of Government control there was the 
greatest dissatisfaction on the part of the Commercial Tele- 
graphers' Union with the actions of the Post Office Department. 
The union was vigorously attempting to extend its membership 
among the employees of the two telegraph companies, and was 
incensed at the persistence with which, it claimed, discharges for 
union affiliation continued to be made. Finally, as the time ap- 
proached for the return of the wires to their private owners a 
strike was called on June n, 19 19. The men's demands included 
an increase of wages, collective bargaining, and the right to join 
the union, together with reinstatement of the men who had been 
discharged on this account. 

The strike affected both companies, in fact the Postal Tele- 
graph more severely than the Western Union. In some sections 
of the country, especially in the South, the service was for a 
time badly crippled. In most places, however, very few of the 

1 The Western Union Telegraph Company had, as we have seen, 
relentlessly followed this practice. Many of the telephone companies 
did the same. 

2 In the meantime, the Company was fostering the growth of a 
company union. 



ii2 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

men went out, and in a short time the union, completely beaten, 
was compelled to call the strike off. This was one of the very 
few cases in which the employer's boast that their men would 
not go out on strike proved to be well founded. 1 

Returning now to the telephone industry, here too the claim of 
discriminatory discharges was a cause of unrest and in some cases 
of strikes. Such a discharge resulted in a strike of telephone 
operators at Wichita, Kansas. At St. Paul and Minneapolis the 
inability of the workers to secure a wage increase resulted in a 
walk-out. Without passing on the merits of these controversies, 
the outstanding fact is that the Post Office Department had failed 
to provide any adequate machinery for determining the justice of 
the workers' claims. In both strikes, however, the Department 
was successful — that is to say, it was able to dictate the terms 
upon which work was to be resumed. 

But this was not to be the case in a very much larger strike of 
the New England telephone operators; and so unpopular had Mr. 
Burleson become with all classes of the community that the de- 
feat which he suffered in this case was a matter of almost univer- 
sal satisfaction. 

The New England Telephone Company operates the Bell Sys- 
tem in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and Maine. 
Some years before the war it had agreed with the telephone girls' 
union — the Telephone Operators' Department of the Interna- 
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers — upon the organization 
of a board of labor adjustment with equal representation of the 
company and the employees. Up to the time of the taking over 
of the telephone wires by the Government this board had had 
a useful career and seems to have functioned very well indeed. 2 

The agreement under which the board was constituted expired 

1 See discussion of this position, so frequently taken by employers, 
in the first section of Chapter XVI. 

2 In describing its work, a circular issued by the union states that : 
"Although established primarily as machinery for adjusting individual 
and personal grievances, it became the medium of all relations be- 
tween the company and the operating force. ... It has reduced the 
working day one and one-quarter to two hours. Requirements for 
promotions, selections of hours, seniority rights, transfers, penalties 
for poor tests, adjustment of tricks, in short, every phase of an 
operator's life and activity has been made the subject of rulings by 
the Adjustment Board." A similar labor policy was followed by the 
Providence Telephone Company, operating in the State of Rhode 
Island. 



TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 113 

in December, 19 18, and efforts to renew it had failed — the officers 
of the New England T. and T. Company claiming that they had 
no authority to act. 1 In November, 1918, the same answer had 
been received by the telephone operators in reply to demands for 
a general wage increase. These demands were then taken to the 
Wage Commission at Washington.. Miss O'Connor, President of 
the Telephone Operators' Department, herself a member of the 
Commission, states that she was assured by Mr. Ryan, its chair- 
man (an important official in the Post Office Department), that 
the Commission had jurisdiction and that it would recommend a 
wage increase. In the meantime Miss O'Connor and Mr. Colpoys, 
a member of the Wage Commission, submitted to the Chairman of 
the Wage Commission a report in which they made two important 
recommendations — that the Commission enunciate the principles 
of the National War Labor Board and that wage adjustment ma- 
chinery be established for the telephone and telegraph service 
similar to that which had been created in the Railroad Adminis- 
tration. At the request of the Chairman of the Commission, this 
report was submitted to the office of the Postmaster General, and 
then to his first assistant, Mr. Koons. Almost immediately there- 
after Miss O'Connor, who had continued as an employee of the 
New England T. and T. Company, was asked to resign unless she 
limited her absences from duty to the call of Government officials. 
Miss O'Connor thereupon severed her connection with the com- 
pany, and on January 28, 19 19, withdrew from membership on 
the Wage Commission. 

No further action having been taken by any Government body 
relative to the workers' demands, a strike vote was ordered for 
February. The following month a committee visited Mr. Bur- 
leson who, it is claimed, in the presence of the committee, directed 
Mr. Koons to have the Wire Control Board consider the matter. 
On April 7 the secretary of the union received a letter from Mr. 
Koons promising a speedy decision by the Wire Control Board, 
but a few days later Mr. Burleson himself telegraphed, asking why 
the demands had not been presented to the superintendent of the 
local company. After additional conferences the workers, thor- 
oughly incensed at the treatment which they had received, ordered 
a strike for April 15, and insisted on their demands being met — 

*The Adjustment Board continued to function in relation to personal 
and general grievances but was not permitted to handle wage questions, 



H4 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

not only the demand for wage increases but also for the restora- 
tion of the wage adjustment functions of the Adjustment Board, 
which, under Mr. Burleson's administration, had been abandoned 
by the Government. Mr. Burleson's answer to the strikers' de- 
mands was not to deny their justice, but to blame the workers 
for not having followed the procedure which he claimed had been 
established. He used the advantage, which the inconvenience 
caused by a strike in a public utility would naturally give him, 
for the purpose of alienating sympathy from the strikers. And 
yet public opinion seems to have been on their side. 

The strike lasted six days, spread throughout New England, 
and completely tied up the telephone system all over that area. 
Mr. Burleson, who in former strikes had been able to send ulti- 
mata to the workers and upon their failure to accede to his terms 
to replace them with others, found himself in this instance in quite 
another position. He was forced to send his representative to 
Boston, who, after conferences with the union leaders, reached a 
settlement with them. The workers received substantial wage in- 
creases (although not as much as they had demanded) retroac- 
tive to January i, 19 19; and the machinery for collective wage 
bargaining was restored. 1 

In the period that followed the New England strike, a number 
of walkouts occurred in other parts of the country due to claims 
of discrimination. 2 The union of the telephone girls was a new 
one and apparently it was bitterly fought by most of the tele- 
phone companies. Many of the strikes commenced without the 
authorization of the national officers but were afterwards sup- 
ported by them. 

By the summer of 1919, the resentment of the telephone oper- 
ators had become so great that a general strike of all the workers 
in the industry was decided upon. Just before the date set for 
this strike a committee, appointed by the A. F. of L., waited upon 
the Postmaster General 3 and succeeded in getting from him a 
statement which satisfied the workers and averted the trouble. 

a As a part of the settlement all of the strikers were restored to 
their positions, as though no break had occurred in the continuity of 
their service. In the other two strikes mentioned in this chapter the 
workers who came back lost the advantages of long service, having 
been, not reinstated, but "reemployed." 

2 At Jacksonville, Florida, and Atlanta, Ga. 

3 Proceedings 39th Annual Convention, A. F. of L., p. 307, 



TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE 115 

This statement embodied in Order No. 3209 of the Post Office 
Department, dated June 14, 1919, gave the employees of telephone 
companies the right to bargain collectively through committees 
chosen by them and provided that, "Where, prior to Government 
control, a company dealt with representatives, chosen by the em- 
ployees to act for them, who were not in the employ of the com- 
pany, they shall thereafter do so. The telephone company shall 
designate one or more of its officials who shall be authorized to deal 
with such individuals or representatives in matters of better condi- 
tions of labor, hours of employment, etc." The former order of the 
Postmaster General, forbidding discriminatory discharges, was 
also reiterated. 

It is claimed, however, that this order did not put a stop to 
the discriminations which had led to the threatened general strike 
and shortly thereafter walkouts occurred at Cleveland and Youngs- 
town, Ohio, in California, Michigan, Virginia and elsewhere, un- 
authorized by the leaders but usually successful in securing con- 
siderable increases in wages. 



CHAPTER X 
The National War Labor Board 

M.a ' of industrial activities were not covered 

:r:e special boards previously discussed. The President's Me- 

the only war labor board the jv n of 

ifined to one departmej lustry, had ceased 

o function upon its return from the Pacific Coast to Was 

in January, 101S. The Adnunistiatois, whom it appointed for 

the copper mines, the packing plants and slsewheie, :'::::mied 

theii work of the Commission came 

to an end with the filing of its reports. 

Meanwhile, hundreds of strikes were occurring all over the coun- 
try in industries vital to the war, yet industries whi 7 not 
covered by any of the existing boards. It ' :zed that, be- 
se the nation's economic needs and because a successful out- 
: of the war to a great extent depended upon the prosp : 
and I 3E of the \ _::re were practically no occupations 
in w :kes could be vi€ rence. Under the 
strain :: war, the nation was forced to re v'i.y for 
the avoidance :: industrial strife in a way in which it had rv 
done — and never dc es — in tunc : ! : 

One of the national industries upon the peaceable operation of 
which so much depended wis s. In most cases, 

open jmpanies had been oven of them 

were in a weak financial condition even prior to our participation 
in the war. Street rail rioyeeshs : : 2 en under: 

and in many places there was the bitterest 1 the 

man: and the men. The Amalgamated Association of 

-. Raifo loyees, the dominant 1 

seeking wage betl recognition, and the closed shop. 

The railway companies were ipposed to theft ^coming 

men: : . this union, fre: :::mination ag. 

men who joined it. and in some cas \ vent as far as 

116 



NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD H7 

upon their employees signing contracts not to join any labor or- 
ganization. The fact that street railway fares were in most cases 
fixed, and the fact that all operating costs were mounting month 
by month made it next to impossible for the street railways, often 
near the point of a receivership, to keep pace in wages with the in- 
creased cost of living. As might have been expected, strikes were 
occurring all over the country, of a nature most difficult to cope 
with, and no agency existed capable of dealing satisfactorily with 
the situation. 

There were also many other industries which did not fall within 
the jurisdiction of any of the wage boards in which unrest threat- 
ened at any moment to develop into stoppages of work. 

Fully to understand the circumstances under which the National 
War Labor Board was organized, it will be necessary to examine 
briefly the steps which led to placing in the hands of the Secretary 
of Labor the task of developing a War Labor Administration. 
From the time of our entrance into the war there were some (al- 
though few) far-sighted advisors of the President and of the Coun- 
cil of National Defense, who realized the necessity of a more uni- 
fied labor administration, able to cope with the thousands of per- 
plexing labor problems which the war had either produced or mag- 
nified. 1 A suggestion in the Council of National Defense, for 
instance, for a central labor administration was defeated in August, 
191 7, by only one vote (a unanimous vote being required for adop- 
tion) . Many valuable months were lost during which various sug- 
gestions were made; finally an Interdepartmental Committee was 
appointed, consisting of representatives of those departments and 
boards chiefly interested in finding a solution of the labor prob- 
lem. This committee reported to the Council of National De- 
fense on December 20, 191 7, outlining steps to be taken and ma- 
chinery to be provided, "to allay industrial unrest and to create 
a spirit of real cooperation between labor and capital during the 
war," and suggesting six functions 2 which would have to be in- 

1 An excellent account of war labor conditions and the need for a 
central administration was written during the war by Professor 
L. C. Marshall. May, 1918, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 
XXVI, page 425. 

2 These functions were: (a) Furnishing an adequate supply of 
labor; (b) machinery for the adjustment of disputes; (c) machinery 
for safeguarding condition of labor in the production of war essen- 
tials ; (d) machinery for safeguarding conditions of living; (e) fact 
gathering body; (f) Publicity and Educational Division. 



n8 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

eluded in any comprehensive plan, one of which was, "machinery 
which will provide for the immediate and equitable adjustment of 
disputes." 

The President approved the program and on January 4, 19 18. 
asked the Secretary of Labor to organize a labor administration 
along the lines of the six functions recommended in the report. 
Thereupon the Secretary of Labor called together an advisory 
council to assist him with suggestions of plans and personnel. 
Professor Leon Marshall, who was the secretary to this council, 
had been in charge of the Industrial Service Section of the Coun- 
cil of National Defense, and had been an active member of the 
Interdepartmental Committee. In describing the work of the 
Council, Professor Marshall says, "On January 19, three days 
after they began their work, the Council presented to the Secre- 
tary of Labor the following memorandum : 

"The Advisory Council recommends to the Secretary of Labor 
that he call a conference of twelve persons representing employers' 
organizations, employees' organizations, and the public, for the 
purpose of negotiating agreements for the period of the war, 
having in view the establishment of principles and policies which 
will enable the prosecution of production without stoppage of 
work. 

"The Advisory Council recommends that this Conference body 
of twelve be composed as follows: Employers' organizations, as 
represented by the National Industrial Conference Board, 1 are to 
name five employers, and these five are to select a person repre- 
senting the general public. Employees' organizations, as repre- 

1 The National Industrial Conference Board consists of 17 National 
Employers' Associations representing 50,000 employers. At the invi- 
tation of the Council of National Defense, it had, on September 6, 
1917, presented to that body a series of recommendations to prevent 
interruption of industry by labor disputes and had recommended the 
creation of a board, constituted equally of representatives of em- 
ployers., employees, and the Government. ... It is interesting to 
note that this is one of the organizations of employers to which the 
President turned when in October, 1919, he organized his first Indus- 
trial Conference. The position taken at this later conference by 
employers is in strange contrast to the remarkably liberal position 
taken 'by them in September, 1917. At this later conference not only 
had their attitude become more conservative, but it was even more 
conservative than the attitude of those employers who were members 
of the '"Public" group. It was precisely this stubbornly reactionary 
stand of the employers' group which led to the withdrawal from the 
conference of the representatives of the employees, i.e., of "Labor." 



NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 119 

sented by the American Federation of Labor, are to name five 
representatives of labor, and these five are to select another repre- 
sentative of the general public." 

This recommendation having been approved by the Secretary 
of Labor, a War Labor Conference -Board was summoned which 
made its report to the Secretary on March 29, 19 18, recom- 
mending the appointment of a National War Labor Board and 
outlining its powers and functions and the "principles and policies 
to govern workers and employers on war industries for the dura- 
tion of the war." On Aprils, 1918, the President created the 
National War Labor Board, adopting the principles recommended 
by the War Labor Conference Board and appointing its members 
asjnembers of the National War Labor Board. 

In this manner, one year after our entry into the war, a tri- 
bunal for the adjustment of labor difficulties was organized which 
soon became a Supreme Court for the determination of war labor 
disputes. It achieved this position because of the representative 
character of its personnel, the ability and standing of its joint 
chairmen, the fact that the Board had the prestige of having 
been appointed by the President of the United States and that 
its principles were promulgated by him, and, finally, because the 
President could — and did — employ his great war powers in en- 
forcing the decisions of the Board in those cases where the exer- 
cise of those powers became necessary. 

It should be noted that the National War Labor Board did 
not oust any of the existing wage boards from their jurisdiction; 
on the contrary, its own activities were expressly limited to dis- 
putes for the adjustment of which there did not exist "by agree- 
ment or Federal law a means of settlement which had not been 
invoked." Subject to this limitation, the Board's powers ex- 
tended to "fields of production necessary for the effective conduct 
of the war, or in other fields of national activity, delays and ob- 
structions in which might in the opinion of the National Board 
affect detrimentally such production." The Board was also pre- 
pared to hear appeals from decisions of existing boards in those 
cases where the principles contained in the President's proclama- 
tion had been violated or where either party to an award had re- 
fused to abide by it. It also determined questions of jurisdiction 
between Government boards. 1 
*The appellate powers of the board were seldom invoked, and it is 



120 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Congress took no part in the creation of the Board, made no 
appropriations for its support and conferred no authority upon it. 
The Board never possessed any legal power to compel either em- 
ployer or employee to submit any matter in dispute to its arbitral 
determination, or legal power to compel either side, which had 
not submitted to its jurisdiction, to follow its recommendations or 
findings. In such cases, the duties of the Board were limited to 
conciliation and mediation (accompanied by the right to summon 
witnesses). Its arbitral determination of wages and other mat- 
ters of disagreement depended upon the voluntary submission to 
the Board — by both parties — of the matter in controversy.] The 
rules of the Board provided that upon the joint submission of a 
dispute a unanimous decision was necessary, and if a unanimous 
agreement could not be reached, the case was referred to a single 
umpire whose decision was final. This procedure was adopted in 
the Bridgeport case and in a number of others of lesser import- 
ance. If a complaint of either party was heard without the agree- 
ment of the other side to abide by the decision of the Board, 
unanimity was not required in the "findings" or "recommenda- 
tions" which in such cases were made. 

In spite of the limitation of its power, the National War Labor 
Board came to be regarded by the public as by far the most im- 
portant^ agency for the maintenance of continuous war produc- 
tion. /In the public mind it embodied the Government policy that 
industry should not be interrupted by strikes, and public opinion 
with its accompanying war psychology was in most cases suffi- 
ciently strong, before the signing of the armistice, to compel both 
sides to submit to the jurisdiction of the Board rather than allow 
disputes to result in stoppages of work. If an employer refused to 
submit to its jurisdiction, the President had the power, during 
the war, to take over the plant, 1 and in two cases refusal of em- 
difficult to say how far the right of appeal could have been insisted 
upon. The most important case in which an appeal was taken was 
stated by W. Jett Lauck, Secretary of the War Labor Board, in his 
memorandum report, to have been that of the New York harbor 
workers. The appellate jurisdiction of the board was also exercised in 
the case of the Commonwealth Steel Company, Granite City, Illinois, 
which had been decided by a representative of the Industrial Service 
Section of the Ordnance Department (in which the decision of the 
Ordnance Department was sustained). 

1 It was also possible for the Government to exert pressure through 
such agencies as the War Industries Board and the Fuel Administra- 



NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 121 

ployers were considered of sufficient importance to justify this 
action. 1 On the other hand, in one case, the failure of the em- 
ployees to abide by the decision of an umpire, appointed by the 
War Labor Board, led to a request by the President to the men 
— the machinists of Bridgeport — to return to work. 2 It is signifi- 
cant to note that the Government did not have any legal powers 
of compulsion over the men commensurate with its right to com- 
mandeer the plant of the employer. Its compulsive powers were 
limited to the withdrawal of draft exemptions which had been 
granted on occupational grounds to those men who were within 
the draft age, and to the refusal of assistance from the United 
States Employment Service to any worker who had violated the 
Government's recommendations, and, in fact, a threat to make 
use of both of these means was contained in the President's appeal 
to the Bridgeport workers. Other cases than those referred to, 
of refusal by either or both employer or employee to submit to 
the National War Labor Board, occurred even before the signing 
of the armistice, but they did not receive much publicity and were 
not considered sufficiently important to justify drastic action. 

After the armistice was signed quite a different spirit prevailed. 
There were very many cases in which both employers and em- 
ployees disregarded complaints to the Board and refused to submit 
to its jurisdiction and to carry out its findings and recommenda- 
tions. 3 Shortly after the armistice the Board decided not to enter- 
tain complaints after December 5, 19 18, unless both sides agreed 
to abide by its award or unless the President, through the Secre- 
tary of Labor, specially requested the Board to hear the case. In 

tion. Thus the Government could deprive an offending or recalcitrant 
employer of priorities or could completely shut off his supply of raw 
materials of most kinds. 

1 I.e., in the cases of Smith & Wesson of Springfield, Massachu- 
setts, and of the Western Union Telegraph Company. See Chapters 
VII and IX. 

2 See Chapter VII. 

3 The change of spirit which followed the armistice is well illustrated 
by the case of the Cleveland and Erie Traction Co., Girard, Pa., 
National War Labor Board, Docket No. 631. Employer and em- 
ployee had jointly agreed to submit the controversy to the Board, but 
before a hearing could be held the armistice had been signed. The 
employer now refused to go on with the case claiming that conditions 
had changed and that the signing of the armistice had ousted the 
Board of jurisdiction. The Board held however that the company 
could not withdraw "from an obligation and agreement made in good 
faith with the men." 



122 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJ1 2NT 

the absence of the extreme prei 
:h had accompanied the w: 
less and less until finally : 5. :::: ird b} r resolu- 

tion decided to receive no more new case 
up its —::".: and to transfer its ret 

ment of Labor. On August 12. the Beard took formal action 
[s existence. 1 
In the short period of its official life, the 

Labor Board teck it intc almost sveiy state in the Union 
I covered a vn.de range of industries, including those 
:ed to the conduct of the war, such as machine she; 
iries shell and munitizr. plants, and inc 
fled a list as moving picture stttiirs. the manufacture 
the printing industry, laundri es the fc ml 1 i n ;• 
others. The Board vras called upon t: fis 

.; urtant street railway in the ::v.r. ::; ; cents 

were indeed asked for by municipal employ 
one of these cases, on complaint of the firemen of the city :: 
Omaha, the Board held that it had no jurisdiction. 3 in another, it 
recommended to the city of Pittsburgh - that it increase the ws 
paid to its fire fighters. 

The decisions of the Board were courageous and nlike, 

and embodied the most progressive views that 

had found sufficiently general approval to h; 1 use 

during the war. At the same time they were sound and conserva- 
2nd although, as was inevitable 3 some ed a 

: deal of criticism at the yr were m - -earns 

- little doubt that their justice and soundness 2 in- 

creasingly apparent when the history of war labor a 
is studied from a mere detached angle than is possible at the 
pi eient time. 

The President's proclamation, creating the Board, adopted and 

; for Auruj: :j. 1519. 
: _ : :::;. ::'■: i:ree: the 

Board n awards and fincir.rs : 17 cases dis- 

rr.:55ei?::er_ isti i:s~ 

referred :: Ir:::::t::: :: La':::: 7 :aie; per. 

tary National War LaL:r Board t: :Le Se: :; :;.e 12 

31, 1919. 
3 D: 
4 Docket Number 226. 



NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 123 

set forth the principles which were to govern its decision. 1 The 
minimum wage was more fully recognized in the awards of the 
Board than it had ever been before, and the eight-hour day, al- 

ptliough not universally applied, was granted in many cases. 

[Wherever possible, collective bargaining was insisted upon, and to 
the newly created committees was often assigned the task of es- 
tablishing wage rates and of adjusting conditions, with the right 
to appeal to the National War Labor Board. 

As the activities of the Board expanded a large organization 
was built up, as many as 250 men and women having been em- 
ployed at the time of its greatest activity. In spite of the Board's 
practice of dividing its membership into sections (usually consist- 
ing of one employer and one employee member each) , the number 
of complaints was so large that it soon became necessary to dele- 
gate to examiners the taking of testimony. This method was fol- 
lowed in more than half of the cases heard by the Board. There 
was also developed the practice of assigning representatives to 
administer awards and to see that their provisions were followed 
by both sides. 2 A staff of expert advisers on matters of economics 
and finance was also developed, and reports prepared on the cost 
of living, the eight-hour day, and similar questions affecting the 
decisions of the Board. In this manner, in the comparatively 
short time of the Board's existence, an incredibly large number of 
complaints were heard and awards handed down. 

Nor was the influence of the Board confined to the cases which 
it heard and decided. From the time of the enunciation of its 
principles and policies, these liberal and wisely conceived doc- 
trines were adopted by all other wage boards, 3 and they formed 
a Magna Charter of war labor rights, satisfying the workers' sense 
of justice, and yet not seriously alienating the loyalty of the em- 
ployers. Although neither side was satisfied, there is no doubt 
that labor was much better pleased with the working of the Board 

1 These are given in full in Appendix No. VII and will be discussed in 
greater detail in a subsequent chapter. 

2 Up to May 31, 1919, 180 awards and findings had been administered 
by the Board's agents, administrators having been present in person in 
128 cases. — Memorandum Report of Secretary Lauck. 

3 The principles did not vary much, from those already being ap- 
plied, except in emphasis, clarity, and the publicity which they received. 
These factors, however, were very important and resulted in the 
applications of the principles over a wider area than would otherwise 
have been possible. 



124 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

than was capital. Yet upon the termination of the war both sides 
seemed to desire its abolition. 

The reason for this desire was that at the close of the war both 
sides chafed under the restriction imposed upon them by the 
existence of the Board. On the part of the workers, this feeling 
was due to the fact that the American Federation of Labor has 
traditionally been opposed to anything resembling compulsory 
arbitration. It has always favored collective bargaining between 
capital and labor, and the conclusion of joint agreements between 
employers and unions, but it has opposed the interference of out- 
side agencies. To be sure, it has favored mediation of the type 
which has been for the last few years carried on by the Depart- 
ment of Labor. This has consisted of efforts by Government rep- 
resentatives to encourage the "getting together" of the two sides, 
without any obligations being imposed on either, and without the 
exercise of any arbitral functions by the Government. (The Na- 
tional War Labor Board was, we must remember, an agency 
which, if it was to function properly, had to have the right, either 
as a result of public opinion or otherwise, to intervene in and to 
decide industrial disputes.) 

Another reason which made the workers willing to have the War 
Labor Board dissolved was their desire, now that the war was 
over, to attain ends more favorable to them than were sanctioned 
by the principles of the Board and by its decisions. Thus they 
sought union recognition even in cases where there had been none 
before the war. They desired reductions in hours of work more 
radical than those which had been awarded by the Board. They 
felt that they had the power to compel employers to grant these 
changes, and did not wish to be hampered in the exercise of this 
pov/er by the existence and authority of the National War Labor 
Board. On the other hand, the employers had never been recon- 
ciled to the employees' immunity from discharge (because of 
union membership), which had been one of the cardinal principles 
of the Board. They desired, in many cases, to resume their former 
discriminatory practices and they felt that with respect to any 
demands of labor they were strong enough to fight them out suc- 
cessfully in open industrial conflict. They were anxious to have 
the National War Labor Board dissolved because they did not 
wish to be placed in the dilemma of either submitting to arbitra- 
tion before an existing tribunal, in which case they felt they would 



NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 125 

be sacrificing their new peace-time power, or of refusing to sub- 
mit, in which case the mere existence of the Board, together with 
the prestige which it had acquired, would have prejudiced public 
opinion against them. The soundness of this feeling, from their 
own point of view, can be seen in the case of the steel strike. 
Public opinion does not seem to have condemned the refusal of 
the Steel Company to arbitrate, whereas, had the War Labor 
Board been in existence and had it offered its good offices — as un- 
doubtedly it would have done — this refusal would have met with 
general condemnation. 

All these reasons make it easy to see why both sides welcomed 
the dissolution of the National War Labor Board with something 
almost akin to relief. 



CHAPTER XI 

War Labor Policies Board and Conference Committee of 
Labor Adjustment Agencies 

WAR LABOR POLICIES BOARD 

We have seen in a previous chapter that in an effort to coordi- 
nate the work of the different labor boards and to strengthen and 
unify the labor program, the President on January 4, 191c, ac- 
cepting the report of the Inter-departmental Committee, directed 
the Secretary of Labor to organize a Labor Administration. One 
of the final steps taken to carry out this order was the organiza- 
tion of the War Labor Policies Board on May 7, 19 18. It was 
composed of representatives of all Government agencies interested 
in production and vitally concerned in finding a proper solution of 
the labor problem. The board was intended to be a planning 
body, to study problems and map out methods for their solution, 
and to formulate the policies by which other branches of the Gov- 
ernment should be guided. By locating this function in a board 
composed of the labor administrators of the different branches of 
the Government it was hoped that the new body would serve to 
unify all Governmental labor policies and to coordinate and de- 
velop war labor activities in a unified, orderly, efficient manner, 
and that the collective "voice of all the industrial agencies of. the 
Government" would supply vision and foresight in charting the 
course to be pursued. 

So far as the activities of the War Labor Policies Board relate 
to the subject matter of this book — labor disputes — they consisted 
mainly in drafting uniform labor clauses for introduction in con- 
tracts for war production * and in attempting to standardize wages 
for all war industry. This latter was a stupendous undertaking, 
involving the consideration of wage scales in thousands of locali- 
ties and in hundreds of different occupations. The board never 

1 These included a clause on Adjustment of Labor Disputes, and are 
set forth in Appendix X. 

126 



WAR LABOR POLICIES BOARD 127 

accomplished its purpose, but its efforts to do so had two results. 
In the first place the Emergency Construction Commission, which 
had only one industry to deal with, and which, at the request of 
the Secretary of War, had made considerable progress in prepara- 
tion for standardizing wages in the building industry, was di- 
rected to discontinue this work and to give its material to the War 
Labor Policies Board. A resolution was also adopted by the Poli- 
cies Board urgently requesting "the departments and boards rep- 
resented to refrain from making changes in present standards 
pending the standardization now under consideration." This res- 
olution was put into effect by departmental orders. It prevented 
Government adjusters from making any changes in wages pend- 
ing action by the Policies Board, and as time went on without 
such action being taken, very embarrassing situations developed. 1 

Thus in the building industry under the Baker- Gompers agree- 
ment it was understood that there would be put into effect on 
Government work wage scales adopted jointly by unions and em- 
ployers' associations. But such new wage scales were frequently 
interpreted by the Emergency Construction Commission to 
amount to "changes in standards," and under the orders of the 
War Department they could not be adopted, because to have done 
so would have been contrary to the resolution of the Labor Policies 
Board. For several months the hands of labor administrators 
were tied, and it was impossible under the circumstances to reach 
adjustments which otherwise would have readily been made, and 
to grant wage increases to which the workers were obviously en- 
titled. It was almost impossible to make the men understand 
why decisions should be so long delayed, and inevitably a great 
deal of unnecessary unrest and a number of strikes resulted. 
Eventually this restriction was withdrawn, and the adjusters were 
allowed to make decisions without waiting for definite action by 
the Policies Board, and as a matter of fact the war ended before 
this standardization had been achieved. 

The board also adopted the principles of the National War 
Labor Board; indorsed excellent regulations in regard to the em- 
ployment of women at night; 2 and established a policy for the 

1 To a certain extent, these situations were relieved by the fact that 
the rule referred to wage Standards and not to actual wages, thereby 
giving a degree of latitude to the Government adjusters. 

3 Prepared by the Women in Industry Service of the Department of 
Labor of which Miss Mary Van Kleeck was the head. 



128 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

United States Employment Service for those cases where an em- 
ployer, whose employees were on strike, requested Government 
assistance. 1 Shortly before the signing of the armistice the Poli- 
cies Board also negotiated agreements between employers and 
workers for the formation of a Metal Trades Board and a Build- 
ing Trades Board. Had the war lasted longer both of these would 
probably have become very important agencies for unifying the 
work of Government wage adjustment. Although from this de- 
scription, the sum of actual accomplishment of the War Labor 
Policies Board may seem slight, it must be remembered that its 
main activities were in other fields than mediation, that it was 
organized very late in the war and that the tasks which it under- 
took involved study and investigation, and were necessarily slow 
of accomplishment. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that if 
such a board were permanently organized and continuously func- 
tioning it would prove of inestimable value. 

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 

In September, 191 8, there was also organized the Conference 
Committee of Labor Adjusting Agencies of which Mr. Frankfurter, 
Chairman of the Labor Policies Board, was likewise the head. 
The personnel of the committee consisted of those in charge of all 
war labor adjustment agencies. In most cases the departments 
represented on the War Labor Policies Board were also repre- 
sented on the Conference Committee (and by the same individ- 
uals). But this was not entirely the case — thus the Department 
of Agriculture and the Food Administration having no wage ad- 
justment boards of their own, were not represented on the Con- 
ference Committee, whereas the National War Labor Board, which 
was not a part of the Labor Policies Board, was, however, repre- 
sented on this Committee. The purpose of the Committee was to 
prevent the adoption of decisions by one agency which would 
upset the work of others. Experience had shown that, inasmuch 
as each board was acting practically independently of every other 

1 The representative of the U. S. Employment Service was to arrange 
for the resumption of work pending arbitration— if the employer re- 
fused, he was to receive no assistance from the Employment Service; 
if the employees were unwilling to return to work and arbitrate, the 
Service was to supply the employer with men to take the places of the 
men on strike. 



WAR LABOR POLICIES BOARD 129 

board, decisions were being made which awarded higher wages to 
some workers in an industry than were being awarded to other 
workers in identically the same industry — and sometimes even in 
the same locality. Naturally this conduced to increase dissatis- 
faction among the workers. It was" to eliminate these inequalities 
that the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board appealed to Pres- 
ident Wilson to create some agency which would be in a better 
position to cope with this problem than was the Labor Policies 
Board. The President thereupon requested the Secretary of Labor 
to carry out this suggestion and the Conference Committee was 
organized. Before awards were thereafter to become effective 
they were to be submitted to this Committee for its approval. 

The Conference Committee was organized so short a time be- 
fore the signing of the armistice that it had little opportunity to 
function. A number of awards were, however, submitted to it 
before they were promulgated, notably those in October, 19 18, 
of the Fuel Administrator, of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment 
Board, and of the Marine and Dock Industrial Relations Division. 
But at the time of their submission they represented fails accom- 
plis. Inasmuch as they were the result of negotiations between 
employer and employee and inasmuch as these awards had been 
virtually promised in advance, it would have been exceedingly in- 
expedient for the Conference Committee to have either delayed or 
changed them. What it did was to listen to, and discuss the pro- 
posed awards, and after a short time give its approval. 

It soon became apparent that if the Committee was to have 
any real power and was not merely to be a rubber-stamp for de- 
cisions already made, agreements like that under which the Emer- 
gency Construction Wage Adjustment Commission operated would 
have to be completely revised, 1 and all of the agreements would 
have had to contain a clause lodging in the Conference Commit- 
tee more or less definite powers of revision. Yet even if the 
original agreements had been changed the exercise of the Com- 

1 This agreement required the adoption of prevailing rates of wages 
for each locality. But the rates of a particular locality might — and 
often did — conflict with the rates in force elsewhere. Sometimes, in 
fact, wages in a particular trade would be fixed at an amount greatly in 
excess of the wages for the same trade in the immediate neighborhood. 
Here it can be clearly seen that if the Conference Committee was to 
function at all the prevailing rate of a particular locality could no 
longer be used as a standard for wage adjustment. 



130 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

mittee's functions would still have involved an inherent difficulty 
of great magnitude. The adjustment agencies were, in almost all 
cases, composed of an equal number of representatives of both 
employer and employee, with or without the representation of the 
public. And the awards arrived at were usually the outcome of 
compromise between the desires of each side which the adjusters 
sought to reconcile. On the other hand the membership of the 
Conference Committee was not equally divided between capital 
and labor; most of its members were Government officials. 1 Con- 
sequently if industrial peace was to be maintained, it was ex- 
tremely inexpedient to submit to a board of this type the con- 
clusions reached by a bargaining process between the immediate 
parties in interest, each of whom was familiar with the special 
problems of the trade in question — problems of which the mem- 
bers of the Conference Committee could not possibly have as in- 
timate a knowledge. The adjustments made by each board were 
frequently the result of patient investigation of all the peculiar 
circumstances affecting a particular industry, and were reached 
in many cases only after both sides had consulted their con- 
stituents and to a greater or lesser degree persuaded them of the 
fairness of the award. When after all of this effort awards were 
finally arrived at, the boards were extremely reluctant to have 
the questions reopened. 

The element of time was likewise of the utmost importance in 
the settlement of labor disputes, and presented another difficulty 
in the successful operation of the Conference Committee. All of 
the boards were overworked and were having the greatest trouble 
in keeping up with their calendars; obviously it was impossible 
to go before the Conference Committee until an award was pretty 
well agreed upon and decisions were usually not reached by the 
adjustment boards until weeks and often months after the pres- 
entation of the controversy. Therefore to have submitted awards 
to the Conference Committee and to have waited for its decision 
would of course have meant more delay — which delay would have 
been much increased had changes been demanded and had the 
award been sent back to the agency of original jurisdiction. 

Nevertheless, in spite of all these difficulties the need for greater 
uniformity was so keenly felt that, had the war continued, and 

1 The personnel of the Conference Committee is set forth in Ap- 
pendix IX. 



WAR LABOR POLICIES BOARD 131 

had the Committee been given a better opportunity to function, 
some method would have been found to accomplish the desired 
result. The Committee would probably have developed, not so 
much into a court of appeals for the review of decisions after they 
had been made, as into a body which, by bringing the representa- 
tives of the different boards into frequent consultation with each 
other, would have afforded them an opportunity to keep in touch 
with the actions which each board was contemplating and thus 
to reconcile their decisions as they were being formulated. 

The other important work of the Conference Committee was 
the preparation of a document setting forth labor standards as the 
basis for a National War Labor Policy to be promulgated by the 
President of the United States. In a comparatively short time 
the Committee agreed upon a set of recommendations which were 
submitted to the President. These recommendations stated that 
the principles of the National War Labor Board, previously an- 
nounced by the President, were not to be superseded, and that 
the War Labor Board was the final arbiter if differences arose as 
to the application of the principles. It also provided "for the 
maintenance of proper standards of living — such standards as are 
appropriate to American citizens devoting their energies to the 
successful prosecution of a righteous war." It stated that: 
"Changes in the cost of living, therefore, call for adjustment in 
wages ... no alteration of the national policy as to American 
standards should occur until the government has announced the 
necessity for the reduction of standards of all classes to meet the 
exigencies of the war. In the interests of stability revision of 
wage scales based upon changes in the cost of living, as herein 
provided, should be made semi-annually." The eight-hour day 
was reaffirmed for Government work (direct or sublet), with Sat- 
urday in June, July and August, a half holiday (four hours). 1 

Another clause provided for the recognition of differentials in 
favor of shipyard and other emergency war workers. In order to 
overcome the poor working conditions in the yards and their dis- 
advantageous locations it had been the practice of the Shipbuild- 
ing Labor Adjustment Board to give them a higher wage than 
prevailed in other industries. Although the clause in question was 
not as clear and unequivocal as was desired by representatives of 

1 These provisions were inserted against the wishes of the Railroad 
Administration. 



132 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

the Shipping Board, the proclamation of the President would have 
put upon this arrangement the sanction of the highest authority 
in the land. Heretofore when an award had been made to the 
shipyards giving the shipyard workers of a particular industry 
a higher rate of wages than they received elsewhere in the same 
industry, immediately there had naturally followed an effort by 
the other mechanics employed in this industry to obtain for them- 
selves a wage equal to that paid to their fellow craftsmen in the 
shipyards. It was hoped that the Presidential proclamation sanc- 
tioning the giving to the shipyard workers a preferential would 
reconcile the workers in other industries to receiving a smaller 
wage. 

In one respect the statement was weak. The abuse of over- 
time, which badly needed definite curbing, was vaguely dealt with. 
The declaration of principles failed to make sufficiently definite 
provisions for limiting this evil — merely stating that, "All govern- 
ment authorities are urged to put a stop to the abuse of overtime 
as extra compensation," and, "No government work on Sundays 
or holidays except in an emergency and then to be paid for at 
double," and so on. 

The draft of the Conference Committee's declaration of policy 
did not reach the President until some weeks before the end of 
the war, and was delayed by his preoccupation with diplomatic 
affairs so that the armistice was signed before this proclamation 
was forthcoming. Nothing further was done. 



CHAPTER XII 

United States Labor Department and State Boards 

Pre-war labor adjustment activities of the Labor Department 
of the Federal Government and the labor bureaus of the several 
states have been discussed in a previous chapter. It is now pro- 
posed to briefly examine the war-time activities of these boards. 
We have seen that in the years immediately preceding our par- 
ticipation in the war, the work of the Bureau of Mediation of the 
U. S. Labor Department had been steadily increasing in volume 
and in importance. This increased activity was maintained during 
the entire war period. 1 The work of the Department was espe- 
cially important during the time which intervened between our 
entry into the war and the organization of the various special 
boards described in the previous chapters. 

UNITED STATES LABOR DEPARTMENT 

Thus the Secretary of Labor was able to prevent the occurrence 
of several large mining strikes which threatened during the spring 
and summer of 191 7, before the Fuel Administration was prepared 
to act in these matters. 

A list of the industries in which the mediators of the Labor De- 
partment intervened would cover most of the industrial life of the 
country and would include practically every trade in which war 
labor boards were subsequently created. Shipyards, packing 
houses, copper mines, munition plants, the building trades, street 
cars, the mechanical and clerical departments of the railroads, 
and many others could be mentioned. The number of workers 
stated by the Department to have been affected by these adjust- 

*In June, 1917, the Department was handicapped by lack of funds, 
and had to dispense with the services of many of its conciliators. On 
July 1, the commencement of a new fiscal year, the new appropriation 
became available and in September Congress made an additional ap- 
propriation for the work of the Department. (See Fifth Annual Re- 
port, Secretary of Labor.) 

133 



i 3 4 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

ments is very impressive. Its reports for 191 7, 19 18 and 19 19 
show that from our entry into the war to June 20, 19 19— a little 
less than twenty-seven months — 2,180,652 workers were directly 
and in addition 2,762,480 indirectly affected by these activities, 
in all very nearly five million men and women! Although these 
figures are based on labor controversies in the adjustment of many 
of which the Department played only a minor role, it is neverthe- 
less true that its mediators contributed substantially to the main- 
tenance of industrial peace during the war and that a very large 
number of workers were affected by their efforts. 

The Department had no authority to insist upon its mediators 
being heard. Moreover its policy was not to attempt arbitration, 
but merely to try to bring the two parties together in conference 
or, if they could not be persuaded to meet each other face to face, 
then to act as mediator between them. 

The Department has the absolute confidence of the vast ma- 
jority of the workers, especially those affiliated with the American 
Federation of Labor. It has, however, been unable to inspire this 
feeling among very many of the employers, especially the largest, 
who are bitterly opposed to labor unions. After the armistice 
the difficulties which all the special war boards encountered in se- 
curing the cooperation of employers were as keenly felt by the 
Labor Department. 

There can be no doubt that its mediation service is utterly in- 
adequate to meet the country's requirements; it is loosely organ- 
ized, and suffers from the fact that its personnel is insufficient both 
in numbers and in industrial representation. 

BUREAU OF INDUSTRIAL HOUSING, U. S. LABOR DEPARTMENT 

As we have seen in a previous chapter the war labor policy of 
the Government included the erection of workingmen's houses 
in many of the overcrowded war-production centers. To carry out 
this work (with the exception of the houses erected by the Ship- 
ping Board — Emergency Fleet Corporation), a Bureau was cre- 
ated under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and for 
administrative purposes a company was organized known as the 
United States Housing Corporation. Although Congress had failed 
to appropriate the necessary funds until the summer of 19 18, the Bu- 
reau undertook and completed the erection of thousands of houses 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 135 

in places like Bridgeport, Conn. ; Erie and Bethlehem, Pa., and Rock 
Island, 111. It was a vast construction program which involved 
the employment of thousands of skilled mechanics and common 
laborers at a time of greatest labor shortage. To get the necessary 
workers, and to meet the problems of labor adjustment, the Hous- 
ing Bureau organized an Industrial Relations Division, 1 independ- 
ent of other Government bodies. The Bureau was not limited by 
the adjustments of the Emergency Construction Wage Adjustment 
Board and could pay any wages to mechanics engaged upon its 
enterprises which it saw fit. Its policy is stated in the Report of 
the Housing Corporation to have been to ascertain "the rates of 
wages and working time in any particular locality from the 
examiner in charge of the nearest branch of the United States Em- 
ployment Service and not to vary from these established rates and 
conditions without instructions from the division." Attention has 
already been called to the chaos which attended the fixing of rates 
in the building industry because of the number of different agencies 
which exercised independent authority in this field. The Report 
points out these conditions by continuing as follows: "But in 
few localities were the established rates being observed, and the 
Industrial Relations Division soon found itself involved in a con- 
test of wage increases. In only two instances, so far as the man- 
ager of the Division is aware, were the contractors of the Housing 
Corporation the first to vary from the established rates." 

As to hours the Housing Bureau claims to have tried to confine 
work on its projects to ten hours a day, overtime on Saturday 
afternoon and not on Sunday, except in cases of real emergency. 
It was no doubt easier for it to do this than for some of the 
other Government departments because of its freedom to meet 
competition as to wage rates on account of its independent wage 
adjustment authority. This independent power was exercised 
after the armistice, when as a result of the stoppage of overtime, 
strikes threatened in many places. The Housing Bureau met this 
emergency by wage increases in order to partially compensate the 
men for the reduction in their income which the elimination of 

* See Report of United States Housing Corporation, December 3, 
1918. Otto M. Eidlitz was Director of the Bureau and President of 
the Corporation; Frank J. Warne was Manager of the Industrial 
Relations Division. 



136 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

overtime involved. 1 Many other questions arose, requiring the 
services of a labor adjuster in order to keep the men at their jobs ; 
they were similar, however, to those we have considered elsewhere 
in this book and therefore need not be given special attention. 

STATE BOARDS 

A large number of individual states are still without any pro- 
vision whatever for governmental aid in the adjustment of labor 
controversies, although some of them have been the scene of vio- 
lent labor conflicts. A few are not even provided with a properly 
organized labor department and in many cases, where provision 
is made for such a department, no authority is given for the con- 
ciliation of labor disputes, 2 athough in some cases the reports 
of these departments contain short accounts of strikes which oc- 
curred during the period of the report. 3 

In most of the jurisdictions in which provision had been made 
for conciliation and arbitration by state boards, these agencies 
continue to function during the war in much the same manner as 
they had previously. 4 It will not, therefore, be necessary to give 

1 It has been pointed out in a previous chapter that partly because of 
overtime payment, wages in the building industry had not nearly kept 
pace with increased living costs. The increases above referred to can 
therefore be justified as fair and proper. 

3 The following states were not provided with any machinery for 
the conciliation of labor disputes: 

Arizona Kansas North Carolina South Dakota 

California Kentucky New Mexico Texas 

Delaware Michigan North Dakota Virginia 

Georgia Mississippi Oklahoma Washington 

Indiana Montana Oregon Wyoming 

Idaho New Jersey Rhode Island 

3 The Report of the Missouri Bureau of Labor Statistics, from 
which it appears that the state itself did not act in the mediation of 
labor disputes, contains short accounts of a number of important 
strikes. The 1917 controversy, involving the Kansas City street rail- 
road mem is worth mentioning. It seems that duringthe strike, men 
were brought to Kansas City to run the cars and violence resulted. 
Forty-three policemen refused to act as guards on the street cars and 
were dismissed from the police force. 

* Among these can be mentioned, 

Colorado Minnesota New York 

Illinois Nebraska Ohio 

Iowa Nevada Pennsylvania 

Massachusetts New Hampshire Utah 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 137 

separate treatment to the activities of each of these boards but 
only to explain the work of those of Massachusetts and New York. 

Two other states should be separately mentioned because of 
special labor legislation enacted by them during the war — Minne- 
sota and New Hampshire. The first of these possessed one of 
the oldest mediation boards in the country although the services 
of this board had not been very often called into use. Shortly 
after the outbreak of the war, however, a Public Safety Commis- 
sion was created with large powers. This Commission on April 
30, 19 1 8, issued an order which, in effect, gave the Board of Ar- 
bitration compulsory powers to settle labor controversies on the 
basis of an agreement which, at the direction of the Governor of 
the State, the board had brought about between the Minnesota 
Employers' Association and the principal representatives of labor 
organizations. Under this new law the activity of the board in- 
creased very much x although the most important controversy was 
not settled by the state board but by the National War Labor 
Board. 

In New Hampshire a law was passed in the first days of 
the war prohibiting strikes in plants doing war work. 2 Not be- 
ing an industrial community nor one in which there were likely to 
be many strikes, the passage of this law is mentioned more as a 
matter of historical interest than because of its influence on war 
production. The enactment of this legislation seems to have at- 
tracted very little attention. 

MASSACHUSETTS 

The State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration had for a num- 
ber of years been the most active of the boards functioning in the 
different states and continued so during the war. Besides its 

The following states have boards of mediation but they do not seem 
to have been active during the war period. 

Connecticut Maine Vermont 

'The Report of the board for a period from September 1, 1917, to 
December 1, 1918, shows that a total number of 45 cases were handled, 
involving 600 firms and 7,000 employees, that 6 of these disputes were 
settled by arbitration, 31 by conciliation and the others were either 
withdrawn, referred to other bodies or pending at the time of the 
submission of the Report. 

a Chapter 146, page 48, The Compiled Labor Laws of the State of 
New Hampshire, 1917. 



138 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

duties as mediator the Massachusetts Board arbitrated a large 
number of controversies, principally in the shoe industry but also 
in the building and paper trade, the street railroads and elsewhere. 

In addition to the activities of the State Board, some of the 
most important strikes occurring within the Commonwealth dur- 
ing the war were settled through the service of the late Henry B. 
Endicott, Executive Manager of the Massachusetts Committee on 
Public Safety. 1 Those affecting railroads and shipyards have been 
referred to in earlier chapters of this book. To Mr. Endicott's 
decision as arbitrator was also left the adjustment of a large num- 
ber of controversies in other fields — fisheries, street railroads, 
trucking and others. 

In May, 1918, a most serious strike occurred in many of the 
textile mills of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Fifteen thousand 
men and women quit work and the entire industry of about 
350,000 employees was affected. 2 The supply of cloth for uni- 
forms for men in the service was interfered with and the Secretary 
of War telegraphed to Mr. Endicott requesting him to endeavor to 
restore production. Mr. Endicott's intervention was successful 
and an agreement, by which he was given power to arbitrate the 
matters in dispute, terminated the controversy. A few months 
later, in July, 19 18, 1800 weavers in certain mills of the American 
Woolen Company struck for the abolition of the premium system. 
The Secretary of War once more asked Mr. Endicott to use his 
good offices and he was able to bring about an agreement whereby 
the premium system, which had for a long time been a source of 
dissatisfaction, was abolished, a wage increase granted, and other 
contested points settled. 3 

The successful adjustment of these two textile strikes was, how- 
ever, not to be duplicated in the very severe conflict which broke 

1 See Part 2. Story of the Massachusetts Committee on Public 
Safety by George H. Lyman. 

3 Ibid., page 32. 

3 In a statement by President W. M. Wood of the American Woolen 
Company, quoted in The Story of the Massachusetts Committee on 
Public Safety at page 138, he said: "The settlement of the Lawrence 
strike by Mr. Endicott was such as to be perfectly satisfactory to both 
sides. The premium system was a source of irritation to the weavers 
and no great benefit to us. We have had a splendid opportunity to 
compare figures on efficiency between our mills in which the premium 
system was used and our other mills, and have arrived at the conclu- 
sion that it did not promote efficiency." 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 139 

out in Lawrence three months after the signing of the armistice. 
In January, 19 19, the United Textile Workers of America — affili- 
ated with the A. F. of L. — presented demands to textile mills all 
over the country for a reduction of working hours to forty-eight 
per week. Nothing, however, was said as to wages, and this meant 
that the demands if granted would be accompanied by a reduction 
in weekly earnings. 

The employers decided upon a reduction of hours from fifty- 
four, as they prevailed in most places, to forty-eight as demanded 
by the unions. The officers of the union were, therefore, satisfied 
and refused to sanction any further demands. But the unorgan- 
ized workers, especially the foreigners, objected to the reduction 
in their pay which this cutting down of the hours involved, and 
demanded fifty-four hours' pay for forty-eight hours' work. The 
employers, having met the demands of the union for shorter hours 
and resenting the radicalism which prevailed among the ranks of 
the unorganized and foreign workers, refused this increase in 
wages and a walkout of more than twenty thousand workers began 
on February 3. The strike lasted three months and was one of 
the bitterest of a period in our history which has been marked by 
many bitter strikes. It soon spread to other cities in Massachu- 
setts and elsewhere, so that a large part of the industry was in- 
volved in the demand for the shorter week without reduction of 
pay. 

The men who had walked out were largely foreigners, many of 
them radical socialists, and the strike attracted a number of other 
radicals to Lawrence. Just about this time the general strike was 
taking place at Seattle and feeling all over the country was run- 
ning high. The conservative press contained sensational stories 
of the doings and purposes of the strikers and the police of Law- 
rence, as well as other city officials, embarked upon a career of 
suppression and violence of very much the same kind which six 
months later accompanied the steel strike. 1 

*In an account of the Lawrence strike, published in so conservative 
a paper as the New York Times on Sunday, May 25th, the following 
appeared : "The newspapers in Lawrence were alarmed at the spread 
of radicalism and advocated the formation of vigilantes, or an organi- 
zation similar to the old-fashioned Ku-Klux Klan of the South. Some 
of the citizens, identity unknown, decided to follow this advice. On 
May 5th they went to one propagandist's hotel about midnight, called 
him to the door, seized him, blackjacked him, and carried him half 



140 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Efforts by the Massachusetts State Board to arbitrate were re- 
fused by the employers who also rejected the suggestion of the 
Governor that Mr. Endicott act as arbitrator. The strike was 
finally ended by the decision of the companies to grant an increase 
in wages which not only equaled the amount for which the strikers 
had originally asked, but was a little in excess of their demands, 
and the men and women who had been out for over three months 
returned to work. 1 

conscious to a waiting automobile. They drove several miles into 
the country, stopped near a tree, fished out a rope from beneath the 
automobile seat, and started to hold a little private lynching bee. By 
this time he had recovered his senses and resisted with all his might. 
In the melee he was badly beaten and, according to his statement, he 
would have been hung had it not been that an approaching automobile 
frightened the vigilantes away. As they left, they shouted to him: 
'Keep out of Lawrence ; you will not escape next time !' " It seems 
perfectly clear, from the evidence, that the police indulged in brutal 
assaults on peaceable citizens whose only offense was their connection 
with the strike and that the right of free assemblage was unjustifiably 
interfered with. The attitude of the city government of Lawrence is 
best shown in the following quotation from a letter of the Commis- 
sioner of Public Safety, Peter Carr, to whom the strikers had ap- 
plied for permission to parade, reprinted in part in the Survey for 
April 5, 1919: "All those who seek to exploit the fair name of 
Lawrence are those who care nothing for our City, our State or our 
Union. Bolshevism, the enemy of democracy, the destroyer of prop- 
erty rights, the breeder of anarchy, will get no foothold in Lawrence. 
A parade under present conditions will encourage bolshevism; there 
will be no parade." 

1 While the strike was in progress a conference of textile strikers 
from different parts of the country was held and a new and more 
radical union formed, known as the Amalgamated Textile Workers of 
America. The organizers of this union had the assistance of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the union was organized on in- 
dustrial lines, attempting to include in its membership all of the 
workers in the textile mills, no matter what their craft. In the period 
of a little more than one year which has elapsed since the formation 
of this union it has had a most phenomenal growth and in May, 1920, 
it claimed a membership of over 50,000 workers. It soon spread to the 
silk industry and took a leading part in the fight for the 44-hour week 
in the silk mills. Its growth was hastened by the expulsion of a num- 
ber of Locals of the United Textile Workers' Union because of their 
refusal to obey their national officers and their insistence on a reduction 
of the working hours to 44. It is stated that the Amalgamated con- 
trols the silk weavers in several important manufacturing centers, 
including New York and Bergen County, N. J. In New York the 
new union has recently concluded an agreement with four leading 
manufacturers by which strikes are prohibited and provisions made 
for an Impartial Chairman to decide all controversies between the % 
weavers and their employers. The agreement is designed not only 
to protect the workers but also to stimulate production. 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 141 

There were also many strikes in the shoe industry. In the 
most important of these — the Lynn strike of 191 7 — both the State 
Board and the Committee on Public Safety participated in bring- 
ing about a settlement. Prior to April, 191 7, conditions in this 
industry in the city of Lynn seem to have been chaotic. The fac- 
tories had been unable to keep their workers steadily employed 
and although rates of pay were the highest in the United States, 
the actual earnings of the workers over a period of several months 
were inadequate. At the expiration of their contract with the 
union, in April, 191 7, the members of the Manufacturers' Associa- 
tion closed down all their plants. Unofficially they stated that 
this action was due to high prices of leather and uncertain market 
conditions, but it was generally believed that the manufacturers 
sought a wage reduction and a modification of union shop rules. 
The lockout or strike that followed lasted over five months during 
which time the industry at this important shoe-making center — 
and in spite of the needs of the army — was almost entirely shut 
down. The Massachusetts State Board endeavored to effect a 
settlement, held hearings and suggested an award but could not 
get the parties to agree. The unions were willing to submit to 
arbitration by Mr. Endicott, but for a time the employers refused. 
Finally Mr. Endicott called a meeting of the two sides and induced 
them both to accept a settlement by which the men were immedi- 
ately to return to work and be paid the wage and bonus they had 
been receiving in April ; there were to be no strikes for three years, 
future controversies being left to the decision of the State Board; 
and Mr. Endicott was to settle the wages to be paid to the workers 
from the time of their resumption of work. His decision, an- 
nounced some months later, left wages where they were when the 
lockout occurred except slight advances to women in a few oc- 
cupations. The award was accepted by both sides, very reluct- 
antly by the men, and in 19 18 a number of strikes occurred, in 
which there seems to have been a failure on the part of the work- 
ers to respect their agreement to arbitrate. The manufacturers 
thereupon succeeded in obtaining an injunction against the United 
Shoe Workers of America, restraining them from participating in 
any strikes against the members of the Manufacturers' Associa- 
tion. The bitterness engendered by these controversies was in- 
creased by the fact that there are two rival unions in the shoe 
industry. The more conservative, the Boot and Shoe Workers 



142 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Union, is affiliated with the A. F. of L.; the more radical, the 
United Shoe Workers of America, is not. The two unions have 
been engaged in a bitter contest for supremacy. During the Lynn 
controversy in 191 7 it was alleged that the Manufacturers' Asso- 
ciation sought to induce their workers, many of whom were mem- 
bers of the United, to join the more conservative organization. 
The rivalry between the two unions resulted in 19 18 in a number 
of strikes, notably in Brockton. 1 

But although not adjusted by the State Board, this account 
would be incomplete without mention of one of the most serious 
strikes of the post-armistice period — that of the Boston police. 
The rising living costs had been most oppressively felt by men and 
women in public employment, teachers, office assistants, firemen, 
policemen. In these occupations salaries were fixed by law and 
during all the time that the cost of living had been increasing to 
well-nigh double its former level, the earnings of the men and 
women in these Government positions had increased but little. 
Mechanics and laborers had by means of their unions and as a 
result of competition among employers obtained wages more or 
less in keeping with rising living costs. But the teachers and the 
policemen were asked to continue their work on salaries which 
were never liberal and which owing to the lessened purchasing 
power of money had become shockingly inadequate. 

The unrest which prevailed everywhere among large bodies of 
Municipal and Federal employees and which during the war had 
found expression in a number of strikes of firemen, 2 resulted dur- 
ing the fall of 191 9 in the formation in Boston of a policemen's 
union, affiliated with the A. F. of L. 3 The Boston police had in 
June, 19 19, received a substantial increase, but not commensurate 
with increased living costs. And in addition to low wages there 

1 This strike was taken up by the National War Labor Board but 
referred back by it to the Massachusetts State Board. 

2 See Chapter X. 

3 The Charter issued by the A. F. of L. to policemen forbids the use 
of the strike. For many years no policemen's locals were organized 
by the A. F. of L. At its June, 1919, Convention, however, a resolution 
was adopted which favored the granting of such charters (Report of 
Proceedings 39th Annual Convention, page 302). Mr. Gompers stated 
in a speech in Boston (reprinted in American Federationist, February, 
1920, p. 135) that "in less than four weeks there were 35 organizations 
of policemen which had sent in their applications for charters— never 
so many from one class of workers in the same period in the history 
of the Federation." 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 143 

were apparently many other causes of complaint in the working 
conditions of the police force. The Police Commissioner (who 
strangely enough is an appointee of the Governor of the State and 
not of the Mayor) placed on trial nineteen men, prominent in the 
union, for violation of a police rule forbidding membership in 
any organization that affiliated with any group save war veterans. 
During the course of the trial efforts were made by a committee ap- 
pointed by the Mayor to find some way out of the threatened 
difficulty ; for it was realized that, if these men were discharged, a 
strike of the entire police force might follow. Attempts at adjust- 
ment were unsuccessful ; the nineteen men were dismissed and on 
September 9, 19 19, the entire police force left their posts. In 
this emergency the authorities, who had had ample warning of this 
contemplated action and who had stated that they bad the situa- 
tion well in hand, failed to provide State Guards to preserve order. 1 

As might have been expected, in the absence of the police and 
with no adequate substitute, the criminal elements of the com- 
munity took advantage of the situation to commit acts of theft 
and violence, with fatal results in several cases. The spectacle of 
the City of Boston left by its police force to the mercy of the law- 
less filled the columns of the country's press and aroused the great- 
est indignation. Public opinion was everywhere against the 
strikers, and although Mr. Gompers and others leaders of the 
A. F. of L. issued statements defending them, their action was 
generally condemned. 

Efforts to settle the strike and to have the police reinstated 
were met by an uncompromising attitude on the part of Governor 
Coolidge and his Police Commissioner. The Governor declared that 
the actions of the police had shown a "deliberate intention to in- 
timidate and coerce the Government," that the success of the strike 
meant anarchy and that he was unwilling "to place the main- 
tenance of the public security in the hands of a body of men who 
have attempted to destroy it." 

The strike was a most unfortunate one in its effect upon public 
opinion and is an important link in the chain of events which 

*The report of the Mayor's Committee of which extracts are given 
in the New York Times for October 4, 1919, states that the Committee, 
concerned for the safety of the city, had suggested that troops be im- 
mediately called in, but the Police Commissioner stated "that he did 
not need or want the State Guard." 



144 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

have led to the present reactionary and intolerant attitude on the 
part of many of those in positions of authority. 

NEW YORK 

In the State of New York the responsibility for the prevention 
and conciliation of industrial disputes is vested in the Bureau of 
Mediation and Arbitration of the Industrial Commission. Al- 
though this Bureau has served a useful purpose, it is entirely in- 
adequate to meet the needs of the largest industrial state of the 
Union. Out of the many hundreds of strikes which occurred in 
191 7 and 19 18, requests for intervention (in most instances by 
only one side) were received in twenty-five controversies in 191 7 
and twenty- four in 191 8; and the Bureau seems to have intervened 
sixty-nine times in 191 7 and eighty-eight times in 191 8 and to 
have been successful in thirty-nine cases in the first year of the 
war and fifty-six in the second. 1 The war mediating agencies of the 
National Government, owing to their connection with the Federal 
production departments, exercised far greater authority than any 
state board could have done, and, as in other jurisdictions, the 
work of the New York Bureau of Mediation became less important 
after the creation of these National agencies. 

In one of the most bitterly fought strikes in New York State of 
the post-armistice period, the State Board made excellent use of 
its powers of investigation and public inquiry. A strike had oc- 
curred in May, 19 19, of the employees of the brass and copper 
mills of Rome, N. Y., several thousand workers being involved. 
The strike was for the eight-hour day and against the abolition of 
a 10% war bonus in wages. For ten weeks, during which the 
strike continued, the employers refused the offers of the state me- 
diators and members of the State Industrial Commission to bring 
about a conference with their striking employees. The Commis- 
sion thereupon, in August, instituted a public inquiry 2 and was 

1 Annual Reports of New York State Industrial Commission, 1917 
and 1918. The period covered by these reports is from July 1st of 
the previous year to June 30th of the year of the report. Many of 
the strikes referred to in the report for 1917 occurred before our entry 
into the war. It appears that only two disputes were settled by arbi- 
tration in 1917 and one in 1918. 

2 See The Bulletin (issued by the New York State Industrial Com- 
mission) August, 1919, for an account of the strike and extracts of 
the testimony given at the public hearings. 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 145 

about to publish its findings, when a settlement was arranged be- 
tween the employers and their men and work was resumed. 

In the fall of 19 19 Governor Smith, at the suggestion of his re- 
construction commission, called a conference to consider the best 
means of avoiding the serious disturbances which were occurring 
in the post-armistice period. As a result of this conference, he 
appointed a Labor Board, consisting of nine members, three rep- 
resenting the public, three representing employers and three rep- 
resenting labor. 1 This board had no statutory power but merely 
the prestige which the fact of its appointment by the Governor 
gave it. Since its creation it has intervened in only a few of the 
many disputes that have arisen but has done successful work in 
one or two cases. 2 

KANSAS 

The strike of the soft coal miners of the winter 19 19, affecting 
as it did practically every bituminous field in the country, oper- 
ated also to tie up completely the coal mines of Kansas. An 
acute coal shortage ensued which necessitated the closing up of 
schools and factories and, it is claimed, threatened the continued 
use of hospitals. The State of Kansas thereupon took over the 
mines and asked for volunteers to operate them. Governor Allen 
called a special session of the legislature and urged upon it the 

1 The membership of the Board was as follows: 
Representing the Public : Lieutenant Governor Harry C. Walker 

Superintendent of Public Works Ed- 
ward S. Walsh 
Adj. General Berry 
Representing Employer: Wm. Baldwin of the Otis Elevator 

Company 
Saul Singer, Cloak, Suit and Skirt 
Manufacturers' Protective Assoc. 

E. J. Barcalo, of Buffalo 
Representing Labor: James P. Holland, President of the 

New York State Federation of Labor 
Hugh Frayne, representing the Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor 

F. M. Guerin, Vice-president State 
Federation 

3 To settle a very serious controversy in the Cloak, Suit and Skirt 
Industry of New York City, the Governor appointed a special board 
whose good offices were accepted by both sides. The board held 
hearings and made an award which seems to have successfully set- 
tled the dispute and reestablished harmonious relations. 



146 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

enactment of a law which he thought would make the recurrence 
of such an emergency impossible. The legislature thereupon 
passed a bill which has, since its enactment, been the storm cen- 
ter of acrimonious discussion all over the country. It creates a 
Court of Industrial Relations composed of three members, 1 which 
may intervene in any industrial controversy in the State in "any 
industry affected with a public interest." 2 Strikes are forbidden 
as are also suspensions of operation by the employer for the pur- 
pose of affecting wages or commodity prices, and severe penalties 
are provided for violations of the law. The Court is given the 
power to fix wages and the new rates may be made retroactive 
to the date when the Court took jurisdiction of the controversy. 
It is provided that wages shall be "fair" and that capital invested 
in an enterprise shall be entitled to a "fair" return. It will thus 
be seen that the Government through the agency of three ap- 
pointed judges is given the power of fixing the wages of all work- 
ers, as well as large powers over the use of capital, in certain essen- 
tial industries. 3 Employers are forbidden to discharge em- 
ployees because of testimony given before the Court but no im- 
munity is provided for discharge on account of union membership 
or activity, and inasmuch as strikes are forbidden, it would seem 
as though the workers were without any protection against the 

J The first appointments to the Court were W. L. Huggins, an 
attorney, chairman; and Clyde M. Reed and William Allen White, 
newspaper men. Mr. White declined to serve, and George N. Wark. 
a law school graduate and a member of the American Expeditionary 
Forces, was appointed in his place. 

3 The manufacture or preparation of food products from their 
natural state to a condition to be used as food; the manufacture of 
wearing apparel in common use by the people; fuel mining and public 
utilities. 

3 The political philosophy of Governor Allen is set forth as follows 
in a speech made by him before the League for Industrial Rights and 
published in Law and Labor, April, 1920, page 88: "There is only 
one place in which justice may reside, only one guarantee of it, 
only one standardization of it, and that is in government. And so 
in Kansas, government has merely taken under its jurisdiction of- 
fenses against the public welfare committed in the name of Industrial 
Warfare; has taken under her jurisdiction the same right to govern 
them as she has to govern recognized crime. You say it cannot be 
done. My friends, if moral principles do not exist in American insti- 
tutions to meet this emergency, then American institutions are doomed 
to failure, because the issue here is government and nothing but 
government." 



LABOR DEPARTMENT 147 

breaking up of their unions by systematic discriminatory dis- 
charges. 

The enactment of this law was vigorously opposed both by or- 
ganized labor and by many employers and since its passage labor 
unions all over the country have made it the target for bitter 'at- 
tacks. President Howatt of the Kansas miners and a number of 
his associates were imprisoned because of their refusal to testify 
before the Court, and both the enactment of the law as well as the 
imprisonment of Mr. Howatt resulted in strikes of the miners, al- 
though it is claimed that these strikes were not at all serious. Gov- 
ernor Allen toured the country explaining the nature of the new 
Court and urging other states to adopt similar measures, and bills 
patterned after the Kansas statute have been introduced in the 
legislatures of a number of states. Too short a time has inter- 
vened since the passage of this law to say from experience how it 
is going to work. The Governor claims that great things have 
already been accomplished and that greater ones are to be ex- 
pected. 1 

1 Willard A. Atkins in The Journal of Political Economy for 
April, 1920, p. 343, says: "It is obvious that the Act is colored with 
the impatient thought of the present post-war period. Indeed under 
more tranquil conditions it is difficult to conceive of similar legislation 
evolving for some time to come." 



PART TWO 
PRINCIPLES 



CHAPTER XIII 
General Principles 

The policies adopted by Government labor boards were of the 
utmost importance in determining the treatment accorded to the 
workers during the war, because sooner or later all branches of in- 
dustry came into contact with them. The course adopted by the 
Government was the resultant of many forces pulling in different 
directions. One of the most important of these forces was the 
American Federation of Labor, the influence of which, because of 
the skill and high degree of organization of its membership, was 
far greater than the relation of its size to the working population 
of the country would seem to have warranted. Its cooperation 
with the Government was essential — so also was that of the finan- 
cial and manufacturing interests. 

Obviously it was difficult to satisfy both sides. And in arriving 
at a policy the Government seems to have disregarded the ex- 
tremists in each camp — the labor radicals, including the left wing 
of the Federation of Labor, and the most reactionary of the cap- 
italists. The task was to find a policy which would satisfy the 
large body of labor, without alienating the financial and employ- 
ing interests any more than was unavoidable. War psychology in- 
duced each side to compromise during the war period. Labor 
waived certain basic peace-time demands — insistence upon which, 
as we have seen, has increased in intensity as the period between 
the armistice and the present time has lengthened. Capital also 
was willing during the war to accept certain principles which in 
peace time it would in many cases actively have fought. Recent 
history, for example the story of the President's First Industrial 
Conference in Washington and the action of countless individual 
employers, confirms the correctness of this statement. 

Many employers are under the impression that the Government 
truckled to labor during the war, and gave it everything it asked. 
A more careful study of just what labor did receive has confirmed 

151 



152 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

and strengthened the opinion formed by the writer during the 
war that this was not in any sense the case, and that the Govern- 
ment did not, except in isolated cases, give to labor any concessions 
which were not demanded both by justice and expediency. 1 It 
will also be realized that, taking into account the power which the 
abnormal economic conditions and the needs of the hour placed 
in labor's hands, its conduct was both conservative and patriotic. 

Early in our participation in the war, two ideas found expres- 
sion: 

( i ) The demand for a relaxation of labor safeguards. 

(2) The demand for the maintenance of the status quo — that 
is to say, that neither side was to attempt to change the condi- 
tions and principles then prevailing in industry. 

As to the first demand, our knowledge of the mistakes England 
had made in throwing down all the barriers which had been 
erected to protect the workers, helped us to avoid a similar error 
(although war hysteria brought about the advocacy of this course 
by a substantial part of public opinion, including even some 
labor bodies). 

As to the second demand, as far as the maintenance of the 
status quo applied to the retention of labor safeguards, it was 
a most salutary one. In the early statements of the Council of 
National Defense, 2 however, and in their amplification by the Sec- 
retary of Labor, this doctrine was used not merely to protect 
established labor standards, but also to discourage labor from 
making any effort — during the war — to obtain amelioration of 
those conditions in a particular industry which it had not been 
able to effect in peace-time (even the twelve-hour day, which was 
expressly mentioned in this statement). On the other hand, the 
employer was similarly urged not to depress conditions of labor. 
The tone of these early statements, in which the leaders of the 
American Federation of Labor concurred, is in sharp contrast with . 
the still earlier resolutions adopted at a conference of the leaders 
of the Federation, at Washington on March 12, 19 17, in which 
they said, "War has never put a stop to the necessity for struggle 
to establish and maintain industrial rights. Wage-earners in war 
times must, as has been said, keep one eye on the exploiters at 

1 See however discussion of overtime evil in the two succeeding 
chapters. 

2 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1917. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 153 

home and the other upon the enemy threatening the national gov- 
ernment." x This remarkable change of attitude illustrates the 
effect of the patriotic motive during the first hysterical months of 
the war, when labor seemed willing to waive claims for even such 
improvements as were clearly demanded by public policy. This 
attitude, however, soon gave place to a more rational one, and 
later still to one of demanding thoroughgoing reforms. 

The position taken by large manufacturers, as reflected in these 
statements of the Council of National Defense, resulted partly 
from their fear of an endeavor to extend the closed shop. In 
other respects also the employers were desirous of maintaining 
the status quo, as was shown by the statement of the Industrial 
Conference Board, submitted to the Council of National Defense 
on September 6, 1917. 2 

This insistence upon the maintenance of the status quo, held 
throughout the war by the employers, but soon abandoned by 
labor, was not the position finally adopted by the Government — 
except on the question of the open and closed shop. On the con- 
trary, the various mediating agencies (especially the National 
War Labor Board) in many cases changed pre-war standards, 
awarding shorter hours, and wages which, in spite of the increased 
cost of living, more nearly approximated a living wage. They like- 
wise failed to adhere to the pre-war status by insisting upon the 
extension of collective bargaining. 

Statements of the Government's war labor principles find ex- 
pression in three places: (1) Resolutions or executive orders of 
officers of the Government or of labor adjusting agencies; (2) 
Agreements between Government departments or boards on the 
one hand, and groups of employers and labor unions on the other; 
(3) Decisions of boards of adjustment. 

1 American Federationist for April, 1917, Volume XXIV, page 277. 

2 In this statement emphasis is laid on the maintenance of the open 
shop, but employers also demanded an "unambiguous interpretation" 
of the Council's recommendations (that standards be not changed) 
with respect to wages and hours, proposing 

"(b) Applied to wages, demands shall be tested by the prevailing 
local standard of the establishment in effect at the beginning of the 
war with such modification as may be shown to be necessary to meet 
any demonstrated advance in the cost of living. 

"(c) Applied to hours, the standard shall be those established by 
statute or prevailing in the establishment at the beginning of the war 
subject to change only when in the opinion of the Council of De- 
fense it is necessary to meet the requirements of the Government." 



154 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

The most comprehensive statement of principles was that of 
the National War Labor Board, contained in the President's Proc- 
lamation of April 9, 191 8. These policies and principles came to 
be regarded as the highest labor law of the land, and were adopted 
by the War Labor Policies Board and accepted by even 7 other 
agency, although many differences arose in their interpretation 
and application. In this chapter it is proposed to examine the 
principles that were applied by the different agencies and to con- 
sider the results upon industry which followed the Government's 
action. 

NO STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS DURING THE WAR 

The first principle enunciated by the National War Labor 
Board was that there should be no strikes or lockouts during the 
war. European countries had prohibited strikes in war time, but 
these legal prohibitions (especially among the Allies) had not 
been effective. With us, strikes were not legally prohibited; at 
any rate both the Government on the one hand and capital and 
labor on the other acted on this assumption. At the most critical 
periods of the war strikes of great magnitude occurred in the ship- 
yards, the copper and coal mines, the lumber camps, and in 
munition plants (even in those engaged in the manufacture of the 
Browning machine gun, which at that particular time was a vital 
need of our army). And yet no attempt was made to prevent 
these strikes by means of legal prohibitions. It was not until a 
year after the signing of the armistice that the Government sought 
by force to put a stop to an important strike — the Lever Act, a 
purely war emergency measure (although never used for this pur- 
pose during the war itself) being made the justification for the 
issuance of a Federal injunction at the request of the Attorney 
General, speaking for the National Government. 1 

1 On several occasions injunctions were issued by state and Federal 
Courts to prevent strikes and picketing under circumstances in which 
such relief might not have been granted except for the existence of 
the national emergency. These strikes were not important and the 
injunctions in question did not receive prominence. It was not until 
the issuance of the injunction under the Lever Act above referred to 
that any serious attempt was made on the part of the Government to 
prevent the occurrence of strikes by court action. In N. Y. State 
a lower court (Judge Scudder — Supreme Court. Trial Term, Queens 
Co., Oct., 1918) held in the case of Rosenwasser Bros. vs. Pepper 
(reported in 104 Misc. 457) that the plaintiff was entitled to in- 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 155 

When machinery for the adjustment of disputes was established 
in the various branches of war production, there was a general 

junctive relief by reason of the fact that 80% of its output of 
shoes, etc., was being manufactured for the U. S. Government. After 
stating in his opinion (p. 475) that "the life of our nation is de- 
pendent upon an uninterrupted production of the things needed to 
successfully carry on the war in which our country is engaged" an 
injunction was granted not merely against repetition of acts of 
violence and disorder, but also providing (p. 475): "Strikes for any 
cause whatsoever to be enjoined for the duration of the war." This 
decision was adversely criticized in the Harvard Law Review (Vol. 
XXXII, p. 837, May, 1919) as unsound on the ground that it is the 
function of legislative or administrative authorities and not of the 
judiciary to determine whether acts otherwise lawful are to be 
deemed unlawful because of national necessities created by the war. 

The U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
(Wagner Mfg. Co. vs. District Lodge No. 9, International Associa- 
tion of Machinists, June, 1918, 252 Fed. Rep. 597) held that the fact 
that the plaintiff was engaged in manufacturing munitions for the 
United States and had been supplied by the Government with ma- 
terials and property rendered it, to all intents and purposes, an 
agency of the Government itself; and that in the exercise of such 
duties, a Federal question was involved which conferred jurisdiction 
on the Federal courts — and subsequently an injunction issued from 
the court, not, however, unusually broad in its terms. 

In the case of Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. vs. Retail Clerks In- 
ternational Protective Association (250 Fed. Rep. 890), also decided 
by the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
(March, 1918), the Food Conservation Act of Congress (Aug. 10, 
1917, Chap. 53, Sec. 4) was invoked by the court to justify an in- 
junction against picketing, etc., considerably broader in its terms 
than would otherwise have been permissible under the Clayton Act — 
holding that during the war emergency the owner of perishable food 
products is entitled to the aid of a court of equity to restrain acts 
which would cause great destruction of food and that in such case 
"it would be wholly immaterial whether it was done by violence, 
threats, intimidation or otherwise." 

In U. S. vs. Hayes — decided on Nov. 8, 1919, Judge A. B. Anderson 
issued a restraining order in connection with the coal strike which 
probably went further than any court of the United States had 
theretofore deemed proper. Under the authority of the Lever Act, 
the injunction issued not only prohibited the defendants from acts 
in furtherance of the coal strike, but also enjoined them from per- 
mitting the strike order to remain in effect and directed them to issue 
a withdrawal and cancellation of the order. The conduct of the 
Government in invoking the Lever Act for this purpose seems to 
have been in violation of distinct pledges made at the time of its 
passage that it would not be applied in cases where workers were 
endeavoring to secure improved working conditions; moreover a 
mandatory injunction in the form issued by Judge Anderson appears 
to have been unprecedented. The Executive Council of the American 
Federation of Labor denounced the decision as unwarranted, un- 
paralleled and autocratic, stating "Never in the history of our country 



156 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

understanding that in these industries strikes were not to take 
place. As a matter of fact this understanding was expressly in- 
corporated in only two of the contracts under which the adjust- 
ment boards were created. 1 In several cases an agreement not to 
strike at least until controversies had been reviewed, was implicit 
in the terms of the contracts, and in all cases the boards took the 
position that there should be no cessation of industry during the 
war. In fact, the prevention of any stoppage of work was the 
main function of these boards. The avoidance of strikes was also 
one of the objects sought to be attained by the April, 191 7, dec- 
larations of the Council of National Defense, already referred to, 
and great prominence was given to this principle by the Presi- 
dent's proclamation creating the War Labor Board. 

Inasmuch as the general principle of "no strikes in war time" 
was adopted almost unanimously by all parties to labor contro- 
versies, it might reasonably have been expected that very few 
strikes would have occurred during the war. Yet the facts were 
the precise opposite; more strikes did occur at this time than dur- 
ing any previous period of similar length in the history of the 
United States. 2 This is so extraordinary that it merits close in- 
quiry and detailed explanation of the factors which were respon- 
sible for these dangerous and abnormally frequent stoppages of 
production. What were some of the more important of these 
factors? 

In the first place, the workers usually had legitimate grievances. 
Their situation at the outbreak of the war, as we have seen in an 
earlier chapter, was frequently such as to deserve immediate bet- 
has any such mandatory order been obtained or even applied for by 
the Government or by any person, company or corporation." 

In addition to the occasional use of injunctions, already referred 
to, a number of State Governments sought to prevent individuals 
from remaining idle, during the national emergency, by the use of 
so-called "work or fight" laws. 

1 I.e. J Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission. The Fuel 
Administration announced an "understanding" on July 23, 1918 
(agreed to by the workers), "That no strike shall take place pend- 
ing the settlement of any controversy until the dispute has been re- 
viewed by him" (the Fuel Administrator). See Monthly Labor Re- 
view, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, for September, 191S. 
The agreement, signed by the workers for the creation of the New 
York Harbor Wage Adjustment Commission, provided that no 
strikes were to take place pending arbitration. Monthly Labor Re- 
view, September, 1918. 

a See Appendix No. 1. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 157 

terment ; in these cases the increase in the cost of living made their 
situation intolerable. In other industries where the previous rate 
of wages was a fair one the increasing living costs made revisions 
imperative, if the wage during the war was to remain the equiva- 
lent of the wage before the war. 1 To make matters worse the at- 
titude of the employers was frequently provocative, particularly 
in the manner in which they discriminated against unionism, fool- 
ishly selecting members of shop committees for discharge imme- 
diately after their election to office, and in other similarly irri- 
tating actions. 

In spite of these genuine grievances the workers in many indus- 
tries — for the first year of the war — had no means of securing 
redress other than the strike. For a long time there was in 
many occupations absolutely no adequate machinery for the ad- 
justment of disputes, and even later when mediation machinery 
of universal application was created there were many cases in 
which it was unworkable. Even the National War Labor Board, 
which was regarded as the most effective instrument for adjusting 
disputes, had no legal power to compel either side to submit to 
its jurisdiction, and there were a substantial number of cases 
in which employers refused to arbitrate and left to the workers 
the choice of either submitting or striking. All labor adjustment 
agencies, especially the National War Labor Board, were also 
overcrowded with work and necessarily slow in hearing grievances 
and making awards. They acted much more quickly if a strike 
was imminent or if the men were on the street 2 and production 
actually stopped. Unable to give prompt attention to every com- 
plaint that was made, the most urgent cases were taken up first, 
and a premium was thus put upon strikes and strike threats. 

Unfortunately, moreover, the persistent tendency of the pub- 
lic and especially of the press 3 to condemn the workers on the 

1 Other grievances have been discussed in the first chapter and else- 
where. 

2 The National War Labor Board, as well as other wage adjust- 
ment boards, insisted that men return to work before it would take 
jurisdiction. In a number of cases, however, where the men were 
out, they were induced to return to work and submit their grievances 
to the Board only on its promise of immediate action. And these 
cases were heard and decided long ahead of cases where submissions 
were made in the regular way. There were also cases in which the 
National War Labor Board held hearings with the men out and upon 
the men going back, went definitely into the case. 

a This will be more fully discussed in Chapter XVIII. 



158 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

occurrence during the war of any and all strikes acted as an ad- 
ditional cause of irritation. The public did not realize that in 
many cases the men had no other way of securing redress or even 
a hearing. 

The facts above set forth explain a large proportion of the 
strikes which occurred during the war. There can, however, be 
no doubt that after making all allowances there were hundreds 
of strikes which should not have occurred and that herein lay 
the greatest failure of the workers to conform to the Government's 
war labor policy. Many strikes took place in industries where 
machinery did exist for the peaceable adjustment of the workers' 
demands, without any adequate effort by the men to secure such 
adjustment. In many other cases the men stopped work without 
sufficient reason for so doing, 1 or in order to force compliance with 
demands not sanctioned by the Government's war labor policy. 2 

Some strikes were the result of the failure of one side or the 
other to comply with Government awards. These cases were, 
however, of infrequent occurrence. Many of the strikes in which 
the men acted without sufficient cause took place against the 
wishes of the national officers and sometimes even without the 
sanction of the local leaders. In very few cases, however did the 
unions mete out any punishment to the locals or to their in- 
dividual members because of these unauthorized strikes. The 

1 A case in point was the strike of machinists employed by the 
General Electric Company (Schenectady Works) in June, 1917, the 
cause of which was the employment by the company of a negro 
student to operate a drill press. The company employed very few 
negroes, and disclaimed any intention of supplanting its skilled men 
by negro employees. It made a practice, however, of employing a 
number of college students during the summer vacation, and among 
those recommended was the negro in question, whom the company 
refused to discharge or segregate. After about a week, the men 
returned to work. Many other examples could be given. 

3 The demand for the extension of the closed shop, more fully dis- 
cussed subsequently in this chapter, was the cause of a large 
number of strikes, in violation of the Government's labor policies, as 
were some of the demands in relation to wages and to hours. A 
strike of a particularly irritating kind was reported from Jackson- 
ville, Fla. Plasterers employed on a housing operation of the Emer- 
gency Fleet Corporation quit work because, they claimed, the fore- 
man was driving them. He pointed out to the men that this was 
not the case — that they were not doing nearly as much work as they 
ordinarily did for a private contractor. They are reported to have 
replied: "We don't have to. It's Uncle Sam's money." 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 159 

unions consequently cannot escape blame. 1 Nor can there . be 
any doubt that although at times the men took matters in their 
own hands and walked out against the wishes of national as well 
as local leaders, there were also many cases in which the leaders 
remained passive and allowed the men to strike for the enforce- 
ment of demands which they knew were not sanctioned by the 
Government. Occasionally, they even encouraged them to do so. 

During the second year of the war, after the organization of the 
National War Labor Board, the development of the Government's 
labor administration, and the extension of the work of labor ad- 
justment to practically all production departments, strikes be- 
came less frequent, although there were still many more than 
could be justified. Had the war continued, they would undoubt- 
edly have decreased more and more. 2 

Looking back over the entire war period, we cannot escape the 
conclusion that strikes were the cause of very substantial losses 
in production, for which both sides were at one time or another 
to blame. In the aggregate, nevertheless, these losses were not 
serious. Indeed it seems certain that the fear of stoppages of 
work made both Government and employer more eager than they 
would otherwise have been to eliminate grievances by fair ad- 
justment of wages, by improving sanitary and housing conditions, 
and by removing all other causes of unrest. If strikes contributed 
substantially to the improvement of the condition of the workers 
— which the writer is sure they often did — they were well worth 
what they cost. At a time of social upheaval and world-wide un- 
rest, when, moreover, the need for workers far exceeded the 
supply, it was absolutely indispensable that reasonable demands 
of the men be satisfied. Unquestionably, strikes and fear of 
strikes were the chief causes for that amelioration of conditions 
which strengthened morale and increased efficiency. 3 Nor has the 
writer any doubt whatever that bad as industrial conditions now 

1 The Administrator of Labor Standards in Army Clothing, in an 
effort to prevent strikes, which he said were happening entirely too 
often in the clothing industry, refused to reinstate five workers who 
had instigated a strike, without any effort being made to bring to 
his attention for adjustment the grievances of the men. (Pohl, Hoyt 
Company. — Brooklyn, New York.) 

3 See Appendix I for statistics relative to the number of strikes, 
men involved, and so on. 

3 We shall see in a later chapter that, in spite of the above, morale 
and efficiency were none too good. 



160 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

are — recognizing fully the extent of present-day unrest and the 
lowered efficiency of the workers — they would be infinitely worse, 
if labor had been treated with less consideration during the war. 

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 

This is the right of the men not only to deal with the em- 
ployers as individuals but also to delegate to a few the right to 
bargain on behalf of the many. Collective bargaining need not 
involve unionism, and would do so only if the representatives of 
the men were not in the employ of the firm, or if, although in 
such employ they were elected as representatives of the union. 
Collective bargaining, then, may be simply defined as the right 
of the workers to choose representatives to deal with the em- 
ployer on their behalf, and to present grievances, and to negotiate 
for changes in wages and working conditions. And it seems in- 
credible that in a country which has for many years boasted of 
its political democracy so many employers should have insistently 
denied the same principle of democracy when applied to industry. 1 

It was realized by Government mediators that the task which 
confronted the nation was not only to settle a particular contro- 
versy and secure the return to work of men who were on strike, 
but that a stronger sense of loyalty and an increased willingness 
to give the best that one has must also be promoted. Every ac- 
tive Government labor board therefore realized the desirability of 
collective bargaining — which gave the workers a sense of respon- 
sibility — as the strongest factor in such promotion of morale, 2 the 

1 The attitude of many employers is illustrated by the testimony of 
Vice President Lewis of the Bethlehem Steel Company, at the hear- 
ings before the National War Labor Board of the complaints of the 
employees against the company. Mr. Lewis was asked if the company 
(this was in the summer of 1918) received complaints from com- 
mittees on behalf of the men. He answered that it did not. He 
said that if anything was wrong with a man's working conditions he 
was to complain to his foreman or superintendent. Pressed for an 
answer as to whether the company would receive a committee con- 
sisting of its own employees (not a committee of the union) he said: 
"I don't think, at this time, we would be prepared to allow that 
practice ... we don't employ a committee, we employ a particular 
individual, and naturally we are always willing to listen to what he 
has to say and make corrections." 

a The Post Office Department seems to have been the only exception. 
In its administration of the telephone service, it not only failed to 
promote collective bargaining, but actually prevented existing ma- 
chinery for this purpose from functioning. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 161 

boards differing only in the extent to which they gave it practical 
application. Consequently not only did the Government protect 
existing forms of collective bargaining, but it also fostered the de- 
velopment of new machinery for the purpose. 1 

The President's Mediation Commission, the National War 
Labor Board, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, and the 
Administrator for Army Clothing, were all active in setting up 
systems of this kind. General Order Number 13 of the Ordnance 
Department recommended collective bargaining, and the Indus- 
trial Service Section of the Ordnance and Aircraft Departments 
actively encouraged its introduction in manufacturing plants. On 
the railroads, it already existed in many places, and its extension 
was fostered. In fact, throughout all industry in the entire coun- 
try the war period witnessed a phenomenal broadening out of this 
principle. 

Collective bargaining can be practiced in many different ways. 
The method usually adopted by the Government was through 
the medium of shop committees, elected by all the workers in the 
plant. 2 But in the installation of these committees and in the 
Government's efforts to get them to function properly great diffi- 
culties were encountered. In the first place, many employers were 
hostile to any form of collective action on the part of their em- 
ployees; they had to be coerced into establishing any type of 
employee representation whatsoever,. Inasmuch as shop commit- 
tees could not possibly function without the exercise of a spirit 
of cooperation by both parties, this was a very unfortunate be- 
ginning. A second difficulty came from the other side. Most 
plants were partially but not wholly organized, and the leaders of 
labor unions were frequently opposed to shop committees which 
they could not control. In case the shop was completely organ- 
ized this objection did not hold, because the shop committees 
would be composed of men who were members of and in sym- 
pathy with the union. If, however, the shop w T as only partially 
organized, and this was the condition in many, if not most, of 
the plants doing war work, these committees might contain men 
who were not members of the union and who might be hostile to 
it. Since the Government made it a fixed policy not to influence 

1 It is interesting to note that the British Commission on Industrial 
Unrest recommended collective bargaining for immediate adoption. 

a In most cases three or six months' service was necessary to qualify 
the worker as a voter. 



162 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

the worker in regard to joining any union, and therefore would 
not force the complete organization of a shop, the Government 
was powerless to overcome this objection of the men. 1 

The difficulty resulting from the partial organization of the 
shops was also illustrated by the friction which in some cases ac- 
companied the election of shop committees. In order to prevent 
employers from controlling these elections and from making im- 
possible the free choice of union members, and, on the other hand, 
to prevent a minority of union men from impropreiy securing the 
election of members of their organization, the Government boards 
found it desirable to insist that the voting take place under the 
supervision of Government representatives. It was even neces- 
sary to exercise care in the choice of a polling place; elections held 
at union headquarters were set aside by both the Shipbuilding 
Labor Adjustment Board and the National War Labor Board be- 
cause it was believed that all the workers had not had an oppor- 
tunity freely to express their choice. And, similarly, one election 
was set aside by the National War Labor Board because it had 
been held in the company's office. Further difficulty arose as to 
what the proper constituencies of the shop committees ought to be. 
Employers usually preferred representation according to physical 
divisions of the plant, i.e., by shops or floors, whereas the em- 
ployees favored representation according to craft. This was nat- 
ural enough, since the organizations which the men had previously 
built up were along craft lines, and the men wished to preserve 
this structure. On the other hand, just because the existing or 
hoped-for organizations of the men were along craft lines, the 
emploj^ers, in their opposition to unionism, preferred to have com- 
mittees which represented the individual shops, 2 rather than en- 
tire crafts. There were also a few cases in which the employers, 
although willing to deal with shop committees, objected to com- 
mittees representing the entire plant. 

1 It might also have been possible for the Government to have sat- 
isfied the unions, if they had compelled employers to deal with 
union committees. But if, at the outbreak of the war, the employer 
had not previously made a practice of so doing, it was an invariable 
rule that he would not be made to do so during the war. (This is 
more fully discussed in a later part of this chapter.) 

2 The plans for the organization of shop committees, used by the 
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, provide for representation 
according to craft. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 163 

Even under ideal conditions, systems of collective bargaining, 
to be successful, are of slow growth. It is therefore not to be 
wondered at that all of these new shop committees did not func- 
tion successfully; as a matter of fact, in some cases where shop 
committees were installed during the war strikes have occurred 
since the signing of the armistice, and the committees have been 
abandoned. 1 Information as to the actual workings of these com- 
mittees is difficult to get, and there is likely in any event to be a 
great deal of difference of opinion. In many cases, they undoubt- 
edly did excellent work; as we have seen, the Taft- Walsh Board 
entrusted them with the application of wage scales throughout 
large plants, with the classification of employees, the enforce- 
ment of rules relative to hours of work and with other important 
functions. In December, 19 18, thirty-six shipyards reported to 
the Shipping Board that their shop committees were working 
well. 2 In other industries also these committees are reported to 
be functioning satisfactorily. 3 

For several years previous this movement had been gathering 
force, and although given a decided impetus by the events of the 
war, it would undoubtedly have been developed in any case. 4 In 
spite of their abandonment in some places, employers everywhere 
are manifesting keen interest in shop committees and in the gen- 



*As an example, the Pittsfield, Mass., plant of the General Electric 
Company. On the other hand although strikes occurred at the same 
time at other General Electric Company shops, the men at Lynn, 
Mass., did not go on strike. Here a shop committee plan installed 
under the direction of the National War Labor Board was working 
excellently and has been continued, as have shop committee plans in 
some of the other plants of the company. 

2 Works Committees— A. B. Wolfe. 

3 Works Councils in the United States, Research Report No. 21, 
October, 1919, published by the National Industrial Conference Board 
quotes from replies to a questionnaire sent out by it to a large num- 
ber of firms which had installed shop committees under the direction 
of the National War Labor Board. In some cases they were re- 
ported as working very well, in other cases it was stated that they 
had been abandoned. 

4 In England a number of National Commissions have recommended 
workers representation and the findings of some of them go very 
much farther. Thus the Whitley Committee recommends not only shop 
committees for individual establishments but also District and Na- 
tional Councils. 



164 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

eral subject of employee representation. 1 Many, perhaps, because 
they see in some of its forms a weapon with which to fight union- 
ism; they realize that representation of the workers in industry is 
bound to come sooner or later in some form or other and they 
prefer shop committees to "outside" unions. 2 Some more far- 
sighted employers realize that representation in industry is de- 
manded by social justice and that with the spread of education 
among the workers they will insist upon getting a larger share of 
control over industry and participation in its management. 

RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 

In the statement of principles of the National War Labor Board 
at the same time that the right of the workers to bargain col- 
lectively was recognized, their right to organize in trade unions 
and engage in legitimate trade union activity without interference 
by the employer was affirmed. 3 The first official pronouncement 

1 In Works Councils in the United States, The National Industrial 
Conference Board, it is stated that practically all of the 225 Works 
Councils, or shop committees reported upon were formed since Janu- 
ary 1, 1918; 86 were created as a result of awards of the National 
War Labor Board, 31 of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, 
3 are war time "Government Committees" and 105 were voluntarily 
instituted. 

2 The opposition of unions to forms of workers' representation 
known as "company" or "household" unions, i. e., shop committee 
plans for workers of a particular plant, not affiliated with the unions 
of the entire trade, was shown at the 39th Annual Convention, 
A. F. of L., June, 1919, by the adoption of a resolution condemning 
the "Rockefeller" plan of industrial representation and all so-called 
"company" unions and demanding the right to bargain collectively 
through trade unions. It is also of interest to note that in the steel 
strike the abolition of "company" unions was one of the demands of 
the strike. 

3 The one exception to this otherwise universal rule occurred in the 
State of Minnesota where the right to organize was denied during 
the war period. Immediately after the declaration of war by the 
United States the legislature of Minnesota passed an act (April 18) 
creating a Public Safety Commission. A year later the State Board 
of Arbitration brought about an agreement between the Minnesota 
Employers' Association and the Minnesota Federation of Labor, 
agreeing upon certain principles as basic in the relation between em- 
ployer and employee during the war. Among them was the pro- 
vision that if an employer, before the war, had refused to employ 
or continue in his employ any member of a trade union, the continu- 
ation of this practice, during the war, would not constitute a ground 
of complaint. The Commission of Public Safety issued an Order 
on April 30, 1917, under war powers given to it, which vested in' the 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 165 

of this principle was that of Secretary Wilson, who, after a con- 
ference with representatives of the Council of National Defense 
and of organized labor, issued a statement on April 23, 191 7, ex- 
planatory of two statements previously issued by the Council of 
National Defense on April 7 and April 16. 1 Secretary Wilson 
referred to the right to organize into trade unions as a "burning 
question," and said "my own attitude is this, that capital has no 
right to interfere with working men organizing labor any more than 
the working man has a right to interfere with capitalists organ- 
izing capital." 2 This was the position taken with great unanimity 
by all labor adjustment boards, although the agreements creating 
the boards did not, for the first year of the war, expressly men- 
tion it except in one case. 3 In practice, however, the boards con- 
sistently acted upon this principle. 

This feature of the Government's war labor program — the 
granting to the workers of the right to organize into trade unions 
— was the one big concession made to labor by the employers, 
and indeed many of the largest among them were never reconciled 
to it. On this point the feeling of the employers was well ex- 
pressed by Newcombe Carlton of the Western Union Company 
when in explanation of the position taken by his company in re- 
fusing to reinstate a number of employees at the request of the 
War Labor Board he issued a statement in which he said, "if these 
principles are interpreted as compelling this company and others 
in like situation to abandon their settled policies, and leaving out- 
side organizations free to work as they may see fit among their 
employees, then the hands of the employers are tied and the prin- 
ciples of the War Labor Board furnish a cloak behind which a 

Board of Arbitration, "compulsory powers to bring about arbitration 
on the conditions set forth in the agreement." This conflict between 
the rule adopted by the State of Minnesota and the principles of 
the National War Labor Board resulted in a good deal of confusion. 
In one case, the Twin City Rapid Transit Company, the right to 
organize was one of the vital issues. The War Labor Board as- 
sumed jurisdiction, and gave the men the right to organize which 
the State Board would have denied them. 

1 Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1917, page 807. 

* Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1917, page 809. 

3 The "understanding" of the Fuel Administration, issued on July 
23, 1918 (Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, September, 
1918), contains express provision against discrimination, as does the 
agreement creating one of the earlier boards, to wit, The New York 
Harbor Adjustment Commission. 



166 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

propaganda for the unionizing of labor in every industry may be 
carried on without hindrance." Although this deep resentment 
at the fact that they were forced to allow their men to organize 
was shared by most employers, 1 few — and the Western Union 
Company was one of them — ventured to go to the length of 
openly refusing to accept this definite rule of the Government. 
But in many instances they covertly violated it. 

The importance of the Government's recognition of the right to 
organize can be appreciated when we recall the fact that the em- 
ployers' denial of this right 2 had been One of the chief causes 
of industrial unrest. In fact, the testimony of the labor adjust- 
ment boards evidences innumerable cases in which before the war 
union members were consistently discriminated against. As an 
example the use of the so-called "rustling card" (and of central 
employment offices) on the Great Lakes and the Pacific Coast was 
shown to have been largely for the purpose of controlling, if not 
eliminating, the employment of members of unions; and discrimi- 
nation was likewise revealed as common in the street railway serv- 
ice, the metal trades, lumber camps, and in hundreds of other 
places. 

In spite of the fact that discrimination of this kind was for- 
bidden during the war by Government policy, the workers con- 
stantly complained that it was, nevertheless, being continued. Nor 

1 Nor was the resentment of the employers lessened by the fact 
that the rule adopted by the Government's Labor Administration was 
directly contrary to that which had previously been adopted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Practices of discrimination on 
account of union membership had gone so far that employees were 
compelled, upon entering upon the employment of certain firms, to 
sign agreements not to join a labor union or to give up their jobs 
if they did so. The State of Kansas had forbidden the requirement 
of these contracts. In the case of Coppage vs. Kansas. 236 U. S. 1, 
this law was declared unconstitutional and in Hitchman Coal and 
Coke Company vs. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 232, an injunction was upheld 
which restrained the officers of a union from securing secret prom- 
ises to join the union from employees who had agreed to give up 
their employment if they joined it. In Adair vs. United States, 208 
U. S. 161, an Act of Congress which forbade interstate carriers from 
discharging because of union membership was held unconstitutional. 

In spite of these decisions by the U. S. Supreme Court, the Na- 
tional War Labor Board refused to permit discrimination in any 
form and in a number of cases ordered contracts of the type above 
referred to abolished. 

3 The metal trades of Bridgeport and practically all of New England 
are cases in point. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 167 

can there be any question that in many instances the workers' 
complaints were justified by the facts — in other words, that fla- 
grant violations of the Government's policy were frequently taking 
place. This persistence in the practice of discriminating against 
members of unions constituted the most serious violation of the 
Government's war labor principles by employers, just as the pep 
sistent calling of strikes by the workers constituted their most 
serious violation. 

The justice of this statement can be shown by the testimony be- 
fore the wage boards, which contains many examples revealing 
how widespread was the practice and how great was the bitter- 
ness which it caused among the men. In their attempt to decide 
whether or not a discharge was justified the Government boards 
were embarrassed by the fact that their decision involved the ne- 
cessity of determining the employers' motives. Unfortunately it 
was very easy for the employer to find a pretext, and the board 
had to decide whether the reason assigned for the decision was 
genuine. This difficulty was increased by the fact that, in view 
of the danger of enemy propaganda and violence, it was essential 
to employ secret service agents, who reported to the firm every 
form of agitation among the men. These detectives did not dis- 
tinguish between routine trade union activity and agitation for 
radical industrial changes. They made no effort to confine their 
reports to actions which could be even remotely construed as sym- 
pathetic toward the enemy, calling attention to action so harmless 
as using the lunch hour for soliciting union membership. 

Even before the war many employers had made it a practice to 
spy upon the activities of the unions. Never warranted in time 
of peace, this practice might have been justified during the war 
if it had been limited to an effort to prevent the unions from be- 
coming instruments for furthering enemy purposes. As a matter 
of fact, however, it was used in many cases to discover employees 
who were active members or organizers of the unions. These 
men were thereupon marked for immediate discharge, or a pretext 
might be waited for until the worker who had been active in his 
organization could be plausibly dismissed. 1 

1 There were cases in which, in order to prevent the spread of un- 
ionism in their shops, firms discharged men who had been in their 
emplo}'' for over 30 years. The writer knows of one instance where, 
for this purpose, the following procedure was adopted. The general 



i68 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

In order to determine whether or not a discharge was justified 
it frequently became necessary to determine what was "legitimate 
trade union activity," as distinguished from practices which were 
clearly not allowable, such as collection of dues during shop 
hours. These questions were sometimes extremely difficult to 
answer, 1 but it was always held that during shop hours solicita- 
tion for union membership and other union activity were illegiti- 
mate. 

As a result of the immunity from discharge for union member- 
ship or activity, granted by the Government, a most active cam- 
paign was carried on by the men to increase the membership of 
their organizations. On the railways alone it is claimed that 
union membership was increased during the war period by one 
million men and it is stated that another million joined the unions 

manager, hearing that an effort was being made to organize the men, 
came to Newark, where the shop is located, and after ascertaining 
the prevailing rate of wages, determined upon a scale which he was 
willing to pay. The new rate, although higher than that which was 
then prevailing in Newark, was lower than the rate demanded by the 
unions, and the men in this shop were working nine hours whereas 
the union demand was eight. The foreman was instructed to go to 
every man, to tell him his new rate, and then to ask him whether or 
not he was satisfied with conditions. If he answered "No" he was 
summarily discharged, irrespective of the length of time that he had 
been in the employ of the firm ; some of the men who v/ere thus dis- 
charged had been with the firm for over 25 years. Inasmuch as 
every member of the union would certainly answer in the negative, 
this proved a convenient method of getting rid of the union men 
without it too openly appearing that they were being discharged for 
union membership. 

*A curious case was decided by Professor Ripley, Administrator of 
Labor Standards in Army Clothing. The employer (A. B. Kirschbaum 
Company of Philadelphia) at the instigation of the Administrator, 
had entered into an agreement with its employees for the introduction 
of a system of collective bargaining in conformity with the practice 
of the National War Labor Board — the shop committees having no 
connection with any outside organization. _ An employee, after warn- 
ing, persisted during the lunch hour in distributing leaflets announc- 
ing a shop meeting of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Amer- 
ica. For this action the worker was discharged. The Administrator 
had some difficulty in deciding whether or not this was "legitimate 
trade union activity." He decided that it was not because ". . . the 
leaflets announcing the meeting remained scattered all over the floor 
during the rest of the day. These leaflets constitute in a sense a tres- 
pass upon the employer's premises and strongly tend to build up the 
outside union regardless of the effect upon the 'household' union set up 
within its gates." The reinstatement of the discharged employee was 
therefore refused. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 169 

in other industries. 1 It cannot be said that the protection af- 
forded by the Government from discriminatory discharges was 
entirely responsible for this increase. Professor Commons 2 and 
others have pointed out that the growth of unions usually takes 
place when prices and profits are rising. It is more than likely 
that in any event a large growth would have taken place, but un- 
doubtedly this growth would have been much smaller without the 
protection which the Government afforded. 

COERCION 

The rules of the Taft- Walsh Board also prohibited the use of 
"coercive measure of any kind to induce persons to join their 
organization" or "to induce employers to bargain or deal there- 
with." Reinstatement was always refused where it was found 
that a discharged employee had violated this rule. But whether 
this rule had as a matter of fact been violated was always diffi- 
cult to determine, as definite proof of acts of coercion was fre- 
quently lacking and what proof there was, was contradictory. 

The commonest forms of coercion were the spoiling of work of 
men who refused to join the unions, ostracizing them, and pes- 
tering them during the lunch hour and to and from the shop. How 
difficult it was to establish the facts of coercion is shown, for ex- 
ample, in the case of spoiled work; sometimes the damage was 
clearly deliberate, in other cases it might appear to have been 
the carelessness of the worker himself, but in all cases it was al- 
most impossible to prove who actually did the harm. 

There can be no doubt that coercion was, and is to-day, fre- 
quently practiced; indeed, during the war, material urgently 
needed for its successful prosecution was deliberately destroyed 
just in order to increase union membership. Although the leaders 

1 The American Federation of Labor — History, Encyclopedia and 
Reference Book, 1919, page 63, publishes a chart showing flunctua- 
tions in union membership from 1881 to 1919. It appears that from 
1905 to 1910 (inclusive) membership remained stationary at approxi- 
mately 1,500,000. It then rose gradually to 2,000,000 in 1914 and 
stayed at practically this level during 1915 and 1916. But in 1917 
(our first year of the war) it rose over a quarter of a million and 
in 1918 almost half a million to nearly 2,750,000. In 1919 it passed 
the 3,000,000 mark. The Railroad Brotherhoods, as well as unions in 
the clothing, textile, and other trades, which also grew rapidly dur- 
ing the war, are not included in these figures. 

a John R. Commons; Industrial Goodwill, page 171. 



170 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

did not encourage these vicious practices, on the other hand they 
did not vigorously oppose them. 

NO CHANGE FROM UNION TO OPEN SHOP OR VICE VERSA 

At the outbreak of the war the biggest industrial issue con- 
fronting the country was the issue of unionism and especially of 
the open versus the closed shop. Most large employers, 
even though they permitted union men to remain in their shops, 
were unalterably opposed to the exclusive employment of union 
men; and they anticipated an attempt on the part of the unions 
to take advantage of the abnormal conditions accompanying the 
war by compelling them to adopt the closed shop. It was in 
answer to these fears that Secretary Wilson, in his statement of 
April 23, 191 7, declared "that where either the employer or the 
employee has been unable under normal conditions to change 
the standards to their own liking, they should not take advantage 
of the present abnormal conditions to establish new standards." 
This was regarded as a statement of the Government's general 
policy, and was interpreted by the Secretary of War to mean 
specifically that the Government did not intend to compel the 
extension of the closed shop. 1 This rule was adopted by all other 
boards, 2 except the Emergency Construction Wage Adjustment 
Commission. 3 

1 In its instructions to bidders, issued by the War Department, Pur- 
chase Section, Gun Division, dated September 25, 1917, there ap- 
peared the following explanation of the "labor disputes clause" : "In 
order to obviate any misunderstanding with respect to the intent of 
this clause or the policy of the Government in inserting the same, 
the Secretary of War designates that contractors be advised of the 
fact that by the foregoing statement (that of Secretary Wilson quoted 
in the text) the Government has emphatically renounced any sug- 
gestion of introducing the closed shop, under cover of settling dis- 
putes in plants doing Government work." 

2 I.e., by the National War Labor Board (See x\ppendix VII); 
by Fuel Administration when, in an "understanding," it stated that 
recognition of unions was not to be exacted where they were not 
now recognized ; in most other cases there was no express provision 
in the agreements creating the boards but this rule was followed. In 
the special case of the New York Harbor Wage Adjustment Board 
the agreement in fact stipulated that the Board "shall have no au- 
thority to pass upon the question of the open or closed shop. (See 
Monthly Labor Review, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
September, 1918, page 4.) 

* This board was organized for the express purpose of permitting 
the utilization by building contractors (engaged in the construction of 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 171 

The relinquishment by the unions of the demand for the closed 
shop (together with the demand for union recognition, the next 
point discussed in this chapter) was the most important conces- 
sion made by labor during the war. And from the standpoint 
of efficient production it was absolutely necessary that the Gov- 
ernment procure this concession; without it, strikes would prob- 
ably have been disastrously widespread and severe, because it is 
certain that many large employers would have fought the demand 
for the closed shop to the last ditch. In fact, the granting of the 
right to organize was in part the result of the Government's ef- 
fort to reconcile labor to this concession. 

Yet the adoption by the Government of the principle that the 
closed shop should not be insisted upon during the war did not 
entirely put a stop to this demand. In the first place it was not 
generally known until later in the war that the Government had 
adopted this policy. And even after it was known there were 
many cases in which the principle was violated. Sometimes the 
demand for the closed shop was used merely as a bargaining point, 
to be withdrawn as soon as negotiations had proceeded any dis- 
tance; at other times it was a genuine demand, seriously made — 
but in many of these cases to be withdrawn as soon as it was 
pointed out that the change to the closed shop was not sanctioned 
by the Government. A few of the International Unions, such as 
the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Em- 
ployees and the Brotherhood of Carpenters, persisted in their ef- 
forts to obtain the closed shop. The latter, indeed, as we have 
seen in a previous chapter, went so far as to refuse to become a 
party to the agreement creating the Shipbuilding Labor Adjust- 
ment Board because to have done so would have meant the 
abandonment of the demand for the closed shop. For the same 

quarters in which to house and drill the newly formed American 
Army) of all the building mechanics in the country, whether or not 
members of trade unions. Although the agreement did not expressly 
state that members of the unions would work with non-union men, 
this was the understanding under which the board was created. And 
in many cases building constructors, who before the war had closed 
union shops, exercised the right — when engaged on cantonment work 
— to employ any one at all, whether union members or not. Much 
later, however, after the announcement by the President of the prin- 
ciples of the National War Labor Board, this rule of no change 
from open to closed shops was, at the direction of the Secretary of 
War, adopted by the Emergency Construction Wage Adjustment 
Commission. 



172 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

reason the carpenters also had constant friction with the Emer- 
gency Construction Wage Adjustment Board. 1 In no case, how- 
ever, did any Government agency compel an employer to change 
from the open to the closed shop. 

Quite a number of small vexatious strikes took place, all of 
them revolving around the same dispute. Usually these strikes 
were called against the wishes of the national officers and fre- 
quently without the sanction of even the local leaders. Thus in 
the New York machine shops there were almost constant walk- 
outs because of the presence of non-union men or of members of a 
rival union. These establishments, although they had never been 
closed shops, were in many cases almost 100% organized. It 
seemed almost impossible to get the men back to work and to 
restore harmony, if the non-union men were not discharged. Al- 
though the Government always took the position that the shop 
should remain open, the employers, who were anxious to see pro- 
duction resumed in their plant rather than waste time over a few 
men, preferred to drop the non-union men, even if they did not 
formally agree to the closed shop. Ordinarily, as has been stated 
earlier, the employers — and especially the larger ones — would 
have fought this closed shop demand to the bitter end. But these 
last mentioned cases were special and more or less unimportant. 

UNION RECOGNITION 

This is frequently confused with the closed shop, although the 
two are entirely distinct. If an employer deals with union offi- 
cials, who are not his own employees, and discusses with them 
conditions in his shop, this would constitute a "recognition" of 
the union in the sense in which this term is ordinarily used. Em- 
ployers who are hostile to labor organizations have been afraid 
that to negotiate about working conditions in their own plants with 
union leaders — not members of their own establishment — would so 

a The carpenters' strike on the Navy Training^ Station at Pelham 
Bay in the summer of 1917, involved as its chief issue the closed 
shop. This was before the jurisdiction of the Emergency Construc- 
tion Wage Commission was extended to navy work. As a matter 
of fact, in this case the carpenters were successful. Upon the organ- 
ization of the National War Labor Board, Mr. Hutcheson, the Broth- 
erhood's President, became a member of it, and hence was com- 
mitted to its principles by his official position. Irrespective of this, 
his organization continued to make this demand. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 173 

strengthen the union in the eyes of their workers that it was bad 
policy for them to do so. In fact, they seem in such cases to 
have feared that such dealings with union representatives would 
inevitably lead directly to the closed shop. 1 

The Government's rule in regard to recognition of the union 
was identical with that governing the extension of the closed shop 
■ — to wit, that no change was to be made during the war, and 
that no employer would be forced to recognize a union where 
such had not been his practice before the war. The principles of 
the National War Labor Board, although, as we have seen, in- 
sisting upon collective bargaining, expressly provide that "in es- 
tablishments where . . . the employer meets only with employees 
or representatives engaged in said establishments, the continuance 
of such conditions shall not be deemed a grievance." This rule 
was generally applied by all Government boards. 2 

Like the giving up of the demand for the closed shop, the giving 
up of the demand for union recognition was an important con- 
cession on the part of labor. 3 Like it also, the demand for union 
recognition was frequently one of several, but was usually not 
insisted upon, especially towards the end of the war when the 

*In the recent steel strike in which the walkout of the men was 
precipitated by Mr. Gary's refusal to see a committee representing 
the A. F. of L. and to discuss with it the grievances of his men, 
the steel company went so far as to say that the closed shop was 
the real issue in the strike, implying that to recognize the union 
would inevitably lead to the closed shop. In explaining his position 
to the Steel Institute, Mr. Gary makes the closed shop synonymous 
with "collective bargaining through labor union leaders." (See Re- 
view of Reviews for November, 1919.) The press in its news ac- 
counts and editorial discussion of the strike assumed that the closed 
shop was actually the issue. Yet, as a matter of fact, the men were 
not demanding the closed shop at all; they merely wanted the right 
to negotiate with their employers through men who were officers of 
international unions. 

a An exception to this general application was the ruling of John 
Lind, ex-Governor of Minnesota, as Umpire of the National War 
Labor Board in the case of the Bement-Niles-Pond Co. Docket 
No. 330. 

3 The importance of this concession can be best realized by recalling 
the strength of this demand shortly after the armistice was signed. 
In the steel industry, for instance, it would have been inconceivable 
that a demand for union recognition — on a nation-wide scale — should 
have been seriously put forward during the war, for the reason that 
such a demand would have been contrary to the Government's war 
labor principles, to which the leaders of the A. F. of L. had sub- 
scribed. 



174 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

principle of "no change" became better known and more gen- 
erally acceded to. 

There can be no doubt that the refusal of the employers to deal 
with union representatives was — and is — the cause of a great deal 
of bitterness among the men. One of the reasons for this is that 
the men feel that union leaders who devote all their time to the 
business of the organization are in a better position to represent 
them and to look after their interest than are the men in the 
shops. The men's attitude toward these leaders is somewhat akin 
of the attitude of employers toward attorneys whom the em- 
ployers engage to represent them (sometimes, indeed, even in 
labor disputes). The men also feel that outside union leaders 
who are not dependent for their livelihood upon the employer will 
be more fearless in their bargaining. A more obscure but none 
the less real cause for this resentment springs from the fact that 
refusal to meet their representatives (for many of whom they 
have a high regard) is frequently taken by the men as a personal 
insult. These leaders are, after all, the heads of an organization 
to which the men in question belong and to which they attach the 
utmost importance. Unwillingness even to meet these leaders 
implies an attitude of contempt toward the whole organization. 
Yet although the abandonment of the men's demand for union 
recognition often resulted in bitterness and unrest, 1 the Govern- 
ment's mediators invariably 2 enforced the rule that when a union 

1 The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway 
Employees always made recognition of the unions one of their de- 
mands, in cities in which the union was not already recognized; and 
a number of very bitter strikes took place (at times accompanied 
by violence) in which this demand was pressed. At Daj^ton, Ohio, 
the men were out on strike and at first refused to go back, pending 
the adjudication of the National War Labor Board, unless their union 
was first recognized. They claimed that so bitter was the opposition 
that if they went back, the union would be destroyed while they were 
waiting for the decision of the Board. The matter was finally sub- 
mitted to the National War Labor Board (Docket No. 150), where 
recognition of the union was denied. 

3 The case of the telephone girls on the Pacific Coast, adjudicated 
by the President's Mediation Commission, is a very interesting one, 
because it is said to have been the first time that a men's union struck 
to secure recognition for a women's union. The commission granted 
recognition to the union, which might appear inconsistent with the 
above statement. But this decision was made in the early days of the 
war before the rule was generally promulgated. It was also based 
upon the fact that the company had previously recognized the girls' 
union in some other parts of the country. (See Report of President's 
Mediation Commission, page 12.) 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 175 

had not been previously recognized, it would not demand such 
recognition during the war. 

MAINTENANCE OF ESTABLISHED STANDARDS 

Reference has already been made' to the attempt in the first 
days of the war to break down the laws and customs which had 
been built up by painful effort for the protection of the work- 
ers, especially of women and children. Unlike similar attempts 
in Europe which were successful, with us, these attempts met with 
prompt defeat in the legislatures of the different states. Wage 
boards also took the position that established safeguards should 
not be relaxed. General Order Number 13 of the Ordnance De- 
partment expressly provided for the maintenance of standards of 
health and comfort, as did the principles of the National War 
Labor Board. In some cases the Government went so far as to 
insist that clauses, protecting standards of health, be inserted in 
contracts for the manufacture of war materials. Thus contracts 
for army clothing provided against the employment of children 
under 16 years of age, compelled compliance with local factory 
laws, and contained provision intended to eliminate the sweat- 
shop system of manufacturing. 1 

The War Labor Policies Board gave thorough consideration to 
the standardization of these labor clauses to be inserted in con- 
tracts of the War and Navy Departments, the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation, and the United States Housing Corporation. 2 Stand- 
ards for safeguarding women, who were entering industry by the 
hundreds and thousands, were worked out by the newly created 
Women in Industry Service of the Department of Labor, indorsed 
by the War Labor Policies Board, and applied by the different 
labor adjustment agencies. These regulations were particularly 
useful in preventing the night work of women except under ex- 

1 Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1917, page 

3 These clauses require that "all work . . . shall be performed in 
full compliance with the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, 
where such work is performed; provided that the contractor shall 
not employ in the performance of this contract any minor under the 
age of 14 years or permit any minor between the ages of 14 and 16 
years to work more than 8 hours in any one day, more than 6 days 
in any one week, or before 6 A. M. or after 7 P. M." Also provisions 
against convict labor and for the observance of the Federal Eight- 
Hour Law. 



176 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

traordinary circumstances, and in providing for the maintenance 
of proper sanitary conditions and for proper limitations of the 
hours of work and for rest periods. It is a remarkable fact that 
in spite of the pressure for war production the Government should 
at this particular time have gone out of its way not only to pro- 
tect existing labor standards but also to initiate new ones. In- 
stead of the war period having been one of retrogression it was 
on the contrary a period during which attention was directed to 
the necessity for these standards as it never was before. 

EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK 

Until fairly recently this principle was almost unknown. The 
movement for its application especially in public work had been 
gathering force as women gained increased political power. It 
has also been one of the demands of the labor unions — not so 
much as a matter of justice to women as to protect the wage 
standards of men. 

The emergencies of war production made it imperative that 
millions of women should be introduced into industry to take 
the places of the men at the front. The wage-earners, union men 
especially, feared that this would result in a lowering of wage 
standards, and they consequently from the outset demanded that 
the women receive the same pay as the men for the same work. 1 
This demand having been adopted by all the war labor boards 
the unions were reconciled to this dilution of their trades. 

The adoption of this principle was a wholesome measure, 
even though its adoption was easier than its enforcement. It pro- 
vided for equal pay for equal work; but the difficulty was to de- 
termine whether or not the work was equal, and if unequal, to 
what degree. 2 For some jobs women were used exclusively, and 
here it was particularly difficult to enforce the rule. Even where 
men and women were engaged in exactly the same work there 
were elements which a strict enforcement of the rule made it nec- 
essary to take into consideration. Thus women might require a 

*See the March 12, 1917, statement of the A. F. of L. {American 
Federationist for April, 1917, page 279) : "In any eventuality when 
women may be employed, we insist that equal pay for equal work shall 
prevail without regard to sex." 

3 See G. D. H. Cole in The Dial, July 26, 1919, for discussion of 
English controversy on this subject. 



GENERAL PRINCIPLES 177 

greater amount of supervision; they might be less adaptable to 
other work and therefore less valuable in a factory; they might 
have to call upon the assistance of men to do heavy lifting which 
men could do by themselves. In the application of the rule there 
can be no doubt that women in many cases did not receive quite 
as much as men would have for the same work. But it is never- 
theless true that on the whole there was a substantial approxima- 
tion to equality, and as a result women's wages advanced during 
the war much more rapidly than they would have if this rule had 
not existed. Speaking generally, women were during the war 
period very well paid. 1 This is in marked contrast to the condi- 
tions which prevailed during the Civil War, when in spite of large 
increases in the cost of living the pay of women advanced very 
little, and in some cases actually declined, although the wages of 
men uniformly advanced. 2 

1 The aeroplane factories paid women 40 cents an hour while learn- 
ing to become machinists, and very much higher wages when they 
became proficient. 

a E. D. Fite in his Social and Industrial Conditions in the North 
during the Civil War, page 186, after referring to the increase in 
prices which he states advanced approximately 100%, says : "The low 
wages of women were a special grievance. When it was known in 
the winter of 1863-1864 that these had practically made no advance, 
general sympathy was aroused ; and when, a year later, it appeared 
that only a paltry advance of twenty-five per cent had been achieved, 
less than half that for men, the sympathy was increased. In some 
lines of women's work no advance at all was made by the latter date, 
but on the contrary an actual decline. This seems scarcely credible, 
and yet the evidence is overwhelming. The most pitiable case was 
that of the seamstresses, thousands of whom were employed in mak- 
ing army clothing, some hired directly by the Government, some by 
contractors under a vicious system of contracting and sub-contract- 
ing. In the Philadelphia Armory in 1861 women were paid by the 
Government seventeen and one-half cents for making a shirt, three 
years later, at the very time when prices themselves were highest, 
only fifteen cents, and at this latter date the contractors were pay- 
ing only eight cents. A small advance by the Government toward the 
close of the war was of little real benefit, since most of the work 
was then being given over to the^ contractors whose prices grew 
lower and lower. Protests in public meetings, the most harrowing 
tales in the newspapers, and petitions to the Secretary of War and to 
the President appeared useless, and the poor victims were left to their 
fate, undoubtedly the greatest sufferers of any class from the war; 
they suffered even more than the clerks in mercantile pursuits and 
college teachers. . . . An average week's wage paid by the contractors 
in 1865 was $1.54" 



CHAPTER XIV 
Hours 

The establishment of the eight-hour day is one of the few in- 
dustrial questions about which it can be said that there has been 
a national policy, favored by a fair preponderance of public 
opinion. 1 It had been established by law — both Federal and, in 
many cases, State — for all public work. Before the United States 
entered the war the movement for the eight-hour day had been 
gaining throughout all industry, and had reached a high point, 
when by means of the Adamson law it was extended to the rail- 
roads. 2 

In any discussion of this question the distinction must be made 
between the absolute eight-hour day, by which the hours of the 
working day were strictly limited to eight, and the basic eight- 
hour day, by which the normal number of working hours is fixed 
at eight, but additional hours are not prohibited, although they 
must be paid for extra, usually at a higher rate. Owing to the 
emergency, the absolute eight-hour day in Government w r ork was 
changed by Presidential order to the basic eight-hour day 3 of the 
usual type, that is to say, with a higher rate of pay for overtime. 
During the war period, therefore, the absolute eight-hour day was 
not usually observed. 4 

1 It is interesting to note that the American Federation of Labor 
adopted the demand for the international establishment of the eight- 
hour day in the peace terms. (Report of Executive Council Buffalo 
Convention, June, 1918.) It was also one of the proposals of the 
delegates of the American Federation of Labor to the inter-allied 
Labor Conference at London in September, 1918. 

3 In a "Memorandum on the Eight-hcur Day," submitted to the 
National War Labor Board by its Secretary, a list of employees 
is given whose work-day had been reduced to eight hours; in 191 5, 
171,978; in 1916, 342,138; in the first six months of 1917, 512,587, 
(including 400,000 men on the railroads). 

3 Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, July, 1917. 

4 It: prevailed in the coal industry. In one case Justice Clark, as 
umpire for the National War Labor Board, insisted upon the ab- 

178 



HOURS 179 

Yet in spite of the tendency toward its general adoption and 
the public opinion in its favor, the demand for the basic eight- 
hour day was the principal cause of a number of the most im- 
portant strikes of the war period and one of the causes of quite a 
few others. Thus in the lumber disputes of the Pacific North- 
west, while there were other causes involved, there seemed very 
little doubt that the principal one was the eight-hour day and 
that its concession would at any time have terminated the strike. 
Not merely was the lumber industry tied up but as a protest 
against "Ten-hour lumber," the strike spread to the shipyards of 
the Pacific Coast, and resulted in a tie-up of important shipbuild- 
ing plants for a period of several months. 1 So bitter was the op- 
position of the Pacific Coast employers to the eight-hour day that 
they went as far as to bind members of their association to dis- 
criminate against any employer who would grant this concession. 

Except when required by existing law, the National War Labor 
Board did not in its principles adopt the eight-hour day. But it 
stated that, "The question of hours shall be settled with due re- 
gard to governmental necessities and the welfare, health, and 
proper comfort of the workers." And in practice the board usually 
awarded the eight-hour day. Such also was the practice of the 
other boards. General Order Number 13 of the Ordnance De- 
partment stated that "the drift in the industrial world is toward 
the eight-hour day as an efficiency measure" and all of the War 
Department's labor adjusting agencies made awards of the eight- 
hour day. And for the shipyards, the railroads, telegraph and 
telephone, in the Government building trades, the stockyards, 
and packing industry, in coal mines, the Western lumber camps — 
in all these places the eight-hour day became practically universal. 
It was also very much extended in the metal trades, in the steel 

solute as distinguished from the basic eight-hour day. He provided, 
however, for a plant committee, consisting of two representatives of 
the employer and two of employees, with power to permit overtime 
if an emergency justifying it existed. Three votes were necessary in 
order to empower the committee to allow overtime. The umpire 
called attention to the heat and fumes to which the workers in the 
industry in question were subjected, quoting testimony to the effect 
that the lives of molders working nine and ten hours a day, average 
only fourteen years. See Molders vs. Wheeling Mold and Foundry 
Co., National War Labor Board, Docket No. 37 b. 

2 The New York Harbor Strike of the fall of 1918 had the eight- 
hour day as one of its principal demands. 



i8o WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

plants, the metal mines, the street railroads, and in numerous 
other industries. And toward the end of the war the War Labor 
Policies Board adopted a form for an eight-hour labor clause to 
be inserted in the contracts of a number of the departments and 
boards. 1 

For longshore work customs at different points varied greatly; 
the early decisions of the National Adjustment Commission 
granted a nine- and in some cases a ten-hour day. In October, 
19 1 8, however, wages and hours for longshore work on the North 
Atlantic coast were standardized and not only was the eight-hour 
day awarded, 2 but Saturday was made a half holiday. An eight- 
hour day was also awarded the longshoremen at many of the 
Pacific ports. 3 On the other hand, decisions of the Shipping Board 
for deep-sea and coastwise shipping did not award the eight-hour 
day, nor was this granted to harbor marine employees. 4 It is in- 
teresting to note, however, that San Francisco, the one im- 
portant port in the United States in which the Shipping Board's 
system of labor adjustment was not in force (because of the op- 
position of the employers to dealing with the International Long- 
shoremen's Association), was the first Pacific port to introduce 
the eight-hour day. 5 

Both before and during the war, the eight-hour day meant 
in almost all industries — other than building — the forty-eight hour 
week. When the Saturday half holiday was observed, an agree- 
ment was usually made whereby five hours were worked on Satur- 
days and the lost three hours were divided equally among the 
other five days of the week, thus making eight hours and thirty-six 
minutes the actual week-day time. 

Some demands for the forty-four hour week occurred before the 

*The Board of Control for Army Clothing had early in the war 
recommended that the provisions of the Federal Eight-hour Law be 
included in contracts for army clothing. Monthly Review, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, October, 1917, p. 31. 

2 Chairman's Report, National Adjustment Commission for period 
ending December 31, 1918, page 146. But in Southern Atlantic ports., 
where the ten-hour day generally prevailed, the decision of the Com- 
mission of December 2, 1918, made no change in this respect. Page 
168 of the same report. 

3 Same report, pages 158 and 164. 

4 The Railroad Administration, however, did grant the eight-hour 
day to the Harbor Marine employees in its service. See Chapter VIII. 

6 Report of Director of Marine and Dock Industrial Relations 
Division, December 31, 1918, p. 163. 



HOURS 181 

signing of the armistice, 1 but they usually were hot pressed, and 
did not give rise to any important controversy, except in the 
clothing industry, which, in New York City, was tied up by this 
demand. 2 

Before the armistice no Government award except that of the 
National Adjustment Commission had allowed the Saturday half 
holiday (in industries where it had not prevailed before) except 
during June, July and August, unless compensated for by addi- 
tional week-day work. After the armistice, as a result of wide- 
spread strikes, the forty-four-hour week was conceded by many 
private employers, especially in the clothing industry, and the 
other needle trades, and the National War Labor Board took 
cognizance of this spread of the forty-four-hour week and awarded 
it to the textile workers of Paterson. The painters of New York 
in the fall of 19 19 went so far as to demand a forty-hour week 
and the jewelers a thirty-nine-hour week and a bitterly fought 
strike followed in each case. These demands would have been 
unthinkable during the war period. The painters were successful 
but the jewelry workers obtained the thirty-nine-hour week in 
only a very small proportion of the New York shops. 3 

1 The National War Labor Board, regarding the 48-hour week as 
the normal one for shop work, refused to grant a 44-hour week to 
painters engaged in the woodworking shops of Philadelphia although 
they allowed the shorter week to painters doing outside work in 
accordance with agreements between the Master Painters and the 
Brotherhood — National War Labor Board, Docket No. 230. 

2 Even in this case the strike, as we have seen, was confined to the 
manufacture of clothing for private use and did not affect Govern- 
ment work. 

'The stubborn resistance with which the jewelry workers' demands 
for the 39-hour week was met is an indication that the movement 
for so great a curtailment in the hours of factory workers will not 
for some time to come meet with success. A substantial number of 
the strikers returned to the jewelry shops on the conditions pre- 
vailing before the strike and the manufacturers seem determined 
not to make any concessions in regard to the shorter week and are 
training men and women to take the place of their former em- 
ployees. On the other hand, in the building trades, the 40-hour week 
had been making progress before the strike of the New York painters. 
Bulletin No. 259, U. S. Department of Labor, giving the^ union scales 
of wages and hours, May 15, 1918, name the following branches 
of the building industry which had up to that time established a 40- 
hour week: The carpenters of Boston and Bridgeport, lathers of 
Boston and Seattle, painters of Boston and Seattle, plasterers of 
Boston, San Francisco and Seattle, the Borough of Queens in the 
City of New York, Philadelphia and Providence, the plasterers, labor- 



182 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

In relation to the rate of payment for overtime, there were great 
variations in the practice of the adjustment boards. The rule 
most generally adopted was time and one-half for week-day over- 
time and double time for Sundays and holidays. When higher 
rates prevailed, they were not interfered with by the Government. 
In the building trades, for instance, the usual practice was double 
time for overtime. But to the railroad men no overtime rate has 
ever been paid to the men engaged in the actual movement of 
trains in the passenger service and it was not until a year after 
the armistice that extra compensation for overtime was paid to 
those in the freight service. 1 In most cases where the rate for 
week-day overtime was time and a half the workers, as we have 
seen, were usually paid double for Sundays and holidays; but 
even here there were some variations, the National Adjustment 
Commission, for instance, awarding the same rate for all over- 
time, no matter when performed. President Wilson in his Proc- 
lamation of March 24, 191 7, suspending the operation of the eight- 
hour day for Government work and permitting a greater number 
of hours, provided that at least time and one-half should be paid 
therefore. The Conference Committee of Labor Adjustment 
Agencies also recommended the same rate except where a higher 
overtime rate has already been established. But they recom- 
mended that in no case should more than double be paid. 

In some cases the men demanded extra compensation for haz- 

ers in Boston and Philadelphia and the tile layers in Boston. Since 
the armistice the 44-hour week has been established in the textile and 
shoe industries in many places and has been conceded to the printers 
to become effective in the near future. In the textile industry, in 
some large centers, the weekly hours have been reduced from 54 to 
48 and in other places, where the eight-hour da}' was not granted 
during the war, efforts have been successfully made to establish it 
since that time. The demand of the bituminous miners in their recent 
strike for the six-hour day impressed the public as a most extreme 
and unwise example of the tendency toward a shorter working day. 
It was not generally realized that, because of the peculiar conditions 
surrounding the mining and transportation of soft soal, the miners 
had seldom if ever averaged 6 hours of steady work a day; in fact 
Acting President Lewis of the United Mine Workers of America is 
quoted in the New York Times of January 19, 1920, as stating 
that the demand of the miners was not for a maximum but for a 
minimum working day of six hours. 

1 See Chapter VIII for detailed statement of the effect of the 
Adamson Law of 1916 and the final adoption for the freight service 
of time and one-half for overtime by the U. S. Railroad Administra- 
tion on December 15, 1919. 



HOURS 183 

ardous or disagreeable work, claiming that these additions should 
supplement the normal increases for overtime and that each suc- 
cessive extra compensation should be pyramided upon each pre- 
ceding one. Thus the longshoremen demanded double rates for 
handling barbed wire and other commodities involving possible 
physical injury or danger to health, such as cement in bags or 
wheat in the bottom of the hold, where the dust was likely to be 
excessive. They also demanded double when working down- 
stream or when loading explosives. 1 

In fact, the remarkable extent to which overtime developed as 
a regular industrial practice during 191 7 and 19 18 was a war 
phenomenon. It became the custom even in industries which 
normally made use of overtime only under exceptional circum- 
stances (such as the building industry) to work ten and sometimes 
even twelve hours a day. 

The beginning of overtime can be traced directly to cost-plus 
contracts, particularly those for the construction of cantonments. 
The Government found it necessary to do a large part of its 
work on a cost-plus basis; in the building industry practically all 
of it. 2 In these cases the contractor's personal interest was not 
in keeping down costs. On the contrary, if his compensation was 
in the form of percentage of cost (rather than a fixed fee) 3 it 
was directly to his financial advantage to have the cost run high. 
Furthermore, the contractor's standing with Government officials 
was largely determined by the speed with which he executed 
his contracts. In his desire for speed — unhampered by any consid- 
erations of economy — his first impulse was to have the men work 
long hours. In the beginning this impulse sprang from the feeling 
that long hours meant increased production. But intelligent em- 
ployers soon realized that as a matter of fact long hours advanced 

*One of the employers calculated that if all of the demands of 
the men were granted and pyramided, longshoremen engaged in extra- 
hazardous work, down stream on Sunday, working during the lunch 
hour, would receive $105 for the day's work. 

2 The principal reason for this was speed. In the first place, time 
was saved in the letting of contracts, because, with work on this 
basis, it was unnecessary to wait for completed specifications and 
plans and estimates thereon. In the second place, it usually costs 
more to do a piece of work quickly than to do it slowly ; therefore 
there was danger that if the contractor had to do the work for a 
definite price, he would look for economy rather than speed — and 
speed was the all-essential thing for the Government. 

3 The Government gave out contracts of both kinds. 



i&4 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

production little if any. Yet they continued the practice of over- 
time^ — in spite of the fact that it did not mean increased pro- 
duction — because they wished to add to their labor force. And since 
the hourly rates of pay in many industries were limited by trade 
custom or by the Government, it they wanted to attract men by 
increased wage the only method they had was by giving the men 
overtime, with the result that competition for workers took the 
form of offering excessive overtime. 

Thus in the building industry, where overtime was paid double 
the normal hourly rates, it was the universal practice to work 
at least two extra hours a day on Government work. This meant 
compensation for four extra hours, and as an example, steam 
fitters, plumbers, or electricians, whose compensation was in many 
localities $0.75 an hour, were thus paid $9.00 every week day. In 
some cases, in order to get men away from one job to another, a 
contractor would offer four hours of overtime, thus bringing the 
pay of these mechanics to $12.00 a day. The pay was too large and 
the hours entirely too long. Unfortunately the large earnings due 
to overtime made the workers of certain industries (partic- 
ularly the building industry) content with an hourly rate which 
remained practically stationary. Considering the increased cost 
of living, $0.75 an hour was not an adequate rate for these skilled 
men. It would have been fairer if hourly rates had been reason- 
ably increased. And this was keenly realized by the men them- 
selves when, upon the signing of the armistice, orders were issued 
in all departments prohibiting overtime. 1 

Not only did overtime have an unfortunate effect upon the 
hourly rates of some of the workers, but it was undoubtedly in- 
jurious to their health. 2 Furthermore, from the Government's 
point of view, it was unnecessarily wasteful. Inasmuch as the 
extra hours did not materially increase production (for it is now 

1 In most cases the men found their earnings reduced one-third ; 
in some cases cut in half. A number of strikes against the abolition 
of overtime followed, some of a very serious nature, notably that at 
Nitro, Va. The housing work of the Shipping Board and of the 
Labor Department was tied up in many places, and wages in a number 
of trades were increased to enable the men to earn a fair amount 
in the normal working day of eight hours. 

2 See for English experience on this point, Final Report of Health 
of Munition Workers' Committee, 1918. For a criticism of this report 
from the employers' point of view, see Research Report, No. 2, National 
Industrial Conference Board. 



HOURS 185 

generally recognized that over considerable periods of time the 
human body is capable of only a definite amount of certain kinds 
of industrial work) the large payroll which resulted from long 
overtime at abnormally high rates represented almost that much 
loss in dollars and cents. The wastefulness of this practice was 
further increased by irregularity of attendance due to the way in 
which overtime affected the men. In the first place, they often 
made so much money in a few days that they felt like taking 
frequent vacations. 1 In the second place, the long hours, made 
much worse by bad transportation, resulted in a working day of 
such extreme length that the men felt it absolutely necessary at 
times to absent themselves from the shop in order to get much 
needed rest. Still another practice developed in many places of 
staying away Mondays but working Sundays in order to get the 
increased pay. 

From the standpoint of the community also the practice of ex- 
cessive overtime had unfortunate social consequences. Large num- 
bers of men were earning from $75 to $100 a week who before 
the war had earned less than half that much. The sudden in- 
crease in their earnings frequently resulted in foolish extravagance 
and sometimes in intemperance. There was a general expectation 
that these high earnings would continue, and some of the excesses 
which have characterized the present unrest undoubtedly have 
their origin in disappointment that the excessive earnings which 
resulted from the war practice of overtime have not been con- 
tinued. 

For all the reasons given above it will be readily seen how great 
an evil was the undue practice of overtime. The question nat- 
urally arises, why did not the Government place an effective curb 
upon it? The reason cannot be said to have been a failure to 
recognize the evil, for the Government did recognize it. In Gen- 
eral Order Number 13 of the Ordnance Department (a similar 
order was issued for the Quartermaster Corps) the statement is 
made, referring to overtime: "There is no industrial abuse which 
needs closer watching in time of war." Similar utterances were 
made by other Government officials. And yet in spite of the rec- 
ognition of the evil of overtime work no general rule was adopted 

*This was particularly true of negroes, whose pay was increased 
in an even larger proportion than that of whites, although it affected 
all of the workers. 



186 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

to cover the entire country until after the armistice was signed. 
One of the reasons for this failure was the length of time which 
elapsed before an adequate war labor administration was organ- 
ized. As we have seen, it was not until May, 1918 (over a year 
after the war began), that final steps were taken to complete this 
organization by the creation of the War Labor Policies Board. A 
national rule coming from that body would have been of the 
greatest help, and had the war lasted longer, it is quite likely 
that some definite action would have been taken. The fact that 
this was not done during the six months in which the board func- 
tioned prior to the armistice was due in part to its preoccuption 
with other matters, and probably in part to the lack of agreement 
among those responsible for the production programs of the dif- 
ferent departments; in part, also, to the difficulty of enforcing any 
common rule upon those in charge of work of such emergency 
character, where it might have been necessary to create innumer- 
able exceptions. 

Nevertheless, some of the individual boards did adopt rules 
which limited the amount of overtime in the industry over which 
they had jurisdiction. 1 Thus the National Harness and Saddlery 
Board in 19 18 limited weekly hours in June, July, August, and 
September to fifty-five, and from October to May to fifty-eight, 
except upon certificate of extreme urgency. The Emergency Con- 
struction Commission confined its overtime to two hours every 
day, although in practice this rule was not very rigidly enforced. 
The Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board for all districts ex- 
cept the Pacific Coast "prescribed a maximum working day of 
twelve hours and a maximum sixty-hour working week, except at 
the order of the Fleet Corporation or Navy Department." 2 

In some cases the National War Labor Board, in order to re- 

X A subcommittee of the Conference Committee of National Labor 
Adjustment Agencies recommended a limitation of overtime to two 
hours, except in a great emergency and we have seen in a previous 
chapter that the "National Labor Policy" recommended by the Con- 
ference Committee for promulgation by the President called attention 
to the overtime evil and charged "all government authorities . . . 
to use every effort to put a stop to this abuse." ^ But the proposed 
statement did not make any specific recommendations and it is very 
doubtful whether the general language which it employed would 
have had any practical effect. 

a P. H. Douglas and F. E. Wolfe in The Journal of Political Econ- 
omy, for May, 1919. 



HOURS 187 

duce irregularity of attendance, made the rule that if an employee 
was to receive overtime he must work a minimum number of 
hours in a given week, but if more than two hours of overtime 
were served in any one day then he was entitled to overtime rates 
for that day, irrespective of the number of hours worked during 
the week. The general rule was, however, that men received pay 
for overtime without regard to the regularity of their attendance. 1 
When all is said and done, it seems to the writer that the lack 
of more effective curbing of overtime constituted the most serious 
failure of the Government's war-time labor administration. All 
the difficulties in the way of such action could have been brushed 
aside by the simple declaration, backed by proper authority, that 
more than a very limited amount of overtime was prohibited ex- 
cept under unusual circumstances, the determination of which 
would have rested with a board created for that purpose. To have 
made such a rule effective, it would have had to apply to all in- 
dustry; yet in war-time, when the Federal Government possessed 
almost unlimited powers, it could easily have been accomplished, 
and an enormous amount of waste and confusion saved. 

1 In the case of the Sturtevant Company, Boston, Mass., Docket No. 
393, the National War Labor Board decided that no men were to re- 
ceive overtime payments unless they had worked 48 hours in the week 
during which the overtime was claimed, allowances being made for 
holidays, sickness or other just cause of absence. In a few other 
cases the War Labor Board required 48 hours of work in any week 
before the worker became entitled to overtime, but in these cases 
the employer guaranteed that an opportunity would be given the 
employees of 44 hours of work in the week. See Mason Machine Co., 
National War Labor Board, Docket No. in. 



CHAPTER XV 
Wages 

In its immediate practical influence upon industry and upon 
the life and health of the workers the most important question 
is undoubtedly wages. This has always been true and was no less 
so during the war, when wage demands were by far the largest 
single cause of strikes. 1 Workers are always more or less dissatis- 
fied with their pay, the opinion of employers to the contrary not- 
withstanding, and most strikes are either solely on account of 
wage disputes or have wage demands as one of their most impor- 
tant causes. During the war this was even more than usually the 
case, due to the constant and rapid increase in the cost of living. 2 

Because frequent readjustments in wages became imperative if 
continuous production was to be maintained, all Governments 
found it necessary to establish machinery by which wage demands 
could be considered and met. This was the case in the United 
States as well as in the other warring countries. Never before 
have the wages of so many millions of our workers been fixed by 
arbitral adjustment. Never before has so much ability and learn- 
ing been applied to the task of finding principles by which ju- 
dicially to determine the amount of pay which workers in a given 
industry should receive. 

In the widespread attempts to fix wages, the truism was borne 
home to many adjusters that in the last analysis there are no 
standards by which scientifically to determine the amounts of 
compensation to which different members of the community are 
by right entitled. 3 Furthermore, not only are scientific standards 
for wage determination completely lacking, but the problems 

1 See Appendix No. I. 

S A fact equally true of Great Britain where the Commission on 
Causes of Unrest found that the rise in the cost of living was the 
greatest single source of labor trouble. 

3 Judge Alschuler in deciding the packing house case (referred to in 
Chapter V), says: "So far as I have been advised or know, there is 
no scientific method for accurate wage fixing. In my view of all 
the facts and conditions, I can only exercise my best judgment." 

1 88 



WAGES 189 

which the wage adjuster faces, especially during a time of emer- 
gency such as war, can seldom be solved in a purely judicial man- 
ner. This, because his primary task during war-time is less to do 
absolute justice than to keep production going. He is therefore 
forced to take into account — consciously or unconsciously — all of 
the surrounding circumstances — the temper, character and power 
of each side. 1 To as great an extent as possible his decision must 
satisfy both parties. This meant in practice that he had to com- 
promise, almost inevitably giving a certain amount of advantage 
to the side which was most powerful or the most difficult to satisfy. 
The practical necessity for this attitude must be borne in mind in 
any discussion of wage adjustments especially during an emer- 
gency period. 

A study of the work of the adjustment boards will show the 
following considerations to have been the most potent in influ- 
encing their decisions: 

(a) A minimum living wage. 

(b) Increases in the cost of living. 

(c) Standardization, both within a given industry and over a 
given territory. 

(d) Increase in productive efficiency. 

(e) The effect of overtime in increasing weekly earnings. 

Yet in spite of the fact that these principles were the deter- 
mining ones in the work of practically all of the boards, never- 
theless there was no common agreement as to the manner in 
which they should be applied or the emphasis that should be 
placed upon one rather than another. There was a large amount 
of confusion in wage fixing, which inevitably operated to increase 
unrest. This confusion was due in part to faulty organization 
and the desire of each department to push its own work even at 
the expense of some other department. It was also due to the fact 
that some of the agreements under which the adjustment boards 
were created prescribed different and inconsistent standards for 
wage fixing; 2 other wage boards were not hampered in their de- 

1 Perhaps it is a realization of this mental process on the part of 
most wage adjusters which frequently induces both sides to do so 
much "bluffing." 

2 We have seen in a previous chapter that the Conference Com- 
mittee of Labor Adjustment Agencies recognized this weakness and 
had the war lasted longer it would doubtless have attempted to secure 
revisions of contract to promote greater consistency and uniformity 
in wage awards. 



190 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

cisions by any hard and fast standards. The consequence was 
that different boards fixed different scales of wages for workers in 
the same trade and locality. Some industries did not suffer from 
this difficulty because a single board had jurisdiction over all of 
the workers in the industry. Thus in the case of leather workers 
there was no conflict of jurisdiction within the trade because the 
National Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission fixed the 
wages of all the men in this industry. 1 But in the case of the 
building and metal trades, workers were employed by many differ- 
ent branches of the Government and wages were set by many dif- 
ferent boards with a large amount of resulting confusion. 

One of the important points gained by labor early in the war 
was the adoption in certain industries of union scales as standards 
for war-time adjustments. Thus the Baker-Gompers Agreement 
■ — creating the Cantonment Wage Adjustment Commission — pro- 
vided that "union scales of wages, hours and conditions in force 
June i, 191 7, in the locality where such cantonment is situated" 
should be taken as basic standards and a similar provision is con- 
tained in the agreement creating the National Adjustment Com- 
mission. On the other hand the original contract creating the 
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board does not make use of 
union scales but provides that wages shall be based upon the 
rates paid in each shipyard on July 15, 191 7. 2 Other agreements 
between the unions and the Government creating wage boards, 
do not contain any express provision as to the standards to be 
used. But in practice, inasmuch as these boards were usually 
composed of representatives of the union and of employers, union 
scales did form the starting point from which wage adjustments 
were made. The same was true to a large extent in the case of 
the Industrial Service Sections, in whose creation the unions took 
no part and in whose membership neither they nor the employers 
were directly represented. 3 

1 This was likewise the case for the coal mining industry and the 
railroad trainmen (except those employed by the small railroads 
which were not taken over by the Government). 

2 See Chapter III. This agreement was modified, however, in 
December, 1917, and the wage rates prevailing in the district, if estab- 
lished through agreement between employer and employee and if 
admitted to be equitable, were to be used as basic standards. 

3 In the adjustments made in localities where union organization 
was weakest this was naturally less true than in those places where 
the unions were strong. 



WAGES 191 

As the war progressed, these original standards — that is to say, 
the rates used in the first adjustments made by the boards — be- 
came of less importance. Because of the unprecedented changes 
in the cost of living, the shortage of labor and the high wages vol- 
untarily paid by many employers in their efforts to get workers, the 
original standards of early 191 7 became obsolete and the deter- 
mination of wages was more and more influenced by the considera- 
tions mentioned above. 

THE MINIMUM WAGE 

The one principle which stands out most prominently and on 
which, in theory at least, there was general agreement (though 
much difference in emphasis and practice) was the desirability of 
the payment to all workers of at least a minimum living wage. 

One of the first statements of this principle is contained in 
General Order Number 13 of the Ordnance Department, to wit: 
"It is necessary that minimum wage rates bear a constant rela- 
tion to increases in the cost of living." A much more definite 
statement was later enunciated in the principles of the National 
War Labor Board as follows: "The right of all workers, includ- 
ing common laborers, to a living wage is hereby declared. ... In 
fixing wages, minimum rates of pay shall be established which will 
insure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health and 
reasonable comfort." 

In order to fix a minimum wage standard, it was necessary first 
to ascertain what the cost of subsistence actually was. For this 
purpose, the National War Labor Board (whose efforts were more 
definitely directed toward this end than were those of other 
boards) created a Cost of Living Section associated with the Bu- 
reau of Labor Statistics of the Labor Department. 1 It was found 
in New York that in June, 1918, $1350 to $1400, and in Decem- 
ber, 1918, $1500 a year was the lowest amount on which the aver- 
age American family of five members could exist. 2 If every worker 

*It was realized that a nation-v/ide survey of living costs was im- 
perative. The Commissioner of Labor Statistics secured for this 
purpose an allotment of $300,000 from the President. A hundred 
different localities were studied, in collaboration with the War Labor 
Board. (See Report of the Secretary of the National War Labor 
Board for year ending May 31, 1919, page 28.) 

a William F. Ogburn in Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science, February, 1919, page 108. 



192 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

was to earn this amount, in an eight-hour day it would have been 
necessary to set the wages of unskilled labor at fifty-five cents an 
hour when the minimum cost of living was $1400, and at sixty 
cents an hour by the time the minimum had reached $1500. It 
was realized that these were impossible figures, and would, if put 
into operation, have entirely demoralized industry at a time when 
it was of the utmost importance that its smooth operation be 
maintained. It was also realized that the figures in question were 
theoretical, and that in practice — and especially during the war 
period — much overtime, usually at higher rates, would be worked. 

For these reasons the minimum rates set by the National War 
Labor Board for unskilled labor were very much less than the 
minimum subsistence rates as theoretically determined. The first 
minimum fixed for unskilled labor was forty cents an hour and 
this amount was awarded in one case in which the men had de- 
manded only thirty cents. 1 The War Labor Board subsequently 
increased its minimum to forty-two and one-half cents and then to 
forty-five cents. 2 

In addition to determining what constituted the minimum sub- 
sistence level the War Labor Board likewise fixed standards for 
a ''minimum comfort level." 3 And although the Board could not 
fully meet these standards, yet there is no doubt that all of its 
decisions were very much influenced by a desire to approximate, 
as nearly as conditions would permit, the minimum subsistence 
level for the unskilled workers and the minimum comfort level for 
the semi-skilled. 4 

1 The much discussed Waynesboro case in which the laborers were 
increased from 22 to 40 cents an hour, National War Labor Board, 
Docket No. 40. 

2 In a number of awards the War Labor Board provided that the 
minimum rate need not apply to workers who were handicapped 
by old age or physical disability. 

'"Very little attention has been paid to this level in budget litera- 
ture, but the standard is as much a reality as is that of any other 
budget. It is one level above that of the subsistence level and pro- 
vides slightly more for comforts, insurance, clothing, and sundries, 
and is supposed to furnish a certain well-being above that of the 
physical level." Memorandum on the Minimum Wage and Increased 
Cost of Living, submitted to the National War Labor Board, by its 
Secretary, page 9. 

4 The influence on the National War Labor Board of a desire to 
conform to minimum standards is shown in its awards to street 
railway employees where minimum rates were set in different sec- 
tions of the country and wages advanced to these standards although 



WAGES 193 

Although no special reference is made to it in the agreements 
or orders under which they were constituted, the necessity for 
an approximation to a minimum wage rate was likewise appre- 
ciated by the other boards, and found its practical application in 
the practice of a number of them of giving to the lowest paid 
worker the largest relative increase (for instance, the graduated 
scale awarded by the Railroad Wage Commission 1 ). There can 
be little question that the minimum wage, even if not strictly ap- 
plied during the war, nevertheless received great publicity and 
wide acceptance through the activities of the National War Labor 
Board and other agencies. If we are to do justice to our indus- 
trial workers, the principles of the minimum wage will have to 
receive universal application — fortunately, during the war prog- 
ress toward this goal was definitely made. 

INCREASES IN THE COST OF LIVING 

By far the most important question which was presented to 
every wage adjuster was the extent of the increase in the cost 
of living. It was generally felt by both employer and employee 
that although not necessarily the determining factor, yet the per- 
centage by which living costs had increased had always to be 
given the fullest consideration before a wage award was made. 
And there were very few hearings at which evidence was not 
offered on this question. 

The boards differed very much as to the extent to which they 
allowed the increased living costs to determine their awards. The 
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board adopted the rule, in theory 
at least, of advancing wages in exactly the same proportion as the 
cost of living had increased. On the other hand the rule of the 
Emergency Construction Wage Adjustment Commission was to 
accept the scales agreed upon by local unions and employers ir- 

this meant very much greater increases in some cases than in others. 
Thus men who in 1914 had been getting 21 cents an hour on the 
Lewiston, Augusta and Waterville Street Railroad were in Nov., 1918, 
awarded 43 cents an hour (an increase of 105%), Docket No. 
448. The men of Charleston, S. C, who had received the same 
amount in 1914 were given 40 cents an hour, the rate for the South- 
ern District (an increase of 91%), Docket No. 695; whereas the 
Street Railway men of Butte, Mont., who had been getting 45 cents 
an hour were awarded 65 cents (an increase of 45%), Docket 
No. 2JTC. 
1 See Chapter VIII. 



194 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

respective of whether or not such scales were commensurate with 
the increases in the cost of living, which, as a matter of fact in 
most cases in this particular industry, they were not. 

Most boards did not adopt any deliberate policy but inasmuch 
as the men invariably pressed for increases which at least equalled 
the increased cost of living and inasmuch as this reason was al- 
ways assigned as one of the main justifications for the new 
scale, the increased cost of living was almost invariably one of 
the principal factors in wage adjustments. 1 

It was soon realized by most boards that no decision could be 
regarded as permanent and after a while the principle was 
adopted of setting six months as the period for the duration of 
an award. At the expiration of this time the award was to be 
reopened if a change in conditions rendered it necessary. 2 The 
awards of many of the boards, however, did not specify the time 
for which the award was to remain effective. 3 Nevertheless there 

X A number of boards, the Railroad Wage Commission, the Ship- 
building Labor Adjustment Board and the National War Labor 
Board, employed experts to study the increases in the cost of living. 
This work was usually done in cooperation with the U. S. Labor 
Department. The figures presented by the employees were usually 
exaggerated, due in part to the undue emphasis which they gave to 
the rise in food prices. 

" This was the provision usually adopted by the National War 
Labor Board. Shortly before the armistice the suggestion was made 
in the Conference Committee of Labor Adjustment Agencies that 
readjustments in wages be made every six months, on April and 
October ist, provided that the cost of living had increased at least 
10% since the last award. This rule was adopted by the Shipbuilding 
Labor Adjustment Board in its decisions of Oct. i, 1918. (The recom- 
mendation of the Conference Committee to the President was that 
revisions be made semi-annually. See Chapter XL) Had the war 
lasted longer a uniform rule would doubtless have been adopted by all 
the boards. 

3 Thus General Order No. 27 of the Railway Administration fixed 
no time for the duration of the award, although a new Board was 
created for further adjustments, nor was there any time limit stated 
in most of the supplements to this order in which later adjustments 
were made. This is also true of the awards of the Harness and 
Saddlery Wage Adjustment Commission and of some of those of 
the National War Labor Board. In the award of the New York 
Harbor Board of June 1, 1918, a time limit of one year was set 
"unless in the judgment of the board conditions warrant a change 
prior to the date thus fixed for expiration." (Monthly Labor Review, 
September, 19 18, page 26.) The awards of the Fuel Administration, 
for both bituminous and anthracite miners, were "to continue in 
force during the war, but not to exceed two years from April I, 
1918." (Monthly Labor Review, Nov., 1918, page 167.) 



WAGES 195 

was a general willingness to reopen awards when changes in the 
cost of living made such a course desirable. Even in the case of 
wage agreements (usually made before the war) which still had 
considerable periods to run, it was realized that the unprecedented 
conditions made the continuance of these agreements unjust and 
employers were usually willing to revise them in the light of the 
new conditions. 1 

STANDARDIZATION 

One of the most definitely marked economic phenomena of the 
war was the tendency manifested throughout all industry towards 
uniformity in wage rates. A leveling process was taking place, 
as a result of which wage differences, between skilled and un- 
skilled, union and non-union labor and between the workers in 
one part of the community and another, became very much re- 
duced as compared with what they had been before the war. 
This was both the natural result of general industrial conditions 
as well as the more or less artificial result of the action of the 
Government boards. 

In normal times there existed very marked inequalities of wage 
payments, due not merely to differences in the skill of workers 
and to whether or not they were members of a union — these dif- 
ferences are easily enough understood. But in addition there 
were innumerable variations in the pay received by equally skilled 
men working in different localities in which the cost of living 
varied little. These differences existed even in the wages re- 
ceived by workers in the same industry and locality, sometimes 
indeed in the same shop. Variations of this kind have been 
pointed out by many writers, who have, however, found great 
difficulty in fully explaining them. A partial explanation of why 
labor does not automatically seek its highest wage level is to be 
found in the human failing of inertia. Inertia, together with a 
lack of knowledge of employment conditions elsewhere, attach- 
ment to a particular place or shop because of friendly association, 

1 This was not always the case ; the Building Trades Employers' 
Association of New York, for example, refused to allow changes in 
existing agreements, and went so far as not to permit the employing 
electricians to revise their contract with their men (prior to its ex- 
piration), by readjusting wages. The reason for this attitude was 
undoubtedly the belief, which was then entertained, that the rise in 
the cost of living was merely a temporary phenomenon. 



196 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

the cost of moving, the ownership of home, all of these play their 
part in normal times in preventing the worker from getting the 
highest wage. 

On the other hand, in times of emergency and consequent 
abnormal labor demand, there arises a competition for men which 
disturbs to a marked degree the wage relationships of normal 
times. For normal times, as our economic system is constituted, 
have always meant times of labor surplus. And during such 
periods the labor unions have been able to modify the conven- 
tional action of the law of supply and demand and have pre- 
vented the competition of their members from resulting in the 
low wage levels which have frequently been caused by such com- 
petition, when unrestrained by union standards. Where a non- 
union man might reduce his wages to get a job, the members of 
a union would go without work in order to maintain the wage 
scale. In normal times the average wage of men in trade unions 
is considerably higher than that of unorganized men in the same 
industry. When, however, the demand for men far exceeds the 
supply employers compete among one another and are willing 
in many cases to pay wages even higher than union rates. 1 In 
open shop industries men were offered these increased rates ir- 
respective of their union membership; consequently the differ- 
ences between the union and the non-union scale of wages were 
largely wiped out. 2 

Moreover, a similar leveling process was taking place in the 
pay of the unskilled as compared with the skilled workers. This 
for the reason that unskilled workers were needed not only for 
the vastly increased work of the kind which would normally have 
been done by them, but also for those new tasks resulting from 
the dilution of the trades and the consequent use of the unskilled 
man or woman to do a very small portion of what had previously 
been the complete task of a highly skilled mechanic. Thus we 
see that unskilled and unorganized workers profit relatively to 

1 Normally union rates tend to become maximum rates, though ac- 
cording to the theory of the unions they set the minimum and not the 
maximum amount that should be paid. 

3 In many cases, indeed, the wages of union men had been fixed by 
previous agreement. And although, as we have seen, these agree- 
ments were sometimes modified before their expiration, in some cases 
the employers insisted that they be kept. This meant that the union 
workers received no increase in spite of wage advances in industry all 
about them. 



WAGES 197 

a greater degree by the leveling process of abnormal times, than 
do the skilled and highly organized. 1 

A further consequence of the abnormal war conditions was an 
unprecedented mobility of labor. Every method, including pa- 
triotic appeals in the press and on public platforms, was used to 
bring home to the workers of other localities the need of men in 
places where war material was being produced. Influenced both 
by the patriotic motive and the desire for better wages, men and 
women left their homes and traveled to distant cities. This 
movement of the workers was accelerated by the action of em- 
ployers who, not content with elaborate newspaper advertisements 
offering high rates of wages, even went as far as to send labor 
scouts all over the country. 2 In this manner some of the natural 
causes which made for previous wage inequalities were overcome 
by the extraordinary conditions produced by the war. Workers 
not only left their homes but they changed from one industry to 
another with a freedom never before known. 3 General wage 
levels were a matter of common knowledge. And the worker 
knew not only the pay of men in his own industry but also that 
of workers in many other trades. The inevitable result was a 
widespread leveling of wages and a flattening out of inequalities. 4 

a The most conspicuous illustration was furnished by the building 
industry. The wages of union men in the building trades increased 
very little during the war and although substantial advances were 
made in the post-armistice period, the wages of union men have 
barely kept pace with the cost of living. But the wage advance of 
unorganized men, especially before the armistice, was much more 
rapid. This was especially true in the South. 

3 Both of these practices had to be curtailed by the Government, 
when toward the end of the war the competition for men became 
fiercer than ever and the U.'S. Employment Service was organized 
in an effort to control the situation. The Government itself then 
took charge of transferring workers to places where they were most 
needed. 

8 For example thousands of coal miners (especially in the anthracite 
fields) left the mines to work in other war industries. The difficulty 
of preventing the men under their jurisdiction from drifting into 
other industries was one of the reasons frequently assigned by wage 
boards for increased awards. 

4 The leveling effect of the action of the wage boards during the 
war period is well shown by a comparison in a number of typical 
war industries of wages in 1914 and 19TQ. Thus for deep water 
longshoremen the rates paid in July, T014, varied from 20 cents in 
Charleston, S. C, and 25 cents in Baltimore, Savannah and Norfolk. 
all the way up to 55 cents in San Francisco and Portland, a difference 
of 175% between the high and the low rates. In July, 1919, 50 cents 



198 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

These natural processes making for standardization were ac- 
celerated and deepened by the more or less artificial action of the 
various wage adjustment agencies. Since production was the 
primary concern of the Government, efficiency demanded that 
men be prevented from shifting from one place or industry to an- 
other where such change was unnecessary, and that such transfers 
be facilitated where they were imperative. Wage uniformity was 
needed to produce both of these results. 1 It also tended to re- 
move the dissatisfaction which men of a particular trade or 
locality would naturally have felt because of higher wages paid 
to others. A further consideration was the conclusion reached by 
all of the boards that one of the reasons which had always been 
given for wage differentials — the difference in the cost of living in 
different localities — was no longer applicable to any appreciable 
degree. There was therefore an almost universal tendency on the 
part of adjustment boards to apply uniform wage scales over 
wider and wider areas. Thus the Shipping Board, whose first 
awards were for single yards and then for districts, ended by 
setting up practically uniform rates for the entire country. 2 The 

was the lowest and 80 cents the highest. The difference instead of 
being 175% was 60%. On the other hand the Baltimore rates, 
which by decision of the National Adjustment Commission were 
made uniform with those of Newport and Boston increased 160%, 
whereas the rates at Portland and San Francisco advanced only 45%. 
For coastwise longshoremen the differences are even greater. Thus 
at Baltimore, the rate in July, 1914, was 20 cents an hour. It was 
increased to the same rates as Newport and Boston — to wit, 65 
cents — a jump of 225%, whereas in Mobile these same men had been 
getting 30 cents per hour and received in July, 1919, only 45 cents an 
hour, an increase of only 50%. 

*The writer does not mean to imply that uniformity was actually 
achieved. But only that a marked tendency toward uniformity 
existed. 

2 See Chapter III. In the decision of the Shipbuilding Labor Ad- 
justment Board for October 1, 1918, for the Atlantic Coast, Gulf 
and Great Lake Shipyards, the "Reasons for a National Wage Scale" 
are stated as follows : "We have adopted these uniform national rates 
because experience has convinced us that by this means only can 
we put a stop to that shifting of employees from yard to yard and 
district to district, which continues to be a chief obstacle to efficient 
ship production. Added arguments for uniform national rates are 
that citizens working for a Government — and work on ships is now 
essentially Government work— feel that they should all be treated 
alike; that there are no longer any marked differences in the cost 
of living between different sections; and that the U. S. Employment 



WAGES 199 

National Adjustment Commission adopted the same policy 1 as 
did to a lesser extent the War and Navy Departments in making 
adjustments in Arsenals and Navy Yards as well as in private 
ordnance plants. The awards of the Harness and Saddlery Ad- 
justment Commission and of the Railroad Administration had 
always been countrywide in their application. 

In the building trades, on the other hand, differentials were 
largely maintained and much confusion resulted. In the first 
place, as we have seen, the Emergency Construction Wage Ad- 
justment adopted wage rates as fixed by local agreement of em- 
ployers' associations and unions for each separate locality and for 
each separate trade. In the second place there were many dif- 
ferent Government agencies which fixed wages for this industry. 
In theory these agencies acted in cooperation but in practice they 
often acted independently and two of them used widely different 
rules for wage adjustment. 2 

The policy of wage boards to standardize wages was almost 
everywhere resisted by the employers. They objected both to 
the removal of differentials as between localities and to the re- 
moval of differentials as between individuals in the same shop and 
craft. 3 Inasmuch as the process of wage leveling was always a 
leveling up, this hostility of the employers can be readily under- 
stood. With respect to differentials between different localities 
there was a certain amount of justice in the employers' position, 
especially in regard to the railroads, where the greatest variations 

Service, rather than divergent wage rates with their unsettling ten- 
dencies, should be relied upon to effect whatever shifting of wage 
earners is necessary to the carrying out of the war program. 

1 See Chapter IV. 

2 The agencies above referred to were the Emergency Construction 
Wage Adjustment Commission, the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment 
Board, whose jurisdiction extended over mechanics employed on 
building construction in the shipyards, and the housing departments 
of both the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Labor Department 
which were independent of each other and of the other two. It should 
be mentioned, however, that the Emergency Construction Wage Com- 
mission had jurisdiction over many more workers than did the other 
boards. Its adjustments were therefore a dominant factor in the 
building industry and inasmuch as they were based purely on local 
rates, the result was illogical and unfortunate variations, whose effect 
was heightened by the mobility of labor previously referred to. 

1 See _ Chapter IV, where an exception is pointed out — to wit, the 
opposition of employers to the request of longshoremen for different 
rates of pay when handling different kinds of cargo. 



200 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

exist both as to degree of service required and the conditions 
under which workers in widely scattered localities lived. 1 On the 
other hand the Government's needs, already referred to, were 
sufficient to justify it in overriding this opposition. But even if 
this had not been the case it would have been a physical im- 
possibility for such boards as those of the railroads (dealing as 
they did with 2,000,000 employees) to have fixed wages in ac- 
cordance with all of the minute variations which existed. 

In considering the opposition of employers to the removal of 
differentials as between individuals we are brought face to face 
with a most difficult problem. Employers have found that their 
best means of obtaining both skill and industry has been by re- 
warding these qualities with higher wages. The unions, on the 
other hand, have realized that collective bargaining became more 
and more difficult as attempts were made to recognize individual 
variations in ability. There was also the danger of discrimina- 
tion against labor organizations and the fact that the union de- 
rived a large part of its numerical strength by reason of the fact 
that it was a protection for the man of average ability, rather 
than the exceptionally skilled (who seldom needed help). 2 

All of these difficulties are well illustrated by the controversies 
in the machine industry in which the widest range of skill and 
productivity exists. The employers wished to be absolutely free 
to reward these variations of productive ability — a wish that was 
intensified by the fact that thousands of unskilled workers were 
inducted into the machine shops during the war and taken into 
the unions. 3 

1 Both of these points are well illustrated by the railroad flagmen. 
Some are stationed in cities where hundreds^ of trains are constantly- 
passing daily; others in remote country districts where there are per- 
haps only half a dozen trains a day and where the flagmen can easily 
own his own home, cultivate his own garden, etc. See Chapter VIII. 

2 Piece work met the difficulties of the employer and some of 
those of the union. But piece rates are applicable to only certain 
industries and do not safeguard the rights of the workers unless ac- 
companied by well-organized collective bargaining. Even then many 
unions object to them because of the danger of "speeding up." 

'At the hearing of the Bridgeport case before the National War 
Labor Board the attorney for the employers said: "We must pre- 
serve this right of the employer to assign and grade the men as 
he sees fit, without attempting to fix any inflexible name or any 
inflexible rate of pay. That it is only by maintaining this full freedom 
of the employer, that the employer is able^ to manage his establish- 
ment and secure that efficiency which ordinarily comes out of the 



WAGES 201 

In localities where the union was strong it had made agreements 
with employers by which the men were classified according to 
their skill and a rate (considered by the union a minimum) set 
for the men of each group. 1 Thus there were toolmakers, first 
and second class machinists, helpers- and others. The demands 
made by the machinists' union in the spring and summer of 191 8, 
referred to in a previous chapter, were for minimum rates for 
certain definite classifications. And many of the employers were 
even more bitterly opposed to this arrangement than they were to 
the wage increases which the men demanded. The effort of the 
union was everywhere to establish minimum rates with broad 
classification, dividing the workers into as few groups as possible. 
The employers endeavored to defeat the establishment of mini- 
mum rates and where they were unable to do so, they sought to 
establish the largest possible number of wage groups. 2 It was 
in Bridgeport that the issue was most bitterly fought out and 
that the failure of the men to get the minimum rates for which 
they had been contending led to their final strike against the de- 
cision of the umpire of the National War Labor Board. 

The tendency toward wage leveling which we have been ex- 
amining was extended still further by the policy adopted by most 
of the Government Departments, especially toward the end of the 
war, of preventing employers from paying wages in excess of the 

hourly rate, when the employer can reward each individual case. 
In other words, we have as many hourly rates as there are human 
beings." 

1 This had for some time been the practice of Arsenals and Navy 
Yards and was adopted by the Shipyards. 

a In many industries in which the unions have long been powerful 
they have succeeded in establishing single wage rates for practically 
every man in the industry. Thus in the building trades, there is just 
one union rate for most trades. Whether a bricklayer is an expert, 
capable of doing the highest grade of work on the front of a building 
or a man who has just graduated from the ranks of the apprentice 
and possesses only a moderate amount of skill, he receives exactly the 
same amount of wages. This was not always the case but has been 
so for a number of years. An evolutionary process by which wage 
differentials have been gradually eliminated can be traced in other 
branches of the building trade. Thus the stonecutters of New York 
had three classifications with 50 cents a day difference in pay. In 
1916 under pressure from the union the 3rd class was eliminated and 
in 1918 a single rate of pay was established. Very recently two 
different rates were abolished for mosaic workers and concrete labor- 
ers. Carpenters had a different rate for the shops and for outside 
men. In 1919 a single rate was established. 



202 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

established rates. 1 The purpose was two-fold; to reduce the 
labor turnover which was caused by one employer hiring away 
the employees of another by the offer of larger wages, and to pre- 
vent excessive wage increases which would have resulted from 
this practice. Recognizing the necessity for this rule as a war 
measure the unions acquiesced in it. 2 

These standardizing processes are also illustrated by the fact 
that many classes of labor whose remuneration had always been 
the result of individual bargaining between employer and em- 
ployee were during the war made the subject of collective bar- 
gaining. Thus the draughtsmen in the shipyards became organ- 
ized and have had wage scales fixed by collective bargaining 
applied over large areas of the country. 3 

We have seen that natural causes tended to produce wage 
leveling and that Government boards intensified this natural 
movement by awarding wages standardized over increasingly 
wider areas. But a most disturbing factor in the general situa- 
tion was the policy deliberately adopted by the Government of 
giving the shipyard workers a differential over mechanics em- 
ployed in every other industry. It has already been pointed out 
that the need for ships and the unfavorable conditions surround- 
ing their production led the Government to attempt to direct a 
flow of labor into the shipyards by giving to ship workers a 
higher wage than was paid to men in the same trade working in 
the same locality. 4 Each new award for the shipyards led to 

x The fact that many contracts were "cost plus" facilitated the en- 
forcement of this policy. See Chapter XI for efforts of War Labor 
Policies Board to establish standard wage rates for the entire country. 

2 After the signing of the armistice the determination of the Ship- 
ping Board to maintain this policy and not to allow ship}^ards to 
pay higher wages than the scale adopted by the Shipbuilding Labor 
Adjustment Board, was one of the causes of the general strike at 
Seattle. See Chapter III. < 

3 The movement to organize architectural and mechanical draughts- 
men has spread to architects' and engineers' offices and the draughts- 
men's union hopes to compel the employment of its members by an 
alliance with the unions in the building trades under the terms of 
which it is expected that building mechanics will refuse to build 
from "non-union" plans. 

* Inasmuch as the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, in its 
final awards, set practically uniform rates for the entire country 
(leveling up any inequalities that may have existed), the amount of 
this differential, substantial everywhere, became very great in those 
areas in which lower than average rates prevailed in other than ship- 
building plants. 



WAGES 203 

demands in every other industry for wages equal to those paid 
to shipbuilders. 1 The workers in other industries could not see 
any justification for the differential and never became reconciled 
to it. The announcement of a new award for the shipyards in- 
augurated a struggle everywhere else to catch up with the pay 
of the ship workers and this pursuit was maintained during the 
entire period of the war. When, however, the Conference Com- 
mittee of Labor Adjustment Agencies was formed and this ship- 
yard differential was discussed, although condemned by many 
of the members of the conference, its maintenance was recom- 
mended by a majority. 

INCREASE IN PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 

Inasmuch as production was the paramount object of war-time 
wage adjustments we might have expected that the effect of any 
wage increases on the efficiency of the workers would have re- 
ceived most careful consideration. To be sure the need for wage 
increases in order to allay unrest and to maintain the worker's 
efficiency was the reason frequently assigned for wage demands 
and the maintenance of the worker's strength is the reason often 
given for insisting that all employees shall receive at least enough 
to provide a minimum of subsistence. Except, however, in rela- 
tion to the minimum wage, the principle of productive efficiency 
does not seem to have been given as much attention by the wage 
boards as were the other principles examined above. 

A reason for this fact may have been the difficulty of deter- 
mining just what was the effect of a wage increase upon efficiency 
and production. Another reason was the fact that the power of 
the men to enforce their demands made wage increases necessary 
irrespective of their effect upon the efficiency of the workers. 

In fact, toward the end of the war the problem of promoting 
production involved not so much a question of giving the workers 

1 An illustration of the effect of shipyards awards is an occurrence 
toward the end of the war in Kings County. Concrete laborers, 
requiring both strength and skill, employed on Government work 
next door to a shipyard, had been receiving 43 cents per hour. Upon 
the announcement of the October award of the Shipbuilding Labor 
Adjustment Board, the shipyard laborers were raised to 54 cents an 
hour — 25% more than the concrete laborers were getting. As a result 
the concrete men went out. The same thing occurred in many 
places all over the country. 



204 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

more pay, but rather the fear that high earnings were lessening 
efficiency, And here we must distinguish between wage rates and 
earnings. The increase in wage rates was in most industries no 
greater than the increase in the cost of living. Earnings, how- 
ever, and especially those of the entire family, did show a much 
greater increase. This was due in part to the elimination of un- 
employment, in part to overtime and in part also to the ease with 
which all members of a family could get work at high wages. 1 
The large amounts which the men themselves were earning were 
in many cases much more than they had ever been accustomed 
to and these were often substantially increased by the unprece- 
dented earning power of other members of the family. 2 Unfor- 
tunately this prosperity had one very bad effect. It led to in- 
efficiency and to an attitude on the part of some of these workers 
of absolute indifference as to whether or not they kept their job. 
Modern industry has unfortunately been accompanied by a con- 
stant labor surplus. On the existence of this surplus we have to 
a large extent depended for the worker's incentive to maintain his 
efficiency. There have normally been more workers than jobs 
and this fact has produced the keenest competition for the posi- 
tions that were available. Efficiency was maintained because of 
the worker's fear of losing his job. But the war period put an 
end to the over-supply of labor. There was no longer any diffi- 
culty to find work ; on the contrary it was now the employers who 
competed with each other for men. The newspapers were filled 

J The pay of boys and of women advanced even more rapidly than 
did that of men — especially of skilled men. Many young boys 
entered the shipyards and munition plants and after a few weeks 
earned very large amounts. Women, too, in aeroplane factories and 
other war work were frequently in receipt of large pay. Even in 
peace industries wages of women showed large increases. For con- 
trast which this affords to the treatment of women during the Civil 
War, see quotation from E. D. Fite in note at p. 177. 

2 Evidence of high earnings was everywhere to be seen. Savings 
bank balances, one indication of the worker's financial condition are 
shown to have increased 8% in 1918 over 1916 and to have increased 
slightly in 1918 over 1917 in spite of large investments made by the 
workers in Liberty Bonds. Storekeepers in all industrial centers 
testified to the unusual buying power of working men and women; 
they mentioned silk shirts, pianos, phonographs and even automobiles. 
They said that the demand for these articles had changed. The people 
who had previously bought them were, in many cases, unable to do so, 
whereas hundreds of new customers for high priced articles of every 
kind had appeared from the ranks of the workers. 



WAGES 205 

with advertisements offering high wages for men and women in 
every industry. 1 If a worker lost his job he could go around the 
corner and get one equally good. Furthermore, his earnings and 
those of other members of his family frequently exceeded the 
amount which he needed to maintain the standard of life to 
which he was accustomed. The incentive to perform efficient and 
steady work was therefore weakened. 2 To be sure, the economic 
motive was reinforced, during the war, by the patriotic motive, 
but this was not strong enough in large numbers of cases to in- 
duce the workers to do a good day's work and to prevent them 
from deliberately absenting themselves from the job. The in- 
efficiency of labor became a serious problem of war production, 
both because of abnormally large absenteeism 3 and because of 
more or less deliberate slacking on the job. 4 Abundant evidence of 
these facts was presented to every wage board. A committee was 
appointed by the Labor Policies Board to investigate and to sug- 
gest a remedy. No means, however, was found to overcome the 

1 A new kind of competition among employers was begun. Wages 
and, to a lesser extent, overtime having become standardized, it was 
to the employers' interest to improve shop conditions in order to 
attract workers. Many of the advertisements during the war offered 
— as inducements — lunch and rest rooms, good light and ventilation, 
etc. 

2 Some of the shipbuilders deliberately attempted to raise the 
worker's standard of living in order to make him more willing to 
keep steadily at work. Automobile salesmen (on the installment 
plan), and other purveyors of luxuries were given facilities for dis- 
playing their merchandise to shipyard workers. 

3 Definite facts in regard to absenteeism are difficult to obtain. 
We do not know what is the normal percentage of absences from 
work nor are such figures available for most war industries. The 
Industrial Relations Division of the Emergency Fleet Corporation 
studied the attendance of over 320,000 employees of the shipyards 
and found that from January to September, 1918, the loss due to 
the absenteeism was 17.8% in steel shipyards and 13.2% in wooden 
shipyards. See Paul H. Douglas in Political Science Quarterly, 
December, 1919, p. 596. A similar condition undoubtedly prevailed in 
other war industries. In fairness to the workers it should be pointed 
out that this excessive loss of time can be accounted for in part by 
the abnormal conditions surrounding the shipyards, and other war 
plants. Bad housing, shockingly inadequate transportation facilities 
and large amounts of overtime were no doubt partly responsible for 
both inefficiency, lateness and absences from the job. 

4 The mine workers seem to have been an exception to this rule. 
Both employers and employees have testified that a larger quantity 
of coal was mined during the war than ever before although the 
force of miners was very much smaller. 



206 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

inefficiency of the workers and this condition has gone over to 
peace time as one of our most serious problems of industry. 1 

OVERTIME 

Attention has already been called to the disastrous extent to 
which overtime was practiced. It is desired at this place to in- 
dicate the influence of the excessive earnings due to overtime 
work upon the decisions of wage adjustment boards. 

Two reasons are usually assigned to justify the payment of 
extra remuneration for overtime. In the first place it is pointed 
out that the higher rate of pay acts as a penalty to prevent 
employees from working more than the normal working day. In 
the second place the added remuneration is considered a bonus to 
the worker to compensate him for the extraordinary strain re- 
sulting from abnormally long hours. In peace times there would 
consequently be no justification for taking into account the extra 
pay accruing from overtime work and because of it awarding a 
lower wage than the men would otherwise have received. In war 
time the question is a more difficult one. Obviously the worker 
is still entitled to extra remuneration (unless the fatigue of over- 
time is to be regarded as a reasonable war sacrifice). The other 
reason for the payment of extra compensation— namely, to penal- 
ize the employer — would, however, seldom apply, inasmuch as the 
Government was usually the employer and in theory at least was 
not allowing overtime to be worked unless it was for the public 
good. 

In normal times overtime is not worked except in emergencies. 
But during the war it became in most industries a regular prac- 

1 There was, to be sure, a short period immediately following the 
signing of the armistice, when with the removal of war-time pressure 
for production unemployment seemed to threaten and it was re- 
ported all over the country that efficiency had very much increased. 
But it quickly became apparent that the labor surplus which we 
then experienced was only a temporary condition. There were soon 
more jobs than men, and efficiency once more went down. Al- 
though accurate figures are difficult to obtain, the almost unanimous 
opinion of employers during 1919 was that the efficiency of their 
workers was no better than from 60 to 75% of what it was before the 
war. Toward the summer of 1920 the acute shortage of labor had 
abated. Indeed in some places there had come a labor surplus. With 
this change in employment conditions an increase in efficiency was also 
reported, though still below the pre-war standard. 



WAGES 207 

tice. As a result weekly earnings were increased by amounts 
varying from 40 to 100 or more per cent. It was psychologically 
impossible to ignore a factor which so potently influenced the 
actual earnings of the men. Consciously or unconsciously these 
large amounts of pay due to overtime were taken into considera- 
tion and wages were fixed at rates lower than would otherwise 
have been the case. 1 

A further consideration with wage adjusters was the effect upon 
employers of a new wage scale. In many cases no difficulty was 
presented because employers were working on cost plus contracts 
and in these cases the extra cost resulting from wage increases was 
paid by the Government. 2 In some instances wage advances 
were deferred until employers' contracts for the disposal of their 
product at old prices had expired. 3 Where the burden of a wage 
increase fell directly upon the employer and could not be shifted 
to the Government or to a private consumer, this fact was un- 
doubtedly taken into consideration. 

Perhaps the most difficult cases from this standpoint were 
those of the street railway companies. Limited by law as to the 
amount of car fare they could charge, these companies were em- 
barrassed by increases in all of their operating expenses. The 
wages which they were paying had always been abnormally low 
and increases in the cost of living made wage increases absolutely 
imperative. To make matters worse, the traction companies in- 
herited from pre-war times both financial unsoundness and a lack 

*It has already been pointed out that the War Labor Board 
took overtime earnings into consideration when it decided not to 
award as a minimum wage, an amount which seemed theoretically 
required for the worker's subsistence. Other wage boards have also 
expressly mentioned overtime as a reason for a smaller award 
than would otherwise have been made ; for example, Judge Alschuler 
in his first Packing House decision. 

*This was also true if work was being done under a contract con- 
taining the labor clause. In some cases indeed the employer profited 
by wage increases because his compensation was based on a per- 
centage of cost. 

a In the case of the coal dock operators of Duluth, National 
War Labor Board Docket No. 201, the selling price of the com- 
pany's product had been fixed by the Fuel Administrator and the 
Board, in making a wage increase, did so on condition that the 
selling price be re-adjusted by the Fuel Administrator. The Presi- 
dent's Mediation Commission granted an increase in wages to em- 
ployees of a copper mining company in Arizona conditional upon 
an increase being allowed in the selling price of copper, if the in- 
crease in wages resulted in absorbing all the profit. 



208 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

of public confidence and regard. If they were to be forced to pay 
materially higher wages and be denied an increased in fare, many, 
if not all of them, would face bankruptcy. This was the situation 
which confronted the National War Labor Board when the em- 
ployees of the street railroads turned to it for wage relief. The 
War Labor Board, seeing clearly the utter inadequacy of the 
men's pay, established standards for different sections of the coun- 
try and, irrespective of the financial condition of the street rail- 
way company, fixed wages in conformity with these standards. 1 
At the same time the board always recommended that fares be in- 
creased to enable the companies to maintain their service. 

After the signing of the armistice it was at first expected that 
the cost of living would immediately decline. It was thought that 
the transition of industry from a war to a peace basis would be 
facilitated by preventing further wage advances. The tendency 
to shift the burden of higher wages to the consumer in the shape 
of higher prices was realized and wage-earners were therefore 
asked not to press their demands for further increases but to 

1 In one case, that of the Kansas City Railways Co. National War 
Labor Board, Docket Nos. 265 and 266, the company's submission 
to the jurisdiction of the board was made "conditional upon the 
granting of an increase in the rate of fare to be charged . . . and 
subject to the financial ability of the company to meet the require- 
ments of the award." The Board found the company's finances such 
as to require an increase in fare to enable it to put the award into 
effect, so that in this case the increase in wage was made condi- 
tional upon an increase in fare. The subsequent history of the case 
makes it a most remarkable one. The Company instead of applying 
to the State Commission for an increase in fare — where it was 
evident that an increase would immediately have been granted — 
applied instead to the Federal Court, "a most fantastic and unwar- 
ranted assumption in respect to the power of this (National War 
Labor) Board." Legal complications now ensued as a result of which 
the fare was not increased and the men were denied an increase in 
wages. A strike followed and the National War Labor Board was 
once more appealed to.^ The Board found that the Company had not 
used its best efforts, in good faith, to secure an increase in fare. 
It therefore declared the condition in which the wage increase had 
been predicated to be imperative and ordered the Company to imme- 
diately put the wage increase into effect. Space does not permit a 
full statement of the facts, but the reader is referred to the opinion 
of the War Labor Board, which is well worth careful study. The 
newspaper advertisements published by the company at the time of 
the second strike entitled "A Strike Against the Community," are 
excellent examples of the manner in which a public service corpora- 
tion can trade upon the necessity of its service to the public, in order 
to fight a legitimate wage demand of its men. 



WAGES 209 

give the Government a chance to reduce the cost of living. In 
some cases, for example the railroad workers, the men were will- 
ing to adopt this policy. But they were disappointed in their 
hopes that the cost of living would decline. The so-called "out- 
law" strikes on the railroads, referred to in a previous chapter, 
followed. In spite of the efforts of their leaders, thousands of 
these men went on strike to secure wage increases which many 
months previously they had been induced to forego because it 
was claimed a reduction would be made in the cost of living. 

BONUS AND PIECEWORK 

Union demands were frequently made for the abolition of both 
bonus and piecework systems. Organized labor has been generally 
hostile to both on the ground that they tend to "speeding up" 
and that they are easily abused by unscrupulous employers. The 
unions maintained this position during the war and also objected 
to piecework and bonus systems for the same reasons which led 
them to prefer standardized union rates to the employer's method 
of rewarding individual merit by giving each employee a special 
rate of wages. The employers, on the other hand, insisted on the 
maintenance of both piece rates and bonuses on the ground that 
it was impossible to secure production without them. 1 

No mention of either piecework or bonus was made in the 
principles of the National War Labor Board nor in the agree- 
ments under which other wage boards were created. Nor was 
there any uniformity in the practice followed by the boards. In 
some places the bonus was abolished by the National War Labor 
Board and by the Administration for Labor Standards in Army 
Clothing; in others it was left undisturbed. The Conference 
Committee of Labor Adjustment Agencies recommended that 
bonuses "having the effect of interfering with established stand- 
ards of compensation should be abolished" and the Fuel Admin- 
istration, on the ground that such was the effect of bonuses in 
the coal mining industry, tried very hard to abolish them. In 
this, however, the Fuel Administration does not seem to have 
been successful. In general, the insistence of employers on the 

1 General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, testified before the House 
Committee on Military Affairs, that arsenal workers who retapped 
100 — 4.7 shells in ten hours, when paid on a premium system, required 
22.95 hours for the same work when paid at an hourly rate. 



210 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

maintenance of bonus and piecework prevailed and these systems 
were as a rule left undisturbed during the war. 1 There was, how- 
ever, a very general agreement among wage boards that piece 
rates once established should not be reduced during the war and 
the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Boards required every ship- 
yard to post a notice to this effect in a conspicuous place in the 
yard. 2 

1 Perhaps the most important case in which the bonus was abolished 
was that of the Bethlehem Steel Company, National War Labor 
Board Docket No. 22. The Board found that "the main cause of 
dissatisfaction is a bonus system so complicated and difficult to under- 
stand that almost one-half of the time of the hearings was consumed 
in efforts to secure a clear idea of the system." The hearings did 
show very plainly that the company was using the bonus unfairly, 
especially in relation to overtime and that if both bonus and overtime 
had been earned only one of them would be paid. 

2 A number of strikes occurred in which the abolition of piece rates 
was one of the demands, but in no case with which the writer is 
familiar was this demand granted. 



WAGES 211 



WAGE CHARTS 



The following charts showing the course of money wages and 
real wages from December, 19 14, to December, 19 19, were pre- 
pared for this book by the Bureau of Applied Economics, Wash- 
ington, D. C, and are based on data collected by the U. S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Interstate Commerce Commission, 
U. S. Railroad Administration, Navy Department, Shipbuilding- 
Labor Adjustment Board, and the U. S. Shipping Board, supple- 
mented by material gathered from other sources. With the ex- 
ception of marine and railroad employees, hourly rates rather 
than earnings are shown, as they are a better gauge of wage 
changes, not being affected by overtime or unemployment. 

The cost of living figures used are those of the U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics as published in the October, 1920, Labor 
Review, converted to a base of December, 1914. 

Unweighted averages have been used except in the iron and 
steel industry and for marine employees. In the steel industry, 
because of the great variation in the rates and the number of 
employees, a weighting system seemed desirable, and each occu- 
pation was weighted by the number of employees in 19 19. For 
marine employees, data were available for the Atlantic and Gulf 
coasts only and the averages were weighted. As the Atlantic and 
Gulf wage rate is intermediate between the Pacific and Trans- 
Atlantic it may be taken as fairly representative of the whole 
industry. 

Since 19 18 shipyard rates have been substantially uniform. 
Prior to 1918 the West Coast had considerably higher rates and 
obtained a lesser per cent of increase during the war. In prepar- 
ing the chart for the shipyards an average has been taken of the 
wage rates on the East and West Coasts. 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, MONTHLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— MARINE 

EMPLOYEES 



Sfer 

Cent 
i*0 


a- 


— 1 

IS 


.5 „ 


16 19 


L7 IS 


ia 19 


a 


i*n 












H&uey vr&ge 


1*70 










/ 
/ 

/ 
/ 




1SQ 










/ 

/ 
/ 
/ 




im 










/ 

/ 




mo 










/ 
/ 

/ 

■ 




90 








) 
/ 
/ 
/ 




asuf 


ao 








/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 




1 


70 








/ 
/ 

/ 






60 








/ / 

/ / 






«sfi 






/ 

/ 
/ 
/ 








40 






/ 

/ 
/ 

/ 
/ 








30 






/ 

/ / 
/ X 
/ / 








20 




/ 

/ 






^ 


Real Vai© 


10 




/ 
/ 

/ >^ 




— — "■ , 


r 




O 
















10 














50 





























212 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, MONTHLY RATE, 
DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 19 19— RAILROADS 



to 


U is 


15 IS 


11 
IS 15 


17 isia is 


19 


loo 














00 










, 


Cost ©f 
Living 


ftO 










/ 


"&<msyWa|e 


TO 












eo 








// 


y 




RO 








/ / 

/ / 
/ / 






40 








// 






30 








/ V 

/ 

/ 
/ 






ao 






/^ > 


/ 
f 






10 



















-^- 


s 








10 




\ 






^■-^ 


HtalVfege 


20 














































































1 





213 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— IRON 

AND STEEL 



COAt 
1KQ 


S* 19 


L5 IS 


16 19 


17 19 


18 IB 


5 


12.0 








/ 
/ 




Money Wa£e 


110 








/ 
/ 

1 

1 






100 








1 

1 
1 






&G 








l 
1 

1 




Cost of 


80 








i 
1 

1 
1 






TO 








1 
1 
1 






fiO 






1 
/ 

/ 


J 






SO 






/ 
/ 

/ 








40 






/ 
/ 








%Q 








y 


V 




SO 






/ / 

f / - 








10 






( / 




> 


HealWa^e 







/v 


/ 
/ 








10 


'■^JSfcSIjJ 












ao 














30 











































214 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 
DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 19 19— SHIPYARDS 





L 

H IS 


15 U 


1I6 1! 


IT 


u 


1 

16 1$ 


1 

19 


140 








/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 




• Money Wige 


130 








/ 
/ 

/ 


/ 






1M 








/ 

/ 
f 






110 






~1 
/ 
/ 








1QO 






/ 
1 
1 








90 






r ' 

i 

1 






Cost of 

Living 


80 






1 
/ 








70 






/ 
/ 








60 






/ 


V / 






50 






/ / 


V 






40 






■/ 


A 


V 




30 


1 

tj 
u 


v 


/ / 




\ 




20 




\ 


/ / 




S 


RttlWgft 


10 





























lO 














1LQ 





























215 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— NAVY 

YARDS 



a 

C«nt 


R « 


15 1! 


IS IS 


117 11 


1a is 


19 


160 














90 










/ 


Cost of 

Living 


80 










/ 




TO 










/ 


-Ha&fcY Vfese 


SO 










• 
• 

• 
• 




KO 








X 


• 
• 




40 








/ / 

/ • 






^O 








• 

/ 
/ 






90 














10 




/ 


f / 








» 




^-1 










10 




^.^ 










2.0 












Real Wage 


SO 







































































216 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— METAL 

TRADES 



I 

Cent 


«4 1 


l 1 

315 X 


m ii 


HT 1 


1 1 

>18 1 


1 

>19 


«2-r„ 














so 












coat of 
Living 


An 










/ / 


Money Wa^e 


70 










X / 

X / 
X / 
X / 




60 










/ 

/ 
/ 

/ 












/ 7 


/ 




40 








/ ' 
/ / ' 






30 








/ 
/ 

/ 






20 








/ 

/ 
I 






10 




y 


* 













y£--~~ 


S 








10 




^^ 


> "^- 




^^— 


R*alWt$e 


ftO 














fiti 







































































217 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— BOOTS 

AND SHOES 



19; 
Per 


,. - 


15 IS 


1 

16 19 


17 IS 


18 IB 


-Mousy V&ie — 


,„ IQP 










/ 
/ 

/ 
/ 

* 


90 










t 
/ 


Cost of 


po 








1 

/ 


/ / 




,,. 7P 








/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 






, *9 








1 / 
I / 






,, so 








1 / 
/ / 






40 








1/ 

1/ 






. £9 






/ / 








fco 




y 


,' / 








10 






/ 











s* 










Rt«lVfe£o 


10 














„ fc° 






• 








SQ 
























































1 













218 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— BUILDING 

TRADES 


Iter 
Cent 


jBr is 


15 U 


16 IS 


17 1? 


18 1? 


19 


1W., 














aa., 










> 


Cost of 
Living 


;•. - M. 










/ 




JR. 










/ 




. ,-M. 














5Q 














40, 










/ 
• 
/ 

/ 




80, 










/ 
/ 
/ 

/ 




20 








-/ 


/ 




IQ. 








* 











/— 


_^^"" 








19. 




\. 










*o 






\ 

\ 








30 








■"..^^ 


-~~r~ 


Real Vfetfe 



























































219 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— 

LONGSHOREMEN 



Cent 
120 


ft * 




15 IS 


16 li 


17 * 


18 I! 


19 


110 










t 
/ 


Money Vbge 


too 










/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 




SO 










/ 
/ 


Cost of 
Living 


no 








/ 


7 / 




70 










/ 




«o 








^ 






KO 








/ 






40 








// 






30 








' / 
/ 
/ 
/ 






3.0 








/ 

/ 
/ 






10 




/ 


/ / 






Heal Wa«e 


O 




^- J 


s 

s 


S 






W 




c \ 




/ 
/ 






20 







































































220 



MONEY WAGES AND REAL WAGES, HOURLY RATE, 

DECEMBER, 1914, TO DECEMBER, 1919— PRINTING 

AND ELECTROTYPING 



I 

1 

Per 
C«nt 


314 


xj 


U5 I 


16 1 


»17 1 


118 i 


19 




100 
















QO 












Co&t of 
Living 




ao 
















TO 
















60 
















so 
















40 
















so 










/ 


Mon^yWag* 




20 










• 
• 
• 
• 






10 
















Q 




S 


-— 


^» ^ 








10 
















9.0 




^> 












Xft 






^ 


\ 




-MlWgtf 












\ v 


-— *** 





















































221 



PART THREE 

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF INDUSTRIAL 

UNREST 



CHAPTER XVI 
The Employer 

We have already referred to the position many employers took 
toward labor unions; the following chapters will be devoted to a 
more detailed examination of the attitudes of capital and labor 
toward each other and toward the Government, as well as the at- 
titude of the public toward all three. Examples of extreme an- 
tagonism between capital and labor will be examined, not because 
they by any means represent the attitude of all or even of most 
employers or employees, but because they show the point of view 
of substantial numbers, and are so divergent and bitter that they 
should be carefully studied. If no way can be found to compose 
these antagonisms, the consequences may prove disastrous to the 
future prosperity of our country. 

A strange contrast is afforded by the position taken by em- 
ployers when acting collectively through their associations, and 
the position taken by many of their most prominent members 
when dealing individually with their own employees. As a rule, 
employers' associations took fairly liberal attitudes toward labor, 
and at their national meetings offered unstinted cooperation with 
the Government in its labor policy. Both the United States 
Chamber of Commerce and the National Industrial Conference 
Board, which between them represent a very large part of the 
financial and industrial resources of America, advocated Govern- 
ment arbitration of labor disputes, and the National Manufac- 
turers' Association passed a resolution indorsing the principles of 
the Taft-Walsh Board. 

In striking contrast to the position of these powerful associa- 
tions was the attitude taken by many of their members, whose 
hostility to organized labor in their own plants, and whose un- 
willingness when dealing with their own employees to accede to 
the Government's suggestions, seriously hampered the adminis- 
tration in its war labor program. 

225 



226 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Even with the war at its height the Lake Carriers' Association 
would not attend a meeting of the Shipping Board, at which em- 
ployers from all over the country were present, because repre- 
sentatives of the Seamen's Union attended. The reason for this 
refusal was the claim that to sit in the same room with union 
representatives would constitute recognition. In New York the 
boat owners would not accept the Government's plan of local ad- 
justment agencies because this involved a board on which a rep- 
resentative of the Longshoremen's Union would be a member; a 
special board had to be created with no representation of either 
employer or employee. 1 At San Francisco the same attitude pre- 
vented any Government arbitration of longshoremen's disputes. 

The Western Union Telegraph Company preferred to have the 
Government take over the wires rather than tolerate union mem- 
bership among its employees, and this same position was taken 
by the Smith & Wesson Company, of Springfield, Massachu- 
setts. The President's Mediation Commission found opposition 
to unions the chief cause of unrest in the packing industry, and 
attributed the growth of the I. W. W. on the Pacific Coast, in 
great measure, to the same cause. 

These are some of the most striking examples of employers' 
opposition to even conservative labor unions. They could be 
multiplied indefinitely. Toward the I. W. W., which in general 
estimation stands on quite another plane than the A. F. of L., the 
opposition was almost universal, and led to very much greater 
excesses. These will be dealt with separately in a later chapter. 

Many employers were also much opposed to any form of col- 
lective bargaining. The Bridgeport manufacturers objected to 
the award of the National War Labor Board, claiming that they 
had submitted to the board the question of wages only and that 
the board had no right to compel them to bargain collectively 
with their employees. The Bethlehem Steel Company maintained 
its opposition to collective bargaining in spite of the efforts of 
Government mediators to induce them to accept it. After other 
Government agencies had failed to prevent strikes at the Bethle- 
hem plant the National War Labor Board took up the case, held 
hearings and found the absence of collective bargaining to be one 

1 One of the New York employers at a conference with the Shipping 
Board said: "If we have a union harbor, God knows what will 
happen." 



THE EMPLOYER 227 

of the most potent causes for a condition of unrest that was 
seriously delaying the company's production of war material. 
After numerous attempts to evade putting the board's rulings into 
effect the company was finally induced to change its position and 
to introduce a system of collective bargaining satisfactory to the 
National War Labor Board. 1 

The Phelps-Dodge Company, replying to a letter of the Presi- 
dent's Mediation Commission requiring the company to bargain 
collectively with its employees and not to discriminate against 
men for union membership, said that they considered such plans 
unnecessary and contrary to their best judgment. "But since we 
have no alternative in the matter, we shall endeavor to carry 
out your wishes in the spirit as well as the letter." 

With respect to the attitude of employers toward the effort 
of workers to procure better wages and conditions, by strikes or 
by other means, we find repeated a number of peace-time assump- 
tions, without any realization of how erroneous these assumptions 
often were in normal times, and how much more so in times of 
war. 

In the first place, employers usually believed that "their men 

1 On December 6, 1918, the joint Chairman of the War Labor 
Board wrote to E. G. Grace, President of the Bethlehem Steel Com- 
pany, in part as follows : 

"Your letter, in our opinion, amounts to a refusal to apply the find- 
ings of the National War Labor Board or to respect its authority, 
on the ground that hostilities have ceased. . . . 

"This action by your company presents a situation of grave im- 
portance to the nation. Last July when the outcome of the war 
was hanging in the balance, upon the representation of officials of the 
War Department that conditions in the Bethlehem Steel Company 
were gravely endangering the successful prosecution of the war and 
in order that our troops might not be left short of guns and amuni- 
tion the War Labor Board exerted every resource to keep the em- 
ployees of the Bethlehem Steel Company at work. . . . 

"You personally agreed to the installation of a system of collective 
bargaining satisfactory to the board and under the supervision of 
the board's examiners. You now wish to repudiate that system 
of collective bargaining and ask that the board's examiners be 
withdrawn. . . . 

"This is a question of the good faith of your company and of the 
Government itself. If the award of the board should now be re- 
pudiated, your workmen would have every right to feel that they 
had been deceived and grossly imposed upon by your company, by 
the War Labor Board and by the other officials of the Government 
who prevailed upon them to remain at work in the assurance that 
they would be justly dealt with." 



228 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

were satisfied," that there was no danger of serious strikes, that 
any trouble with their workers would be the result of the actions 
of a few "agitators." Was there any labor adjuster in any part 
of the country who did not hear these statements repeated over 
and over again? The writer has gone from a meeting with em- 
ployers where these statements were made, to a union meeting 
seething with bitterness and unrest, where the "agitators" most 
bitterly complained of were, as a matter of fact, the least radical 
of a large group of dissatisfied and protesting workers. He has 
left a factory where the management assured him there was not 
the least danger of a strike and before he could get back to his 
office one department of this very factory (unorganized at that) 
had struck; hundreds of men quickly followed suit. 

In Arizona, the scene of some of the bitterest industrial war- 
fare, the employers in the early days of the war assured the Coun- 
cil of National Defense (which was trying to arrange for arbitra- 
tion in case of trouble) that there was no danger of strikes. With- 
in a short time thousands of men had stopped work. 

These cases are typical of hundreds of others. Moreover, when 
strikes occurred the employers not infrequently accused the men 
of profiteering and disloyalty. The strikers were "stealing car- 
tridges from the boys on the other side." When the employers 
made these charges they frequently ignored well-founded griev- 
ances of the men, their own unwillingness to arbitrate and in cer- 
tain cases their own provocative actions. 

There were some strikes — many of them — that were unneces- 
sary, that should not have occurred, and that are strongly to be 
condemned. But most strikes were the result of the failure of 
employers to advance wages in keeping with the increased cost 
of living, and to make other concessions which were demanded 
both by abstract justice and by the strategic strength of labor. 
The abuse and condemnation which greeted strikes that were 
justifiable simply added to the resentment of the workers. If 
the men, especially the better paid ones, asked for increases in 
wages larger than the increased cost of living they were roundly 
denounced as profiteers. And yet these demands were simply for 
wages commensurate with those already paid by aggressive em- 
ployers, who, having profitable contracts, were bidding up wages 
to get men. In a word, the demands were for the equalization of 
the wage scale in a given industry; and often the requests of the 



THE EMPLOYER 229 

men had already been granted by a Government board to other 
workers doing similar jobs in some other branch of the Govern- 
ment service. 

In judging of the reasonableness of the employers' condemna- 
tory attitude, when men asked for increases greater than just 
enough to cover increased living costs, the reader must bear in 
mind that it is impossible for a workman to improve his condition 
in slack times when labor is plentiful; at such times he is laid 
off with little thought of what idleness may mean to him and his 
family, and unless protected by a labor union he will, if he keeps 
his employment at all, almost invariably face a reduction in 
wages. The worker's opportunity comes when men are scarce and 
work is plentiful. Then he can strike successfully and improve 
his condition. If under these circumstances he asks for the eight- 
hour day in an industry which has lagged behind by not having 
established it, or if his demands for wage increases are somewhat 
more than the exact rise in the cost of living, the writer fails to 
see that such conduct is to be condemned. It takes two sides to 
make a strike; the men who make demands, and the employer 
who refuses them. The general attitude during the war was to 
hold the employee responsible for the occurrence of strikes, with- 
out taking into consideration the fact that the employer played 
an active part in causing them by refusing to grant the demands 
of the men. The apportionment of blame ought to have been 
determined by the reasonableness of the demands, and not by the 
mere fact of the occurrence of the strike. And the question of 
reasonableness frequently depended upon the justice of pre-war 
wages, hours, and conditions. 

Employers would often ask, "What is going to be the attitude 
of the returning soldier, who has been facing death at the front 
for $30.00 a month and his keep, while his comrades at home 
have been out of danger and making big money? What is he 
going to say to you fellows when he gets back?" A labor leader 
answered this query in the writer's presence by asking the em- 
ployer what the returning soldier would say about the employer's 
p-ofits. If the employers had abandoned profits during the war — 
because of the sacrifice which was being made by the "boys at the 
front" — they might have been in a position to chide the workers for 
asking for higher wages. It seems incredible that men who were 
tiying to make just as much money out of the war as they pos- 



230 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

sibly could should not have realized the irony involved in their 
attitude of deprecating wage increases because of the feelings of 
the men at the front. The workers also gave the other obvious 
answer that the jobs awaiting the returning soldiers were going 
to be just that much better, because, through the insistence of 
those who stayed at home — either by means of strikes or other- 
wise — the eight-hour day was being extended, wages were keeping 
pace, more or less, with the rising living costs, and general con- 
ditions were improved. All this meant that the soldiers who had 
risked their lives at the front would return to conditions more 
nearly approximating those ideals of democracy for which they 
had fought. 

Charges of corruption were also not uncommon — "enemy prop- 
aganda"; "enemy money"; "disloyalty." Many a labor adjust- 
ing board found that bitterness and antagonism were intensified 
by employers raising the "false issue of loyalty." Undoubtedly 
there were labor troubles induced by enemy influence, and also 
cases in which enemy propaganda was a factor. These, however, 
were probably very few in number; and yet hardly a strike oc- 
curred but the employer felt — and frequently said — that the 
strikers were disloyal and probably corrupt. 1 

In certain places where the I. W. W. was at all active there 
was likewise an attempt to connect any labor dispute with that 
organization and as such to brand it as revolutionary, "un-Ameri- 
can," and Socialistic. Many strikes were thus condemned, even 
though started by unorganized men or by members of unions af- 
filiated with the American Federation of Labor; and in some cases 

1 In the New York harbor strike hearing, before the National War 
Labor Board, January, 1919, the attorney for the shipowners called 
upon the unions to produce their books, "particularly those showing 
money from German sources." The opinion of Judge George W. 
Anderson as to the truth of most accusations of this kind is quoted 
in the New Republic for January 28, 1920, at page 251 as follows: 
"As United States Attorney from November, 1914, to October, 1917, 
I was charged with a large responsibility as to protecting the com- 
munity from pro-German plots. In October I went on the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission, and was until the armistice in intimate 
personal association with the Attorney General. . . . Now, I assert 
as my best judgment, grounded on the information that I can get, 
that more than ninety-nine per cent of the advertised and reported 
pro-German plots never existed. I think it is time that publicity be 
given to this view" 



THE EMPLOYER 231 

they were ruthlessly suppressed in the manner deemed fitting for 
"outlaw" organizations. 

There was also a tendency to accuse strike leaders of selfish- 
ness, of thinking more of their own power, prestige, and salaries, 
than of the national welfare. , These same accusations were made 
before the war, and have been made since. They may be success- 
ful in prejudicing the public, irrespective of their truth — they 
certainly increased bitterness among the men. 1 

Moreover, there was a disposition on the part of employers who 
indulged in any form of welfare work to lay stress upon such 
work in dealing with strike committees. In presenting their 
side of the case to labor adjusting agencies, group insurance, a 
sanitary factory, a fine lunch room, would be given prominence, 
when the workers were demanding that wages keep up with living 
costs, or that the eight-hour day be extended to their industry. 
The testimony of wage adjusting boards is full of examples of 
this kind, the only effect of which was to prejudice the workers 
against all forms of welfare work. 

The one attitude of the employers with which the writer is in 
closer sympathy is the universal condemnation of the workers' 
inefficiency. 2 When all allowances are made, the impartial ob- 
server cannot escape the conclusion that in many cases there was 
an inexcusable slacking on the part of the men. While the na- 
tion was suffering for want of production, hundreds of thousands 
of workers lay down on their jobs and did just as little work as 
they could "get away with." This form of sabotage — not always 
deliberate perhaps — together with a considerable number of un- 
justifiable strikes, were the two things at which the employer's re- 
sentment was most legitimate. 

What was the employer's attitude toward the Government labor 
administration? 

There was quite a wide divergence of opinion, depending some- 
what on the employer's previous relations with his workers, his 
attitude toward organized labor, and somewhat, too, upon his 
opinion as to his ability to defeat a strike. 

Shortly before our entrance into the war, and much to the dis- 
gust of many employers, the Government had granted to the Rail- 
road Brotherhoods the eight-hour day. In order to avoid a na- 

*It goes without saying that in some cases these charges were true. 
8 See Chapter XV. 



232 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

tion-wide railroad strike, Congress at the request of the President 
went so far as to enact into law the men's demands for a shorter 
day. 1 And as part of our war preparation the President of the 
American Federation of Labor had been appointed a member of 
the Council of National Defense and Chairman of its labor com- 
mittee. It soon became evident that the Government intended to 
ask not only for the cooperation of big business in its prosecu- 
tion of the war, but also for that of organized labor. When it 
was realized that the latter was to be given representation on 
wage boards, and that to a very great extent union standards were 
to be adopted, the natural distrust with which many business men 
looked upon the Government was very much increased. 

In the pre-war period when labor was plentiful strikes were 
not very much feared, and there was little understanding by many 
employers of how different the conditions were during the war. 
Comparatively little systematic arbitration of industrial differ- 
ences (except in a few industries) had been practiced in this coun- 
try prior to our entry into the war. The employer, infinitely less 
wise in his dealings with labor than in the management of any 
other part of his business, was accustomed to handle labor dis- 
putes in his own way, without interference by the Government or 
other outside source. 

Consequently the largest employers were sometimes bitterly 
opposed to any intervention by the Government in their disputes 
with their workers. Especially did they resent the Government's 
policy of forbidding discharges for union membership (a prohibi- 
tion which, as we have seen elsewhere, was frequently violated). 
Indeed, there was a feeling that labor was actually being coddled 
and that the motive of the Government was in part at least politi- 
cal. One frequently heard it said that it was easy enough to deal 
with labor if you gave it all it wanted. There was apparently 
no general realization that the war had placed in the hands of the 
workers a new power and above all a realization of their new 
strength, and that the old method of fighting out industrial dis- 
putes was an impossible one during the war, entailing unthinkable 

a It is interesting to note that many employers at the present time 
believe that this action on the part of Congress, which was and is 
described by them as cowardly yielding to the labor unions, is the 
most important factor in present extensive labor unrest. 



THE EMPLOYER 233 

delays, added bitterness, increased inefficiency, and in the end 
almost certain defeat for the employer. 

When exasperated by inefficiency, by the heavy labor turnover, 
and by strikes, the final quarrel of the business man with the 
Government's labor policy was due to the administration's un- 
willingness to conscript labor. "If men can be conscripted for 
the army, if we can send them to the front to face privations 
and death, why cannot the Government conscript labor for war 
industry?" This question was asked thousands of times — pub- 
licly and privately, officially and unofficially. 

The distinction between conscription for the army, where men 
were directly serving the Government, and conscription for private 
industry, where men would have been forced to work for private 
profit, was absolutely ignored. To be sure, workers in war in- 
dustries were indirectly helping the Government, but they felt 
that primarily they were working for the profit of the employer. 
Time and again the men took the position, "Let the Government 
be our direct employer, and our attitude will be quite different; 
and if necessary, we will work for thirty dollars a month. We 
are perfectly willing that you conscript labor, if you will also 
conscript capital." It was lost sight of that the industrial con- 
flicts which took place during the war were between the worker 
and the private employer. The public might suffer, but just as 
the employer blamed this upon the worker, so the worker in turn 
put the responsibility upon the employer. 

Employers also felt that if men went on strike they should 
lose their draft exemption, and as a consequence the draft boards 
were used in many places for the purpose of intimidation and to 
break up strikes. This is a serious charge, but the writer does not 
see how an impartial observer can come to any other conclusion. 
The special district committees which had jurisdiction over ques- 
tions of industrial exemption were composed largely of lawyers 
and business men. The rules provided that if a worker had been 
granted exemption from the draft on the ground of his industrial 
need to the community and thereafter left his job, it was the duty 
of the employer to notify the draft board of this fact. This was 
a perfectly proper rule as far as it related to the ordinary sever- 
ance of employment. The trouble was that if there was talk of 
a strike, the employer would threaten the worker with the revoca- 
tion of draft exemption, and immediately upon the occurrence of 



234 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

a strike would notify the draft board that the men had left his 
employment. Thereupon, the board would quickly put him back 
in class i-A and the man would in a few -days be taken to camp. 
In most cases the draft boards knew perfectly well that the man 
had not permanently left his employment, but that he was taking 
part in a strike. Both employer and draft board must have 
known that industrial draft exemption was given solely because 
the services of the worker were more valuable in industry than in 
the army, and yet they caused highly skilled men to be inducted 
into the service, who a short time before these very employers 
had stated were essential to a war industry. 1 This misuse of 

*One of the grievances of the men, presented to the War Labor 
Board, in the Bridgeport case was coercion of the workers by means 
of the draft board. In support of this charge, the men produced the 
following order: 

"American Can Company, 
"Liberty Ordnance Plant, 
"Union Avenue, 

"Bridgeport, Conn., June 28, 1918. 
"This plant employs a number of men who have received ex- 
emption or deferred classification on account of the value of their 
services in the production of munitions or guns. Any of these men 
who walk out in this crisis will automatically forfeit such classifica- 
tion and their local board will receive immediate advice to that 
effect. Every assurance has been given that these men will at once 
be placed in class i-A of the draft and that further exemption at 
this or any other plant, will be refused. 

"BY DIRECTION OF THE ACTING CHIEF OF ORDNANCE: 

"C F. Hepburn, 
"Captain, O. R. C" 

The above order was posted on the bulletin board of the American 
Can Company and it is claimed that the foreman stated, "If you 
fellows go out at 12 o'clock to-day, your draft exemption will be 
taken away and you will be in camp in a week." The workers also 
introduced in evidence an article in a Bridgeport paper, issued at the 
time of the strike, as follows: "Munition workers employed at the 
Remington Arms and other places, who have been placed in a de- 
ferred classification as registrants for the draft, by local boards, will 
be placed in Class i-A if they go out on strike, according to a decision 
made yesterday by one of the city draft boards. It is probable that 
all of the other boards will take similar action." 

"The decision to change the classification of munition workers 
who go out on strike thus violating their industrial value to _ the 
government, was made yesterday, upon the application of a machinist 
at the Remington Arms to determine his status if he went out in the 
strike which is threatening." 

Complaints were made by the workers in many parts of the 
country that a position similar to the one outlined above was taken 



THE EMPLOYER 235 

the draft law was repeatedly called to the attention of the au- 
thorities in Washington and yet no definite orders seem to have 
been issued to correct this abuse. 

by employers and draft boards in their districts. The International 
Seamen's Union claimed that the Lake Carriers' Association was using 
methods of intimidation to prevent the men from striking and quoted 
from a bulletin issued by the Association which, referring to seamen 
of draft age, stated : 'The government's selective service regulations 
absolutely require that these men stuck (sic) to their job." The union 
points out to its members that this statement is false and goes on 
to say: "Your classification as seamen is for the purpose of enabling 
you to do your duty — your war duty — to the United States as seamen ; 
it is not for the purpose of compelling you to submit to the Lake 
Carriers' Association or to any other private employer. . . . Why 
does the Lake Carriers' Association circulate false statements among 
seamen in these critical times?" 



CHAPTER XVII 
The Worker 

It has already been pointed out that the worker's demands 
were generally confined to such conservative claims as improve- 
ment in working conditions, increases in wages, the eight-hour 
day, and the right of collective bargaining and of organization into 
trade unions. For the most part, demands for the closed shop, 
the forty-four-hour week, and for any radical industrial changes 
were during the period of the war waived by the workers, partly 
under Government pressure and partly under patriotic impulse. 

The power of labor had been increasing even before the out- 
break of the European war. A decided impetus was given to this 
growth of power by the labor shortage produced by the war, and 
by the dependence of the warring countries upon industrial forces, 
of which labor was the most important. Our American labor 
leaders had not failed to see the recognition which in European 
countries (especially the one closest to us, England) had increas- 
ingly been given to their industrial classes. It was therefore not 
strange that with the imminence of our entry into the war the 
feeling on the part of our labor leaders — that labor was entitled 
to play a new and most important part in our national affairs — 
should have become definitely crystallized. It found expression 
in the March 9, 191 7, resolutions 1 of the American Federation 
of Labor wherein it was demanded that the workers be given 
representation on national boards "coequal with that given to 
any other part of the community." 

This desire for adequate representation became all the more 
insistent because the men believed that the vigilance which was 
needed in ordinary times to protect their rights would have to be 
redoubled in war times in order to prevent standards from being 
lowered. Their new consciousness of power made them all the 

1 March 9, 1917, Conference of the American Federation of Labor, 
reported in the American Federationist for April, 1917. 

236 



THE WORKER 237 

more determined to protect their rights from the encroachments 
which in the past had accompanied times of violent disturbance 
of a national or an international kind. They believed that to 
"establish at home justice in the relation of men ..." was a 
fundamental part of the preparedness of the nation. They as- 
serted that "conditions of work and pay in Government employ- 
ment and in all occupations should conform to principles of 
human welfare and justice." x 

During the Civil War the workers fared bady. 2 There was 
a determination not only that this should not take place during 
this war, 3 but a desire in many quarters to better working condi- 
tions as much as was consistent with the war emergency. 

This was exemplified by the fact that at all hearings before 
labor boards the workers demanded that wages keep pace with 
the increased living costs, and at many of them they not only 
made this demand but enlarged upon it, stating quite frankly that 
they realized that labor was scarce and that this was their oppor- 
tunity substantially to improve their condition. When the war 
was over labor would once more be plentiful, employment would 
be difficult to find. 4 This, therefore, was their chance. Further- 
more, the enormous increase in the earnings of large corporations 
was well known, and the men believed that there was a fortune in 

1 Ibid A "Wage earners in war times must keep one eye on em- 
ployers at home, the other on the enemy threatening the National 
Government." 

a See E. D. Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North 
During the Civil War. 

8 "All previous wars of magnitude have been accompanied by 
terrible financial suffering among the mass of the people. One of their 
most frequent results — a social injury enduring for a whole genera- 
tion — has been the degradation of the standard of life among the 
wage earners. The last war waged by the United Kingdom on 
anything like the scale of the present Armaggeddon — the Napoleonic 
Conflict that lasted almost unceasingly from 1793 to 1815 — reduced the 
British working class to a very general destitution, exhausted popular 
savings, filled the prisons, put 10% of the whole population on the 
pauper roll, brought down wages to the barest subsistence level, and 
destroyed for many years every vestige of either industrial or political 
power among the wage-earning classes." Sidney Webb in The North 
American Review for June, 1917, p. 877. 

"This fear proved up to the summer of 1920 to have been un- 
founded. Owing partly to a cessation of immigration and to an 
enormous industrial activity caused by an abnormally large home 
demand, coupled with decreased production due to strikes and less- 
ened efficiency of the individual workers, there did, in fact, develop 
a marked labor shortage. 



238 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

every war contract. War prosperity was general and, as they ex- 
pressed it, they wanted to get "theirs." 1 

A further example of the workers' determination not entirely 
to forego the opportunity for their improvement which the war 
afforded was illustrated by their desire to receive protection from 
many large emplo}^ers with their policy of ruthless discharge solely 
on account of union membership. This desire was also the result 
of the feeling that if they were to give up demands for the 
closed shop, they should receive something in return. Nor did 
they hesitate, under the protection extended to them by the Gov- 
ernment against discrimination, to do their utmost to increase 
trade union membership and to organize the men in establish- 
ments where the spread of the unions had been previously pre- 
vented by the aggressive opposition of the employers. 

Furtherfore, in addition to seeking the spread of trade union- 
ism, they also, in sharp contrast to the English workers, insisted 
upon the maintenance of trade union customs. In England, 
shortly after the outbreak of the war, these customs were aban- 
doned by the unions upon the promise of the Government to re- 
store them upon the return of peace. This action of English 
trade union leaders was, however, the cause of much dissatisfac- 
tion and unrest among the men. Perhaps because of the realiza- 
tion of how unpopular this renunciation had been in that country- 
no such general waiver of trade union practices took place in the 
United States. In fact, there were cases in which the men in- 
sisted most unreasonably upon the maintenance of customs that 
greatly retarded production. An example of this was the action 
of the ship caulkers on the Pacific Coast (already referred to), 
whose rules narrowly restricting the employment of apprentices 
prevented for many months the training of an adequate number 
of men. An exception to this policy was the ready acquiescence 
by the unions in the Government's inducting of women into in- 
dustry to take the place of the men at the front. 2 

*As we have seen in a previous chapter, wages did not on the 
average increase to any "greater extent than did the cost of living. 
However, in some industries, they did advance to a much greater 
extent. These extra large wage increases resulted from two causes 
—from the bidding up of wages by employers, and from the desire 
of the workers to share in war profits by taking advantage of the 
shortage of labor. 

2 They properly insisted, however, that in these cases the women 
receive equal pay for equal work, and they cooperated with the 



THE WORKER 239 

Yet taken by and large, the attitude of the workers, and of the 
union leaders who represented many of them, was usually reason- 
able and cooperative. There were, however, cases in which their 
demands and their actions were unreasonable in the extreme. If 
men were unjustly discharged, they were of course entitled to re- 
instatement. Nevertheless, protests against discharge were not 
confined to cases of injustice, but were extended to cases where 
the justice of the discharge was beyond a reasonable doubt. Not 
infrequently reinstatement would be demanded on behalf of men 
who had acted in such a manner as to make their dismissal es- 
sential to the preservation of discipline. The indignation of em- 
ployers against offenders of this kind was very much increased 
when the unions not only justified the offenses of the men but still 
sought in spite of them to have the men reinstated. 

Thus in the case of the Savannah Electric Company, heard by 
the National War Labor Board, reinstatement was asked for 
men, some of whom the Board found to have been guilty of vio- 
lence; others of cheating. 1 In another case, upon the occurrence 
of a strike, union leaders had ordered the men to remain at the 
benches but to do no work; the foreman demanded that the men 
either work or leave the factory. Upon the termination of the 
strike the representatives of the workers demanded the reinstate- 
ment of the men whose orders had been so subversive of all dis- 
cipline. The employer was unwilling to take the men back, and 
in this position was sustained by the National War Labor Board. 2 

In most instances, it should in fairness be pointed out, the lead- 
ers of the unions did not intentionally ask for the reinstatement 
of men who they had any reason to believe were not entitled to it, 
and these requests, when made, were as a rule promptly with- 
drawn when it appeared that the employer had been justified in 
his actions. 

Another respect in which the actions of labor leaders were not 
all that the Government desired was in the manner in which they 
represented the Government's attitude towards labor to the mem- 
bers of their unions and to workers whom they tried to persuade 
to join them. There was an earnest effort by all branches of the 

Department of Labor to prevent women from being assigned to tasks 
beyond their strength. 

National War Labor Board Docket, No. 748. 

3 National War Labor Board Docket, No. 231. Case of the General 
Electric Company. 

/ 



240 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Government to treat both employer and worker with absolute im- 
partiality, not favoring either one side or the other. It was ex- 
tremely important that an attitude of industrial neutrality be 
maintained and that it be understood by both sides that each 
would be treated fairly. And yet some of the local leaders in 
their organizing campaigns persistently sought to give the im- 
pression that the United States Government favored workers who 
were organized as against those who were not. The fact that the 
various boards had asked the unions for assistance in securing ad- 
ditional labor was presented to the men in an exaggerated light, 
and it was stated that the Government had "turned over to union 
officers the task of mobilizing the workers." 1 Anti-union em- 
ployers, who were themselves convinced that the Government was 
favoring organized labor, were irritated beyond measure by state- 
ments of this kind, making the work of conciliation all the more 
difficult. 

There was also not infrequently a lack of candor on the part of 
local leaders in representing to their constituents the principles 
of the Taft-Walsh Board — the policy that there should be no 
strikes often being deliberately glossed over. The principles of 
the War Labor Board as enunciated by the President commence 
with the statement, "there should be no strikes." In reprinting 
these principles for circulation among the men there were cases 
in which this statement was intentionally omitted. It must be 
stated that this was done by local, not by national, leaders, and 
was undoubtedly contrary to the wishes of the latter. 

In another chapter reference has been made to the resentment 
which the men felt at the frequent refusal of employers to meet 
the representatives of their unions. The Government insisted 
upon collective bargaining, that is to say, it compelled employers 
to meet committees of their own employees, as representatives of 
the men, and to discuss with them the adjustment of the difficul- 
ties in their individual plants. The reader must not confuse col- 

*In an advertisement inserted by the machinists' union of Newark, 
New Jersey — in the Newark Evening News of May 20. 1918 — the 
following sentence is used: "Uncle Sam has cast his lot with the 
wage-earner (the real American), and is playing the part of an 
organizer." • There is also a cartoon, with the caption "Uncle Sam 
and His Boys — Find the Favorite Son," which depicts two men sleep- 
ing blissfully in bed, one of them, Uncle himself, the other, union 
labor — meanwhile another man, who in this case is labeled "unor- 
ganized labor," occupies an unhappy position on the floor. 



THE WORKER 241 

lective bargaining with trade unionism, upon the first of which 
the Government insisted, but upon the second of which the rule 
was that no change would be forced during the war. Where an 
employer before the war had followed the practice of refusing to 
meet representatives of the union he would not be compelled to 
do so during the war. Many employers stood upon their rights 
in this matter, and continued to refuse to meet union representa- 
tives. 

This persistent refusal, while within the employers' rights, was 
unquestionably the source of much dissatisfaction and resentment 
among the workers, and where it occurred the settlement of dis- 
putes was made much more difficult. It is a curious fact that in 
some cases these very union leaders, whom the employers refused 
to meet, were more conservative than the men themselves in the 
shops, and this refusal to meet the leaders removed a strong con- 
ciliating force. 1 

The adage that extremes provoke extremes is well illustrated by 
our labor experience. In places where the employers were most 
reactionary, the most aggressive and radical labor leadership was 
to be found. This was true of Arizona mines and Northwest lum- 
ber camps as well as of cities like Bridgeport, Newark, and Chi- 
cago, where an excessive conservatism on the part of the employ- 
ers was, as is often the case, accompanied by labor leadership of 
the most fiery and extreme kind. 

Now if, as we have seen, the relations between the workers and 
their employers were in many cases strained, it is important to 
point out that, broadly speaking, the feelings of the men toward 
the Government were cordial. To be sure, there was often a 
belief that the Government was catering to big business. This 
belief was in specific cases based upon dissatisfaction with wage 

1 In one strike with which the writer was acquainted, through being 
an adjuster, the employers at first refused to meet union representa- 
tives. They met a strike committee, consisting of their own em- 
ployees and found it impossible to make any progress with them to- 
ward a settlement. After about a week of fruitless negotiations, 
they decided to meet with the representatives of the union, and at 
the first conference terms were agreed upon which resulted in settling 
the strike. The explanation for this result was twofold — the em- 
ployers by agreeing to meet the union representatives had by that one 
step removed one of the sources of dissatisfaction, and the union 
leaders, being in this case conservative and wanting to see produc- 
tion resumed, used their influence to induce the men to accept terms 
to which the more radical shop leaders had been opposed. 



242 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

awards and upon the actions of individual Government officials, 
many of whom in peace times had been employers, in some cases 
employers of the reactionary type. A further feeling of resent- 
ment arose from the fact that many cost plus contracts were 
awarded to corporations which had always been more or less un- 
friendly to organized labor, the men claiming that these com- 
panies, in a desire to avoid employing members of unions, dis- 
criminated against them to the extent of using common laborers 
to do the work of skilled artisans — and paying them skilled arti- 
sans' wages. It was also felt that these discriminatory tactics, 
which the men believed resulted in reckless waste of the Govern- 
ment's money, had the approval of certain Government officials. 
In spite of these causes for friction, and in spite of the opinion 
that the Government was subservient to big business — an opinion 
almost as widespread as the opinion (on the employers' side) that 
the Government was coddling labor — yet on the whole there was 
a general belief that the Government was doing its best to treat 
labor fairly, and, in fact, that it was pursuing a broad and liberal 
policy. 1 

Perhaps because of this general confidence that they would 
receive fair treatment from Government labor boards, the men 
during the war period were more willing to submit to arbitration 
than were the employers. A further explanation lies in the fact 
that it is almost always the worker who has the grievance. The 
employer is quite satisfied with the status quo; the worker is 
seeking to better his condition or to prevent it from becoming 
worse by reason of adverse changes in the cost of living. He 
therefore makes demands for higher wages and for other improved 

1 Report of the officers of the Railway Employees Department of 
the A. F. of L. to the Fourth Biennial Convention, April, 1918 
"We feel, however, that we are fortunate that Government control of 
railroads has been brought about under an administration which 
has been exceptionally fair to Labor, and ample assurance exists 
that dealing with our new employer will prove in many ways 
much more ^ preferable to our former relations with many officials 
whose varying moods, idiosyncrasies and prejudices sometimes oc- 
casioned avoidable friction and loss to both parties. 

At the 13th annual convention of the Building Trades Department 
of the A. F. of L. (page 101), a resolution was adopted in refer- 
ence to the Government's adjustments under the Baker-Gompers 
agreement "... While in all cases we did not meet with success, 
we have reason to feel that in the aggregate we were treated very 
fairly." 



THE WORKER 243 

conditions, which, if uncomplied with, must be either waived or 
enforced by Government intervention or by means of a strike. 
Consequently it is not unnatural that the initiative, when the in- 
tervention of Government mediation boards is sought, should 
come from the side which is looking for a change of conditions. 1 
While it is true that as a general rule labor was willing to ar- 
bitrate, there were cases in which there was a decided unwilling- 
ness to do so, because the men knew in advance from previous de- 
cisions of the boards that their demands would be refused. But 
these cases were exceptional. After all it must be realized that from 
the actual process of arbitration, labor derived a certain strength, 
for arbitration of itself inevitably implied a degree of recognition 
of trade unions — not recognition in the technical sense — but an 
acknowledgment of their existence and importance. The value of 
arbitration to the unions was augmented by the fact that the 
Government gave to organized labor representation on arbitra- 
tion boards and it is therefore not unnatural that labor should 
have welcomed this opportunity for public service together with 
the prominence which such service implied. 

*The records of both state and Federal labor boards substantiate 
this statement. See Monthly Bulletins for experience of the U. S. 
Labor Department, and also reports of the board of mediation for 
the railways (created by the Newlands Act), and finally, the records 
of the state labor boards. 



CHAPTER XVIII 
The Public 

Turning now to a consideration of the war-time attitude of 
the public toward both labor and capital, we are first of all im- 
pressed by the fact that at the outbreak of the war we did not 
possess any well-defined public policy toward labor. 1 In fact, 
there was so little comprehension of the problem that those in 
executive positions received practically no suggestions or in- 
telligent comment from either the press or Congress. An exami- 
nation of newspaper and magazine files, and of the Congressional 
Record for the entire period of the war will show how few help- 
ful suggestions or fruitful ideas in relation to the organization of 
an adequate labor administration or the proper handling of in- 
dustrial difficulties and disputes were forthcoming from these rep- 
resentatives of public opinion. The early declarations of the Coun- 
cil of Xational Defense, which, as we saw in a rather lengthy 
examination in Chapter XIII, contributed little to the creation of 
a sound labor policy, were greeted with a wealth of commendation 
out of all proportion to their usefulness or importance in the task 
of helping us to find a solution for the perplexities with which the 
nation's production problem was surrounded. Even among experts 

a The break-up of the President's first Industrial Conference was a 
result of the absence of any common meeting ground for capital 
and labor. It would have been harder for either side to maintain a 
position of irreconcilability, if there had existed a clear-cut public 
opinion. This, however, was lacking, just as during the war there 
was no common assent to any definite labor policy. During the war, 
on the other hand, patriotism demanded production, and when the 
Government announced a policy which seemed to further this end, jt 
received public endorsement. Both sides were thus compelled — in 
war-time — to accept the principles adopted by the Government. The 
war forced it to become a leader. But with the coming of peace 
the Government was unwilling or unable to take the lead. There was 
no unified opinion to take the place of the leadership which the Gov- 
ernment had abandoned, and consequently nothing to clarify the 
resulting confusion. 

244 



THE PUBLIC 245 

there were few who recognized the necessity for the development 
of a broad, unified labor administration, and there was not a 
suspicion of this need in editorial sanctums or on the floor of Con- 
gress. A few liberal weeklies, however, made suggestions of some 
value. 1 But editorials in the daily papers were of no use whatever. 
In Congress the debates displayed amazing ignorance of indus- 
trial conditions. During those early days, when it should have 
been apparent to the most inexperienced that the avoidance of 
industrial disputes was a vital part of any war program, appro- 
priations for the conciliation work of the labor department were 
refused on the ground that the settlement of strikes was a private 
and not a Government affair. 2 The report of the President's Me- 
diation Commission, one of the ablest labor documents produced 
during the war, was bitterly assailed in Congress. Throughout 
the discussions of measures for housing war workers, in the course 
of debates provoked by labor disputes, and in almost every case in 
which Congress attempted to discuss problems of labor or to pro- 
vide remedies for industrial evils, there was a total lack of con- 
structive statesmanship, and, in its place, prejudice and misunder- 
standing. Without any effort being made to determine whether 
or not the workers had just grievances, both in the press and in 
Congress there was a tendency to condemn them for the mere 
fact of striking. In numberless cases the men were blamed for 
stopping work, but in hardly a single case was fault found with 
the employer for his failure to grant reasonable demands. This 
was not so much because of prejudice against the workers, as be- 
cause of a feeling that the men should have stayed at work ir- 
respective of the existence of grievances. In most cases the jus- 

1 The New Republic of April 14, 1917: "With singular unanimity 
the press has magnified Gompers' recommendation that neither em- 
ployers nor employees shall endeavor to take advantage of the coun- 
try's necessities to change existing standards to a guarantee against all 
industrial unrest. Patriotic manifestos unsupported by definite ad- 
ministrative plans are no guarantee, since standards change daily as 
food costs mount . . . hence the Government should make them 
(wages) more flexible by creating joint conciliation committees to be 
provided with the power to make adjustments." Further sugges- 
tions are made as to how these committees should function. 

3 See V. E. Macy, Chairman Committee on Conciliation, Labor 
Committee of the Council of National Defense, and later of the 
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, in Proceedings of the 
Academy of Political Science for February, 1919, volume VIII, No. 2, 
page 92. 



246 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

tice of a strike was not considered ; its existence alone was enough 
to condemn it. 

Senator Thomas of Colorado, in addressing the Senate on April 
2, 191 8, said: "I contend that the man who incites a strike at 
this time — I do not care what his motives are — is an enemy to 
the United States and should be treated as such. I declare, Mr. 
President, deliberately, that the fomenters of strikes in our labor 
ranks are traitors to the country whose protection they invoke/* 

Senator Calder of New York, in February, 19 18, said: "I do 
not propose, Mr. President, that we shall kill men who stop work, 
but I propose that the men who stop work in Government plants 
during the war shall be denied the right of reemployment while 
the war exists . . . and I would say to them that they shall be 
required to take their places side by side with the American sol- 
diers in France who are struggling to uphold the honor and dig- 
nity of the nation." 

Did the members of Congress think that the labor problems 
with which the country was confronted — which had their roots in 
our entire industrial history, and which were complicated by the 
constantly rising cost of living and all the other causes of indus- 
trial unrest — were going to be solved by indiscriminate and un- 
thinking abuse of this kind? It is not too much to say that in 
the solution of the labor problems arising out of the war, the 
executive branch of the Government received practically no assist- 
ance from Congress. It was forced to create special technical 
boards, the members of which were drawn from the universities, 
the bar, and the ranks of business and labor — boards created 
without the sanction of Congress, and in most cases without its 
direct financial support. Not only did the executive branch in 
groping its way toward the formation of a definite policy fail to 
receive from Congress the assistance which it so much needed, 
but instead, the task of adjusting war-time difficulties and allay- 
ing industrial unrest was made all the harder by the lack of sym- 
pathy and perception in the utterances of our national legislator's. 
It is a striking fact that this same lack of helpfulness in the solu- 
tion of labor problems, which Congress displayed during the war, 
is still manifest to-day. This is especially unfortunate since the 
war mediating agencies, created by the executive, have been 
allowed to disappear without any effective effort having been 
made on the part of Congress to create substitutes, at a time 



THE PUBLIC 247 

when they have been so obviously needed, and at a time when 
permanent substitutes for these temporary boards might so readily 
have been created. Congress has been content to let labor af- 
fairs drift along unguided and uncontrolled. 

This lack of discrimination also showed itself in the press, in 
the manner in which strikes were condemned, without even con- 
sidering, in the apportionment of blame, so vital a factor as will- 
ingness to arbitrate. There were cases in which the men were will- 
ing to abide by the Government's decision as to the justice of 
their claims, but the employers were absolutely unwilling to do 
so, and the men did not go out until all reasonable efforts to secure 
arbitration had been exhausted. And yet even in these cases 
they were blamed for going out on strike. 1 

But much more serious than attitudes of prejudice against or- 
ganized labor or than indiscriminate abuse of the workers for 
strikes were editorials in the press and speeches in Congress con- 
doning and at times even advocating the use of violence against 
men who agitated for or indulged in strikes. At a time when 
feelings ran unusually high, when hysteria was sweeping over the 
world, when four years of war had unleashed the worst passions 
of men — at such a time as this it seems inexcusable that those to 
whom was entrusted the guidance of public opinion should have 
given utterances to expressions the only result of which must have 
been to augment passion and prejudice and to break down obe- 
dience to and respect for the law. 

And yet many editorials appeared in the daily press in all parts 
of the country similar to the following: "Even if our shipyards 
were placed under martial law, we still have flabby public opinion 
which would wring its hands if we took the labor leader by the 
scruff of the neck, backed him up against the wall and filled him 
with lead. Countries which consider themselves every bit as 
civilized as our own do not hesitate about such a matter for a 
moment." 

The I. W. W. publications and other radical organs made it a 
practice to republish and give wide publicity to these incitements 
to violence on the part of the conservative press, using this mate- 
rial for propaganda purposes. Thus Solidarity for July 17, 191 7, 
quotes the Freeport,, 111., Bulletin as saying that "any en- 

a The strike of the machinists in Newark in July, 1918, is an 
excellent example. See Chapter VII. 



248 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

deavor by the I. W. W. to prejudice the cause of the United 
States by fomenting strikes in the ore field should be met by 
hanging a few ringleaders to the nearest tree." From Godwin's 
Weekly, of Salt Lake City, the following is taken: "Unless the 
I. W. W. are branded as traitors and treated as such, the indig- 
nant citizen will take the situation in hand one of these days, and 
string up a few agitators of this contemptible cult without court 
procedure or any other form of ceremony." 1 The Tulsa Daily 
World for November 9, 191 7, is quoted from as follows: "Any 
man who attempts to stop the supply for one-hundredth part of 
a second is a traitor and ought to be shot! ... if the I. W. W. 
or its twin brother, the Oil Workers' Union, gets busy in your 
neighborhood, kindly take occasion to decrease the supply of 
hemp. A knowledge of how to tie a knot that will stick might 
come in handy in a few days. It is not time to dally with the 
enemies of the country. . . . We are either go'ing to whip Germany 
or Germany is going to whip us. The first step in the whipping 
of Germany is to strangle the I. W. W.'s. Kill them, just as 
you would kill any other kind of a snake. Don't scotch 'em; kill 
'em. And kill 'em dead. It is no time to waste money on trials 
and continuances and things like that. All that is necessary is the 
evidence and a firing squad. Probably the carpenters' union will 
contribute the timber for the coffins." 

The I. W. W. Defense Bulletins quote a number of statements 
from the Sacramento Bee in which citizens are urged to take the 
law into their own hands if necessary. The newspapers of the 
West went so far as to justify the Arizona deportations and the 
tar and feathering of workers. For although many of our news- 
papers recognize the flagrant injustice of these acts of violence 
as well as their inexpediency, such newspapers were on the whole 
exceptional. 2 In Jerome, Arizona, was printed the following open 
defiance of the law: "There were two justifiable wholesale deporta- 
tions in Arizona last summer. . . . The Jerome Wobblies were 

a The present editor of the successor of Godwins Weekly disclaims 
the sentiment expressed in the above quotation. 

a Occasionally editorials of a different kind appeared (as is the case 
to-day). The following is well worth quoting, from the pen of 
Colonel Robertson, editor of the North Yakima Republican: "But 
the fact remains that there are half a hundred men in the Yakima 
jail who are being deprived of their liberty, indefinitely, arbitrarily, 
and without a shadow of legal authority or even a pretense that 
such authority exists in any officer or any court. I would be an 



THE PUBLIC 249 

sent to Needles and then turned back on Arizona soil, where they 
dispersed. Bisbee shipped her undesirables over into New Mexico. 
. . . Let Hayden go ahead and get his anti-deportation bill 
passed, if he can. It won't make any difference to Jerome or 
Bisbee or any other place in Arizona, when conditions similar to 
those of last summer arise." And even so conservative a paper 
as the Boston Transcript said of the murder of Frank Little, which 
occurred in Butte, Montana, that it knew "of millions of people 
who, while sternly reprehending such proceedings as the lynching 
of members of that anti-patriotic society (the I. W. W.), will 
nevertheless be glad, in their hearts, that Montana did it in the 
case of Little," while the Helena Independent cynically remarked 
that Montana holds "that Butte disgraced itself like a gentleman." 
The natural result of all this advocacy of violence was to make 
irreconcilables of men and women who otherwise would have con- 
fined their efforts for betterment to moderate channels. 

Even to-day we are still paying the penalty for this dangerous 
invitation to violence; the general use of force, together with the 
intolerance which always goes with it, and the suppression of all 

I. W. W. myself, if I had to work for some of these employers on 
the terms they propose." 

One of the clearest expressions of the indignation aroused by the 
Bisbee Deportations, appeared in the New York Globe in its issue of 
July 13, 1917, under an editorial captioned, Lynch Law in Arizona: 
"For some years as often as industrial trouble has arisen in the west- 
ern mining regions, and the organizers of the skeleton and largely 
imaginary organization called the I. W. W. have appeared on the 
scene, the cry has arisen* to suspend the law while the invaders are 
driven out ... It also appears that the casualties are always 
greater among the strikers than among those who pretend to fear 
them, thus suggesting where the aggression began. Any one familiar 
with the published disclosures concerning what has been done in the 
name of law and order in Idaho, Montana, Colorado, and Michigan 
finds it dffficult to resist the conclusion that the method of strike 
settlement followed is not only contrary to law, but is practically 
ineffective. What does a man think who is loaded in a bull-pen 
without warrant or charge against him, and then, with a pistol 
at his head, marched away and put on a train? Is he likely to have 
stimulated in him a Taw-abiding spirit and to believe that the great 
republic stands for law and equality of right ? ^ Grave have been 
the offenses against order' that have been committed by those who 
pretend to want order. # The Bisbee plan does not work. It is foolish 
and fatal and is planting the seeds of trouble. Lynch law ft rynch 
law whether committed by a. gang of white-cappers, or Ku Klux or 
by citizens in frock coats. The I. W. W. is a most objectionable 
organization. It exists because it is able plausibly to say a square 
deal is denied and our Government is in the hands of a selfish class." 



250 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

unpopular ideas on one side, with the inevitable accompaniment 
of extreme radicalism on the other, have become all too tragically 
widespread. This disregard for the law and the impulse to 
achieve results by violent means, which might reasonably have 
been expected to follow five years of world war, have been aug- 
mented by these inflammatory utterances. They have found ex- 
pression, among other places, in widespread race riots, acts of vio- 
lence by the American Legion, and the arrest and brutal treat- 
ment of strikers (as for example in Wyoming during the coal 
strike and throughout Pennsylvania during the steel strike). 1 

One of the most flagrant of recent examples was the full page 
advertisement in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer of November 18, 
1919: "There is just one chance left — and by the Eternal God, 
we must take it or we are lost. . . . Real Americans must rise 
as one man in the righteous wrath of outraged patriotism. First 
invoke such legal machinery as we have; and if that is not suffi- 
cient, then hastily construct something fool-proof. We must 
smash every un-American and anti-American organization in the 
land. We must put to death the leaders of this gigantic con- 
spiracy of murder, pillage and revolution. We must imprison for 
life all its aiders and abettors of native birth. We must deport 
all aliens. . . . The I. W. W., the Non-partisan League, the so- 
called Triple Alliance in the State of Washington, the pro-German 
Socialists, the Closed Shop labor unions, the agitators, malcon- 
tents, anarchists, syndicalists, seditionists, traitors — the whole 
motley crew of Bolshevists and near-Bolshevists — must be out- 
lawed by public opinion and hunted down and hounded until 
driven beyond the horizon of civic decency.' , 2 

Similar utterances, which undoubtedly had the same unfor- 
tunate results, were made in the United States Senate, and public 

1 These incidents of the steel and coal strikes are made all the worse 
because many of them were committed by representatives of the 
Government. 

2 This, like similar utterances on the part of the reactionaries 
during the war, was spread far and wide by the radical press. 
(The New York Call, for example, devoted a series of articles to it.) 
Yet perhaps the most significant reaction was that of the labor_ men 
connected with the newspaper in which it appeared. Immediately 
after it was printed, the employees of the paper met and refused to 
continue work until the advertisement was removed. The Govern- 
ment also stepped in and declared the issue non-mailable. The men 
adopted a resolution of protest which is so remarkable that the fol- 
lowing sections are reproduced: "We have been patient under mis- 



THE PUBLIC 251 

opinion does not seem to have been shocked when doctrines so 
subversive of all democratic Government were promulgated in the 
highest legislative body in the land. 

Senator King, of Utah, said: "There has been too much maud- 
lin sympathy lavished upon them by silly cranks and foolish up- 
lifters, Recently a large number of I. W. W.'s gathered in one of 
these mining towns of Arizona; they called strikes, defied the law, 
and committed many crimes; took possession of property; pre- 
vented honest men from working, and created a condition of an- 
archy and terror. Finally the residents of the town organized 
and drove the I. W. W.'s from their midst. It was a drastic 
step. It was perhaps without legal sanction. But the frightful con- 
ditions brought about by the reign of the organization which 
knows no law became intolerable to those who had homes and 
property and who desired peace and opportunity to labor." x 

Senator McCumber, after describing how several hundred I. 
W. W.'s congregated, goes on to say, "They were ordered to leave. 
They were arrested. They refused to work. There were too 
many of them to put into jail, so the farmers organized 

representation, faithful in the face of slander, long suffering under 
insult; we have upheld our agreements and produced your paper, 
even though in so doing we were braiding the rope with which you 
propose to hang us; day after day we have put in type, stereotyped, 
printed and mailed calumny after calumny, lie after lie, insult after 
insult ... So long as these things appeared to be a part of your 
unfair fight against organization — our organization and others — we 
have been able to endure them in the hope that at last truth must 
prevail. But there must be a limit to all things. In the page ad- 
vertisement, purporting to have been written and paid for by one 
Selvin, but which had as well have occupied the position in your 
paper usually taken up by your editorial page, your utter depravity 
as a newspaper, your shameless disregard of the laws of the land, 
your hatred of opposition, your reckless policy of appeal to the pas- 
sions of citizenry, reached depths of malice and malignancy hitherto 
unbelievable. It is nothing less than excitation to violence, stark and 
naked invitation to anarchy. If your business management cannot 
demonstrate its capacity and sagacity, if your editorial directing heads 
must remain blind to the things they are bringing us to ; if, together, 
you cannot see the abyss to which you are leading us — all of us; 
if you have no more love for our common country than is mani- 
fested in your efforts to plunge it into anarchy, then as loyal Ameri- 
can citizens — many of us ex-service men who very clearly proved 
our faith in America and its institutions — we must — not because we 
are unionists, but because we are Americans — find means to protect 
ourselves from the stigma of having aided and abetted your cam- 
paign of destruction." 
1 Congressional Record, LVI, pp. 6565; May 6, 1918. 



252 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

and came to town with their shotguns and they gave them orders 
to leave. They got out, and they did not come back, and if they 
had, there would have been a great many funerals in that part 
of the state." x 

As to the attitude of the press toward the Government's labor 
policies, it can be stated, speaking generally, that most news- 
papers during the war supported these policies. Although the pas- 
sage of the Adamson law in the fall of 191 6 had met with a 
good deal of adverse criticism, nevertheless after we entered the 
war, there was comparatively little opposition to the administra- 
tion's treatment of industrial difficulties. 

In some places, however, the opinion of employers that the 
Government was coddling labor was echoed in the press, and some 
of the more partisan and reactionary publications indulged in at- 
tacks of a most bitter character upon the administration. It will 
doubtless seem surprising that the insistence of the Government 
that union men be not dismissed solely for membership in unions, 
and that collective bargaining between the firm and committees 
of its own employees be installed, should have resulted in any 
very violent protest; and yet the taking over of the plant of 
Smith & Wesson by the War Department — because of its re- 
fusal to submit to the ruling of the Taft- Walsh board that the 
firm reinstate the men whom it had discharged because they be- 
longed to labor unions, and that it deal with committees of its 
men (not of the union, but of its own employees) — called forth 
the following from the North American Review's War Weekly, for 
September 7, 1918: "Is our Pacifist-Socialist Secretary of War 
strongly for efficiency in war industries or for the imposition 
of Socialistic fads upon this country? . . . We can conceive 
no possible ground of justification for this astounding action of 
the War Labor Board. We know of no legislation authorizing the 
executives thus to require private business concerns to revolu- 
tionize their business methods. We cannot see that the War 
Labor Board or the War Department has any more right to pre- 
scribe collective bargaining instead of individual bargaining than 
it has to prescribe red ink instead of black ink in the firm's letter- 
heads." 

Another example of this unreasonable hostility appeared in 
the American Lumberman, which, when speaking of the lumber 

'Congressional Record, March 21, 1918, Vol. 56, PI. 4, page 3821. 



THE PUBLIC 253 

strikes in the Northwest — the principal cause for which was the 
demand for the eight-hour day — said: "When we consider the 
situation without prejudice or passion it is really pitiable to see 
the Government groveling in the dust, truckling to a lot of 
treasonable labor agitators and showing a willingness to practi- 
cally paralyze a great industry simply to placate these agitators 
who are playing into the hands of our enemies." 

The same sort of thing was echoed in Congress. Senator Sher- 
man, for example, and others attacked the President's Mediation 
Commission. Senator McCumber, of North Dakota, criticizing a 
speech made by James O'Connell at the Boilermakers' Conven- 
tion, said: "The only excuse I can find for this is that they have 
been misled by the doctrines promulgated by their leaders — the 
doctrine of more and more and always more, and feel that they 
are justified in taking advantage of their Government even to the 
extent of fatally crippling its war endeavors. Nor is the Govern- 
ment at all blameless in this matter; it has surrendered soul and 
conscience to unionized labor. I am informed that on the West 
Coast the Government itself stepped in, forced yards either to 
close business or to recognize labor unions with all their disas- 
trous rules." 

Other branches of the Government, in their desire to help along 
production, sometimes took similarly unreasonable and unthink- 
ing positions. Patriotic speakers occasionally urged workers not 
to join unions and not to listen to agitators. Agents of the De- 
partment of Justice and representatives of the Intelligence Bureau, 
of the Army and Navy, many of whom were doubtless hurriedly 
recruited and untrained for their duties, were ludicrously ignorant 
of the fact that their superiors in Washington were cooperating 
with labor unions and entrusting them with a large measure of 
responsibility. Unlike the more important officials they looked 
with suspicion and frequently ill-concealed hostility upon any de- 
mands of these organizations for better working conditions. In 
most cases their motives were patriotic, but their actions resulted 
in increased irritation among the workers and in further labor 
unrest. 

Turning from a consideration of the attitude of the press and 
Congress to an examination of the positions taken by the men 
themselves who were on Government boards, we find that 
most of them did their best to be fair to both sides. In this they 



254 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

did not always succeed, because they took with them to public 
life those prejudices which were the result of their private occu- 
pations and previous environment. Many of the most important 
Government representatives in the Ordnance Department and 
elsewhere were, not unnaturally, recruited from the ranks of big 
manufacturers who in their own business were hostile to organized 
labor, and they inevitably carried over to their new positions some 
of their former bias. Indeed, in a few cases the officials were 
absolutely unfair to organized labor. 1 On the other hand, there 
were also a few cases, it has been reliably stated, where individuals 
took positions in war adjustment labor boards with the deliberate 
intention of using these strategic positions more to further the 
cause of organized labor than to find equitable solutions of the 
labor disputes with which they came in contact. These extreme 
cases were, however, very rare. By and large, Government offi- 
cials performed their duties of production management, adjust- 
ment, and investigation, with creditable fairness to both sides. It 
can be said especially of the men who occupied important posi- 
tions on the Boards of Adjustment that their very arduous tasks 
were performed with the utmost conscientiousness and an earnest 
desire to do justice to both sides. The Government was for- 
tunate in having secured for these positions men of integrity and 
in almost all cases of great ability. 

1 A Government mediator said to the v/riter that when he was 
called upon to grant a wage increase in a particular locality, he would 
endeavor to delay matters and to ''jolly the men along" as far as pos- 
sible. If, however, it appeared that the men would actually go out, 
he would speedily make an adjustment. In fairness, it ought to be 
stated that this was a very exceptional case. 



CHAPTER XIX 

The I. W. W. and the Loyal Legion of Loggers and 
Lumbermen 

THE I. W. W. 

In its philosophy the Industrial Workers of the World is un- 
compromisingly revolutionary, desiring to see the immediate and 
complete overthrow of the capitalistic system, and at the same 
time justifying practically any means to accomplish this end. With 
these revolutionary theories and with the I. W. W.'s justification 
of sabotage the writer has absolutely no sympathy — on the con- 
trary, he dissents most strongly from both of these points of view. 
However, in its actual work as a labor organization attempting 
to improve the condition of the lowest workers in the social scale, 
the I. W. W. has been the victim of such outrageous treatment 
during the war that it is desirable that the facts should be set 
forth as accurately as possible. This, not in justification or de- 
fense of I. W. W. theories, — the writer is as far as he possibly can 
be from any desire to defend or justify them — but because no 
good can be accomplished by prejudice, injustice, or violence, 
from ail three of which the I. W. W. has suffered. 

Judging it only by the doctrines contained in the preamble to 
its constitution, and by the utterances of many of its leaders 
before and during the war, it is not strange that a society organ- 
ized as is the one under which we live should look upon the I. W. 
W. with hostility, and that in war-time this feeling should have 
developed into active hatred and persecution. But an impartial 
study of the things it actually did during the war, not of its 
theoretical philosophy, but of its work in the field, and an im- 
partial study of the nature and conduct of the rank and file will 
show: 

(i) That the large majority of its members were and are ig- 
norant of its subversive doctrines. 1 

1 Report of the President's Mediation Commission, page 14. This 
opinion is not shared by many persons whose occupations have brought 

255 



256 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

(2) That during the war its functions were those of the ordi- 
nary trade union, 1 even though its leaders expressed extremely 
radical and frequently revolutionary opinions. 

(3) That in time of war the natural test of patriotism is the 
support given by the individual to the government in its prosecu- 
tion of the war. Judged by this standard, the leaders of the I. 
W. W. were unpatriotic. They believed that this war was no 
different from previous wars; that its basis was capitalistic ex- 
ploitation, 2 and that the laboring classes had no interest in 
participating in it. During the early months of the war Solidarity, 
the official I. W. W. organ, opposed the draft, as did many leaders 
of the organization. 3 Later the I. W. W. does not seem to have 
taken any official position toward the war, neither supporting it 
nor opposing it. 4 They became indifferent to the success or fail- 

them into conflict with the I. W. W. But it is the belief of the 
best qualified neutral observers. 

1 Carleton H. Parker in an article on the I. W. W. in the Atlantic 
Monthly for November, 1917, says: "The I. W. W. movement can 
be described with complete accuracy as an extension of the American 
labor strike into the zone of casual migratory labor. All the super- 
ficial features, such as its syndicalist philosophy, its sabotage, threats 
of burnings and destruction, are the natural and normal accompani- 
ments of organized labor disturbance in this field." 

2 Solidarity, July 7, 1917: "Capitalism is a Hydra with many heads. 
War is but one of them ; government repression is but one of them 
and the prostituted press is one of them. If the working class had 
the power to cut off one of these heads it would have the power 
to kill the monster outright. It is the historic, mission of the work- 
ing class to do away with the Beast, for there is no room on the 
earth for both Capitalism and the producing class." On August 18, 
1917, in the very midst of the war, Solidarity said : "The time for talk 
is past; the time for action is here — ACT. If each of us will do 
his bit, Capitalism will be at our mercy within a month. Stir up the 
smoldery flames of discontent until the conflagration can be seen 
around the world." 

3 There were also leaders of the more radical branches of the 
A. F. of L. and of other labor organizations who at the beginning of 
the war were opposed to our participation in it and to the draft. The 
report of the President's Mediation Commission at page 6 says : 
"The labor difficulties (in Arizona) were further complicated by 
factors created by the war. This was particularly true of the situa- 
tion in the Globe district. Doctrines of internationalism, which be- 
fore the war had permeated the minds of labor the world over, 
strongly marked the labor leadership in the Globe district. It led 
to resolutions of opposition to the war by the miners' local at the out- 
break of the war." 

4 The Literary Digest of July 28, 191 7, quotes from an interview 
with Wm. D. Haywood of a Chicago correspondent of the N. Y. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 257 

ure of either side, feeling that in any case the industrial battle 
would have to be fought out under the same capitalistic condi- 
tions. The activities of the organization were thereafter confined 
to industrial matters and efforts to improve the condition of the 
working classes. It ought to be pointed out that this early hos- 
tility and later indifference to the war were not shared by the rank 
and file, whose feelings were much like those of most other work- 
men — in most cases the war had their enthusiastic support, in 
others they were indifferent to it. 

(4) That officers and members of the I. W. W. were in many 
places treated as outlaws, no effort being made to distinguish 
in the case of particular individuals, between their theoretical 
principles and their practical activities. 

(5) That employers made the existence and the doctrines of 
the I. W. W. excuse for illegal and violent conduct toward any 
organized effort to improve wages, hours, or working conditions, 
whether by members of the I. W. W., the A. F. of L., or otherwise. 

(6) That in practically all cases the workers had legitimate 
causes for complaint and that in many cases men who became 
identified with the I. W. W. worked under conditions of great 
hardship for which the employers were directly to blame; 1 and 
that, in spite of these genuine grievances, the workers had ordi- 
narily no means of securing redress except the strike. 

(7) That during the war, with the exception of certain con- 
spicuous cases, the I. W. W. was the frequent victim of brutal 
violence on the part of employers and the public, and of illegal 
action by Government officials who in some cases went so far as 
to participate in and even to lead in the commission of acts of 
extreme brutality. And that these actions were treated with 

Tribune: "We are not thinking of the war at all in these strikes. 
In that respect we don't know there is a war. What we are doing 
is trying to improve the conditions of our boys — their living and 
working condition." 

a The report of the President's Mediation Commission, at page 13, 
speaking of conditions in the lumber industry of the Pacific North- 
west says : . . . "but the rigors of nature have been reinforced 
by the neglects of men. Social conditions have been allowed to grow 
up full of danger to the country. . . . The living conditions of 
many of the camps have long demanded attention." At page 6 speak- 
ing of conditions in the Arizona copper mines the Report says : 
"But neither sinister influences (of the enemy) nor the I. W. W. 
can account for these strikes. The explanation is to be found in 
unremedied and unremediable industrial disorders." 



258 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

approval by large sections of the press, Congress, and speakers 
on public platforms. 

The I. W. W. has succeeded best among common laborers, who 
have been largely neglected by other unions, among foreigners, 
among scattered and migratory workers whom the American Fed- 
eration of Labor has been unable — or indisposed — to organize, 
and also among those men who were prevented by the opposition 
of employers from joining the conservative type of craft union, 
thus leaving the field open to aggressive organizations. We hear 
of it during the war as operating chiefly in the States west of the 
Mississippi and in three occupations, lumber, mining, and agri- 
culture, in each one of which the above elements were largely 
present. 

In almost every case which a search of available material dis- 
closes, the demands during the war of the workers in these three 
industries (whether of I. W. W. or other origin) were precisely 
the demands made by labor everywhere else in the United States, 
with very significant emphasis in many cases on improvement "in 
sanitary conditions, which in other sections of the country and 
in other industries is heard of less frequently and less insistently. 
They were demands which were sanctioned by the principles of 
the Taft- Walsh and of every other war labor board, and most 
of them would in large part have been granted to the workers 
by any of these war labor adjusting agencies. 

These demands 1 were almost entirely confined to the right to 
organize, increases in wages, the eight-hour day, and better sani- 
tary conditions. Occasionally there is the orthodox union demand 
for the abolition of piecework and the bonus system. The 
"rustling card" which in its application to longshoremen had been 
abolished by the National Adjustment Commission was also a 
frequent cause of complaint. 

The leaders of the I. W. W. in their stump speeches and in their 
literature preached the socialistic doctrines of class war and ad- 

J The demands of the lumber-jacks, whose strike crippled the 
lumber industry of the Northwest during a large part of 1917 were: 

Better sanitary and working conditions. 

The eight hour day. 

A minimum wage of $60 a month. 

The right to organize. 

Men to be hired on the job or at the union hall, but not through 
"rustling cards." Charles Merz; New Republic, September 29, 1917. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 259 

vocated the complete abolition of the wage system. This was 
part of their radical propaganda, but did not enter into any 
particular controversy except incidentally through the fact that 
this kind of agitation was from the psychological point of view 
particularly obnoxious to the employer, and, indeed, to many 
of the workers themselves. In some cases there were demands 
that the Government take over the industries in which strikes 
were occurring. These were, however, infrequent, and seemed to 
have been based on the theory of the temporary exercise of the 
Government's war-time powers, in orders to restore production, 
rather than on any desire to bring about State ownership as 
such. This demand was made by the conservative unions in 
other places, and as we have seen, the Government did take over 
a number of industries because of industrial disturbances, and 
threatened to do the same in many other cases. 

Inasmuch as members of the I. W. W. were frequently workers 
in isolated and inaccessible communities, the employer in many 
cases furnished board and lodging. This added another element 
of possible trouble, and any one who has seen labor camps in or 
near settled communities will not find it difficult to believe that 
sanitary conditions in the lumber belt of the Northwest and in 
similar isolated places were very bad indeed. That this was 
the case is the judgment of many official investigators, and there 
can be no doubt whatever that the demand of the men for im- 
proved working and living conditions was amply justified. 1 

Nor do we find in the wages asked for by the I. W. W. any 
justification tor the resentment with which these demands were 
met. Judged by the increases in the cost of living and the wage 
advances which took place in other industries in the United States, 

1 In many of the lumber camps, bunk houses were dangerously 
overcrowded, constructed in an insanitary manner, with double tiers 
of continuous bunks, and in some cases provided with no means 
of ventilation except the door. In many of the camps no place was 
provided for the men's damp and steaming clothes, all the vapor 
and foulness being confined to the already overcrowded bunk houses. 
The condition of toilets can be judged from the following quotation 
from the Camp Sanitation Survey, made by the Loyal Legion of 
Loggers and Lumbermen, and published at Portland, Oregon, in 
June, 1918, page 48. 

"One of the Sanitary Officers reports that at a certain camp which 
he visited, and in which the toilets were unusually bad even for a 
logging camp, he was informed by the camp foreman that he had 
not seen the inside of the men's toilet for at least two years. The 



260 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

the demands of the I. W. W. were not excessive and were often in 
fact moderate. 

As to hours, the demands were largely confined to the eight- 
hour day, which the President of the United States had spoken 
of in a message to Congress in 191 6 as demanded "by the whole 
spirit of the times and the preponderance of evidence in recent 
economic experience." When we consider how steadily the eight- 
hour day has been spreading from one industry to another, and 
that many recent strikes have not been for the eight-hour day 
as asked for by the I. W. W. but for the forty-four-hour week, 
and, finally, that the shorter week is now rapidly being adopted, it 
is difficult to believe that only two short years ago one of the 
most serious strikes of the war — the lumber strike of the North- 
west — should have been caused by the demand for the reduction 
of working hours from ten to eight daily. And yet this was un- 
doubtedly the chief cause of one of the hardest fought strikes 
with which the I. W. W. was connected — the tie-up during the 
greater part of 19 17 of the lumber industry of the Northwest. 
Strikes in the wooden shipyards, of the Pacific Coast, lasting for 
several months, also resulted from this strike, the shipbuilders 
refusing to handle "ten-hour lumber." Neither the existence of 
the war, with the resulting dire need for spruce, nor the appeal of 
the Secretary of War and the Governor of the State of Washing- 
ton, were sufficient to induce the lumber owners to grant a work- 
ing day which so many other industries in the country had 
adopted. 

The demands of the I. W. W. almost always included the right 
to organize and protection against discrimination. Inasmuch as 
this was one of the fundamental war labor principles guaranteed 
by the President's Proclamation in creating the National War 
Labor Board, and insisted upon by every other adjusting agency, 
we could quickly pass to the next grievance, were it not for the 
fact that because of the revolutionary doctrines of the I. W. W. 

officer invited him to inspect it at once, which he did, and was 
so impressed by what he found that he immediately set fire to the 
shack and ordered a new latrine built at once." 

These were some of the sanitary conditions which were undoubtedly 
responsible for the growth of the I. W. W. in the Northwest. The 
success of that organization, when it tied up the production of 
lumber, was unquestionably one of the principal factors which 
focussed attention upon these insanitary conditions, and led to very 
great improvements, which took place during the war period. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 261 

it might be argued that this organization was not entitled to the 
protection which was accorded to so-called "legitimate unions." 
Employers frequently took this position: that the purposes of the 
I. W. W. leaders were revolutionary; that their demands had as 
their ultimate object the taking over of industry by the workers; 
that they were led by the most radical element who were unwill- 
ing to make agreements with employers, and who openly preached 
the doctrine that there can be no peace between employer and 
employee until the workers have taken over all industry. 

If any clear-cut distinction had been made between the I. W. 
W. and more conservative unions — that is to say, if the employ- 
ers had conceded to the ordinary trade union the right to organize 
(or where the men were not organized at all, had allowed them to 
form a union), but had at the same time taken the position that 
they were unwilling to have their men join the I. W. W. because 
it preached revolution and sabotage and was opposed to any time 
agreements with employers — the question would be a very much 
easier one to deal with. Amid the confusion with which the en- 
tire subject is surrounded there can be no doubt, however, that 
in most cases no such distinction was made. In many places 
where the I. W. W. was active, the employers followed the prac- 
tice of hitting a union head if they saw one, without examining 
very carefully to see whether the body to which the head was 
attached carried a card issued by a branch of the I. W. W. or by 
the American Federation of Labor. The revolutionary doctrines 
of the I. W. W. were in many cases exploited to inflame the pub- 
lic mind against every form of unionism. These doctrines were 
used as an excuse for ruthless violence against persons who made 
demands for improvements, wherever and by whomsoever these 
demands were made. 1 

As a matter of fact the war furnished us with a number of con- 
spicuous cases in which those responsible for production cooper- 
ated with the I. W. W. The United States Forest Reserve, a 
bureau of the Department of the Interior, charged among other 
things with the duty of fighting forest fires in the great Pacific 
Northwest, the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen or- 
ganized by Colonel (later General) Disque of the War Depart- 
ment Spruce-Production Board, the National Adjustment Com- 

*As in the Bisbee deportation case where only one-third of the 
men belonged to the I. W. W. 



262 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

mission in the Port of Philadelphia, all worked with the I. W. W., 
going as far as to cooperate with its representatives when new 
men were to be hired. The testimony of those in authority is 
unanimous that the men responded to good treatment and worked 
loyally. As a practical question, therefore, production having 
been all-important during the war, the policy of repression and 
violence pursued in most places seems to the writer to have been 
a serious blunder. It did not succeed in ending strikes, but only 
served to embitter the workers and to increase the "strikes on the 
job." 

On its merits as a question of war labor jurisprudence or equity, 
the writer also believes that the I. W. W. was entitled to im- 
munity from discharge or other interference solely because of 
membership in that organization. There was almost unanimity 
of opinion among* those charged with the duty of war labor ad- 
ministration that the war period should be one of truce as to 
certain controversial industrial questions. This principle of an 
industrial truce was in some cases tactitly and in others openly 
agreed to. Thus demands for the closed shop were barred by our 
war labor policy, and demands for radical social changes were 
likewise out of the question for the war period. 1 

The workers could, had they seen fit to do so, have taken advan- 
tage of the scarcity of labor and the enormous need for com- 
modities, which the war produced, and have demanded radical 
changes in industry, and it is very difficult to see how such de- 
mands could have been successfully resisted. As a rule, how- 
ever, the workers, radicals as well as conservative, observed the 
truce and did not make any serious attempts to press those claims 
which were, for the time being, barred out. During this period it 
seems very clear to the writer that a sound and liberal labor policy 
required the extension to all labor organizations, including the 
I. W. W., of the right to organize. No matter how objectionable 
to a particular employer or community the industrial activity of 
this organization may have been, as long as it confined its actions 
to legitimate efforts to improve working conditions, it should, 
during the war period, have been fairly and decently treated. 

1 It is true that this truce was not always respected by the I. W. W. 
leaders; neither was it always respected by the employers. But the 
breaches of the truce do not seem to have been of sufficient im- 
portance to affect the present discussion. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 263 

The war demands made by the I. W. W. are thus seen to have 
been, for the most part, no different than those made by the 
more conservative labor unions, and they were generally reason- 
able and even moderate. And yet the I. W. W. was throughout 
this period treated as an outlaw organization. The entire com- 
munity (with a few exceptions) acted on the theory that it pos- 
sessed no rights whatever of privacy, liberty, or even life itself, 
which deserved respect. 

Here the question naturally arises why, if these statements are 
correct, was the treatment accorded to the I. W. W. so drastic? 
Why were the I. W. W. leaders outlawed when making their de- 
mands, whereas the A. F. of L. was listened to, its demands 
granted, and its leaders given positions of great responsibility? 
Perhaps the most important reason was that, in the public mind, 
the unpatriotic and revolutionary opinions of the leaders were at- 
tributed to all the members of the organization, and the entire 
movement was identified with revolutionary doctrines and a failure 
to support the Government. This feeling was natural and to cer- 
tain extent justified (especially against the leaders), but it was 
irrelevant as far as disputes about wages, hours, and sanitary 
conditions were concerned. Nor were the employers slow to 
take advantage of this popular resentment to discredit perfectly 
legitimate demands; they focused attention in the press and else- 
where upon the subversive doctrines, using them as a smoke 
screen to hide from the public — and perhaps from themselves — 
the real grievances. 

If an organizer appeared in an agricultural section to demand 
increases in wages, he was immediately thrown into jail. 1 In the 
midst of strikes in the mines and lumber camps, in some cases for 
the redress of intolerable conditions, the offices of the striking 

*The following from the New York Times, appearing at as late a 
date as June 13, 1919, illustrates the complacency with which ar- 
rests were reported for apparently no greater offense than an effort 
to organize the workers : 

"Seize I. W. W.'s in Kansas. 

"Quick Action Follows Attempt to Start Trouble in Wheat Belt. 

"Kansas City, Mo., June 12. — Five men are under arrest to-day at 
Hutchinson, Kas., on a charge of fomenting revolution, and it is be- 
lieved by the Federal authorities that they are members of the 
Industrial Workers of the World. 

" These arrests,' said Fred Robertson, United States District At- 
torney for Kansas, 'followed the first reports of the appearance of 
I. W. W. agitators in the Kansas wheat belt, and their efforts to or- 



264 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

unions were raided, their members were thrown into jails (fre- 
quently to be released weeks or months later without trial), hun- 
dreds of strikers were deported without the slightest semblance of 
lawful action, and, in at least one case, a deliberate and cold- 
blooded murder was committed. 1 

The deportation at Bisbee, Arizona, 2 is probably the most de- 
plorable act of industrial violence which has occurred in the his- 
tory of our country. It consisted of the forcible deportation of 
i, 1 86 strikers in the Warren District of Arizona, who were put 
on board trains and dumped out at the town of Hermanas, New 
Mexico, and for months deprived of their right to return to their 
homes at Bisbee. Under the leadership of the Sheriff of the 
county, many of its leading citizens were part of a mob of 2,000 
armed men responsible for this outrage. They took possession of 
the telegraph and telephone, rounded up the strikers in a ball field, 
and placed those unwilling to return to work in box cars, sending 
them out of the state. They set up a "Kangaroo Court," which 
sat for several months, summoned men before it for alleged dis- 
loyalty — the test of which seems to have been their willingness to 
return to work — and if they were unwilling to do so, offered these 
men, without the slightest pretense of legality, the alternative of 
imprisonment or deportation. 3 The 1,186 deported men were, 
after great hardship, taken care of it by the United States Army, 
whose investigation disclosed the fact that only about one-third 
of the men were members of the I. W. W. One- third were mem- 
bers of the American Federation of Labor, and the other one- 
third were unorganized. 

In partial explanation of this unprecedented example of defiance 
of all natural rights and legal guarantees, it should be pointed 
out that copper, the production of which was being so seriously 

ganize the harvesters. We are not going to waste a minute with 
these troublemakers.' 

"Other arrests are expected as the Federal authorities believe many- 
organizers of the I. W. W. are at work in the grain belt of Kansas." 

1 Many of these events have been set forth in official reports, but 
it seemed proper to include in this volume a list of such of the more 
important of these acts of violence and oppression as were clearly 
connected with industrial disputes. Other cases are not relevant to 
the subject of this inquiry. 

3 See Report on Bisbee Deportation made by the President's Media- 
tion Commission, November 6, 1917. 

"Robert Bruere in the Nation (New York), February 28, 1918. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 265 

interfered with in this strike, was an essential for the prosecution 
of the war. Patriotic resentment was therefore particularly strong 
and was fanned into frenzy by the revolutionary and unpatriotic 
teachings of the leaders of the strike. . Another factor arose from 
the fact that Bisbee is located on the Mexican border, and fear 
of raids is never wholly absent. It was reported that members 
of the I. W. W. were pouring into town and a serious uprising was 
feared. An appeal was made for Federal troops, but the Army 
officers sent on two occasions, June 30 and July 2, to investigate 
reported that everything was peaceable and that the troops were 
not needed, and they were therefore refused. Their absence un- 
doubtedly increased the hysterical condition of the residents. 

The Federal and State Governments have each proceeded 
criminally against the men responsible for this wrong but, so far, 
both prosecutions have failed. In the Federal Court a demurrer 
to the indictment was sustained on the ground that the jurisdic- 
tion was in the State rather than the Federal Courts 1 and an 
appeal to the Supreme Court has been taken but is not yet de- 
cided. In the courts of Arizona one of the defendants was re- 
cently brought to trial on the charge of kidnapping. The jury 
brought in a verdict of acquittal apparently on the ground that 
the act of deportation was one of "necessity," justified by the cir- 
cumstances surrounding it — in much the same way that an in- 
dividual would be justified if he committed homicide in self-de- 
fense. The trial of the case lasted three months and was remark- 
able in many ways. One cannot help wondering how a minority 
— especially one which entertains unpopular beliefs — would have 
any rights which the majority would be bound to respect, and any 
acts of violence even if committed on so reckless a scale as 
the Bisbee deportations would go unpunished, if the decision of 
the Court in this case is a correct one. 2 

"Federal Reporter, Volume 254, p. 611. 

a The Court ruled as follows : "The offer of proof as to conditions 
existing in the Warren district at the time of the so-called deporta- 
tions, the purpose and intent of the persons deported, the contem- 
plated destruction of lives and property within that district, the 
preparations to carry out that intent and the acts and conduct as 
well as the statements of the persons deported, present a situation 
where it cannot be said as a matter of law that the rule of necessity 
cannot be applicable but rather leaves the question of the existence 
of such necessity to be determined by the jury as a question of a fact 
under proper instructions if such were the conditions and the citizens 



266 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Civil suits are also pending on behalf of the deported men 
against the mining companies and their officials. A settlement of 
these claims by which each of the men would have received a 
substantial sum was almost consummated in the month of October, 
1919, but fell through, and the suits are still awaiting trial, 

Other deportations occurred at Jerome, Arizona, where sixty-five 
I. W. W. were sent to Needles, Cal., but, not being allowed to de- 
train, they were sent on to Kingman, Arizona. At Gallup, New 
Mexico, during a strike of the United Mine Workers (A. F. of L.) 
deportations took place under charges of disloyalty. At Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, on November 7, 191 7, seventeen members of the I. W. 
W. were taken from the custody of the police and whipped and 
tarred and feathered. It seems that shortly after the murder 
of Frank Little a bomb was exploded at the home of a prominent 
oil man, who narrowly escaped death. A fire of apparent in- 
cendiary origin also broke out in the refineries. Both of these oc- 
currences were attributed to the I. W. W. by the local newspapers 

of Bisbee had called in vain upon state and federal authorities for 
protection against a threatened calamity such as is set forth in the 
offer of proof, it cannot be said as a matter of law that they must 
sit by and await the destruction of their lives and property, without 
having the right to take steps to protect themselves." Douglas Dis- 
patch, March 25, 1920. And in his charge to the jury the Court said: 
"There is no presumption that one who forcibly seizes and carries a 
person into another state acts under the law of necessity and when 
such a claim is made the burden is upon the one asserting it, but 
such burden only goes to this extent, that he must produce such 
evidence as will raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt 
whether he did not act, under all the circumstances, in accordance 
with the rule of necessity. If the jury, after the consideration of all 
the evidence, entertains a reasonable doubt whether the defendant 
and those acting with him were not justified in acting as they did 
under the law of necessity their duty is always to give the defendant 
the benefit of such doubt and acquit him, but if they have no reason- 
able doubt they should return a verdict of guilty." Bisbee Review, 
April 29, 1920. The Douglas International for May 5, 1920, reprints 
an editorial from the El Paso Times, which after commending the 
action of the jury and the general principles upon which its verdict 
was based, gives an account of the strike and the resulting deportations 
and says : "The community took steps to protect itself. It went 
about the matter in an orderly and effective manner. There was no 
resort to mob violence. The sheriff of the county swore in hundreds 
of deputies. The undesirables and agitators and their sympathizers 
merely were rounded up and shipped out of town. That was all 
there was to it. Only in its magnitude was the proceeding very dif- 
ferent from the practice common enough all over the country of run- 
ning undesirables out of town'' (Italics the writer's.) 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 267 

and violence against this organization was openly advocated. Al- 
though there was apparently no evidence connecting the I. W. W. 
with these outrages, yet the following took place: Seventeen I. 
W. W. were arrested for vagrancy. They were taken from jail 
in automobiles which after going a short distance were stopped 
by armed and masked men, who told the police to "beat it" — 
which the police did. The seventeen men were made to strip to 
the waist, whipped and tarred and feathered. After this their 
clothes were burned and they were ordered to leave Tulsa and 
never to return. 

At Jackson, Michigan, in November, 1918, a machinist was 
tarred and feathered. 

At Aberdeen, S. D., an I. W. W. organizer was taken to the 
outskirts of the town and beaten with clubs. 

At Franklin, N. J., another I. W. W. organizer was hung to 
a tree — it is alleged, by the chief of police and a mob, and cut 
down only when unconscious. 

Similar cases of violence are reported from Yakima and Aber- 
deen, Washington, and Yerrington, Nevada. 

In Montana, seventy-five striking Finns, in the coal mines, 
were crowded into jail by the "Liberty Committee," for failure to 
register under the draft. The men could not speak or understand 
English and were released by Federal officers on the ground 
that there was no intent to disobey the law. Shortly thereafter, 
some of the leaders of the men were seized by the "Liberty Com- 
mittee" and thrown into jail on the charge of being members of 
the I. W. W. (criminal Syndicalism) and several Finns were tor- 
tured in efforts by the Liberty Committee to find out the leaders 
of the I. W. W. 

Most degrading of all, perhaps, was the murder of Frank Little, 
an I. W. W. organizer who had come to Butte, Montana, a 
cripple suffering from a broken leg, to organize the workers. He 
was seized in the middle of the night by armed citizens, taken a 
distance out of town and, in cold blood, hung up from railroad 
ties. This incident occurred shortly after the Bisbee deportation 
and no one was ever punished for it. 

These acts of physical violence which we have recorded, al- 
though inexcusable, were still not the first incidents of this kind 
which have marred the industrial history of our country. The war 
period served only to multiply these occurrences and to intensify 



268 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

their bitterness. But the war period did witness the introduc- 
tion of a new era of legal — that is to say, criminal — condemnation 
of certain radical industrial and political organizations. Laws were 
passed by a number of states as well as by the Federal Govern- 
ment which were so worded as to be susceptible of an interpre- 
tation broad enough to include many kinds of labor agitation, in- 
nocent as well as dangerous. 

Now the writer wishes to make it clear that he has no desire 
to question these measures so far as they were used by the Govern- 
ment to protect itself against enemy propaganda and violence, or 
sedition and disloyalty by our own citizens. But unfortunately 
these laws were frequently used, not for their legitimate purpose, 
but for the illegitimate one of curbing any agitation for indus- 
trial betterment, and steps were taken and procedure adopted in 
the enforcement of these laws which made the attainment of jus- 
tice impossible. 

In looking back over the record of legal prosecutions during the 
war, there can be no doubt that war hysteria placed in the hands 
of Government officials and unscrupulous employers the power of 
criminal prosecutions of strikers and the suppression of attempts 
— not to interfere with the successful waging of the war — but to 
secure improvement in industrial conditions. Many persons re- 
garded strikes, at this critical time, as in themselves necessarily 
disloyal, on the ground that they interfered with production — 
hampering our Government and aiding the enemy. We have al- 
ready pointed out that frequently this was not the case; that 
on the contrary many strikes resulted in better working condi- 
tions and in making the men better satisfied. And therefore, in 
the long run, a strike which had this effect stimulated rather than 
retarded production. 1 

The facts were, however, that in certain parts of the country, 
especially those in which the I. W. W. was active, organizers were 
thrown into jail immediately upon their appearance among the 
workers. This was noticeably the case in the wheat and oil 
fields, the timber belt, and the mines, where men were often im- 

1 Even if it were always true that strikes retarded production, it 
must still be borne in mind, as has been pointed out elsewhere, that 
workers were not always to blame for their occurrence. Frequently 
the responsibility rested on employers, the strike having been the 
only method by which the workers could secure redress of very real 
grievances. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 269 

prisoned, seemingly for no greater offense than attempting to se- 
cure for the workers higher wages and better working conditions. 
Not only were they arrested, but they were kept in jails for 
months and months without trial, in some cases dying or becoming 
insane as a result, it is alleged, of bad prison conditions and ill- 
treatment. Sometimes these men were released after long periods 
of incarceration without any effort to bring them to trial; some- 
times they were tried under laws enacted after their original ar- 
rest. "Mass" trials took place, in one case as many as sixty-five 
men being placed on trial at the same time — as a result of which 
many of these men received prison terms equivalent to life sen- 
tences. These trials have been condemned by responsible lawyers; 
in fact, the utter impossibility of any fair judgment being reached 
as to the guilt or innocence of all these sixty-five men will be 
realized by any one familiar with the jury system. 

The intolerance with which the I. W. W. was treated during 
the war seemed at the time to be the result purely of war hysteria. 
But the ending of the war nevertheless brought no abatement; 
on the contrary the feeling became intensified and at the present 
writing the spirit of intolerance seems to be as strong as ever. 1 

1 The statement recently issued by twelve prominent attorneys in- 
cluding Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School, Ernst Freund 
of the University of Chicago, Felix Frankfurter, Francis Fisher Kane 
and Frank P. Walsh sets forth illegal practices committed by the 
U. S. Department of Justice since the signing of the armistice similar 
to those referred to above. "Wholesale arrests both of aliens and 
citizens have been made without warrant or any process of law; men 
and women have been jailed and held incommmticado without access 
of friends or counsel; homes have been entered without search war- 
rant and property seized and removed ; other property has been 
wantonly destroyed; workingmen and workingwomen suspected of 
radical views have been shamefully abused and maltreated. . . . 
Punishment of the utmost cruelty, and heretofore unthinkable in 
America, have become usual. Great numbers of persons arrested, 
both aliens and citizens, have been threatened, beaten with black- 
jacks, struck with fists, jailed under abominable conditions, or actu- 
ally tortured." Following the statement, exhibits are presented con- 
taining affidavits and other proof of the charges. Exhibit 8 refers 
to evidence taken by a commission sent by the Interchurch World 
Movement to investigate the Steel Strike which is stated to show 
that "the sfceel and coal companies use the local and Federal Govern- 
ments to harass and get rid of troublesome workers." Exhibit 15 
contains the decision of Judge Bourquin of the U. S. District Court 
of Montana in proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
an alien held for deportation. The record shows, says the Court 
that: "from August, 1918, to February, 1919, the Butte union of the 



270 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 



LOYAL LEGION OF LOGGERS AND LUMBERMEN 

In a previous chapter we have seen that in the summer of 191 7 
the entire lumber industry of the Northwest was crippled by 
strikes in which the principal demand of the men — for the eight- 
hour day — was bitterly resisted by the lumber operators. 1 The 
President's Mediation Commission, which in the early fall of 191 7, 
had visited the scene of the trouble, did not succeed in harmon- 
izing the difficulties. The strike had been a failure to the extent 
that the employers had not granted the demands of the strikers 
and that lumbering had been partially resumed. Many of the 
workers, however, who under the best conditions did not remain 
very long in one place, or even in one occupation, had drifted 
into fields where hours and conditions of employment were better 
than in the lumber camps. Among those who remained "strikes 
on the job" were to an alarming extent increasing the inefficiency 
of the workers. 

In order to meet this situation, the Spruce Division of the War 
Department 2 sent Colonel (later General) Brice P. Disque into 
the fields, charged with the difficult mission of restoring produc- 
tion. To accomplish this end two steps were taken: First, a 
considerable number of enlisted men were sent into the woods to 
get out the timber; second, an organization was created, known 
as the Loyal Legion of Loggers and Lumbermen, which endeavored 
to establish harmony between the operators and their employees, 
to fix wages, improve conditions, and thus to obtain the desired 
production. 

The 4 L's, as it came to be known, consisted of both employer 

Industrial Workers of the World was dissatisfied with working 
places, conditions and wages in the mining industry, and to remedy 
them were discussing ways and means, including a strike if necessary. 
In consequence its hall and orderly meetings were several times 
raided by employers' agents, federal agents and soldiers duly officered, 
acting by Federal authority and without warrant . . . broke and 
destroyed property . . . cursed, insulted, beat, dispersed and bayo- 
neted members by order of the captain commanding^ . . . perpe- 
trated an orgy of terror, violence and crime against citizens and aliens 
in public assemblage, etc. 

*The data gathered by the Labor Department and published in 
Monthly Review, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 1919, see Appendix 
No. 1, shows that as against 44 strikes in the lumber industry in 1916, 
the number rose to 295 in 1917. In 1918 it dropped to 74. 

'Aircraft Production Board. 



THE I. W. W. AND LOYAL LEGION 271 

and employee. In order to become a member, the applicant was 
required to sign a pledge of loyalty, but during the war no dues 
were expected to be paid. The Loyal Legion was organized into 
locals which elected representatives for the various districts into 
which the entire territory was divided. Conventions were held 
in which representatives of both employers and employees for the 
district met with Colonel Disque or his assistants. 

On March 1, 19 18, the employers established the eight-hour 
day without reduction of wages; x a sanitary survey of camps and 
mills was undertaken, which resulted in the publication by the 
Loyal Legion of an excellent pamphlet describing minimum sani- 
tary requirements. A Sanitation Division was established under 
the direction of which sanitary conditions in the camps were very 
much improved. Other welfare features were also provided, such 
as the installation of reading rooms, libraries, recreation and movie 
halls. 

The Loyal Legion operated largely in Oregon, Washington and 
Idaho, and its organizers claim a remarkable record of successful 
achievement. Before the armistice was signed it is said that 
nearly 100,000 workers were enrolled as members; 2 a monthly 
magazine, published by the Legion, had a circulation of over 
90,000 copies. It is claimed that the labor turnover, which had 
previously been over a thousand per cent per annum, was sub- 
stantially reduced, and that the lumber output was increased five 
hundred per cent. 3 

When the Loyal Legion was first organized, it met with bitter 
opposition from both operators and to a lesser degree from the 
unions. 4 As the war progressed, the operators seem to have be- 

1 There is a good deal of dispute as to whom credit should be given 
for the establishment of the 8-hour day — whether to Gen. Disque, the 
Loyal Legion or the unions ; Robert S. Gill, Editor of the Four L 
Bulletin, in The Survey, May 1, 1920, after speaking of the new 
spirit of cooperation which the Four L's inaugurated, puts it in this 
way: "In March, 1918, the eight-hour day was conceded by the 
operators, on request of the government and owing to the new feel." 

2 American Lumberman, September 14, 1918. 

3 Eighth Biennial Report, Bureau of Labor Statistics, State of Ore- 
gon, p. 30, and Bulletins of Loyal Legion. 

4 A curious incident connected with this opposition was due to an 
error in the office of the War Department. An inquiry was directed 
to the Department as to whether or not the Loyal Legion had official 
sanction. Although the organization had the direct approval of the 
Secretary of War, this inquiry came into the hands of an officer who 



272 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

come reconciled to the existence of the organization and to have 
become its enthusiastic supporters; the unions, however — the In- 
ternational Association of Timber Workers (affiliated with the 
American Federation of Labor) and the I. W. W. — became more 
and more antagonistic. 1 

There dees not seem to be much doubt that General Disque's 
Department, when employing men, did not discriminate against 
union members and even went so far as to ask the cooperation of 
the unions. There is considerable conflict of opinion, however, 
as to whether or not the Department allowed men, after they 
had joined the Legion, to become members of labor unions, and 
some of the younger officers on General Disque's staff, in patriotic 
zeal, undoubtedly exceeded their authority, and interfered in an 
unwarranted manner with meetings to organize the lumber work- 
ers into labor organizations. General Disque issued a bulletin, 
stating that the civil rights of members of the Loyal Legion could 
not be interfered with and in the main this policy seems to have 
been carried out. After the signing of the armistice, the Govern- 
ment support was withdrawn. A number of men, who had been 
officers of the Loyal Legion as members of General Disque's staff, 
retained such positions in a civil capacity, and the Loyal Legion 
has continued as a peace body. As such it seems to be receiving 
the support of the operators, but the determined opposition of 
organized labor, being regarded by the latter with feelings similar 
to those aroused by the so-called "household" unions. 

As an instrument for procuring war production, it was cer- 
tainly a most successful one. What its record will be in time of 
peace is a more difficult question to determine. 

was not informed on the subject and who, without proper investiga- 
tion, wrote a letter stating the the Loyal Legion did not have the 
sanction of the War Department. This letter was given wide pub- 
licity by the opponents of the Legion. It was contradicted, however, 
by the publication of a telegram from the Secretary of War. 

1 The continuance of the Loyal Legion as a peace-time organiza- 
tion was submitted to a vote of the membership and 85% favored it. 
Robert S. Gill, The Survey, May 1, 1920. 



CHAPTER XX 
Conclusions 

A study of the conditions set forth in the preceding chapters 
emphasizes the conclusion that the difficulties which industry ex- 
perienced in meeting the needs of the war and of the post-armistice 
period were the result of pre-war difficulties rather than new ones 
created by the war emergency. Irritations, caused by war condi- 
tions, were added to previous bad industrial relations. As a result 
former difficulties were intensified, a large number of strikes oc- 
curred and the Government was forced to step in to overcome the 
impediments to production. 

At the beginning the Government seemed indifferent, then it 
took steps gropingly without the formulation of any clearly de- 
fined policy. The means at first adopted were the result of the 
suggestions of the particular individuals who represented the Gov- 
ernment at the points of disturbance. Gradually a recognition of 
the need for greater uniformity and a more coherent policy was 
forced upon all parts of the community and there was evolved a 
body of war labor principles which represented the most en- 
lightened attitude toward labor which the nation has ever at- 
tained or has yet been prepared to accept. 

The liberal and progressive attitude taken at this period by the 
administration brought down upon it the bitter reproaches of the 
employers, who felt that the Government was catering to the labor 
vote. Nor was labor on its side satisfied, but was convinced that 
the Government was favoring capital. 

In judging of the wisdom and fairness of the Government's con- 
duct it must be borne in mind that the nation faced a grave emer- 
gency and that as a result of war conditions an unprecedented 
power was placed in the hands of labor. The men were in a posi- 
tion to force large concessions from the employers. How far they 
could have gone by the sheer exercise of the power of the moment 
is difficult to say. But an examination of what actually was 

273 



274 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

awarded them will make it apparent that they did not take undue 
advantage of the situation and that the actions of the Government 
were amply justified both by justice and expediency. 

There is a widespread belief that the workers were greatly over- 
paid and that they profiteered at the expense of the nation. It 
is most important to determine the justice of this charge. 

The cost of living at the time of the armistice had increased 
about 70% and by the summer of 1920 had about doubled. But 
this rise in the cost of living started before any increase took 
place in wages and there can be no doubt that living costs would 
have, gone up irrespective of wage advances. From statistics com- 
piled in many occupations it appears that the wages of unorgan- 
ized common labor have more than doubled; in some industries 
they have even tripled. It is, however, not open to argument that 
pre-war wage levels for common labor were insufficient to support 
decent American standards. These increases were furthermore 
the result of economic conditions rather than of the action of Gov- 
ernment boards. The unprecedented shortage of common labor 
made it only natural that the wages of these very poorly paid 
men should have risen sharply as competition increased among 
employers for their services. In some cases, it is true, the wage 
boards made more or less arbitrary increases in order to stand- 
ardize wages and thus to prevent the men of one industry or 
locality from being attracted to a wage elsewhere which more 
nearly conformed to the general wage standard. But on the whole 
the wage increases of the unskilled worker were the result of the 
law of supply and demand and not of the actions of Government 
Boards. 

The wages of skilled mechanics are somewhat more difficult to 
analyze. Some crafts did not during the war period receive 
anything like as great an advance as the cost of living. This, 
for instance, was true generally of the building trades. On the 
other hand shipbuilders received a considerably greater increase. 
By 1920 there were still great variations but certain trades in 
which wages had lagged rose sharply. Others, including some of 
those in which wages advanced most during the war, stood still 
or advanced very little. The schedules of different trades indi- 
cate that the increase in the wages of skilled workers was on an 
average about equal to the increased cost of living and by the 



CONCLUSIONS 275 

summer of 1920 this was still approximately true. 1 Nevertheless 
the workers were undoubtedly better off during the war and up to 
the summer of 1920 than they had ever been. Weekly earnings 
of the individual, and especially the aggregate earnings of the en- 
tire family showed a higher percentage of increase than hourly 
rates indicated, due to the large amounts of overtime and the 
elimination of unemployment. 

Although the Government's wage awards were on the whole 
equitable, where it failed most conspicuously was in handling over- 
time. Here an almost total lack of control resulted in glaring and 
disruptive abuses, leading to extravagant costs for Government 
work and giving to the men the hope of a continuance of weekly 
earnings far in excess of the productive power of industry. 

That part of the Government's war labor policy which related 
to the treatment of labor unions has been even more sharply 
criticised than has its wage awards. Employers have the very 
definite opinion that the attitude of the Government toward the 
unions resulted not only in the large growth of union member- 
ship but also in increasing union aggressiveness and self-assertion. 
This judgment does not take into account the economic strength 
of labor nor that concessions were insisted upon from labor as 
well as from capital. The Government on the one hand prevented 
the employer from discharging an employee solely for union mem- 
bership, on the other hand it insisted that labor abandon de- 
mands for the extension of the closed shop and union recognition. 
Labor's waiver was a sacrifice at least equal to that of the em- 
ployer. 

Whereas in previous wars labor had suffered great hardship by 
the reduction in the purchasing power of wages, during this war 
labor at least held its own. Though it was accorded greater rec- 
ognition by the Government, yet taking into consideration all of 
the facts, it cannot be said that labor was unduly favored. Had 
the Government adopted a less liberal policy it is extremely doubt- 
ful if labor's cooperation could have been secured. 

During the post-armistice period, when the extreme emergency 

1 See : How Wages Kept Pace with the Cost of Living, Erville B. 
Woods; The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, May, 1920. Wages in Various Industries, Bureau of 
Applied Economics, Washington, D. C, 1919 and 1920. Wartime 
Changes in Wages, Research Report No. 20, National Industrial Con- 
ference Board. Profits, Wages, and Prices, David Friday. 



276 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

i was over, the Government's attitude radically changed. War 
^boards of all kinds were disbanded. Forms of compulsion, which 
\m the midst of the emergency had not been attempted, were used 
to prevent strikes. Instead of planning for the transition of the 
nation from a state of war to one of peace the difficult adjust- 
ments which were necessary were left to the haphazard and self- 
regarding actions of the business and laboring community. The 
supports which had been placed under the industrial structure 
while the changes due to the war were taking place were suddenly 
withdrawn. Both employer and labor, to be sure, welcomed this 
withdrawal. But the public by its failure to insist on the con- 
tinuance of the war boards deprived itself of protection against 
a condition of disorganization for which it has had to pay the 
largest part of the bill. 

To many of the workers it seemed that during the emergency of 
war they had been, as they expressed it, "jollied along" and that 
with the emergency over the Government and the employers de- 
liberately broke their promises. There can be no doubt that the 
men's charges were justified in a number of cases. This changed 
attitude was the cause of widespread unrest and men insisted on 
striking even though their leaders opposed this action. Scores of 
unauthorized strikes occurred, the result of the disillusionments 
that followed the war. 

Among the many hopes raised by the war was the hope that 
never again would we go back to the old days of unregulated in- 
dustry. The practicability of arbitration seemed so conclusively 
demonstrated that it was widely believed that industry would 
never again exist without adequate provision for the avoidance 
of industrial disputes. But this hope proved illusory. 

Nor is^ it difficult to see why arbitration in a great emergency 
was more successful than in normal times. War psychology gave 
to all members of the community the impulse to make sacrifices 
for the common good. Capital and labor both consented to waive 
certain controversial demands for which representatives of each 
side fight bitterly in times of peace. Some of the chief sources 
of present day conflict were thus removed. What remained was 
the difficult, although comparatively simple, task of applying the 
rules that had been agreed upon. 

But the moment the war was over each side was eager to re- 
assert the rights which it had temporarily waived. Labor im- 



CONCLUSIONS 277 

mediately returned to an aggressive policy of extending union in- 
fluence, forcing to the front its insistence that employers deal with 
union officials. This was the cause of many important strikes, 
notably the steel strike. The demand. for the closed shop was re- 
newed. The forty-eight-hour week, which had almost crystallized 
into a fixed principle of Government boards, was no longer satis- 
factory to workers in many trades who demanded the forty-four- 
hour week or a shorter one. There was an unwillingness to leave 
the settlement of these questions to the decision of adjustment 
boards. 

The desire once more to resort to force rather than to submit 
to the uncertainties of judicial process was not confined to the 
men. The employers also had been chafing under the constraint 
which the power of the Government had placed upon them. They 
wanted to be free to fix wages and to control their men. Feeling 
intensely that the spread of unionism was due to Government pro- 
tection, they wanted most of all to resume the practice of dis- 
charging workers for union activity. Some corporations seemed, 
indeed, to welcome strikes as a means of checking the spread of 
unionism. Whatever the motive, there can be no doubt that the 
practice of union discrimination was resumed and that a deter- 
mination to maintain this practice was one of the factors which 
made impossible the continued success of arbitration. 

More important even than war psychology in forcing the ac- 
ceptance of decisions of labor boards had been the industrial power 
of the Government in war-time. It became the employers' largest 
customer. It controlled the supplies of raw materials and of 
credit; it operated the railroads; it had the right to commandeer 
any plant needed for war production. In some occupations it 
became practically the only employer. It was thus in a position 
to force the directors of industry if they wished to continue in 
business — and to a lesser extent to force the workers — to accept 
its labor policies and to arbitrate labor difficulties rather than 
to fight them out. 

The success of arbitration under these conditions made us too 
sanguine. The implications of a continuous use of arbitral proc- 
esses were not generally realized. We overlooked the very im- 
portant fact that the submission of industrial controversies to 
judicial settlement meant the relinquishment of an attempt by one 
or both sides to achieve its own way by force; that it meant the 



278 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

substitution of the judgment of the arbitrator for the will of the 
parties to the dispute. But the same factors which, through the 
centuries, have kept nations from settling their disputes in a 
peaceful manner are at work to destroy industrial peace — the un- 
willingness of the individual or the group to substitute arbitration 
for force. 

Another difficulty is the absence of any agreement upon a set 
of principles as a basis for the adjustment of disputes. A code 
may be improvised in an emergency and imposed on each side 
by the power of a Government, but the acceptance ef Govern- 
ment-made standards can be procured only for the period of the 
emergency. Just as soon as it has passed, neither side will con- 
tinue to accept compromises. This was well illustrated by the 
President's first Industrial Conference where it was impossible to 
reach an agreement in spite of the difficulties confronting the 
nation. The President's second Conference, in order to agree 
unanimously upon a report, was forced to eliminate most contro- 
versial matter, and produced a document unacceptable to labor 
and not particularly welcome to capital. 

Nor has either side faith in the impartiality or the wisdom of 
the judges who must be called upon to decide industrial con- 
troversies. The questions at issue are often of so controversial a 
nature and involve so many technical problems of industry that 
it is almost impossible to obtain judges who possess the necessary 
knowledge and impartiality. 

The greatest obstacle to the continuous use of arbitration 
boards lies, perhaps, in a weakness inherent in any attempt to 
settle disputes by judicial process. By its very nature, arbitra- 
tion, a semi-legal procedure, tends to produce fixation, tends to 
the uniform application of hard and fast rules. A board of judges 
will almost inevitably seek precedents for its guidance. Even 
during so short a period as that which elapsed from the creation 
of the National War Labor Board in April, 19 18, to the signing 
of the armistice, the tendency toward rigidity was already mani- 
fest. But progress in industry must come from continuous growth 
and change. If we are to avoid the danger of revolution we must 
find the means for constant evolution, bringing about modifica- 
tions which are neither too rapid to be assimilated nor too slow 
to be effective. There is far too wide a difference of opinion on 
industrial questions — the present structure of society falls far too 



CONCLUSIONS 279 

short of the ideals of every thinking person — to make advisable 
the creation of any arbitral machinery which is likely to impede 
a continuous process of industrial growth. 

All this was not realized at the conclusion of the war. The 
extreme need for production in order to reduce the cost of living 
made the use of arbitration seem essential. And when, in spite 
of the war-time success of arbitration, the men went out on in- 
numerable strikes in 19 19, the general feeling of resentment was 
not unnatural. This resentment was very much increased because 
many of the strikes were led by foreigners and many of them 
were started without the sanction of the national officers of organ- 
ized labor — "outlaw," the press seemed to delight in calling them. 

All this led, not to an effort to remove legitimate grievances, 
but to an increase in the intolerance and the repression which ac- 
companied the v/ar and to the advocacy of new and quick remedies 
to cure difficulties which had been accumulating since the advent 
of the factory system. Ill-considered laws were advocated for 
the suppression of freedom of speech, for interference with aca- 
demic freedom. There has been much agitation for the introduc- 
tion of compulsory arbitration, especially in connection with pub- 
lic utilities. The adoption by Congress of such a plan for the rail- 
ways was prevented by only a narrow margin and in many juris- 
dictions attempts were made to set up tribunals similar to the 
Kansas Industrial Court. 

But experience has shown that you cannot, for any length of 
time, successfully deprive workers of the right to strike. In Eng- 
land where the heads of the unions agreed that there should be 
no strikes for the period of the war, the unwillingness of the men 
to abide by this renunciation led to the assumption of power by 
the shop stewards, who called the men out on strikes which the 
leaders had promised would not take place. In Australia, where 
compulsory arbitration has received its most extensive trial, the 
verdict of impartial investigators is that the system is not the 
solution of the industrial conflict. Men cannot be forced to abide 
by decisions which do not appeal to their sense of fairness. Dan- 
gerous as the occurrence of strikes may be, nothing seems plainer 
than that compulsory arbitration or any attempt to forbid strikes 
by law is certain to fail. 

But it does not therefore follow that the Government ought 
not to use every means to facilitate the peaceful adjustment of in- 



280 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

dustrial disputes. Although machinery created by agreement be- 
tween employers' associations and strongly organized unions is 
the best means which can to-day be devised to prevent the occur- 
rence of strikes, yet in most industries such agreements have not 
been possible. Even where they exist, there often comes a time 
when the industry may require outside assistance to prevent a 
rupture. To keep the peace in such emergencies as well as in 
the vast realm of industry in which no such agreements have been 
made, the creation of adequate arbitral machinery seems highly 
desirable. And the war experience has shown, not that it is pos- 
sible to entirely prevent strikes, but that the existence of proper 
facilities for arbitration is a tremendous help in accomplishing this 
task. 

To what extent then has all of this experience enabled us to 
state what the requisites are for any successfully constituted system 
of arbitration? The greatest obstacle to the creation of such a 
system is the antagonism between many of the large employers 
and the labor unions. On its side, labor is unalterably opposed 
to the creation of any boards of arbitration on which it is not rep- 
resented and it is therefore a matter of serious doubt whether the 
successful creation of any arbitral machinery is possible if the 
employer maintains his opposition to organized labor. During the 
war the Government used its economic power to compel employers 
to abide by the decisions of boards of adjustment on which organ- 
ized labor was represented. But when the war was over and the 
continuance of the boards as peace-time agencies was being con- 
sidered, it was the presence of union men which was particularly 
unacceptable to the employers. That an impasse had been reached 
was evident from the experience of the two Industrial Conferences 
called by the President. 

No matter how unpalatable to employers their existence may 
be, an impartial reading of industrial history will show that the 
many improvements that have taken place in the condition of the 
workers have been largely the result of the efforts of the labor 
unions and of the economic and political power they have been 
able to exert. And this was no less true during the war. The 
most potent influence in preventing a lowering of the workers' 
economic status, such as took place during the Civil War, was 
the existence in many industries of labor unions and the fear in 
others that low wages would invite their spread. In many places 



CONCLUSIONS 281 

where unions did not exist and there was little or no fear of the 
strike, employees fared badly. Let any one compare the treat- 
ment given by the Government to its teachers or clerks with the 
treatment accorded to organized mechanics. The same compari- 
son can be made between the organized and the unorganized 
groups of employees of any industry. 

The natural representatives of the workers are the labor unions 
— organizations which they themselves have voluntarily formed. 
Unfortunately these organizations, like so many other groups in 
the community, are sometimes badly and even corruptly man- 
aged. The difficulty with the average employer is that he sees 
the faults of the other side so much more clearly than he sees 
the weaknesses of his own and he fails to recognize very real 
grievances of the workers. The same lack of vision can be im- 
puted to the employees who see the employer's shortcomings with- 
out understanding his difficulties. Most of the things which each 
side says about the other are true, or largely true, but in neither 
case are they the whole truth. When an employer criticizes the 
management of a union and charges it with making for ineffi- 
ciency and limiting production, the charge is in many cases true. 
But the employer does not see that in a competitive system the 
existence of the union is essential to the protection of the workers 
and that he himself limits production when he thinks it to his in- 
terest to do so. He fails to realize that the faults of union man- 
agement are the faults of most democratically controlled bodies. 
No one can defend corruption and mismanagement in labor unions, 
but one of the best ways of helping to eliminate these evils is to 
allow the unions to concentrate their attention upon them and not 
compel the unions to dissipate their energies in a struggle for exist- 
ence against the attacks of powerful employers. 

Unless the industrial development of America is to be greatly 
different from that of every other industrial country the unions 
will continue to grow in numbers and in power. An attitude of 
irreconcilable hostility by big business interests runs contrary to 
the processes of social evolution. It creates an impossible situa- 
tion, delaying the successful organization of industry and the 
peaceful adjustment of disputes. 

As to the technique of arbitration, the size of boards, the man- 
ner of their organization, their constituency and like questions, our 
experience during the war was very broad indeed and embraced 



282 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

many differently constituted agencies, and yet this experience does 
not point as clearly and unmistakably to definite conclusions as 
one might have wished. Boards of all sizes were created during 
the war. Thus disputes in the clothing trade were settled by one 
man; so were some of those in munition plants. Many boards 
contained three members, some five and six, some eight and one 
even twelve. All of them were, in the main, successful and the 
war experience therefore fails to indicate that any particular im- 
portance attaches to size. It is interesting to note that when Con- 
gress, upon the relinquishment of public control, was called upon 
to create a permanent board of adjustment for the railroads it 
did not model this upon any of those created during the war but 
decided upon a board of nine members — a much larger one than 
those previously created. 

The representative character of the members is a more im- 
portant question. Should the public be represented? Should 
employer and employee? Boards created during the war contained 
examples of all kinds. Usually all three were given places. But 
on some boards the public only was represented; in others the 
public was not represented at all. Unquestionably the war emer- 
gency emphasized the public character of industry. The old idea 
of the employer that "this is my business" is being modified by 
the recognition of the workers' share. But we are gradually real- 
izing that the employer and employee are not the only ones who 
have a stake in industry — the public too has its share. The boards 
which were created in the early days of the war contained repre- 
sentatives of the public in whom was vested the power of decision 
if the spokesmen of labor and capital disagreed. Those organized 
in the second year of the war usually contained employee and em- 
ployer members only. The National War Labor Board was a 
distinct variation in that it had an equal number of representa- 
tives of labor and of capital, with each group electing a chairman 
who was in theory to represent the public. But the fact that the 
chairmen were chosen by the groups made them at least in part 
representative of the group rather than of the public and there 
were not infrequent deadlocks caused by each chairman voting 
with his group. The joint chairmen were not, however, merely 
representatives of employer and employee. Deadlocks would have 
been of much more frequent occurrence had not ex-President Taft, 
the joint chairman elected by the employers, voted in many im- 



CONCLUSIONS 283 

portant matters with the employees. The conspicuous failures of 
the board, however, were cases which were decided by umpires — 
exclusively the representatives of the public. 

The railroad boards created in the second year of the war con- 
sisted of even numbers of representatives of each side, with no 
public representation (except that in theory these boards were 
only advisory to the Director General of Railways). They were 
eminently successful and in every case reached an agreement. On 
the other hand the Board of Appeals of the Shipbuilding Labor 
Adjustment Board, which was also composed of an equal number 
of representatives of capital and of labor with no public repre- 
sentation, was deadlocked shortly after the armistice, with dis- 
astrous consequences — the Seattle general strike. 

It will thus be seen that, although the war period witnessed 
heretofore unusual recognition of the public interest in the com- 
position of most of the boards, yet it cannot be said, as a result 
of that experience, that public representation will necessarily in- 
sure the success of the board. Most unions and most employers 
prefer arbitration conducted exclusively by representatives of the 
two sides. In their opinion the representative of the public is 
apt to become the deciding member of the board with the prob- 
ability that his decision will be unsatisfactory to at least one side 
and perhaps to both. They believe that boards on which em- 
ployer and employee are equally represented usually manage to 
agree and that there will then be a feeling that the settlement, 
even if unsatisfactory, is self-imposed. Undoubtedly there is much 
sound psychology in this view, and yet it cannot be the solution of 
the future. The public has a real interest which must be recog- 
nized and which both sides are apt to forget. The boards which 
lack public representation are liable to deadlock and more im- 
portant still, their decisions can too easily ignore the public. They 
may, indeed, by joint agreement go so far as to create a monopoly 
of the business, labor upon payment of high wages consenting to 
what amounts to a conspiracy among employers to extort unfair 
profits from the public. It seems clear that a properly constituted 
board of arbitration will include representatives of all three of the 
parties interested in the outcome of the dispute, although a new 
form of representation of the public may prove desirable. Perhaps 
experiments with industrial parliaments and trade guilds, now 



284 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

being made, will develop a finer organization of industry and 
more harmonious industrial relations. 

The area of jurisdiction is also important. Should a system of 
arbitration be national or are disputes better adjusted by a board 
with only local authority? Should machinery be created within 
each industry like the Industrial Councils of England or should 
the boards have general authority to adjust any disputes within 
definite geographic areas? Whenever it is possible to create an 
adjustment board with jurisdiction confined to a particular in- 
dustry such a course would seem best. To the fact that the juris- 
diction of most of the war boards was confined to one industry 
was due a large part of their success. The "public" member of 
the board was thus able to become thoroughly familiar with the 
details of the industry, to acquire expert knowledge of the indus- 
trial processes in connection with which labor adjustments v/ere 
to be made. Even the National War Labor Board subdivided its 
work so that disputes in certain industries were in the first instance 
handled by particular members of the board. 

If an industry is national in scope, with nation-wide competition 
such as the shipbuilding, clothing or steel industries, it would 
seem that a national agency, able to standardize working condi- 
tions for the entire country, would be desirable, with local exam- 
iners or deputies. For an industry like building in which com- 
petition is limited to the immediate locality in which the work is 
done, it is not so important — although still highly desirable — 
that wages and working conditions be standardized on a national 
scale. In industries of this kind purely local boards would prob- 
ably function best, for in many ways a local tribunal being closer 
to the situation is better able to reach a decision satisfactory to 
both sides. It is easier for purely local boards to make differen- 
tiations in wages and working conditions and to render prompt 
decisions. Our entire emergency experience has shown that de- 
lay leads to endless complications. Many a controversy, if 
promptly decided, can be amicably settled, but when delayed pas- 
sions are aroused, the subtle forces underlying industrial relations 
are disturbed and irretrievable harm is done. Strikes have often 
been due solely to the delay of the boards in taking jurisdiction. 
Nothing could be more wasteful than such a strike. And yet the 
boards are often not to blame as they are usually overburdened 
with work. A local board is less likely to have a crowded calendar; 



CONCLUSIONS 285 

and being on the spot it can get to work more promptly and decide 
more expeditiously. It seems wiser, therefore, to confine arbitra- 
tion to local bodies in cases where the creation of national boards 
is not imperative. 

The difficulties of arbitration were not the only ones illumi- 
nated by our war experience. At every point it threw light upon 
general industrial problems. Immigration, for instance, was shown 
as one of the controlling factors in determining the conditions 
of the workers. It was the cessation of immigration during the 
war that more than anything else gave labor its economic power. 
From 19 14 to the summer of 1920 immigration practically stopped 
and it has been estimated that there are in this country one mil- 
lion less workers for each year of that period. Before 19 14 our 
industries could count on the yearly arrival of vast hordes of 
men and women accustomed to low standards of living, difficult 
to organize and glad to work for the then prevailing wages of 
from fifteen to twenty cents an hour. If the large industries of 
the country continue to have at their disposal an unlimited supply 
of ignorant immigrants, eager to work long hours for amounts of 
pay less than enough properly to support American standards of 
life, then the wages of common labor will once more decline and 
the wage standards of the entire industrial population will be in 
danger of debasement. 

One of the disappointments of the workers was the small bene- 
fit which because of the increased cost of living they derived 
from high wages. It is partly on this account the post-armistice 
period witnessed demands on a scale heretofore unknown for 
more sweeping changes in our industrial structure. Thus, in two 
of the most powerful labor organizations in the country, the 
miners and railroad men, demands have been put forward not 
only for government control, but for participation therein by the 
workers. In many other trades, this same spirit has become in- 
creasingly evident, sometimes taking the form of a desire to es- 
tablish a kind of Guild Socialism. It cannot be said to affect the 
majority of American workers. But there can be no doubt that 
the number of men and women is daily increasing who desire a 
thoroughgoing change in industry rather than merely the better- 
ment which would result from an increase in wages, or a shorten- 
ing of hours. And the widespread growth of sentiment of this 
kind is distinctly a result of the war. 



286 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

As the answer of many conservative men and women to this 
war-engendered radicalism has come the intense reaction and 
repression of the post-armistice period. This has been accom- 
panied by a willingness to use violence and suppression, to permit 
our constitutional liberties to be abused and abridged. Intoler- 
ance with any differences of opinion has frequently supplanted 
that broad and generous hospitality to new ideas with which we 
have liked to associate the name of America. It is quite probable 
that this -willingness to use force and repression against an un- 
popular minority is merely a passing phase. With the return to 
more normal economic conditions, a large mass of our people 
will probably realize that the best methods of promoting evolu- 
tionary changes are by the extension of American civil liberties 
and by efforts to correct abuses rather than to imprison those who 
point them out. Reaction breeds radicalism and radicalism in 
turn makes for reaction. We are thus in a vicious circle which 
constitutes a real danger. It is to be hoped that as the 
excitement and hysteria bred by the war die down, this vicious 
circle will be broken and we will return to a state of mind in 
which the liberty of the citizen is respected even when it leads 
him to differ radically in his economic views from the opinion of 
the majority. 

The state of industrial unpreparedness in which the country 
found itself at the outbreak of the war was in a measure overcome 
and on the whole a fairly creditable showing made. But the con- 
dition of our industrial relations was such that we might have 
faced serious consequences had not the emergency forced a tem- 
porary truce between capital and labor. It cannot be said that we 
are better off to-day. On the contrary, the occurrences of the 
post-armistice period have tended to increase the bitterness with 
which many of the workers and employers have always regarded 
each other. 

During the war itself, progress was made toward securing a 
broader spirit of cooperation. But to-day we are more than ever 
in need of a better understanding between employer and em- 
ployee. It is imperative that present feelings of hostility be re- 
placed by a mutual desire to cooperate. This cannot come unless 
the very real improvement which has already been made in the 
conditions of many wage-earners be further extended and unless 



CONCLUSIONS 287 

the workers be gradually given a substantial share of the control 
of industry. 

Just how far it will be possible to go and just how quickly 
are questions about which reasonable men differ. What is needed 
is a disposition to welcome a change and a willingness to help bring 
it about as rapidly as conditions warrant. There must also come a 
keener realization that in the struggles between employer and em- 
ployee their positions are not equal. The stake, on the one side, 
is frequently a little more or a little less money to a group which 
already has much. On the other, it is frequently more or less 
food and shelter for the man and his family when he has not 
enough of either to live. Many employers can shut down their 
plants for years without even inconvenience, but to the workers 
enforced idleness means at best the exhaustion of hard-earned 
savings; at worst want and perhaps starvation. 

The essential need is the development by both employer and 
employee of a new conception of efficiency and a new ideal of 
service. The efficiency of the worker has been secured largely 
through the fear of losing his job. Society has not supplied him 
with any other motive. Without the fear of enforced idleness 
efficiency has slumped and indifference has taken its place. In- 
dustry, in the past, has been conducted by both sides without 
sentiment and to a great extent without ideals. Almost any busi- 
ness man will probably say, quite frankly, that his object in con- 
ducting his business is to make profits and nothing else. In the 
stress of competition and dominated by his limited conception 
of business an employer will not hesitate to cut wages and to 
discontinue the employment of his workers irrespective of the 
hardship which such a course may entail. The idea of service 
either to the public or to those employed in industry is seldom 
present. And the worker, who is just about the same sort of 
human as the employer, will give just as little return for his 
wages as he can without any belief in the dignity of his occupation 
or any realization of society's need that he gives the best that is 
in him. 

Fortunately both employer and employee are here and there 
showing the workings of a new spirit. The idea of service is be- 
ginning to take its place in the new conception of industry. Some 
employers are endeavoring to give their workers a larger share of 



288 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

control. They are groping their way toward organization on the 
basis of cooperation and service. Some of the workers also see 
that if they are to share in this control they too must develop a 
new conception of cooperative efficiency. Among the churches, as 
well, there has come the desire to translate theology and ethics 
into terms of industrial policy and practice. A number of our 
most important religious bodies have given utterance to programs 
for better industrial relations which show how widespread is the 
conviction that industry must be reshaped to conform to our tra- 
ditional ideals of democracy and to express our newer ideals of 
service. 



APPENDICES 



APPENDIX I 

STRIKE DATA, 1914 TO 1919 

Statistical information is perhaps of less value in regard to 
strikes than to other sociological phenomena. This partly be- 
cause there are many important factors concerning industrial con- 
flicts which cannot be set forth in terms of statistics; partly also 
because available information is very incomplete. Prior to 1880 
no reliable data are to be had as to the number of strikes or their 
size and other characteristics. But because of the importance 
which industrial controversies were beginning to assume, the 
Tenth Census (1880) contained a special report dealing with 
them. And for the next twenty-five years, that is to say, from 
1881 to 1905, the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics under- 
took a study of the strikes which occurred during these years, 
publishing its results in four annual reports of the Bureau, in 
1887, 1894, 1901 and 1906. The Monthly Review of the De- 
partment said of them: "The data for these reports were secured 
by thorough investigations by trained field agents, and it is prob- 
able that few strikes and lockouts were omitted. Because of the 
time and expense involved the Bureau has not considered it pos- 
sible to continue this method, although it is probably the only one 
likely to secure complete returns." * 

Between the years 1905 and 19 14 the Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics did not publish any information as to the number of strikes 
which took place although data were issued by the American Fed- 
eration of Labor as to disputes which affected that organization. 
In 1 9 14 the Bureau of Statistics of the newly organized Labor 
Department compiled "a record of strikes and lockouts entirely 
from printed sources — newspapers, labor journals, trade union 
periodicals, and manufactures', trade, and other papers. In 191 5 
the same method was continued, and in connection with about 

1 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April, 1916, 
P- 13. 

291 



2 9 2 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

1,400 strikes an attempt was made to supplement the information 
thus obtained by sending a schedule of inquiry to persons thought 
to have detailed knowledge concerning them." 1 This method has 
been continued to this date and the Monthly Labor Review has 
published annually the material thus obtained. In June, 19 19, 
a more extended study was made of the data for the years 19 16, 
191 7 and 1918, which was published in the Monthly Review for 
that month, and a year later the figures for 19 19 were added. 2 At- 
tention is called by the Labor Department to the fact that the 
information gathered by it since 19 14 is less complete than that 
obtained by the more careful methods employed from 1881 to 
1905 and that no comparisons can therefore be made between 
these two periods. 3 

In the period from 1881 to 1905 there occurred a total of 
38,303 strikes and lockouts, or an average of 1,532 a year. In 
1 88 1 the number was only 477. For the twelve years following 
1889 it fluctuated from 1,1 11 in that year to 1,839 m 1900. In 
1901 the number rose to 3,012 and in 1903 there occurred the 
largest number of strikes and lockouts of the period — 3,648. (A 
useful series of tables and charts is given in Groat — An Introduc- 
tion to the Study of Organized Labor in America, pp. 168 et seq.) 

The largest number of strikes and lockouts beginning in a 
single month was 617 in May, 191 6. In May, 191 7, there was 
463; 391 in May, 1918, and 413 in May, 1919. The largest an- 
nual number of strikes and lockouts in a single city occurred in 
New York, where, in 1916, there were 363; in 1917, 484; in 
1918, 484; in 1919, 360. See Monthly Labor Review, June, 1920. 
(The figures vary slightly from those given in Monthly Labor Re- 
view, June, 1919.) 

It will be seen from Table No. 1 that the largest number of 
strikes in the country's history occurred in 19 17, the first year 
of the war. There were about the same number of workers in- 
volved in the strikes of 191 7 and 1918 and many more in those 
of 19 1 6. In 19 1 9 the number of strikes was nearly one thousand 
less than in 191 7, whereas the number of workers involved far 

1 Monthly Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April, 1916, 

p. 13. 

'Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, June, 
1920, p. 20. 

3 Ibid., April, 1916. 



APPENDICES 



293 



exceeded that of any previous year and was over three times the 
number in 191 7. 



TABLE NO. I 





Num- 
ber of 
Strikes 


Lock- 
outs 


Total 


| Number of Employees Involved 




Strikes 


Lock- 
outs 


Total 


1914 


979 

1246 
3678 
4233 
3181 
3253 


101 
159 
108 
126 
104 
121 


1080 
1405 

3786 
4359 
3285 
3374 


** 

468,983 
1,546,428 
1,193,867 
1,192,418 
3,950,411 


** 

35,292 
53,182 
19,133 
43,041 
162,096 


** (1) 


1915 


504,275 (2) 


1916 


1,599,610 (3) 


1917 


1,213,000 (4) 


1918 


1,235,459 (5) 


1919 


4,112,507 (6) 



(1) ** Information not given. 

(2) Information as to number of employees available in 873 cases. 

(3) Information as to number of employees available in 2664 cases. 

(4) Information as to number of employees available in 2220 cases. 

(5) Information as to number of employees available in 2097 cases. 

(6) Information as to number of employees available in 2493 cases. 

It will be seen from Table No. II that by far the largest 
single cause of strikes has been wages and that there was a 



TABLE NO. II 
Principal Causes of Strikes and Lockouts from 1914 to 1919.* 





1914 


1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 


1919 


Causes 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 

to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 

50.8 

67.6 
3. 

15.5 
1.9 

4.4 
7.8 

14.4 
4.8 


No. 

1115 

2087 
122 

932 
65 

176 
397 

748 
141 

3161 


%of 
to- 
tal 




294 

387 

48 

96 

72 

110 

63 

96 

47 

808 


36.3 

47.6 
5.9 

10.1 

8.9 

13.6 
7.7 

11.8 
5.8 


409 

623 
81 

251 
39 

86 
52 

06 

73 

1405 


29.1 

44.3 
5.7 

17.8 

2.7 

6.1 
3.7 

6.6 
5.1 


1349 

2110 
120 

725 
59 

145 
366 

586 
127 

3155 


42.7 

66.8 
3.8 

22.9 
1.8 

4.2 
11.6 

18.5 
4. 


1578 

2260 
521 

649 
99 

227 
314 

564 
206 

3567 


44.2 

63.3 
14.6 

18.1 
2.7 

6.3 
8.8 

15.8 

5.7 


1433 

1906 
85 

427 
56 

125 

221 

406 
137 

2819 


35.3 


Wages with or without oth- 


66.0 




3.9 


Hours with or without 


29 5 


General conditions 

Conditions and other de- 


2.0 

5 6 


Recognition of the union . . 
Recognition and other de- 


12.6 

23 7 


Discharge of employees . . . 

Total for which informa- 
tion was furnished .... 


4.5 



* Percentages given in Tables II and III are based on the number of strikes for which infor- 
mation is available as to the subject matter of each table. 



294 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

marked increase from 191 6 to 19 18 in the proportionate number 
of strikes for this cause. Nor is this to be wondered at when we 
consider the rise in the cost of living during the period in ques- 
tion. In 19 1 8 one-half of all the strikes were solely for higher 
wages and two-thirds of the entire number had wage advances 
as one of their demands. In 19 19 the number of strikes solely on 
account of wages declined but the number in which wage demands 
figured was still two-thirds. 

Other periods show a like preponderance in strikes for this 
cause. Carroll Wright in "Battles of Labor" gives estimates of 
the number of strikes from 1741 to 1880 and says that out of 
1,491 strikes and lockouts during this period 1,089 were f° r wages. 
In 1 88 1 over 70% of the stoppages of work were for wage de- 
mands alone. But in the period from 1881 to 1905 the general 
tendency was toward fewer strikes solely on account of wages 
and more of them for recognition of the union or the enforcement 
of union rules, the number of strikes for the latter cause rising 
in 1905 to almost 35%. On the other hand, during the war 
period there was an increasingly large number of strikes for wages 
and a fluctuating percentage for union recognition — as low as 
3.7% in 1915, 8.8% in 1917 and 7.8 in 1918. When the war- 
time waiver of labor's demand for recognition of the union came 
to an end in 1919, the percentage of strikes for recognition alone 
rose sharply to 12.6% and to 23.7% when the strikes in which 
this demand was combined with others are included. 

The number of strikes solely for the shortening of hours was 
unusually large in 1917 — 14.6%; it dropped to 3% in 1918. Com- 
bined with other demands the percentage rose, in 19 19, to the 
highest percentage of the war period. 

Table No. Ill shows that strikes which occurred during the 
war years of 191 7 and 19 18 were of substantially shorter dura- 
tion than those of the preceding years. Almost half of the strikes 
of 191 7 and 19 1 8 did not last more than six days. In 1919 the 
duration of strikes once more increased; less than one-quarter 
lasted six days or less, whereas over half lasted from fifteen days 
to several months. During 191 7 and 19 18 the largest number of 
strikes were for the short periods; but in 19 19 the largest number 
were for the longer periods, the highest percentage lasting from 
one to three months. 



APPENDICES 



295 



TABLE NO. Ill 

Duration of Strikes * 





1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 


1919 


Time 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 

to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 

to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 

to- 
tal 


2 days or less 

3 to 6 days 


84 
124 
130 

96 
100 

29 

17 


14.4 
21.3 
22.4 
16.5 
17.2 

5. 

2.9 


364 

514 
510 
384 
219 
99 
23 


17.2 
24.3 
24. 
18.1 
10.3 
4.6 
1.0 


389 

257 
290 
198 
157 
53 
9 


28.7 
18.9 
21.4 
14.6 
11.6 
3.9 
.7 


393 
357 
376 
282 
172 
30 
21 


24. 

21.8 

23. 

17.2 

10.5 
1.8 
1.2 


163 

252 
328 
378 
455 
144 
21 


9.4 

14 7 


7 to 14 days 


18 8 


15 to 31 days 

32 to 91 days 

92 to 200 days 

Over 200 days 


21.7 

26.2 

8.3 

1.2 


Total (for which in- 
formation was given) 


580 




2113 




1353 




1633 




1741 





* Percentages given in Tables II and III are based on the number of strikes for which infor- 
mation is available as to the subject matter of each table. 

For purposes of comparison it would have been desirable to 
include a table showing the number of individuals engaged in the 
industries enumerated above. But the classification in the census 
reports do not correspond with the classifications of Table IV. 

TABLE NO. IV 
Strikes and Lockouts in the Leading Industrial Groups * 





1914 


1915 


1916 


1917 


1918 


1919 


Industry 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 


No. 


%of 
to- 
tal 




275 
78 
14 
40 


25.4 
7.2 
1.2 
3.7 


231 

139 

30 

14 


16.4 

9.8 

2.1 

.9 


394 

227 

72 

44 

34 

70 

561 

402 

27 

261 

228 

3786 


10.4 

5.2 

1.9 

1.1 

.8 

1.8 

14.8 

10.6 

.7 

6.8 

6. 


460 

487 

56 

299 

19 

37 

535 

407 

101 

238 

331 

4359 


10.5 

11.1 

1.2 

6.8 

.4 

.8 

12.1 

9.3 

2.3 

5.4 
7.5 


427 

428 

73 

75 

16 

39 

458 

182 

138 

205 

186 

3285 


12.9 

13.0 

2.2 

2.2 

.4 

1.1 

13.9 

5.5 

4.2 

6.2 

5.6 


442 

308 

75 

41 

32 

69 

556 

172 

102 

267 

234 

3374 


13 1 




9.1 




2.2 




1.2 




1 












2 




129 

51 


11.9 

4.7 


321 
67 


22. 
4.7 


16 5 




5 1 




3 


Textiles 


54 

52 

1080 


5. 
4.8 


84 
18 

1405 


5.9 
1.2 


7 9 




7 


Total 









* Percentages are figured on the entire number of strikes and lockouts as given in Table 
No. I. 



296 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

In a general way, however, the census shows that by far the 
largest number of employees in any one industry was engaged in 
transportation, in which comparatively few strikes occurred. The 
five industries in which the largest number of strikes took place 
— the metal trades, building, clothing, textiles and mining — em- 
ployed the largest number of workers except transportation. In 
other words, with that exception, the number of strikes corre- 
spond roughly with the number of workers. It must be borne 
in mind that these figures relate to the number of strikes and do 
not take into consideration the number of employees involved. 

It should be noted that the data published by the National 
Conference Board, which relate, however, to strikes occurring 
only during the first six months of the war, do not agree with 
the figures given above for the year 191 7 and show the follow- 
ing percentages — demands refused, 35%; demands granted, 27%; 
compromised, 38%. 

Perhaps the most significant fact shown by Table V is the 
small number of cases in which the men returned to work pend- 







TABLE NO. V 

Results of Strikes 














1915 


1916 


1917 , 


1918 


1919 




No. 

128 
193 
322 

31 
69 


% 

19 

29 

47 

5 


No. 

724 
733 
766 

70 
99 


% 

31 

32 
34 

3 


No. 

366 
581 
679 

131 
142 


% 

21 

33 
39 

7 


No. 

417 
591 
659 

198 
212 


% 

23 
32 
35 

10 


No. 

624 
533 
729 

42 
33 


% 


In favor of employer . . 
In favor of employee . . 

Compromised 

Employee returned 

pending arbitration . 

Not reported 


32 

28 
38 

2 


(Have not been includ- 
ed in figuring per- 
centages.) 





ing arbitration. In 19 16 this was only 3%. In 191 7 it rose to 
7% and in 19 18 to 10%" — a substantial increase, but not very im- 
pressive, considering the development of arbitral machinery and 
the large number of strikes which nevertheless took place. In 
19 19, however, when the wage boards were abolished, the per- 
centage dropped to 2.2%. 



APPENDICES 



297 



TABLE NO. VI 









Number and percent- 


Unreported 




Number and percent- 


Number and percent- 


age of strikes and 


(not in- 




age of strikes and 


age of strikes and 


lockouts in which em- 


cluded in 


Year 


lockouts in which em- 


lockouts in which em- 


ployees were not 


figuring 




ployees were mem- 
bers of a union 


ployees were not 


members of a union 


percent- 




members of a union 


when strike began but 


ages) 








became organized 




1914.. 


no data 














1915.. 


929 


82 


176 


15.5 


29 


2.5 


459 


1916.. 


2455 


82.7 


446 


15 


71 


2.3 


814 


1917.. 


2372 


90 


204 


8 


55 


2 


1728 


1918.. 


1884 


83 


360 


16 


26 


1 


1015 


1919.. 


1913 


92 


136 


6.6 


29 


1.4 


1296 



APPENDIX NO. II 

EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION WAGE COMMISSION 

The first members of the Board were: 

General E. A. Garlington, representing the War Department. 

John R. Alpine, representing labor. 

Walter Lippmann, representing the public. 

General Garlington was succeeded by Colonel S. K. Ansell, 
who in turn was succeeded by Colonel J. H. Alexander. Colonel 
Alexander, after his appointment in April, 19 18, was chairman 
of the board and its most active member. 

Walter Lippman was succeeded by Stanley King, who was fol- 
lowed by Dr. E. M. Hopkins. 

The Board was constituted under the following agreement: 



June 19, 1917. 

For the adjustment and control of wages, hours and conditions 
of labor in the construction of cantonments, there shall be created 
an adjustment commission of three persons, appointed by the Sec- 
retary of War; one to represent the Army, one the public, and one 
labor; the last to be nominated by Samuel Gompers, member of 
the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, 
and President of the American Federation of Labor. 

As basic standards with reference to each cantonment, such 
commission shall use the union scales of wages, hours and condi- 



298 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

tions in force on June i, 191 7, in the locality where such canton- 
ment is situated. Consideration shall be given to special circum- 
stances, if any, arising after said date which may require particu- 
lar advances in wages or changes in other standards. Adjustments 
of wages, hours or conditions made by such board are to be 
treated as binding by all parties. 

(Signed) Newton D. Baker. 

(Signed) Samuel Gompers. 

Explanatory letters and telegrams followed between Louis B, 
Wehle, representing the War Department, and Samuel Gompers 
and Frank Morrison, representing the American Federation of 
Labor, in which Mr. Wehle explained that the "Government can- 
not commit itself in any way to the closed shop and that the con- 
ditions in force on June 1, 191 7, which are to serve as part of the 
basic standards, do not include any provisions which have refer- 
ence to the employment of non-union labor. . . . The word 'con- 
ditions' is of course clearly understood to refer only to the union 
arrangements in the event of overtime, holiday work, and matters 
of that kind." Mr. Gompers telegraphed, "Your understanding of 
the memorandum signed by Secretary Baker and me is right. It 
had reference to union hours and wages. The question of union 
shop was not included." 



APPENDIX NO. Ill 

SHIPBUILDING LABOR ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

The original members of the Board were: 

V. Everitt Macy, chairman, appointed by the President. 

E. F. Carry, appointed by the Shipping Board. 

A. J. Berres, representing the American Federation of Labor. 

Mr. Carry was, after a very short time, succeeded by Louis B. 
Coolidge, and Mr. Coolidge, toward the end of the war, by Dr. 
L. C. Marshall. 

Henry R. Seager was secretary of the Board and was, some 
time after the signing of the armistice, succeeded by W. E. 
Hotchkiss. 

The country was divided into nine districts, co-terminus with 
the districts of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, viz. — New Eng- 



APPENDICES 299 

land, North Atlantic, Delaware River, Middle Atlantic, South At- 
lantic, Gulf, Great Lakes, South Pacific and North Pacific. 

The original agreement provided for a board of three members 
— one representing the public, one the Shipping Board and one 
appointed by the President of the American Federation of Labor. 
The Navy was entitled to separate representation when matters 
affecting it were under consideration ; two representatives of labor 
were also provided for, one to act when matters concerning the 
metal trades were to be decided, the other to represent the car- 
penters and joiners. Local representation of both sides was an- 
other feature of the original contract and the board before which 
the Seattle hearings, in the fall of 191 7, were held, contained 
such local representation. The agreement, as amended on Decem- 
ber 8, 191 7, abolished all of these forms of special representa- 
tion and provided for a simplified board of three members, one 
representing the public, the second representing the Shipping 
Board and Navy Department jointly, and the third represent- 
ing the workers. 

The Board had jurisdiction over the following types of work: x 

(a) The construction and repair of Shipbuilding plants paid 
for by the Emergency Fleet Corporation or the Navy. 

(b) The construction or repair of ships in yards either directly 
under the Emergency Fleet Corporation and Shipping Board or 
under direct contract with them. 

(c) The construction or repair of ships in private plants doing 
work for the Navy. 

(d) The outfitting of vessels after launching. 



APPENDIX NO. IV 

NATIONAL ADJUSTMENT COMMISSION 

As originally constituted consisted of: 

Raymond B. Stevens, chairman, representing the United States 
Shipping Board. 
Walter Lippmann, representing the War Department. 

* P. H. Douglas and F. S. Wolfe, The Journal of Political Economy, 
March, 1919, page 154. 



300 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

T. V. O'Connor, representing the International Longshoremen's 
Association. 

P. A. S. Franklin and H. H. Raymond nominated by the Com- 
mittee on Shipping of the Council of National Defense, repre- 
senting Deep-Sea and Coastwise Shipping interests, respectively. 
Each served separately when either deep-sea or coastwise shipping 
matters was being considered. 

Raymond B. Stevens was succeeded by Robert P. Bass (John 
G. Palfrey was acting chairman in August, 191 8). On January 
1, 1919, Mr. Bass was succeeded by William Z. Ripley. 

Walter Lippmann was succeeded by Stanley King, who was fol- 
lowed by E. M. Hopkins (John R. McLane, alternate). On Jan- 
uary 1, 19 19, Samuel J. Rosensohn succeeded E. M. Hopkins. 

In the spring of 19 18 it was decided to have the Shipping in- 
terests represented by a number of men, rather than one perma- 
nent member of the board. The following were appointed to rep- 
resent Coastwise Shipping: W. P. Coria, John Crowley, E. A, 
Kelly, E. E. Palen, J. H. W. Steele, William M. Tupper; the 
following to represent Deep-Sea Shipping: E. J. Barber, H. C. 
Blackiston, R. K. Freeman, J. H. Rossiter, M. J, Sanders. 



APPENDIX NO. V 

NEW YORK HARBOR WAGE ADJUSTMENT BOARD 

Organized October 20, 191 7; for text of original and supple- 
mentary agreements see B. M. Squires in Monthly Labor Review, 
September, 19 18, pages 4 and 12. 

As first constituted the personnel of the board was as follows: 

Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Baker, representing the War Depart- 
ment and Shipping Board. 

George P. Putnam, representing the Department of Commerce. 

Ethelbert Stewart, representing the Department of Labor. 

T. V. O'Connor and T. L. Delahunty were added to the Board 
to represent labor and William Simmons and W. B. Pollack to 
represent the employers and the railroads. 

Lieutenant Colonel Baker was succeeded by Keyes Winter as 
member of the Board but not as chairman. 



APPENDICES 301 

Ethelbert Stewart was succeeded by B. M. Squires, who was 
elected chairman of the Board. 
William Simmons was succeeded by F. A. Bishop. 



APPENDIX NO. VI 

RAILROAD WAGE BOARDS 
The Eight-Hour Commission (appointed by the President) : 

Geo. W. Goethels, Chairman; Edgar E. Clark, George Rublee, 
and M. O. Lorenz, Secretary. 

The Committee appointed by the Council of National Defense: 

Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of Interior; W. B. Wilson, Secre- 
tary of Labor; Daniel Willard, President Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad, and Samuel Gompers, President American Federation 
of Labor. 

The Commission of Eight: 

Elisha Lee; J. W. Higgins, Secretary, Western Managers Bu- 
reau; Chas. P. Neill, Chairman, ex-Commissioner, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; John G. Walber, Secretary, Eastern Managers Bureau; 
W. S. Stone, Grand Chief Engineer, Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers; Timothy Shea, Acting President, Brotherhood of Lo- 
comotive Firemen and Enginemen; G. H. Sines, Vice-President, 
Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen, and L. E. Sheppard, Acting 
President, Order of Railroad Conductors. 

Railroad Wage Commission (known as the Lane Commission) : 

Franklin K. Lane, Chairman, Secretary of Interior; Charles C. 
McChord, Lawyer; J. H. Covington, Chief Justice, D. C. Su- 
preme Court, and Wm. R. Wilcox, Lawyer. 

Board of Railroad Wages and Working Conditions, established 
under Article VII of General Order No. 27, May 25, 191 8: 

G. H. Sines, Chairman, Vice-President, Brotherhood of Rail- 
road Trainmen; F. F. Gaines, Vice-Chairman, Superintendent of 
Motive Power of Central Railroad of Georgia; J. J. Dermody, 



302 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Vice-President, Order of Railroad Telegraphy; C. E. Lindsay, 
Division Engineer, Maintenance of Pay Department, New York 
Central Lines; W. E. Morse, Vice-President and General Man- 
ager, Denver & Salt Lake Railroad Company, and A. O. Whar- 
ton, President, Railway Employees 7 Department, A. F. of L. 

Railroad Board of Adjustment No. i , established by Article IX 
of General Order No. 13, March 29, 19 18: 

Charles P. Neill, Chairman, ex-Commissioner, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics; L. E. Sheppard, Vice-Chairman; F. A. Burgess, Assist- 
ant Grand Chief Engineer, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; 
W. N. Doak, Vice-President, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; 
J. W. Higgins, Secretary, Western Managers Bureau; Albert Phil- 
lips, Vice-President, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Engineers; John G. Walber, Secretary of Eastern Managers Bu- 
reau, and E. T. Whiter, Assistant General Manager, Pennsyl- 
vania Lines West. 

Railroad Board of Adjustment No. 2, established by General 
Order No. 29, May 31, 19 18: 

E. F. Potter, Chairman, Assistant General Manager of the 
Soo Lines; F. J. McNulty, Vice-Chairman; A. C. Adams, Superin- 
tendent of Shops, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad; 
H. J. Carr, Member Executive Board, International Association 
of Machinists; Otto E. Hoard, Vice-President, Amalgamated 
Sheet Metal Workers International Alliance; F. H. Knight, As- 
sistant to President, Brotherhood Railroad Carmen; W. S. Mur- 
rian, Superintendent of Motive Power of Southern Railway; W. 
H. Penrith, Assistant to General Manager of Chicago & Alton 
Railway; Geo. W. Pring, Vice-President, Railway Employees' De- 
partment, A. F. of L.; E. A. Sweeley, Master Car Builder, Sea- 
board Air Line; R. J. Turnbull, Inspector of Transportation, At- 
lantic Coastline Railroad, and G. C. Van Domes, Vice-President, 
International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths. 

Railroad Board of Adjustment No. 3, established by General 
Order No. 53 : 

H. A. Kennedy, Chairman; T. H. Gerrey, Vice-Chairman; 
Richard P. Dee, E. A. Gould, S. N. Harrison, F. Hartenstein, G. 
E. Kipp, and W. A. Titus. 



APPENDICES 303 

Division of Labor, created February, 1918: 

W. S. Carter, President, Brotherhood Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen, assisted by G. W. Hanger, formerly member of Board 
of Mediation and Conciliation, and J. A. Franklin, formerly Presi- 
dent, Brotherhood of Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders. 

Women's Service Section: Miss Pauline Goldmark, Manager. 



APPENDIX NO. VII 

NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 

The membership of the National War Labor Board as consti- 
tuted at the time of its appointment was as follows: x 

William Howard Taft, joint chairman and public representa- 
tive of the employers. 

Frank P. Walsh, of Kansas City, Mo., joint chairman and pub- 
lic representative of employees. 

For employers: 

L. F. Loree, of the Delaware & Hudson Railroad Company. 

W. H. Van Dervoort, of the Root and Van Dervoort Engineer- 
ing Company, of East Moline, 111. 

C. Edwin Michael, of the Virginia Bridge and Iron Company, 
Roanoke, Va. 

Loyall A. Osborne, of the Westinghouse Electric and Manu- 
facturing Company. 

B. L. Worden, of the Submarine Boat Corporation, New- 
ark, N. J. 

For employees: 

Frank J. Hayes, of the United Mine Workers of America. 

Wm. L. Hutcheson, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners. 

Wm. H. Johnston, of the International Association of Ma- 
chinists. 

1 Report Secretary of National War Labor to the Secretary of 
Labor. 



304 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Victor Olander, of the International Seamen's Union of America. 
Thomas A. Rickert, of the United Garment Workers. 

These appointments of the Secretary of Labor were approved 
and affirmed by the President of the United States by a proclama- 
tion issued April 8, 19 18. 

The following appointments and changes in personnel took 
place: 

W. Jett Lauck, economist, of Chevy Chase, Md., to be perma- 
nent secretary, May 9, 19 18. 

Thomas J. Savage, of the International Association of Ma- 
chinists, alternate for Mr. Johnston. 

T. M. Guerin, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners, alternate for Mr. Hutcheson, May 13, 19 18. 

F. C. Hood, of the Hood Rubber Company, W T atertown, Mass., 
alternate for Mr. Loree, May 17, 1918. 

C. A. Crocker, of the Crocker-McElwain Company, Holyoke, 
Mass., alternate for Mr. Worden, June 1, 19 18. 

F. C. Hood, alternate for Mr. Loree, to become principal on the 
the resignation of Mr. Loree, June 1, 19 18. 

John F. Perkins, of the Calumet-Hecla Copper Company, al- 
ternate for Mr. Osborne, June 1, 19 18. 

Frederick N. Judson, lawyer, of St. Louis, Mo., vice-chairman 
and alternate for Mr. Taft, June 18, 19 18. 

John F. Perkins, alternate for Mr. Osborne, alternate for Mr. 
Hood, June 27, 19 18. 

H. H. Rice, of the General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Mich,, 
alternate for Mr. Van Dervoort, July 1, 19 18. 

Wm. Harman Black, lawyer, of New York City, vice-chairman 
and alternate for Mr. Walsh, July 20, 19 18. 

Matthew Well, of the International Photo-Engravers' Union, 
alternate for Mr. Olander, July 24, 19 18. 

John J. Manning, of the United Garment Workers, alternate for 
Mr. Rickert, July 24, 191 8. 

J. W. Marsh, of the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing 
Company, alternate for Mr. Michael, September 1, 1918. 

On October 9, 1918, the board was notified of the death of 
Thomas J. Savage, and Fred Hewitt, of the International Asso- 
ciation of Machinists, was designated alternate for Mr. Johnston, 
October 22, 19 18. 



APPENDICES 305 

F. C. Hood resigned as member of the board on November 
19, 1918. 

P. F. Sullivan, of the Ba3^ State Street Railway Company, of 
Massachusetts, alternate for Mr. Osborne, December 3, 1918. 

Frank P. Walsh, joint chairman, resigned as a member of the 
board on December 3, 19 18. 

Wm. Harman Black, vice-chairman and alternate for Mr. 
Walsh, resigned as a member of the board on December 3, 19 18. 

Basil M. Manly, journalist, of Washington, D. C, joint chair- 
man, to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Mr. Walsh, 
December 4, 19 18. 

Wm. Harman Black, vice-chairman and alternate for Mr. 
Manly, December 4, 19 18. 

John F. Perkins, alternate for Mr. Hood, to fill the vacancy 
caused by the resignation of Mr. Hood, December 4, 19 18. 

B. L. Worden resigned as a member of the board on December 
9, 1918. 

C. A. Crocker, alternate for Mr. Worden, to fill the vacancy 
caused by the resignation of Mr. Worden, December 11, 1918. 

Harold O. Smith, of the J. and D. Tire Company, Charlotte, 
N. C, alternate for Mr. Crocker, January 17, 1919. 

Granville E. Foss, of the Brightwood Manufacturing Company, 
of North Andover^ Mass., alternate for Mr. Perkins, February n, 
1919. 

C. A. Crocker resigned as a member of the board on February 
24, 1919. 

Principal members and alternates appointed subsequent to the 
creation of the board were nominated and appointed in the same 
manner as were the original members, the date given above being 
the date of appointment or of entering upon duty. 

Proclamation by the President of the United States Establishing 
National War Labor Board 

Whereas in January, 191 8, the Secretary of Labor, upon the 
nomination of the president of the American Federation of Labor, 
and the president of the National Industrial Conference Board, 
appointed a War Labor Conference Board for the purpose of 
devising for the period of the war a method of labor adjustment 
which would be acceptable to employers and employees; and 



306 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Whereas said board has made a report recommending the cre- 
ation for the period of the war of a National War Labor Board 
with the same number of members as, and to be selected by the 
same agencies that created, the War Labor Conference Board, 
whose duty it shall be to adjust labor disputes in the manner speci- 
fied and in accordance with certain conditions set forth in the said 
report; and 

Whereas the Secretary of Labor has, in accordance with the rec- 
ommendation contained in the report of said War Labor Con- 
ference Board dated March 29, 19 18, appointed as members of 
the National War Labor Board Hon. William Howard Taft and 
Hon. Frank P. Walsh, representatives of the general public of 
the United States; Messrs. Loyall A. Osborne, L. F. Loree, W. H, 
Van Dervoort, C. E. Michael, and B. L. Worden, representatives 
of the employers of the United States; and Messrs. Frank J. 
Hayes, William L. Hutcheson, William H. Johnston, Victor A. 
Olander, and T. A. Rickert, representatives of the employees of 
the United States: 

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby approve and affirm the said 
appointments, and make due proclamation thereof and of the fol- 
lowing for the information and guidance of all concerned: 

The powers, functions, and duties of the National War Labor 
Board shall be to settle by mediation and conciliation contro- 
versies arising between employers and workers in fields of pro- 
duction necessary for the effective conduct of the war, or in other 
fields of national activity, delays and obstructions in which might, 
in the opinion of the National Board, affect detrimentally such 
production; to provide, by indirect appointment, or otherwise, 
for committees or boards to sit in various parts of the country 
where controversies arise and secure settlement by local mediation 
and conciliation; and to summon the parties to controversies for 
hearing and action by the National Board in event of failure to 
secure settlement by mediation and conciliation. 

The principles to be observed and the methods to be followed 
by the National Board in exercising such powers and functions 
and performing such duties shall be those specified in the said 
report of the War Labor Conference Board dated March 29, 19 18, 
a complete copy of which is hereunto appended. 

The National Board shall refuse to take cognizance of a con- 



APPENDICES 307 

iroversy between employer and workers in any field of industrial 
or other activity where there is by agreement or Federal law a 
means of settlement which has been invoked. 

And I do hereby urge upon ail employers and employees within 
the United States the necessity of utilizing the means and methods 
thus provided for the adjustment of all industrial disputes, and 
request that during the pendency of mediation or arbitration 
through the said means and methods, there shall be no discon- 
tinuance of industrial operations which would result in curtail- 
ment of the production of war necessities. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
the seal of the United States to be affixed. 

Done in the District of Columbia, this eighth day of April, in 
the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eighteen, and 
of the independence of the United States the one hundred and 
forty-second. 

(Seal) Woodrow Wilson. 

By the President: 

Robert Lansing, 
Secretary of State. 

FUNCTIONS, POWERS, AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD 

The functions and powers of the National War Labor Board are 
as follows: 

To bring about a settlement, by mediation and conciliation, of 
every controversy arising between employers and workers in the 
field of production necessary for the effective conduct of the war. 

To do the same thing in similar controversies in other fields of 
national activity, delays and obstructions in which may, in the 
opinion of the National Board, affect detrimentally such pro- 
duction. 

To provide such machinery, by direct appointment or other- 
wise, for the selection of committees or boards to sit in various 
parts of the country where controversies arise, to secure settle- 
ment by local mediation and conciliation. 

To summon the parties to the controversy for hearing and 
action by the National Board in case of failure to secure settle- 
ment by local mediation and conciliation. 

If the sincere and determined effort of the National Board 



3 o8 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

shall fail to bring about a voluntary settlement and the members 
of the board shall be unable unanimously to agree upon a deci- 
sion, then and in that case and only as a last resort an umpire 
appointed in the manner provided in the next paragraph shall 
hear and finally decide the controversy under simple rules of pro- 
cedure prescribed by the National Board. 

The members of the National Board shall choose the umpire 
by unanimous vote. Failing- such choice, the name of the um- 
pire shall be drawn by lot from a list of ten suitable and disin- 
terested persons to be nominated for the purpose by the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

The National Board shall hold its regular meetings in the city 
of Washington, with. power to meet at any other place convenient 
for the board and the occasion. 

The National Board may alter its methods and practice in 
settlement of controversies hereunder from time to time as ex- 
perience may suggest. 

The National Board shall refuse to take cognizance of a con- 
troversy between employer and workers in any field of industrial 
or other activity where there is by agreement or Federal law a 
means of settlement which has not been invoked. 

The place of each member of the National Board unavoidably 
detained from attending one or more of its sessions may be filled 
by a substitute to be named by such member as his regular sub- 
stitute. The substitute shall have the same representative char- 
acter as his principal. 

The National Board shall have power to appoint a secretary 
and to create such other clerical organization under it as may 
be in its judgment necessary for the discharge of its duties. 

The National Board may apply to the Secretary of Labor for 
authority to use the machinery of the Department in its work of 
conciliation and mediation. 

The action of the National Board may be invoked, in respect to 
controversies withm its jurisdiction, by the Secretary of Labor or 
by either side in a controversy or its duly authorized representa- 
tive. The board, after summary consideration, may refuse further 
hearing if the case is not of such character or importance as to 
justify it. 

In the appointment of committees of its own members to act 
for the board in general or local matters, and in the creation of 



APPENDICES 309 

local committees, the employers and the workers shall be equally 
represented. 

The representatives of the public in the board shall preside 
alternately at successive sessions of the board or as agreed upon. 

The board in its mediating and conciliatory action, and the um- 
pire in his consideration of a controversy, shall be governed by the 
following principles: 

Principles and Policies to Govern Relations Between Workers and 
Employers in War Industries jot the Duration of the War 

There should be no strikes or lockouts during the war. 

RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 

The right of workers to organize in trade-unions and to bar- 
gain collectively through chosen representatives is recognized and 
affirmed. This right shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered 
with by the employers in any manner whatsoever. 

The right of employers to organize in associations or groups 
and to bargain collectively through chosen representatives is rec- 
ognized and affirmed. This right shall not be denied, abridged, 
or interfered with by the workers in any manner whatsoever. 

Employers should not discharge workers for membership in 
trade-unions, nor for legitimate trade-union activities. 

The workers, in the exercise of their right to organize, should 
not use coercive measures of any kind to induce persons to join 
their organizations nor to induce employers to bargain or deal 
therewith. 

EXISTING CONDITIONS 

In establishments where the union shop exists the same shall 
continue, and the union standards as to wages, hours of labor, 
and other conditions of employment shall be maintained. 

In establishments where union and non-union men and women 
now work together and the employer meets only with employees 
or representatives engaged in said establishments, the continuance 
of such conditions shall not be deemed a grievance. This declara- 
tion, however, is not intended in any manner to deny the right or 
discourage the practice of the formation of labor unions or the 
joining of the same by the workers in said establishments, as 



310 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

guaranteed in the preceding section, nor to prevent the War Labor 
Board from urging or any umpire from granting, under the ma- 
chinery herein provided, improvements of their situation in the 
matter of wages, hours of labor, or other conditions as shall be 
found desirable from time to time. 

Established safeguards and regulations for the protection of 
the health and safety of workers shall not be relaxed. 

WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 

If it shall become necessary to employ women on work ordi- 
narily performed by men, they must be allowed equal pay for 
equal work and must not be allotted tasks disproportionate to 
their strength. 

HOURS OF LABOR 

The basic eight-hour day is recognized as applying in all cases 
in which existing law requires it. In all other cases the question 
of hours of labor shall be settled with due regard to governmental 
necessities and the welfare, health, and proper comfort of the 
workers. 

MAXIMUM PRODUCTION 

The maximum production of all war industries should be main- 
tained and methods of work and operation on the part of em- 
ployers or workers, which operate to delay or limit production, 
or which have a tendency to artificially increase the cost thereof, 
should be discouraged. 

MOBILIZATION OF LABOR 

For the purpose of mobilizing the labor supply with a view to 
its rapid and effective distribution, a permanent list of the num- 
bers of skilled and other workers available in different parts of 
the country shall be kept on file by the Department of Labor, the 
information to be constantly furnished — 

i. By the trade unions. 

2. By State employment bureaus and Federal agencies of like 
character. 



APPENDICES 311 

3. By the managers and operators of industrial establishments 
throughout the country. 

These agencies shall be given opportunity to aid in the dis- 
tribution of labor as necessity demands. 

CUSTOM OF LOCALITIES 

In fixing wages, hours, and conditions of labor, regard should 
always be had to the labor standards, wage scales, and other con- 
ditions prevailing in the localities affected. 

THE LIVING WAGE 

1. The right of all workers, including common laborers, to a 
living wage is hereby declared, 

2. In fixing wages, minimum rates of pay shall be established 
which will insure the subsistence of the worker and his family 
in health and reasonable comfort. 



APPENDIX NO. VIII 

WAR LABOR POLICIES BOARD 

Department of Labor — Felix Frankfurter, professor of law, 
Harvard University, chairman; Max Lowenthal, assistant to 
chairman; Miss Mary Van Kleeck, director of Women in Industry 
Service. 

War Department — Dr. E. M. Hopkins, assistant to the Secre- 
tary of War. 

Navy Department — F. D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy. 

Department of Agriculture — G. I. Christie, assistant to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, in charge of farm labor activities. 

War Industries Board — Hugh Frayne, general organizer, Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor, New York City. 

Fuel Administration — John P. White, ex-president of the United 
Mine Workers of America. 

Shipping Board — Robt. P. Bass, ex-governor of New Hamp- 
shire. 

Emergency Fleet Corporation — Charles Piez, general manager. 



312 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Food Administration — M. B. Hammond, professor of economics 
and sociology, Ohio State University. 

Railroad Administration — W. I. Tyler, assistant director, Divi- 
sion of Operations. 

Committee on Public Information — W. L. Chenery, Chicago, 

Executive secretary — George L. Bell, San Francisco. 

Industrial adviser — Herbert F. Perkins, Chicago. 

Labor Adviser — John R. Alpine, vice-president, American Fed- 
eration of Labor. 

Economic adviser — L. C. Marshall, dean, University of Chicago. 

The purposes and proposed operation of the War Labor Policies 
Board, as stated by Mr. Frankfurter, are in part as follows: 

The War Labor Policies Board and the board representing the 
various bureaus of the Labor Department will constitute a dove- 
tailing process linking up every agency of the Government whose 
activies in any way involve the employment or the direction of 
labor. The policies board will be representative of the War De- 
partment, the Navy Department, the Department of Agriculture, 
the Shipping Board, the Fuel Administration, the Food Adminis- 
tration, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Railroad Adminis- 
tration, and the War Industries Board. Its functions, while in 
a sense technical, will be thoroughly administrative, inasmuch as 
its decisions will be carried out by the departments and agencies 
represented in its, membership. 

In the matter of wages it will not attempt to set a flat rate 
for any one craft or trade in the country as a whole; but it will 
fix standards to be determined for all industries in a given sec- 
tion of the country after investigations disclosing the conditions 
of life, including the cost of living and the services rendered. The 
facts will be ascertained justly and comprehensively from infor- 
mation to be sought from the workers' own organization, private 
employers and their organizations, Government bureaus, and 
wherever else exact knowledge may be secured. 

We must husband our labor supply, so as to satisfy the war 
needs of the country to the fullest possible practical extent. It is 
necessary, therefore, that the sources of supply be wisely directed 
and employed. With respect to this phase of the industrial prob- 
lem it will be the function of the war policies board to allocate the 
supply according to the productive needs of the country. Under 



APPENDICES 313 

decisions of the board on this score it will be impossible for one 
industry to draw the labor supply from another unless it has been 
regularly determined that the first industry has a higher claim 
upon the supply on the basis of a more pressing Government need 
than the industry from which it would draw the workers. This 
question will, of course, be determined by the war policies board. 
But by the establishment of standardized wage conditions the 
incentive for workers to leave one industry and go to another will 
have been removed anyhow. 

In addition to controlling the labor supply by the methods just 
reviewed the policies board will also regulate hours of labor in the 
various industries and determine the needs of industry with re- 
gard to housing and transportation facilities, etc. 

The need of the hour is production, the fullest munitioning, 
equipment, and feeding of the forces at the front. Labor, indus- 
trial managers, and Government officials are all heartily united to 
bring about this end. There will be the utmost pooling, not only 
of the industrial resources but of the resources of goodwill and 
intelligence, and in this spirit the work will proceed efficiently. 
There is much to be done, but it will be done because it must be 
done. 

The following resolution was passed by the policies board per- 
taining to standardization of wages: 

Whereas the recent uncoordinated activities of Government con- 
tractors in the matter of hiring labor for war industry have re- 
sulted in competitive bidding by one contractor against another 
for the available labor at any scale deemed expedient for the oc- 
casion, which has resulted in producing restlessness and waste- 
ful movement of labor from one industry to another, and whereas 
it is absolutely essential to the stabilization of industry through- 
out the United States that all wages for both skilled and un- 
skilled labor engaged in war work be standardized: Therefore be 
it resolved, That wages paid by Government departments and 
contractors engaged in war work should, after conference with 
representatives of labor and by industrial management, be sta- 
bilized by this board; that the committee on standardization is 
hereby instructed to proceed with its work with all possible ex- 
pedition, and that as soon as such standardized scales are estab- 
lished the full influence and authority of all departments of the 



314 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

Government represented on this board will be exercised to main- 
tain them. 



APPENDIX NO. IX 

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE OF LABOR ADJUSTMENT 
AGENCIES 

Felix Frankfurter, Chairman. 

Labor Department — Felix Frankfurter and J. B. Lennon. 

Railroad Administration — G. H. Sines and C. E. Lindsay. 

National War Labor Board— Wm. H. Taft and Frank P. Walsh. 

Fuel Administration — Rembrandt Peale and W. J. Diamond. 

National Adjustment Commission — Robert P. Bass and T. V. 
O'Connor. 

Emergency Construction Wage Commission — Col. J. H. Alex- 
ander and John R. Alpine. 

National Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission — 
Major Samuel J. Rosensohn. 

Navy Department — Franklin D. Roosevelt and Louis McH. 
Howe. 

Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board — V. E. Macy and A. J. 
Berres. 

War Department — F. L. Hopkins and Major F. W. Tully. 



APPENDIX NO. X 

LABOR CLAUSES 

The following clauses were adopted by the War Labor Policies 
Board for introduction into the contracts of— 

i. War Department. 

2. Navy Department. 

3. Emergency Fleet Corporation. 

4. U. S. Housing Corporation. 

Clause on Laws and Restrictions Relating to Labor. 

Adopted July 12, 191 8. 
Amended July 26, 19 18. 



APPENDICES 315 

All work required in carrying out this contract shall be per- 
formed in full compliance with the laws of the State, Territory, 
or District of Columbia where such labor is performed; provided, 
that the contractor shall not employ in the performance of this 
contract any minor under the age of fourteen years or permit 
any minor between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years to work 
more than eight hours in any one day, more than six days in any 
one week, or before 6 A. M. or after 7 P. M. Nor shall the con- 
tractor directly or indirectly employ any person undergoing sen- 
tence of imprisonment at hard labor which may have been im- 
posed by any court of any State, Territory, or municipality hav- 
ing criminal jurisdiction. Provided, however, that the President 
of the United States may, by Executive Order, modify this pro- 
vision with respect to the employment of convict labor and pro- 
vide the terms and conditions upon which such labor may be em- 
ployed. These provisions shall be of the essence of the contract. 

Clause on Adjustment of Labor Disputes. 1 

Adopted July 19, 19 18. 

In the event that labor disputes shall arise directly affecting the 
performance of this contract and causing or likely to cause any 
delay in making the deliveries and the (head of de- 
partment) shall have requested the contractor to submit such 
dispute for settlement, the contractor shall have the right to 

submit such dispute to the (head of department) for 

settlement. The (head of department) may there- 
upon settle or cause to be settled such disputes, and the parties 
hereto agree to accede to and to comply with all the terms of such 
settlement. 

If the contractor is thereby required to pay labor costs higher 
than those prevailing in the performance of this contract imme- 
diately prior to such settlement, the (head of depart- 
ment) or his representative in making such settlement and as a 
part thereof may direct that a fair and just addition to the con- 
tract price shall be made therefor; provided, however, that the 
(head of department) or his representative shall 

1 The Labor Disputes Clause used by the Ordnance Department is 
similar to the above, although not identical with it. See A Report of 
the Activities of the War Department in the Field of Industrial 
Relations During the War, page 72. 



316 WAR-TIME STRIKES AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT 

certify that the contractor has in all respects lived up to the terms 
and conditions of the contract or shall waive in writing for this 
purpose only any breach that may have occurred. 

If such settlement reduces such labor cost to the contractor, 

the (head of department) or his representative may 

direct that a fair and just deduction be made from the contract 
price. 

No claim for addition shall be made unless the increase was 

ordered in writing by the (head of department) or 

his duly authorized representative, and such addition to the con- 
tract price was directed as part of the settlement. 

Every decision or determination made under the article by the 
(head of department) or his duly authorized rep- 
resentative shall be final and binding upon the parties thereto. 

Clause on Eight-Hour Basic Day, with Time and a Half for 
Overtime. Adopted June 28, 19 18. 

To be introduced into contracts which come under such a pro- 
vision by reason of existing Federal laws: 

Wages of laborers, operatives and mechanics doing any part of 
the work contemplated by this contract, in the employ of the 
contractor, shall be computed upon a basic day rate of eight- 
hours' work, with overtime rates to be paid for at not less than 
time and one-half for all hours in excess of eight hours. Com- 
pliance by the contractor with the provisions of this article shall 
be of the essence of the contract. 



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INDEX 



Absenteeism, 185, 186, 205. 

Adamson law, 83-85, 231, 252. 

Administrator of Labor Stand- 
ards in Army Clothing, 58, 
161, 209. 

Agreement, Atlantic, 34; creating 
Cantonment Adjustment Com- 
mission (Baker-Gompers), 15, 
127, 190, 297; of Fuel Admin- 
istration with miners, 102 ; 
Harness and Saddlery Adjust- 
ment Commission, 63; creating 
National Adjustment Commis- 
sion, 39; Adjustment Commis- 
sion of 1919, 42-43; Washing- 
ton, 97; creating Shipbuilding 
Labor Adjustment Board, 22. 

Air Craft, Industrial Service Sec- 
tion, 65, 72. 

Allen, H. J., Governor, 145. 

Alschuler, Judge Samuel, 55. 

Amalgamated Association of 
Street Railway Employees, 116, 
171. 

Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 
58, 60. 

Amalgamated Textile Workers, 
note 1, 140. 

American Federation of Labor, 
agreement creating Shipbuild- 
ing Labor Adjustment Board, 
22; agreement creating Nation- 
al Adjustment Commission, 37; 
agreement with Secretary of 
War, 15; appeal to President, 
53; company unions, note 2, 
164; employers limit refusal 
to discriminate to affiliated 
unions, 57; failure to organize 
migratory workers, 258; influ- 
ence on labor policy, 151 ; labor 
standards, 152; opposition to 



compulsory arbitration, 124; 
police unions, note 3, 142; to 
nominate members of Confer- 
ence Board, 118; resolutions, 
236. 
American Telephone & Telegraph 

Co., 106. 
American Woolen Co. strike, 

138. 
Anderson, Judge George W., 
opinion on enemy plots, note 
1, 230. 
Arbitration, causes of success of, 
in war, 276; difficulties of, in 
peace, 277; general discussion, 
281. 
Army Clothing, Administrator of 
Labor Standards in, see Ad- 
ministrator. 
Atlantic Seamen strike, 35. 
Attendance, irregularity of, see 

Absenteeism. 
Award, anthracite miners, 98; 
Army Ordnance, Bridgeport, 
77', Arsenal and Navy Yard 
Wage Commission, 63; bitumi- 
mous miners, note 2, ioo; 
Council of National Defense 
committee, 84; Harness and 
Saddlery, 63; National Adjust- 
ment Commission, 41-43; Na- 
tional War Labor Board, gen- 
eral, 122, Bridgeport (Eidlitz), 
78, N. Y. Harbor (Macy), 51; 
New York Harbor Wage Ad- 
justment, 46; N. Y. machinists. 
67; first Pacific Coast shipyard, 
23; railroad service, 03; rail- 
road shopmen, 92; Railroad 
Wage Commission, 88; Ship- 
building Labor Adjustment, 22- 
31; Washington agreement, 
97- 
Awards, duration of, 194. 



321 



322 



INDEX 



B. 



Baker-Gompers agreement, see 

Agreement. 

Baltimore strike, 24. 

Bethlehem Steel Co., 226. 

Bidding for workers, 8, 18. 

Billings general strike, note I, 30. 

Bisbee deportation, 264. 

Bituminous miners' strike, 99, 
100. 

Boards of conciliation, pre-war, 
11; Massachusetts, 137. 

Board, of Adjustments, No. 1, 
No. 2 and No. 3, 89; Building 
Trades, 128; of Control, Hamp- 
ton Roads, note 2, 18; of Medi- 
ation and Conciliation, 11, 82; 
Metal Trades, 128; National 
War Labor, 116; New York 
Harbor Wage Adjustment, 45; 
New York State Labor, 145; 
Operating (telephone), 109; 
railway wage boards person- 
nel, 301 ; Railway Wages and 
Working Conditions, 89; Ship- 
building Labor Adjustment 
(Macy), 20; War Labor Con- 
ference, 119; War Labor Poli- 
cies^ 126; Wire Control, 108; 
see individual references. 

Bonus, miners, 102; general dis- 
cussion, 209. 

Boot and shoe workers' union, 
141. 

Boston police strike, 142. 

Bridgeport strike, 67, 73, 226. 

Building Trades Board, 128. 

Bureau of Industrial Housing, 
134. 

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 191. 



C 



Calder, W. M., Senator, 246. 

Call to the Sea, 34. 

Canners strike, 104. 

Cantonment Wage Adjustment 
Commission, see Emergency 
Construction. 

Carlton, Newcombe, 165. 

Carpenters, Brotherhood of, re- 
pudiation of Baker-Gompers 



agreement, 16; shipyard strike, 
24, 171. 

Civil War, condition of workers 
in, 177. 

Closed and open shop, 14, 16, 23, 
31, note 1, 173; general discus- 
sion, 170. 

Clothing, Administrator of Labor 
Standards in Army, see Ad- 
ministrator. 

Clothing strike, 61. 

Coercion, 169, note 1, 234, 

Collective bargaining, 9, 54, 55, 
56, 59, 83, 227, 173 and note 1, 
240; general discussion, 160. 

Commercial Telegraphers Union, 
107, in. 

Commission of Eight, 84, 90; per- 
sonnel, 301. 

Conciliation boards, pre-war, 11; 
Massachusetts, 137. 

Concrete workers strike, note 1, 
203. 

Conference Committee of Labor 
Adjusting Agencies, 128, 182, 
209; personnel, 314. 

Congress, 245-247. 

Conscription of labor, 233. 

Construction Wage Commission, 
see Emergency Construction. 

Consumers' League, 59. 

Continuous discharge books, 36. 

Contracts, labor clauses in, 126, 
175, 180, 314. 

Coolidge, Calvin, Governor, 143. 

Copper mine strike, 55. 

Cost of living, as cause of pre- 
war unrest, 7; as cause of 
strikes, 157 ; longshoremen 
award reopened because of in- 
crease of, 44; belief in reduc- 
tion of, 27; effect on old agree- 
ments, 12; effect on police 
strike, 142; effect on wage de- 
mands, 9, 188; employers' pro- 
posal as to wages, 153 ; increase 
found by Railroad Wage Com- 
mission, 88; in some occupa- 
tions wages not equal to, 91 ; 
investigation of, 191 ; Pacific 
coast shipyard award, 23 ; policy 
of Conference Committee, 131 ; 
President's appeal to railroad 
men on reduction of, 93; Rail- 



INDEX 



323 



road Wage Commission to con- 
sider, 87 ; relation to wage 
awards, 193, 274. 
Council of National Defense, 
Coal Production Committee, 
g6; interdepartmental commit- 
tee on labor administration, 
117; labor standards, 152; me- 
diation of railroad disputes, 
84; workers' right to organize, 
165. 



D. 



Dayton street railway strike, 
note 1, 174. 

Department of Commerce, New 
York Harbor Wage Adjust- 
ment, 46. 

Department of Interior, 261. 

Department of Justice, 253; pro- 
test of attorneys, note 1, 269. 

Department of Labor, 10; Bu- 
reau of Industrial Housing, 
134 ; Labor Adjustment Com- 
mission, 39; New York Harbor 
Wage Adjustment, 46; war ac- 
tivity, 133. 

Department of War, Administra- 
tor of Labor Standards in 
Army Clothing, 58; Arsenal 
and Navy Yard Wage Commis- 
sion, 62; Emergency Construc- 
tion Wage Commission, 14; In- 
dustrial Service Sections of 
Ordnance, Quartermaster and 
Aircraft, 65; Loyal Legion of 
Loggers and Lumbermen, 270, 
272; ^ National Adjustment 
Commission, 39; National 
Harness and Saddlery Adjust- 
ment Commission, 63 ; standard 
labor clauses, 175, 314. 

Deportations, 264-266. 

Differentials, Wage, see Wages. 

Dilution, effect on common labor 
rate, 196. 

Discharge books, 36. 

Discrimination, 59, 69, 78, 79, 103, 
107, no, 114, 116, 124, 157, note 
3, 165, 166, 232, 242, 277. 

Disloyalty, 264, 266, 268. 

Disque, General Brice P., 270, 
271, 272. 



Doak, W. N., 90. 
Draft exemption, 233. 
Draughtsman, 202. 

E. 

Earnings, pre-war, Commission 
on Industrial Relations, 2; ex- 
cessive war-time, 19, 184-185 ; 
increase in, 204; Railroad Wage 
Commission, 2; see Wages. 

Efficiency, 5, 60, 95, 231, 287; 
general discussion, 203-206. 

Eidlitz, Otto M., 78. 

Eight Hour Commission, person- 
nel, 301. 

Eight-hour day, see Hours. 

Emergency Construction Wage 
Commission, 14; cost of living, 
193; name changed, 16; over- 
time, 186; rule for adjusting 
wages, 17; strikes in jurisdic- 
tion of, 16; text of agreement 
and personnel, 297; union scales 
as standard of, 190; wage vari- 
ations, 199. 

Emergency Fleet Corporation, In- 
dustrial Relations Division, 31 ; 
standard labor clauses, 175. 

Employees, see Workers. 

Employers, opposition to union- 
ism, see Unionism; opposition 
to labor clause, 66; resist wage 
standardization, 199 ; general 
discussion, 225-235. 

Enemy plots, Judge Anderson's 
opinion of, note 1, 230. 

Endicott, Henry B., 138, 140, 141. 

Equal pay for equal work, 176. 



F, 



Fishermen's strike, 105. 
Food Administration, 104. 
Fore River strike, 24. 
Frankfurter, Felix, 54, 61, 128. 
Fuel Administration, 95 ; penalty 
clause, 101 ; bonuses, 102, 209. 



Gallup, N. M., deportations, 266. 
Garfield, Harry A., 06, 100, 101, 
102. 



324 



INDEX 



General Electric Company strike, 
note i, 158. 

General lockout, note 1, 30. 

General Order No. 13, see Ord- 
nance Department. 

General strike, Billings, Kansas 
City, Springfield, Waco, note 
1, 30; Seattle, 25-30. 

Gitchell, Major B. H., 63, 69, 72. 

Gompers, Samuel, 15, 143, 232. 

Great Lakes seamen strike or- 
dered, 1917, 36; 1918, 37. 



H. 



Hampton Roads Board of Con- 
trol, note 2, 18. 

Hines, Walter D., 93. 

Hiring halls, 41, 42, 166. 

Holidays, 181 ; overtime payment 
for, 182-186; see Hours. 

Hopkins, E. M., 72. 

Hours, pre-war, 3; Eight-hour 
day allowed seamen, 35; eight- 
hour day demand of marine 
workers, 49; eight-hour day in 
mines, 101 ; eight-hour day the 
goal of labor, 12; employers' 
proposal, note 2, 153; forty- 
four-hour week demand of 
clothing workers, 60; general 
discussion, 178-187; on rail- 
roads, 83-85, 231, 252; policy 
of Housing Bureau, 135; prin- 
ciple of Conference Committee, 

131- 
Housing, Bureau of Industrial, 

134 

Howatt, Alexander, 101, 147. 
Hylan, J. F., Mayor, 44. 

I. 

Immigration, as industrial factor, 
285. 

Indianapolis cantonment strike, 
14. 

Industrial Service Section, Bu- 
reau of Aircraft Production, 
65, 72, 161 : Ordnance Depart- 
ment, 65, 161 ; Quartermaster's 
Department, 58, 65. 

Industrial Relations Division, 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 



30; Housing Bureau, 135; Ma- 
rine and Dock, 33. 

Industrial unionism, note 1, 140; 
note 2, 54. 

Industrial unpreparedness, 5-7. 

Industrial Workers of the World, 
226, 230, 247-251; general dis- 
cussion, 255-269. 

Injunctions, 100; note, 154; note 
1, 166. 

International Association of 
Timber Workers, 272. 

International Association of Ma- 
chinists, 71, 73. 

International Brotherhood o f 
Electrical Workers, 112. 

International Longshoremen's As- 
sociation, agreement creating 
National Adjustment Commis- 
sion, 39; boat owners' objec- 
tion to board because of union 
representation, 226; New York 
strike of 1919, 43 ; coastwise, 
44. 

International Seamen's Union, 
Atlantic agreement, 34; opposi- 
tion of Lake Carriers' Associa- 
tion, 2^'f Refusal of Lake Car- 
riers' to meet, 226. 

Irwin, Payson, 76. 

J. 

Jacksonville plasterers' strike, 

note 2, 158. 
Jerome deportation, 266. 
Joint boards of adjustment, 11; 

conclusions, 273-288. 

. K. 

Kansas City general strike, note 

i, 30. 

Kansas Coal strike, 101, 145. 

Kansas Court of Industrial Re- 
lations, 145. 

Kerstein, L., 59. 

King, W. H., Senator, 251. 

L. 

Labor Administration, 117, 126. 
Labor clauses in contracts, 126, 

175, 180, 314. 
Labor shortage, 6, 236, 285. 



INDEX 



325 



Labor standards, maintenance of, 
152, 170, 175- 

Lake Carriers' Association, 36; 
alleged intimidation, note 234; 
refusal to meet with union men, 
226; rejection of Atlantic agree- 
ment, 37. 

Lake seamen's threatened strike, 
1917, 36) 1918, 37. 

Lawrence strike, 139. 

Lever act, 96. 

Lippmann, Walter, 75. 

Little, Frank, murder of, 267. 

Living wage, see Wages. 

Lockout, general, note 1, 30; 
Government policy towards, 

154. 

Longshoremen, see International 
Association of. 

Loyal Legion of Loggers and 
Lumbermen, 261; general dis- 
cussion, 270-272. 

Lumber Carriers' Association 
adopts Adjustment Commission 
agreement, note 3, 39. 

Lumber districts disputes, 56; 
strike, 179, 260, 270. 

Lynn strike, 141. 

M. 

Macy Board, see Shipbuilding 
Labor Adjustment. 

Mahaney, R. B., 76. 

Marine and Dock Industrial Re- 
lations Division Shipping 
Board, 33. 

Marine Workers' Affiliation, 45. 

Marshall, Louis, 61. 

Massachusetts Board of Concilia- 
tions, 137. 

■ Mediating agencies, pre-war, 10- 
11. 

Mediation, Board of (Railway), 
11, 82. 

Mediation Commission, Presi- 
dent's, see President's. 

Merritt, Ralph B., 104. 

Metal Trades Board, 128. 

Minimum Wage, 123, 191, 201. 

Minneapolis and St. Paul strike, 
112. 

Minnesota Public Safety Com- 
mission, 137. 



Mc. 

McLane, John R., 72. 
McCumber, P. J., Senator, 251, 
253. 



N. 



National Adjustment Commis- 
sion, 39; agreement of 1919, 42- 
43; cooperation with I. W. W., 
261 ; hours, 180 ; Lumber Car- 
riers' Association adopts agree- 
ment, note 3, 39; overtime, 182; 
personnel, 299; uniformity of 
rates, 199. 

National Harness & Saddlery Ad- 
justment Commission, 63, 186, 
190. 

National Industrial Conference 
Board, note 1, 118, 153, 225. 

National Manufacturers' Associa- 
tion, 225. 

National War Labor Board (Taft- 
Walsh) awards administered, 
note 2, 123; awards in street 
railway cases, note 1, 192, 208; 
bonus and piece-work, 209; 
Bridgeport, 77-81 ; change of 
standards, 153, 175; collective 
bargaining, 161 ; cost of living 
section, 191 ; creation and func- 
tions, 1 16-125, 282-284; discus- 
sion of principles, 154; editorial 
criticism, 252; eight-hour day, 
179 ; forty-four-hour week, 181 ; 
living wage, 191 ; misrepresen- 
tation of principles, 240; New- 
ark, 69; New York Harbor 
dispute, 47-51; personnel, 303; 
President's proclamation, 305 ; 
right to organize, 164; Smith 
& Wesson, 70; street railway 
cases, 122; Telegraphers, 107. 

Newark Bay strike, 24. 

Newark strike, 68. 

New England Telephone Co., 112. 

New England telephone strike, 
1 12- 1 14. 

New Hampshire law prohibiting 
strike, 137. 

New York Harbor strike, 45, 51. 

New York Harbor Wage Adjust- 
ment Board, 45; personnel, 299. 



326 



INDEX 



New York Industrial Commission, 
Bureau of Mediation, 144. 

New York painters' and jewelry 
workers' strikes, 181. 

New York State Labor Board, 
145. 

New York State strikes, 144. 

New York machinist strikes, 67. 

Nitro strike, note 1, 184. 



O. 



O'Conneli, James, 253. 

O'Connor, Julia S., note 3, 109, 
113. 

Omaha firemen, 122. 

Open and closed shop, see Closed 
Shop. 

Operating Board (Telephone), 
109. 

Ordnance Department, Industrial 
Service Section, 65, 161; gen- 
eral order No. 13, 161, 175, 
179, 185, 191. 

Organize, right to, 164. 

Over-payment of workers, 18, 184., 
274. 

Overtime, first abuse of, 18; Con- 
ference Committee, 132; gen- 
eral discussion, 206; Govern- 
ment control of, 275; practice 
of boards, 182-187; railroads, 
94; see Wages. 



P. 



Pacific Coast strikes, shipyards, 
22; telephone and oil workers, 
54; telephone, note 2, 174. 

Packing house dispute, 54 and 
note 2. 

Peale, Rembrandt, 98. 

Pelham Bay strike, note 1, 172. 

Penalty Clause, coal mining, 
101. 

Phelps-Dodge Co., 227. 

Piecework, 209. 

Pittsburgh firemen, 122. 

Police strike, 142. 

Postal Telegraph Co., 106. 

Postmaster General, 108, no, in, 
113. 



Postoffice Department, 108; labor 
policy, note 1, 108, 109; note 2, 
160. 

President of A. F. of L., see 
Gompers. 

President's telegram to carpen- 
ters, 24; letter to Bridgeport 
strikers, 79, 121 ; to telegraph 
companies, 108; to railroad 
unions, 93. 

President's Mediation Commis- 
sion, 53, 161 ; note 2, 174, 226, 
227, 245, 253; note 1, 255; note 
3, 256; note 1, 257, 270. 

Press, opinions of, 247-253. 

Productive efficiency, see Effi- 
ciency. 

Public, The, 244-254. 



Quartermaster corps, Administra- 
tor of Labor Standards in 
Army Clothing, 59; Industrial 
Service Section, 65, 71. 



R. 



Railroad Administration, Boards 
of Adjustment, No. 1, No. 2, 
No. 3, 89; personnel, 302; Board 
of Railroad Wages and Work- 
ing Conditions, 89; development 
of labor relations, 82; Labor 
Director, 90; personnel, 302; 
personnel of railroad boards, 
301-302; relation to New York 
Harbor dispute, 48-52; uni- 
formity of awards, 199. 

Railroad strikes, before Govern- 
ment control, note 4, 86; shop- 
men, 89-92; trainmen, 93. 

Railroad wage boards, personnel, 
301-302. 

Railroad Wage Commission, 87; 
award, 33 ; personnel, 301. 

Railroad Board of Mediation, 11, 
82. 

Recognition of union, 172, 226. 

Right to organize, 164. 

Ripley, William Z„, 59, 60, 61, 
note 1, 168. 



INDEX 



327 



Rogers, Major Wm. G, 7&-77- 
Rome brass mills strike, 144. 
Ryan, W. S., note 3, 109, 113. 



St. Paul and Minneapolis strikes, 
112. 

Sanitation, 4, 5, 20, 59, 259, note 
1, 271. m 

Seamen's union, see International. 

Seattle strike, 25-30, 283. 

Secretary of Labor, 10; Arsenal 
and Navy Yard Wage Commis- 
sion, 62; attempt to avert coal 
strike, 99; averted coal strike, 
97; Chairman Mediation Com- 
mission, 54; New York long- 
shoremen strike, 44; on change 
of standards, 170; on right to 
organize, 165 ; organization of 
labor administration, 118 ; or- 
ganized conference committee, 
129; proposed increase for 
miners, 100 ; statement on labor 
standards, 152 ; understanding 
with Fuel Administrator, 102. 

Secretary of Navy, Arsenal and 
Navy Yard Wage Commission, 
62. 

Secretary of War, action in Smith 
& Wesson case, 7; demobilizes 
labor sections, 71 ; denies ex- 
tension of closed shop, 170; es- 
tablishes Arsenal and Navy 
Yard Wage Commission, 62; 
establishes Harness and Sad- 
dlery Commission, 63; signs 
agreement creating Cantonment 
Wage Adjustment Commission, 
15. 

Secret service agents, 167, 253. 

Senatorial comment on Govern- 
ment labor policy, etc., see 
chapter XVIII. 

Sherman, L. Y., Senator, 253. 

Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment 
Board (Macy), cost of living, 
193 ; creation, 20 ; extends col- 
lective bargaining, 161 ; over- 
time, 186; refers award to Con- 
ference Committee, 129; sum- 
mary of agreement and per- 



sonnel, 298; uniformity of 
rates, 198. 

Shipping Board Industrial Rela- 
tions Division, Atlantic agree- 
ment, 34; Emergency Fleet Cor- 
poration, 30; Marine and Dock, 
33; National Adjustment Com- 
mission, 39; New York Harbor 
Adjustment Board, 46; hours, 
180; see Shipbuilding Labor 
Adjustment Board. 

Shoe workers' strike, 141-142. 

Shop committees, see Collective 
Bargaining. 

Slacking, 205, 231, 270. 

Smith & Wesson, 70, 226, 252. 

Springfield, 111., general strike, 
note 1, 30. 

Standardization, see Wages. 

Standards, maintenance of, 175, 
152, 170. 

Steel strike, note 1, 173. 

Street railways, 116, 117; note 2, 
122; note 1, 192; 208. 

Strikes, American Woolen Co., 
138; Atlantic Seamen, 35; be- 
fore Government controlled 
railroads, note 4, 86; Billings, 
note 1, 30; bituminous miners, 
99-100; Boston police, 142; Bis- 
bee, 264; Bridgeport, 67, 73, 
226; canners, 104; clothing, 61; 
coastwise longshoremen, 44; 
concrete workers, note 1, 203; 
copper mines, 55; Dayton street 
railroad, note 1, 174; fishermen, 
105 ;^ Fore River, Newark Bay, 
Baltimore, 24; for forty-four- 
hour week, 61, 181; General 
Electric, note 1, 158; Great 
Lake seamen ordered, 1917, 36; 
Great Lake seamen ordered, 
I 9i8, 37 \ in jurisdiction of Con- 
struction _ Wage Commission, 
16 ; Indianapolis cantonment, 
14; Jacksonville plasterers, 
note 2, 158; Kansas City, note 
1, 30; Kansas Coal, 101, 145; 
Lawrence, 139; Lumber, 179, 
260, 270 ; Lynn, 141 ; Newark, 
68; New England Telephone, 
112-114; New York, 67; New 
York Harbor threatened, 45; 
New York Harbor, 51; New 



328 



INDEX 



York longshoremen, 43 ; New 
York State. 144; New Ycrk 
painters and jewelry workers, 

181; Xitro, note I, ::_: pack- 
ing houses, 54: Pa; 
ship yards. 22 ; Pa: 
telephone and oil workers, 54; 

Pacific coast telephone, note 2, 
174; Peiham Bay, note 1, 172; 
railroad. 93 ; railroad shopmen, 
89-92; St. Paul and Minneapolis, 
112; Seattle. 25-30, 283: ship 
yard carpenters. 24; shoe, 141- 
142 ; Smith & Wesson. 70, 226 ; 
Springfield, 111., note 1, 30; 
steel, note I, 173 ; street rail- 
ways, 116-117; telephone, 114- 
115; textile, 138; threats of. in 
shipyards. 22 ; trainmen, 93 ; 
Waco, note 1. 30; Wichita, 112. 

Strike data, 291 ; Department of 
Labor statistics, 133. 

Strike, general, see General strike. 

Strikes and lockouts. Government 
policy towards. 154. 

Strikes, causes of. 69; general dis- 
cussion, 154-160; injunctions, 
100; note 1, 154; Industrial 
Court, 145 ; Xew Hampshire 
law, 137; Lever act, 154. 



Lnionism, opposition to, 3, 12, 

36. 37-39, 60, 68, 73.. 157, 164- 

170-172, 223-235, 240, 280; 

5-28 see also 

E is crimination. 

I Garment Workers, 58. 
Workers, 63. 
: i Mine Workers, 96, 98. 102, 

Led Shoe Workers, 141, 
United Textile Workers, 139. 
U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 225. 
U. S. Employment Service, 42, 

127. 
L . S. Forest Reserve. 261. 
U. S. Housing Corporation, 134, 

ITS- 
JS. S. Steel Corporation, 36; note 

,1. 173. 

Lnrest, pre-war causes, 2-9, 166; 
post-war causes, 276, 



V. 



Yacerelli. F. P. A., 44. 

Yail. i. X.. 109. 

Yiolence. advocacy of, 248-251 ; 
discharge upheld in cases of, 
239; towards I. W. W., 263-269. 



T. 



Taft-Walsh Board, see National 

War Labor Board. 
Telegraph. 106. 
Telephone girls' union. 112. 
Telephone strikes, 112-115; note 2, 

174. 

Textile strikes, 138. 
Thomas, C. S.. Senator, 246. 
Toilers of the World, 104, 
Tole, Major James. 77. 
Tulsa expulsion, 267. 
Turnover, 5, 202, 271. 



U. 



Union recognition, 17c, 226. 

Unions, discussion of Govern- 
ment policy towards, 275. 

Unionism, growth of, 47, 91, 103, 
168; note 1, 169, 275. 



W. 

Waco strike, note 1, 30, 

Wage charts, 210-221. 

Wage fixing, 135. 

Wages, coal miners, note 2, 100; 
conclusions, 274. 275 ; employ- 
ers' proposal relative to, note 
2. 153 ; general discussion, 188, 
211 ; in copper mines, note 2. 
56 ; irregularities attending 
change to war basis, 8; living, 
12. 131. 153. 191 ; longshore- 
men's differentials. 40, 198, 199; 
maxima and minima, 25 ; mini- 
mum, 123, 191, 201 ; piecework 
in clothing factories, 60; pre- 
war. 2; note 1, 3; note 1, 86; 
overtime. 206; railroad em- 
ployees, 85, 88, 89; railway dif- 
ferentials, S3; rule for adjust- 
ments by Emergency Construe- 



INDEX 



329 



tion Wage Commission, 17; 
shipyard differentials, 131, 202; 
standardization, 27, 40, 91, 126- 
127, 190, 195; standardization 
in building industries, 17; note 
2, 201 ; uniform scales in ship- 
yards, 23, 40. 

War Labor Conference Board, 
119. 

War Labor Policies Board, 
126, 175, 180, 186, 205; labor 
clauses for contracts, 314; per- 
sonnel and program, 317; reso- 
lution on standardizing wages, 
313. 

War, opposition to, 256. 

Weinstock, Harris, 104. 



Western Union Co., 106, 165, 166, 
226. 

White, John P., 98. 

Wichita strike, 112. 

Wire Control Board, 108. 

Women, advance in pay, note 1, 
204; effect of war on their em- 
ployment in England, note 1, 6; 
employment at night, 127, 175; 
equal pay for equal work, 176, 
177; introduction into industry, 
6; pay during Civil War, note 
1, 177; union assent to dilution, 
238. 

Women in Industry Service, 175. 

Workers, general discussion, 236- 
243. 















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